Woolfian Boundaries - Clemson University
Woolfian Boundaries - Clemson University Woolfian Boundaries - Clemson University
74 WOOLFIAN BOUNDARIES of culture and of the displacements and condensations which make the tangles and infi ltrations of discursive networks. In his contribution to the FPSI Manifesto, Flügel defi nes the “psychology” that unites the variety of societies and individuals comprised by the federation, as well as setting down the strategy by which such a psychology may be rendered useful. Flügel fi nds this common psychological foundation in the word “progressive”—a mental attitude described as predominantly scientifi c and psychological, in contradistinction to the “moral” attitude of other regimes, the “blind reliance on outworn loyalties, conventions, and taboos” necessary to societies run on “rigidly conservative, communist, or fascist lines” (“A Psychology” 302-3). Originating in the super-ego and the primitive instincts of the id, the “moral” attitude is by defi nition a “rigid and archaic one, which adapts itself only with the utmost diffi culty to the changing conditions of modern life” (“A Psychology” 296). Th e aim of the progressive, like the aim of psychoanalysis, is to modernise the mind by strengthening the control of the ego over the super-ego and the id, making conscious and sublimating the primitive and archaic elements which stand in the way of progress. Creating modern subjects is to achieve a freer, less oppressive society run on principles of reason and science, and ultimately to prevent war. Th e civilised modernity represented by conscious reason is asserted by other progressives concerned with the psychology of peace (as opposed to the primitive unreason of the psychology of war), notably in Th e Intelligent Man’s Way to Prevent War (1933), edited and introduced by Leonard Woolf. Pointing to “human psychology, the beliefs and desires of human beings,” as the ultimate reason for war, the book’s contributors propose to consider “these psychological factors and the part which education must play in creating the psychology of peace” (16). Leonard Woolf’s related attack on metaphysics and the dangers of the symbol in Quack, Quack! (1935) participates in the same promotion of reason and the intellect as protection against resurfacing primitive instincts and morality. Quack, Quack! is a tract against quackery, the return of the superstitions of the savage, threatening to displace classical intellectual integrity since the early nineteenth century. Leonard traces such anti-rational tendencies through the Hegelians, Carlyle, Nietzsche, and Bergson, to their culmination in fascist ideology: “the supreme example in modern times of the reversion to savagery and the belief in political magic” (Quack, Quack! 37). What a “civilised” man such as Bergson has in common with the fascists and the “quacks”—the god-inspired kings of primitive cultures—is a claim to inspiration combined with symbolic obscurity, the fi ction of synthetic intuitions communicable only by symbolisation and analogy. In conveying such intuitions, “the oracle itself has lost all perception of what is imagery and metaphor and simile and what is the truth which it is seeking to express through imagery, metaphor, or simile…the quack himself can no longer distinguish between the symbol and the thing symbolized” (Quack, Quack! 133). Th e state of “inspiration” claimed by the primitive and the fascist Führer alike manifests itself corporeally (as embodiment/performance) and as verbal and visual symbols which deliberately confuse sign and referent and demand instinctive, emotional response. Th us, writes Leonard: As soon as the god had entered the king or priest, “the latter became violently agitated, and worked himself up to the highest pitch of apparent frenzy, the muscles of the limbs seemed convulsed, the body swelled, the countenance became
Real Bodies and the Psychology of Clothes terrifi c, the features distorted, and the eyes wild and strained”…. Th e Polynesian Führer sometimes “continued for two or three days possessed by the spirit or deity; a piece of native cloth, of a peculiar kind, worn round one arm, was an indication of inspiration, or of the indwelling of the god with the individual who wore it”…. In Germany and Italy the inspiration of Hitler and Mussolini is permanent. Hence the wearing of a piece of cloth of a peculiar kind (e.g. inscribed with the swastika) has also become permanent and has been extended from the god-inspired leader to the leader-inspired followers, for it indicates that the wearer has accepted the inspiration either directly or indirectly. (Quack, Quack! 45-47; internal quotations from Frazer’s Th e Golden Bough). So far we have seen that both Flügel and Leonard Woolf are concerned with the relations between mind/psychology, discourse/symbolic systems (including visual and verbal symbols), and the body. Th eir modernising projects spring from the conviction that the “symbol” upholds its authority by the combined forces of id and super-ego, and consist in liberating the conscious mind from the primitive, archaic instincts of the body and the moral response of the super-ego. While Leonard Woolf emphasises the education of the rational mind as a counter-measure to the Nazi’s primary object of education, “the rearing of strong bodies” (Quack, Quack! 