Torts - Cases, Principles, and Institutions Fifth Edition, 2016a

Witt & Tani, TCPI 8. Duty Problem
In contrast, this case involves the provision of a governmental service to protect the public
generally from external hazards and particularly to control the activities of criminal wrongdoers. .
. . The amount of protection that may be provided is limited by the resources of the community
and by a considered legislative-executive decision as to how those resources may be deployed.
For the courts to proclaim a new and general duty of protection in the law of tort, even to those
who may be the particular seekers of protection based on specific hazards, could and would
inevitably determine how the limited police resources of the community should be allocated and
without predictable limits. This is quite different from the predictable allocation of resources and
liabilities when public hospitals, rapid transit systems, or even highways are provided.
Before such extension of responsibilities should be dictated by the indirect imposition of
tort liabilities, there should be a legislative determination that that should be the scope of public
responsibility . . . .
It is notable that the removal of sovereign immunity for tort liability was accomplished
after legislative enactment and not by any judicial arrogation of power (Court of Claims Act, s 8).
It is equally notable that for many years, since as far back as 1909 in this State, there was by
statute municipal liability for losses sustained as a result of riot . . . . Yet even this class of liability
has for some years been suspended by legislative action . . . , a factor of considerable significance.
When one considers the greatly increased amount of crime committed throughout the
cities, but especially in certain portions of them, with a repetitive and predictable pattern, it is easy
to see the consequences of fixing municipal liability upon a showing of probable need for and
request for protection. To be sure these are grave problems at the present time, exciting high
priority activity on the part of the national, State and local governments, to which the answers are
neither simple, known, or presently within reasonable controls. To foist a presumed cure for these
problems by judicial innovation of a new kind of liability in tort would be foolhardy indeed and
an assumption of judicial wisdom and power not possessed by the courts.
. . .
For all of these reasons, there is no warrant in judicial tradition or in the proper allocation
of the powers of government for the courts, in the absence of legislation, to carve out an area of
tort liability for police protection to members of the public. Quite distinguishable, of course, is
the situation where the police authorities undertake responsibilities to particular members of the
public and expose them, without adequate protection, to the risks which then materialize into
actual losses.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division affirming the judgment of dismissal
should be affirmed.
KEATING, J., dissenting.
Linda Riss, an attractive young woman, was for more than six months terrorized by a
rejected suitor well known to the courts of this State, one Burton Pugach. This miscreant,
masquerading as a respectable attorney, repeatedly threatened to have Linda killed or maimed if
she did not yield to him: “If I can’t have you, no one else will have you, and when I get through
with you, no one else will want you.” In fear for her life, she went to those charged by law with
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