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Mind, Body, World- Foundations of Cognitive Science, 2013a

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3.10 A Classical Architecture for Cognition<br />

The physical symbol system hypothesis defines classical cognitive science. This<br />

school <strong>of</strong> thought can be thought <strong>of</strong> as the modern derivative <strong>of</strong> Cartesian philosophy.<br />

It views cognition as computation, where computation is the rule-governed<br />

manipulation <strong>of</strong> symbols. Thus thinking and reasoning are viewed as the result <strong>of</strong><br />

performing something akin to logical or mathematical inference. A great deal <strong>of</strong><br />

this computational apparatus must be innate.<br />

However, classical cognitive science crucially departs from Cartesian philosophy<br />

by abandoning dualism. Classical cognitive science instead adopts a materialist<br />

position that mechanizes the mind. The technical notion <strong>of</strong> computation is the<br />

application <strong>of</strong> a finite set <strong>of</strong> recursive rules to a finite set <strong>of</strong> primitives to evolve a<br />

set <strong>of</strong> finite symbolic structures or expressions. This technical definition <strong>of</strong> computation<br />

is beyond the capabilities <strong>of</strong> some devices, such as finite state automata,<br />

but can be accomplished by universal machines such as Turing machines or electronic<br />

computers. The claim that cognition is the product <strong>of</strong> a device that belongs<br />

to the same class <strong>of</strong> artifacts such as Turing machines or digital computers is the<br />

essence <strong>of</strong> the physical symbol system hypothesis, and the foundation <strong>of</strong> classical<br />

cognitive science.<br />

Since the invention <strong>of</strong> the digital computer, scholars have seriously considered<br />

the possibility that the brain was also a computer <strong>of</strong> this type. For instance, the<br />

all-or-none nature <strong>of</strong> a neuron’s action potential has suggested that the brain is<br />

also digital in nature (von Neumann, 1958). However, von Neumann went on to<br />

claim that the small size and slow speed <strong>of</strong> neurons, in comparison to electronic<br />

components, suggested that the brain would have a different architecture than an<br />

electronic computer. For instance, von Neumann speculated that the brain’s architecture<br />

would be far more parallel in nature.<br />

Von Neumann’s (1958) speculations raise another key issue. While classical<br />

cognitive scientists are confident that brains belong to the same class as Turing<br />

machines and digital computers (i.e., all are physical symbol systems), they do not<br />

expect the brain to have the same architecture. If the brain is a physical symbol<br />

system, then what might its architecture be like?<br />

Many classical cognitive scientists believe that the architecture <strong>of</strong> cognition<br />

is some kind <strong>of</strong> production system. The model <strong>of</strong> production system architecture<br />

was invented by Newell and Simon (Newell, 1973; Newell & Simon, 1961, 1972)<br />

and has been used to simulate many psychological phenomena (Anderson, 1983;<br />

Anderson et al., 2004; Anderson & Matessa, 1997; Meyer et al. 2001; Meyer & Kieras,<br />

1997a, 1997b; Newell, 1990; Newell & Simon, 1972). Production systems have a<br />

number <strong>of</strong> interesting properties, including an interesting mix <strong>of</strong> parallel and serial<br />

processing.<br />

Elements <strong>of</strong> Classical <strong>Cognitive</strong> <strong>Science</strong> 89

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