Torts - Cases, Principles, and Institutions Fifth Edition, 2016a

Witt & Tani, TCPI 8. Duty Problem
[I]t [is not] difficult to discern when title to a drink passed to Garcia. Although his
payment of the admission fee did not entitle him to, say, take possession of all the alcohol at the
party, nor did he at that time necessarily take title to any particular drink, when Garcia did pour
himself a drink and begin to consume it, title to that drink clearly passed to him. We conclude the
plain meaning of a “sale,” . . . includes Garcia’s payment of the entrance fee for Manosa’s party,
irrespective of the fact possession of a particular drink did not occur immediately upon
payment. . . .
Because [Manosa] sold Garcia alcoholic beverages at her party, [the statute] permits “a
cause of action [to] be brought [against her] by or on behalf of any person who has suffered injury
or death.”
. . .
Noting that alcohol is “furnished at an infinite variety of social settings hosted by
nonlicensees—from gallery openings, bar mitzvahs, weddings, political fundraisers and charity
events—where admission is not ‘free’ and financial contributions from attendees are expected or
required,” defendant argues by a reductio ad absurdum that this court would wreak havoc on the
“social fabric of modern life.” . . . The assertion is exaggerated. One does not normally charge
guests an entrance fee to attend bar mitzvahs, weddings, or gallery openings, and the provision of
alcoholic beverages to guests invited to such events typically is governed by social host immunity.
(Even if a host at such an event charged his or her guests for alcohol, such payment would simply
raise questions of licensure, and civil liability could attach only if the host sold alcohol to an
obviously intoxicated minor.) In any event, in contrast to how Manosa conducted herself at her
party, ordinary social hosts do not use bouncers, allow uninvited strangers into their homes, or
extract an entrance fee or cover charge from their guests. Nor does maintaining the social fabric
of our society depend on protecting from civil liability those persons who would sell alcoholic
beverages to minors who are already visibly intoxicated.
. . .
The decision of the Court of Appeal is reversed and the case remanded for further
proceedings consistent with our opinion.
Note
1. Social hosts and liquor sales. Historically, an injured third party could not sue a social
host or liquor vendor for providing alcohol to a tortfeasor. Courts refused to impose liability in
these situations for three reasons. First, courts held that the consumption, not the sale or
provision, of alcohol caused the injury. Second, courts regarded the intoxicated tortfeasor’s act as
an intervening, superseding cause. Third, courts believed that intoxicated individuals were largely
responsible for their own actions. LaDonna Hatton, Note, Common Law Negligence Theory of
Social Host Liability for Serving Alcohol to Obviously Intoxicated Guests, 26 B.C. L. REV. 1249,
1249-50 (1985).
Courts gradually began to impose liability on liquor vendors under a negligence theory.
See, e.g., Lopez v. Maez, 651 P.2d 1269 (N.M. 1982). In the mid-1980s, courts also began to
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