06.09.2021 Views

Torts - Cases, Principles, and Institutions Fifth Edition, 2016a

Torts - Cases, Principles, and Institutions Fifth Edition, 2016a

Torts - Cases, Principles, and Institutions Fifth Edition, 2016a

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

Witt & Tani, TCPI 4. Negligence St<strong>and</strong>ard<br />

Table 1: The Negligence Analysis<br />

Burden of the<br />

precaution (B)<br />

Scenario 1:<br />

Expensive<br />

Precaution<br />

Scenario 2:<br />

Inexpensive<br />

Precaution<br />

Probability of<br />

harm absent the<br />

precaution (P)<br />

Expected<br />

damages in the<br />

event harm<br />

occurs (L)<br />

15 10% 100 Not negligent<br />

5 10% 100 Negligent<br />

3. The ex ante view. So far we’ve given consideration to what we might think of as the ex<br />

post application of the H<strong>and</strong> test. We have asked how someone in the position of a judge or jury<br />

would operationalize it with respect to precautions not taken. But the deeper significance of the<br />

Learned H<strong>and</strong> test may be its ex ante implications. Parties knowing that in the event of an injury<br />

they will be held liable for having failed to take certain precautions that were cost justified should<br />

begin to take those precautions. Consider the cricket club: under a negligence regime, will they<br />

build a higher wall at the beginning of the year? In scenario 2, assuming that they have a lawyer<br />

who is worth her socks, they sure will. In scenario 1, on the other h<strong>and</strong>, they will not. Note that it<br />

is very likely that in the actual world the cricket team will get decent advice on such a question.<br />

They almost certainly will have a liability insurance policy. And if they do, the liability insurer<br />

will have every incentive to inspect the field <strong>and</strong> require the team (on pain of a higher liability<br />

insurance premium) to raise the fence.<br />

We can see this in Table 2, which is a variation on the two scenario set-up in Table 1.<br />

Here we include a fourth column that adds the ex ante decision that the negligence regime<br />

incentivizes. You can see that where the precaution costs more than it is worth, the rational actor<br />

will not build. But where the precaution is less costly than the expected cost of the injuries that<br />

will take place absent the precaution, the rational actor will build.<br />

Table 2: To Build or Not to Build (under a Negligence Regime)<br />

(B) (P) (L) Court<br />

Determination in<br />

event of injury<br />

Ex ante view:<br />

Build the<br />

Higher Fence?<br />

Scenario 1 15 10% 100 Not negligent—D<br />

doesn’t pay<br />

Scenario 2 5 10% 100 Negligent—D<br />

pays<br />

Not build<br />

Yes build<br />

4. Strict liability in the ex ante view. At this point in the analysis something striking<br />

emerges. Let’s take the same scenarios as above but compare the incentives to take precautions<br />

under a Learned H<strong>and</strong>-style negligence regime with the incentives to take precautions under a<br />

166

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!