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Torts - Cases, Principles, and Institutions Fifth Edition, 2016a

Torts - Cases, Principles, and Institutions Fifth Edition, 2016a

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Witt & Tani, TCPI 8. Duty Problem<br />

American thought, the dominance <strong>and</strong> prestige of the l<strong>and</strong>owning class in Engl<strong>and</strong> during the<br />

formative period of the rules governing the possessor’s liability, <strong>and</strong> the heritage of feudalism.<br />

The departure from the fundamental rule of liability for negligence has been accomplished<br />

by classifying the plaintiff either as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee <strong>and</strong> then adopting special<br />

rules as to the duty owed by the possessor to each of the classifications. Generally speaking a<br />

trespasser is a person who enters or remains upon l<strong>and</strong> of another without a privilege to do so; a<br />

licensee is a person like a social guest who is not an invitee <strong>and</strong> who is privileged to enter or<br />

remain upon l<strong>and</strong> by virtue of the possessor’s consent, <strong>and</strong> an invitee is a business visitor who is<br />

invited or permitted to enter or remain on the l<strong>and</strong> for a purpose directly or indirectly connected<br />

with business dealings between them.<br />

Although the invitor owes the invitee a duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid injuring<br />

him, the general rule is that a trespasser <strong>and</strong> licensee or social guest are obliged to take the<br />

premises as they find them insofar as any alleged defective condition thereon may exist, <strong>and</strong> that<br />

the possessor of the l<strong>and</strong> owes them only the duty of refraining from wanton or willful injury.<br />

The ordinary justification for the general rule severely restricting the occupier’s liability to social<br />

guests is based on the theory that the guest should not expect special precautions to be made on<br />

his account <strong>and</strong> that if the host does not inspect <strong>and</strong> maintain his property the guest should not<br />

expect this to be done on his account.<br />

An increasing regard for human safety has led to a retreat from this position, <strong>and</strong> an<br />

exception to the general rule limiting liability has been made . . . for the protection of the licensee<br />

has been imposed . . . in cases involving dangers known to the occupier. . . .<br />

Another exception to the general rule limiting liability has been recognized for cases<br />

where the occupier is aware of the dangerous condition, the condition amounts to a concealed<br />

trap, <strong>and</strong> the guest is unaware of the trap. . . .<br />

The cases dealing with the active negligence <strong>and</strong> the trap exceptions are indicative of the<br />

subtleties <strong>and</strong> confusion which have resulted from application of the common law principles<br />

governing the liability of the possessor of l<strong>and</strong>. Similar confusion <strong>and</strong> complexity exist as to the<br />

definitions of trespasser, licensee, <strong>and</strong> invitee.<br />

In refusing to adopt the rules relating to the liability of a possessor of l<strong>and</strong> for the law of<br />

admiralty, the United States Supreme Court stated:<br />

The distinctions which the common law draws between licensee <strong>and</strong> invitee were<br />

inherited from a culture deeply rooted to the l<strong>and</strong>, a culture which traced many of<br />

its st<strong>and</strong>ards to a heritage of feudalism. In an effort to do justice in an industrialized<br />

urban society, with its complex economic <strong>and</strong> individual relationships, modern<br />

common-law courts have found it necessary to formulate increasingly subtle verbal<br />

refinements, to create subclassifications among traditional common-law categories,<br />

<strong>and</strong> to delineate fine gradations in the st<strong>and</strong>ards of care which the l<strong>and</strong>owner owes<br />

to each. Yet even within a single jurisdiction, the classifications <strong>and</strong><br />

subclassifications bred by the common law have produced confusion <strong>and</strong> conflict.<br />

As new distinctions have been spawned, older ones have become obscured.<br />

Through this semantic morass the common law has moved, unevenly <strong>and</strong> with<br />

hesitation, towards “imposing on owners <strong>and</strong> occupiers a single duty of reasonable<br />

396

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