Mind, Body, World- Foundations of Cognitive Science, 2013a

It may once have seemed foolhardy to work out connections between fundamental
neurophysiological mechanisms and highly complex social behaviour, let alone
to decide whether the mechanisms are specific to social processes. However . . .
neuroimaging studies have provided some encouraging examples. (Blakemore,
Winston, & Frith, 2004, p. 216)
The existence of social cognitive neuroscience is a consequence of humans evolving,
embodied and situated, in a social environment that includes other humans and
their facial expressions, gestures, and actions. The modern field of sociable robotics
(Breazeal, 2002) attempts to develop humanoid robots that are also socially embodied
and situated. One purpose of such robots is to provide a medium for studying
human social cognition via forward engineering.
A second, applied purpose of sociable robotics is to design robots to work
co-operatively with humans by taking advantage of a shared social environment.
Breazeal (2002) argued that because the human brain has evolved to be expert in
social interaction, “if a technology behaves in a socially competent manner, we
evoke our evolved social machinery to interact with it” (p. 15). This is particularly
true if a robot’s socially competent behaviour is mediated by its humanoid
embodiment, permitting it to gesture or to generate facial expressions. “When a
robot holds our gaze, the hardwiring of evolution makes us think that the robot is
interested in us. When that happens, we feel a possibility for deeper connection”
(Turkle, 2011, p. 110). Sociable robotics exploits the human mechanisms that offer
this deeper connection so that humans won’t require expert training in interacting
with sociable robots.
A third purpose of sociable robotics is to explore cognitive scaffolding, which
in this literature is often called leverage, in order to extend the capabilities of
robots. For instance, many of the famous platforms of sociable robotics—including
Cog (Brooks et al., 1999; Scassellati, 2002), Kismet (Breazeal, 2002, 2003, 2004),
Domo (Edsinger-Gonzales & Weber, 2004), and Leanardo (Breazeal, Gray, & Berlin,
2009)—are humanoid in form and are social learners—their capabilities advance
through imitation and through interacting with human partners. Furthermore, the
success of the robot’s contribution to the shared social environment leans heavily on
the contributions of the human partner. “Edsinger thinks of it as getting Domo to
do more ‘by leveraging the people.’ Domo needs the help. It understands very little
about any task as a whole” (Turkle, 2011, p. 157).
The leverage exploited by a sociable robot takes advantage of behavioural loops
mediated by the expressions and gestures of both robot and human partner. For
example, consider the robot Kismet (Breazeal, 2002). Kismet is a sociable robotic
“infant,” a dynamic, mechanized head that participates in social interactions.
Kismet has auditory and visual perceptual systems that are designed to perceive
social cues provided by a human “caregiver.” Kismet can also deliver such social cues
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