Mind, Body, World- Foundations of Cognitive Science, 2013a

others’ actions mind reading or mentalizing (Goldman, 2006). “Having a mental
state and representing another individual as having such a state are entirely different
matters. The latter activity, mentalizing or mind reading, is a second-order
activity: It is mind thinking about minds” (p. 3).
There are three general, competing theories about how humans perform
mind reading (Goldman, 2006). The first is rationality theory, a version of which
was introduced in Chapter 3 in the form of the intentional stance (Dennett, 1987).
According to rationality theory, mind reading is accomplished via the ascription of
contents to the putative mental states of others. In addition, we assume that other
agents are rational. As a result, future behaviours are predicted by inferring what
future behaviours follow rationally from the ascribed contents. For instance, if we
ascribe to someone the belief that piano playing can only be improved by practising
daily, and we also ascribe to them the desire to improve at piano, then according to
rationality theory it would be natural to predict that they would practise piano daily.
A second account of mentalizing is called theory-theory (Goldman, 2006).
Theory-theory emerged from studies of the development of theory of mind
(Gopnik & Wellman, 1992; Wellman, 1990) as well as from research on cognitive
development in general (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997; Gopnik, Meltzoff, & Kuhl, 1999).
Theory-theory is the position that our understanding of the world, including our
understanding of other people in it, is guided by naïve theories (Goldman, 2006).
These theories are similar in form to the theories employed by scientists, because
a naïve theory of the world will—eventually—be revised in light of conflicting
evidence.
Babies and scientists share the same basic cognitive machinery. They have similar
programs, and they reprogram themselves in the same way. They formulate theories,
make and test predictions, seek explanations, do experiments, and revise what
they know in the light of new evidence. (Gopnik, Meltzoff, & Kuhl, 1999, p. 161)
There is no special role for a principle of rationality in theory-theory, which distinguishes
it from rationality theory (Goldman, 2006). However, it is clear that both of
these approaches to mentalizing are strikingly classical in nature. This is because
both rely on representations. One senses the social environment, then thinks (by
applying rationality or by using a naïve theory), and then finally predicts future
actions of others. A third theory of mind reading, simulation theory, has emerged
as a rival to theory-theory, and some of its versions posit an embodied account of
mentalizing.
Simulation theory is the view that people mind read by replicating or emulating
the states of others (Goldman, 2006). In simulation theory, “mindreading includes
a crucial role for putting oneself in others’ shoes. It may even be part of the brain’s
design to generate mental states that match, or resonate with, states of people one
is observing” (p. 4).
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