Torts - Cases, Principles, and Institutions Fifth Edition, 2016a

Witt & Tani, TCPI 7. Proximate Cause
CHAPTER 7. PROXIMATE (“LEGAL”) CAUSE
A. Introduction
In order to recover damages in a negligence suit, the plaintiff must show not only factual
causation, but also something more: what lawyers call “proximate cause” or “legal cause.” The
doctrine of proximate cause stands for the idea that the plaintiff should not be able to recover if
the plaintiff has not shown an appropriate relationship between the negligent act and the harm
complained of, even if the defendant’s negligence hasin factcaused the plaintiff’s injury.
Some injuries, courts say, are too remote from the negligence in question to be properly charged
to the defendant’s conduct. Other injuries are not unduly remote, and so are properly attached to
the defendant’s conduct. As you read the following cases, ask yourself how courts distinguish
remote from proximate harms. Is the doctrine of proximate cause different from the foreseeability
dimension that we studied in the negligence analysis in Chapter 4? Given that these are all cases
in which the defendant’s conduct was necessary in producing the plaintiff’s injury, is it
appropriate to call this doctrine a type of “causation” at all? Many jurists have answered no to
both questions. There is no denying that the doctrine of proximate causation has played a
prominent role in torts cases since nearly the beginning of modern tort law. But a lurking
question remains: Why do we have it?
The next case is an old classic. Its outcome no longer reflects current law. Keep that in
mind! But the basic factual set-up offers a crisp illustration of the basic conundrum dealt with by
the doctrine of proximate cause: how far down a chain of cascading harms does a tortfeasor’s
liability extend?
Ryan v. New York Central R.R., 35 N.Y. 210, 215 (1866)
HUNT, J.
On the 15th day of July, 1854, in the city of Syracuse, the defendant, by the careless
management, or through the insufficient condition, of one of its engines, set fire to its woodshed,
and a large quantity of wood therein. The plaintiff’s house, situated at a distance of one hundred
and thirty feet from the shed, soon took fire from the heat and sparks, and was entirely consumed,
notwithstanding diligent efforts were made to save it.
A number of other houses were also burned by the spreading of the fire. The plaintiff
brings this action to recover from the railroad company the value of his building thus destroyed.
The judge at the Circuit nonsuited the plaintiff, and the General Term of the fifth district affirmed
the judgment.
The question may be thus stated: A house in a populous city takes fire, through the
negligence of the owner or his servant; the flames extend to and destroy an adjacent building: Is
the owner of the first building liable to the second owner for the damage sustained by such
burning?
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