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Torts - Cases, Principles, and Institutions Fifth Edition, 2016a

Torts - Cases, Principles, and Institutions Fifth Edition, 2016a

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Witt & Tani, TCPI 10. Damages<br />

4. When a tortious act is concealable, a judgment equal to the harm done by the act will<br />

underdeter. Suppose a person who goes around assaulting other people is caught only half the<br />

time. Then in comparing the costs, in the form of anticipated damages, of the assaults with the<br />

benefits to him, he will discount the costs (but not the benefits, because they are realized in every<br />

assault) by 50 percent, <strong>and</strong> so in deciding whether to commit the next assault he will not be<br />

confronted by the full social cost of his activity.<br />

5. An award of punitive damages expresses the community’s abhorrence at the defendant’s act.<br />

We underst<strong>and</strong> that otherwise upright, decent, law-abiding people are sometimes careless <strong>and</strong> that<br />

their carelessness can result in unintentional injury for which compensation should be required.<br />

We react far more strongly to the deliberate or reckless wrongdoer, <strong>and</strong> an award of punitive<br />

damages commutes our indignation into a kind of civil fine, civil punishment. Some of these<br />

functions are also performed by the criminal justice system. Many legal systems do not permit<br />

awards of punitive damages at all, believing that such awards anomalously intrude the principles<br />

of criminal justice into civil cases. Even our cousins the English allow punitive damages only in<br />

an excruciatingly narrow category of cases. But whether because the American legal <strong>and</strong> political<br />

cultures are unique, or because the criminal justice system in this country is overloaded <strong>and</strong> some<br />

of its functions have devolved upon the tort system, punitive damages are a regular feature of<br />

American tort cases, though reserved generally for intentional torts, including the deliberate use of<br />

excess force as here. This suggests additional functions of punitive damages:<br />

6. Punitive damages relieve the pressures on the criminal justice system. They do this not so<br />

much by creating an additional sanction, which could be done by increasing the fines imposed in<br />

criminal cases, as by giving private individuals—the tort victims themselves—a monetary<br />

incentive to shoulder the costs of enforcement.<br />

7. If we assume realistically that the criminal justice system could not or would not take up the<br />

slack if punitive damages were abolished, then they have the additional function of heading off<br />

breaches of the peace by giving individuals injured by relatively minor outrages a judicial remedy<br />

in lieu of the violent self-help to which they might resort if their complaints to the criminal justice<br />

authorities were certain to be ignored <strong>and</strong> they had no other legal remedy.<br />

What is striking about the purposes that are served by the awarding of punitive damages is<br />

that none of them depends critically on proof that the defendant’s income or wealth exceeds some<br />

specified level. The more wealth the defendant has, the smaller is the relative bite that an award<br />

of punitive damages not actually geared to that wealth will take out of his pocketbook, while if he<br />

has very little wealth the award of punitive damages may exceed his ability to pay <strong>and</strong> perhaps<br />

drive him into bankruptcy. To a very rich person, the pain of having to pay a heavy award of<br />

damages may be a mere pinprick <strong>and</strong> so not deter him (or people like him) from continuing to<br />

engage in the same type of wrongdoing. . . . But rich people are not famous for being indifferent<br />

to money, <strong>and</strong> if they are forced to pay not merely the cost of the harm to the victims of their torts<br />

but also some multiple of that cost they are likely to think twice before engaging in such<br />

expensive behavior again. Juries, rightly or wrongly, think differently, so plaintiffs who are<br />

seeking punitive damages often present evidence of the defendant’s wealth. The question is<br />

whether they must present such evidence—whether it is somehow unjust to allow a jury to award<br />

punitive damages without knowing that the defendant really is a wealthy person. The answer,<br />

obviously, is no. A plaintiff is not required to seek punitive damages in the first place, so he<br />

should not be denied an award of punitive damages merely because he does not present evidence<br />

that if believed would persuade the jury to award him even more than he is asking.<br />

665

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