Property Volume 2, 2012a
Property Volume 2, 2012a Property Volume 2, 2012a
for a public use within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, which of course is made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, see Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 239 (1897), 506
7.4.2.2. Per se Takings Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) A. Camden Lewis argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Gerald M. Finkel and David J. Bederman. C. C. Harness III argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were T. Travis Medlock, Attorney General of South Carolina, Kenneth P. Woodington, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Richard J. Lazarus. 1 Justice Scalia, delivered the opinion of the Court. In 1986, petitioner David H. Lucas paid $975,000 for two residential lots on the Isle of Palms in Charleston County, South Carolina, on which he intended to build singlefamily homes. In 1988, however, the South Carolina Legislature enacted the Beachfront Management Act, S. C. Code Ann. § 48-39-250 et seq. (Supp. 1990), which had the direct effect of barring petitioner from erecting any permanent habitable structures on his two parcels. See § 48-39-290(A). A state trial court found that this prohibition rendered Lucas’s parcels “valueless.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 37. This case requires us to decide whether the Act’s dramatic effect on the economic value of Lucas’s lots accomplished a taking of private property under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments requiring the payment of “just compensation.” U. S. Const., Amdt. 5. I A South Carolina’s expressed interest in intensively managing development activities in the socalled “coastal zone” dates from 1977 when, in the aftermath of Congress’s passage of the federal Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 1280, as amended, 16 U. S. C. § 1451 et seq., the legislature enacted a Coastal Zone Management Act of its own. See S. C. Code Ann. § 48-39-10 et seq. (1987). In its original form, the South Carolina Act required owners of coastal zone land that qualified as a “critical area” (defined in the legislation to include beaches and immediately adjacent sand dunes, § 48-39-10(J)) to obtain a permit from the newly created South Carolina Coastal Council (Council) (respondent here) prior to committing the land to a “use other than the use the critical area was devoted to on [September 28, 1977].” § 48-39-130(A). In the late 1970’s, Lucas and others began extensive residential development of the Isle of 507
- Page 462 and 463: the “public accommodation” will
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- Page 476 and 477: 7.4. Takings 7.4.1. Eminent Domain
- Page 478 and 479: extensive improvements to her house
- Page 480 and 481: Court explained that “community r
- Page 482 and 483: projects.” Id., at 33-34. 17 It i
- Page 484 and 485: private party. 268 Conn. 1, 159, 84
- Page 486 and 487: use for their confiscated property
- Page 488 and 489: v. Consolidated Gas Util. Corp., 30
- Page 490 and 491: (and a provision meant to curtail s
- Page 492 and 493: if the government owns, or the publ
- Page 494 and 495: operated by water power to flood up
- Page 496 and 497: Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles
- Page 498 and 499: the complicated inquiry the Court
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- Page 506 and 507: private affairs the public interest
- Page 508 and 509: It is said that one fact for consid
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- Page 514 and 515: Palms, a barrier island situated ea
- Page 516 and 517: id., at 438, n. 16. See also United
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- Page 520 and 521: principles of nuisance and property
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- Page 524 and 525: and Jonathan W. Emord; for the Long
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- Page 528 and 529: front Management Act is general, in
- Page 530 and 531: Lake Tahoe’s exceptional clarity
- Page 532 and 533: Brennan’s opinion for the Court i
- Page 534 and 535: dimensions and the term of years th
- Page 536 and 537: the Takings Clause, of course, are
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- Page 540 and 541: eneficial use of land is permitted.
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for a public use within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, which of course is made applicable to<br />
the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, see Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226,<br />
239 (1897),<br />
506
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