Mind, Body, World- Foundations of Cognitive Science, 2013a

Given the breadth of connectionist cognitive science, only a selection of
its elements have been introduced in this chapter; capturing all of the important
contributions of connectionism in a single chapter is not possible. A proper
treatment of connectionism requires a great deal of further reading; fortunately
connectionism is described in a rich and growing literature (Amit, 1989;
Anderson, 1995; Anderson & Rosenfeld, 1998; Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2002; Carpenter
& Grossberg, 1992; Caudill & Butler, 1992a, 1992b; Churchland, 1986; Churchland
& Sejnowski, 1992; Clark, 1989, 1993; Dawson, 2004, 2005; Grossberg, 1988;
Horgan & Tienson, 1996; Quinlan, 1991; Ramsey, Stich, & Rumelhart, 1991; Ripley,
1996; Rojas, 1996).
Connectionist cognitive science is frequently described as a reaction against
the foundational assumptions of classical cognitive science. The roots of classical
cognitive science draw inspiration from the rationalist philosophy of Descartes,
with an emphasis on nativism and logicism (Chomsky, 1966; Devlin, 1996). In contrast,
the foundations of connectionist cognitive science are the empiricist philosophy
of Locke and the associationist psychology that can be traced from the early
British empiricists to the more modern American behaviourists. Connectionist
networks acquire structure or knowledge via experience; they often begin as blank
slates (Pinker, 2002) and acquire structure as they learn about their environments
(Bechtel, 1985; Clark, 1989, 1993; Hillis, 1988).
Classical cognitive science departed from Cartesian philosophy by seeking
materialist accounts of mentality. This view was inspired by the digital computer
and the fact that electronic switches could be assigned abstract logical interpretations
(Shannon, 1938).
Connectionism is materialist as well, but arguably in a more restricted sense
than classical cognitive science. The classical approach appeals to the multiple realization
argument when it notes that under the proper interpretation, almost any
physical substrate could instantiate information processing or symbol manipulation
(Hillis, 1998). In contrast, connectionism views the digital computer metaphor
as mistaken. Connectionists claim that the operations of such a device—regardless
of its material nature—are too slow, brittle, and inflexible to be appropriate for modelling
cognition. Connectionism posits instead that the brain is the only appropriate
material for realizing the mind and researchers attempt to frame its theories in
terms of information processing that is biologically plausible or neuronally inspired
(Amit, 1989; Burnod, 1990; Gluck & Myers, 2001).
In adopting the digital computer metaphor and the accompanying logicist
view that cognition is the result of rule-governed symbol manipulation, classical
cognitive science is characterized by a marked structure/process distinction. That
is, classical models—typified by Turing machines (Turing, 1936) or production systems
(Newell & Simon, 1972)—distinguish between the symbols being manipulated
Elements of Connectionist Cognitive Science 199