Torts - Cases, Principles, and Institutions Fifth Edition, 2016a

Witt & Tani, TCPI 7. Proximate Cause
of persons rendering such services, whether done in a proper or negligent manner,
the original tortfeasor’s negligence is a legal cause of the injuries received because
of the injury party’s involuntary submission to such services. . . . It is to be noted
that the rule enunciated applies even if the services rendered were not negligent. . .
. If the services are rendered negligently, the rule based on questions of policy makes
the negligence of the original tortfeasor a proximate cause of the subsequent injuries
suffered by the victim. . . . In such a case there is no need to charge the jury about
the different types of causes which may come into play. . . . Medical services
necessitated by the negligence of a tortfeasor are in most cases administered in a
hospital. The conveyance of Pridham by ambulance to a hospital was a necessary
step in securing medical services required by the accident at Cash & Carry.
Therefore the rule holding the original tortfeasor liable for additional harm from
medical care rendered because of the original injury should be extended to, and
include, injuries sustained while being transported to a hospital where medical
services can be obtained.
359 A.2d 193, 197-98 (N.H. 1976).
Pridham was cited and followed recently in Anaya v. Superior Court, in which a wrongful
death claim against the City of Los Angeles was upheld against a motion to dismiss for
remoteness grounds. The decedent was injured in an automobile accident involving a city
garbage truck and then killed when the helicopter transporting her to the hospital crashed. 93 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 228 (Cal. App. 2000).
What about other kinds of injury aggravations? In Wagner v. Mittendorf, 134 N.E. 539
(N.Y. 1922), plaintiff broke his leg because of defendant’s negligence. After the plaster cast was
removed, plaintiff’s physicians encouraged him to walk to strengthen his leg muscles. Plaintiff’s
crutches slipped and he fell, rebreaking the leg at the same point at which it had first been broken
by defendant’s negligence. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the award to the plaintiff of
the incremental damages arising out of the second break.
Torts commentators have often wondered whether Wagner allows for a stopping point.
“What if the plaintiff must use crutches permanently and is killed ten years later in a fire because
of his inability to run away?” Does the defendant become an insurer for all foreseeable
downstream injuries that would not have happened but for the defendant’s negligent act? See
MARK FRANKLIN & ROBERT RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 404 (7th ed. 2001).
Rule of Thumb for No Proximate Cause?
In Ohio, the common law embraces a “no proximate cause” rule for police officers
involved in police chases that injure third parties. The rule states that “when a law enforcement
officer pursues a fleeing violator and the violator injures a third party as a result of the chase, the
officer’s pursuit is not the proximate cause of those injuries,” unless the officer acts in an
“extreme or outrageous” manner. Whitfield v. Dayton, 167 Ohio App.3d 172 (2d Dist. 2006).
The “no proximate cause” rule allows Ohio courts to supplant a fact-intensive proximate
cause inquiry with a general rule of thumb that police are not liable for these kinds of injuries.
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