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Mind, Body, World- Foundations of Cognitive Science, 2013a

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and research agenda, breaking completely from traditional (symbolic) cognitive<br />

theories. SA is not a new approach to cognition, much less a new school <strong>of</strong> cognitive<br />

psychology. (Vera & Simon, 1993, p. 46)<br />

We see later in this book that production systems provide an interesting medium<br />

that can be used to explore the relationship between classical, connectionist, and<br />

embodied cognitive science.<br />

3.11 Weak Equivalence and the Turing Test<br />

There are two fundamentals that follow from accepting the physical symbol system<br />

hypothesis (Newell, 1980; Newell & Simon, 1976). First, general human intelligence<br />

is the product <strong>of</strong> rule-governed symbol manipulation. Second, because they are universal<br />

machines, any particular physical symbol system can be configured to simulate<br />

the behaviour <strong>of</strong> another physical symbol system.<br />

A consequence <strong>of</strong> these fundamentals is that digital computers, which are one<br />

type <strong>of</strong> physical symbol system, can simulate another putative member <strong>of</strong> the same<br />

class, human cognition (Newell & Simon, 1961, 1972; Simon, 1969). More than fifty<br />

years ago it was predicted “that within ten years most theories in psychology will<br />

take the form <strong>of</strong> computer programs, or <strong>of</strong> qualitative statements about the characteristics<br />

<strong>of</strong> computer programs” (Simon & Newell, 1958, pp. 7–8). One possible<br />

measure <strong>of</strong> cognitive science’s success is that a leading critic <strong>of</strong> artificial intelligence<br />

has conceded that this particular prediction has been partially fulfilled<br />

(Dreyfus, 1992).<br />

There are a number <strong>of</strong> advantages to using computer simulations to study cognition<br />

(Dawson, 2004; Lewandowsky, 1993). The difficulties in converting a theory<br />

into a working simulation can identify assumptions that the theory hides. The<br />

formal nature <strong>of</strong> a computer program provides new tools for studying simulated<br />

concepts (e.g., pro<strong>of</strong>s <strong>of</strong> convergence). Programming a theory forces a researcher<br />

to provide rigorous definitions <strong>of</strong> the theory’s components. “Programming is, again<br />

like any form <strong>of</strong> writing, more <strong>of</strong>ten than not experimental. One programs, just<br />

as one writes, not because one understands, but in order to come to understand.”<br />

(Weizenbaum, 1976, p. 108).<br />

However, computer simulation research provides great challenges as well. Chief<br />

among these is validating the model, particularly because one universal machine<br />

can simulate any other. A common criticism <strong>of</strong> simulation research is that it is possible<br />

to model anything, because modelling is unconstrained:<br />

Just as we may wonder how much the characters in a novel are drawn from real<br />

life and how much is artifice, we might ask the same <strong>of</strong> a model: How much is<br />

based on observation and measurement <strong>of</strong> accessible phenomena, how much is<br />

Elements <strong>of</strong> Classical <strong>Cognitive</strong> <strong>Science</strong> 93

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