81), Flügel is particularly concerned with the idea that modernising the mind eff ectively depends on modernising the body. Hence the project of the clothes psychology, of describing how bodies and minds are fashioned by clothing; how bodies signify and perform within a culturo-symbolic order; and how it is possible to sublimate states of interiority onto a bodily exterior. Integrating clothing into a general theory of human development, Flügel understands dress as a gendered discourse invested with narcissistic/exhibitionistic and phallic symbolic value. On the journey from naked infant to clothed and civilised adult, clothing emerges as an important component in drawing the infant out of the primary, iddominated condition. Simplifi ed, clothing mediates paternal law, the prohibition placed upon the narcissistic and auto-erotic pleasures the infant gains from his or her naked body. Clothing also signifi es the individual’s position with respect to the phallus. Th e case among primitive people for men to be more decorated than women, and the remnants of this in some European customs, suggests that men are inherently more inclined to decoration and women more inclined to modesty in dress. Traces of the primitive state are seen in military and ecclesiastical hierarchies and in academic robes, also in the forms of social convention which require men to temporarily remove a garment as a sign of respect, for example the hat on entering a church. Th us, “In men, castration itself is symbolised by the removal of garments, while the possession or display of the corresponding garments serves, in virtue of their phallic symbolism, as a reassurance against the fears of castration” (Psychology of Clothes 104-5). In modern times, according to Flügel, sexual diff erence divides along diff erent lines. Apart from the anachronistic remnants of primitive phallic display referred to above, modern males are ruled by clothes regimes abounding “in features which symbolise [man’s] devotion to the principles of duty, renunciation, self-control” (Psychology of Clothes 113), eff ectively preventing sublimation of infantile narcissism onto clothing. Sublimated narcissism of this kind is understood to be of benefi t to the individual and culture, carrying 75
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74 WOOLFIAN BOUNDARIES<br />
of culture and of the displacements and condensations which make the tangles and infi ltrations<br />
of discursive networks.<br />
In his contribution to the FPSI Manifesto, Flügel defi nes the “psychology” that unites<br />
the variety of societies and individuals comprised by the federation, as well as setting down<br />
the strategy by which such a psychology may be rendered useful. Flügel fi nds this common<br />
psychological foundation in the word “progressive”—a mental attitude described as<br />
predominantly scientifi c and psychological, in contradistinction to the “moral” attitude of<br />
other regimes, the “blind reliance on outworn loyalties, conventions, and taboos” necessary<br />
to societies run on “rigidly conservative, communist, or fascist lines” (“A Psychology”<br />
302-3). Originating in the super-ego and the primitive instincts of the id, the “moral”<br />
attitude is by defi nition a “rigid and archaic one, which adapts itself only with the utmost<br />
diffi culty to the changing conditions of modern life” (“A Psychology” 296). Th e aim of<br />
the progressive, like the aim of psychoanalysis, is to modernise the mind by strengthening<br />
the control of the ego over the super-ego and the id, making conscious and sublimating<br />
the primitive and archaic elements which stand in the way of progress. Creating modern<br />
subjects is to achieve a freer, less oppressive society run on principles of reason and science,<br />
and ultimately to prevent war.<br />
Th e civilised modernity represented by conscious reason is asserted by other progressives<br />
concerned with the psychology of peace (as opposed to the primitive unreason of the<br />
psychology of war), notably in Th e Intelligent Man’s Way to Prevent War (1933), edited and<br />
introduced by Leonard Woolf. Pointing to “human psychology, the beliefs and desires of<br />
human beings,” as the ultimate reason for war, the book’s contributors propose to consider<br />
“these psychological factors and the part which education must play in creating the psychology<br />
of peace” (16). Leonard Woolf’s related attack on metaphysics and the dangers of<br />
the symbol in Quack, Quack! (1935) participates in the same promotion of reason and the<br />
intellect as protection against resurfacing primitive instincts and morality. Quack, Quack!<br />
is a tract against quackery, the return of the superstitions of the savage, threatening to<br />
displace classical intellectual integrity since the early nineteenth century. Leonard traces<br />
such anti-rational tendencies through the Hegelians, Carlyle, Nietzsche, and Bergson, to<br />
their culmination in fascist ideology: “the supreme example in modern times of the reversion<br />
to savagery and the belief in political magic” (Quack, Quack! 37). What a “civilised”<br />
man such as Bergson has in common with the fascists and the “quacks”—the god-inspired<br />
kings of primitive cultures—is a claim to inspiration combined with symbolic obscurity,<br />
the fi ction of synthetic intuitions communicable only by symbolisation and analogy. In<br />
conveying such intuitions, “the oracle itself has lost all perception of what is imagery and<br />
metaphor and simile and what is the truth which it is seeking to express through imagery,<br />
metaphor, or simile…the quack himself can no longer distinguish between the symbol<br />
and the thing symbolized” (Quack, Quack! 133). Th e state of “inspiration” claimed by the<br />
primitive and the fascist Führer alike manifests itself corporeally (as embodiment/performance)<br />
and as verbal and visual symbols which deliberately confuse sign and referent and<br />
demand instinctive, emotional response. Th us, writes Leonard:<br />
As soon as the god had entered the king or priest, “the latter became violently<br />
agitated, and worked himself up to the highest pitch of apparent frenzy, the muscles<br />
of the limbs seemed convulsed, the body swelled, the countenance became