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Torts - Cases, Principles, and Institutions Fifth Edition, 2016a

Torts - Cases, Principles, and Institutions Fifth Edition, 2016a

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Witt & Tani, TCPI 10. Damages<br />

If the legal system cannot devise mechanisms for addressing a coherent dispute as<br />

a unified whole, the litigation will aggregate itself anyway. The end result may be<br />

the worst of both worlds. Neither does the client have individual litigant autonomy,<br />

nor does the legal system obtain real finality <strong>and</strong> consistency by precluding the<br />

relitigation of decided issues. Neither can the client rely on full control by the<br />

client’s individually retained lawyer, nor can the client rely on explicit ethical duties<br />

to the client by those who control the case.<br />

Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural <strong>and</strong> Ethical Implications of<br />

Coordination Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381 (2000).<br />

Other authors have taken a more favorable view of the informal aggregation that resulted<br />

in the Vioxx settlement:<br />

The Vioxx settlement took the form not of a class action settlement but of a contract<br />

between the defendant-manufacturer Merck & Company, Inc. <strong>and</strong> the small number<br />

of law firms within the plaintiffs’ bar with large inventories of Vioxx clients. The<br />

contract described a grid-like compensation framework for the ultimate cashing out<br />

of Vioxx claims, but Vioxx claimants themselves literally were nonparties to that<br />

contract. The enforcement mechanism for the deal consisted not of preclusion but<br />

of contractual terms whereby each signatory law firm obligated itself to do two<br />

things: to recommend the deal to each of its Vioxx clients <strong>and</strong>—“to the extent<br />

permitted by” applicable ethical strictures—to disengage from the representation of<br />

any client who might decline the firm’s advice to take the deal. Absent a signatory<br />

law firm’s commitment of its entire Vioxx client inventory to the deal, Merck would<br />

have the discretion to reject the firm’s enrollment such that none of the firm’s clients<br />

would be eligible to participate.<br />

The Vioxx settlement worked, at least in the practical sense that it garnered, by a<br />

comfortable margin, the overall rate of participation from Vioxx claimants that<br />

Merck had specified as a precondition for its funding obligations. . . .<br />

[T]he deal consisted of . . . allocation of the fixed overall sum of $4.85 billion from<br />

Merck according to a point system designed to assess the relative strength of<br />

individual Vioxx users’ cases as to specific causation. . . .<br />

Richard A. Nagareda, Embedded Aggregation in Civil Litigation, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1105<br />

(2010).<br />

4. The BP Oil Spill<br />

On April 20, 2010, an explosion in an offshore oil rig operated by BP created an<br />

outpouring of oil into the Gulf of Mexico. Approximately 4.9 million barrels of oil spilled into<br />

the Gulf before the well was ultimately sealed. Oil eventually reached the shores of Texas,<br />

Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, <strong>and</strong> Florida. Businesses <strong>and</strong> individuals, from beach resorts to<br />

fishermen, felt the economic impact of the spill. The spill also caused significant ecological<br />

661

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