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Torts - Cases, Principles, and Institutions Fifth Edition, 2016a

Torts - Cases, Principles, and Institutions Fifth Edition, 2016a

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Witt & Tani, TCPI 2. Intentional Harms<br />

ongoing harassment of an employee, if the cumulative quality <strong>and</strong> quantity of the harassment is<br />

extreme <strong>and</strong> outrageous.<br />

. . . .<br />

We agree with the overwhelming weight of authority in this state <strong>and</strong> around the country<br />

that when repeated or ongoing severe harassment is shown, the conduct should be evaluated as a<br />

whole in determining whether it is extreme <strong>and</strong> outrageous. Accordingly, we hold that the court<br />

of appeals did not err in doing so.<br />

We now consider whether Shields’s conduct, taken as a whole, amounts to extreme <strong>and</strong><br />

outrageous conduct. “It is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant’s<br />

conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme <strong>and</strong> outrageous as to permit recovery . . . .”<br />

When reasonable minds may differ, however, it is for the jury, subject to the court’s control, to<br />

determine whether, in the particular case, the conduct has been sufficiently extreme <strong>and</strong><br />

outrageous to result in liability. Restatement (Second) of <strong>Torts</strong> § 46 cmt. h. To support liability<br />

for intentional infliction of emotional distress, it is not enough that the defendant has acted with<br />

an intent that is tortious, malicious, or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional<br />

distress. Id. § 46 cmt. d. Although the defendant's intent is relevant, the conduct itself must be<br />

extreme <strong>and</strong> outrageous to support liability.<br />

. . .<br />

We recognize that, even when an employer or supervisor abuses a position of power over<br />

an employee, the employer will not be liable for mere insults, indignities, or annoyances that are<br />

not extreme <strong>and</strong> outrageous. But Shields’s ongoing acts of harassment, intimidation, <strong>and</strong><br />

humiliation <strong>and</strong> his daily obscene <strong>and</strong> vulgar behavior, which GTE defends as his “management<br />

style,” went beyond the bounds of tolerable workplace conduct. The picture painted by the<br />

evidence at trial was unmistakable: Shields greatly exceeded the necessary leeway to supervise,<br />

criticize, demote, transfer, <strong>and</strong> discipline, <strong>and</strong> created a workplace that was a den of terror for the<br />

employees. And the evidence showed that all of Shields’s abusive conduct was common, not rare.<br />

Being purposefully humiliated <strong>and</strong> intimidated, <strong>and</strong> being repeatedly put in fear of one’s physical<br />

well-being at the h<strong>and</strong>s of a supervisor is more than a mere triviality or annoyance.<br />

Occasional malicious <strong>and</strong> abusive incidents should not be condoned, but must often be<br />

tolerated in our society. But once conduct such as that shown here becomes a regular pattern of<br />

behavior <strong>and</strong> continues despite the victim’s objection <strong>and</strong> attempts to remedy the situation, it can<br />

no longer be tolerated. . . . Conduct such as being regularly assaulted, intimidated, <strong>and</strong> threatened<br />

is not typically encountered nor expected in the course of one’s employment, nor should it be<br />

accepted in a civilized society. . . . Accordingly, the trial court properly submitted the issue to the<br />

jury, <strong>and</strong> there was some evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that Shields’s conduct was<br />

extreme <strong>and</strong> outrageous.<br />

B. Intent<br />

[Under the doctrine of vicarious liability, it is not necessary that GTE acted with the requisite intent.<br />

“If the intentional tort is committed in the accomplishment of a duty entrusted to the employee,<br />

rather than because of personal animosity, the employer may be liable. Shields’s acts, although<br />

inappropriate, involved conduct within the scope of his position as the employees’ supervisor.”]<br />

61

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