Woolfian Boundaries - Clemson University
Woolfian Boundaries - Clemson University Woolfian Boundaries - Clemson University
“CE CHIEN EST À MOI”: VIRGINIA WOOLF AND THE SIGNIFYING DOG by Jane Goldman Woolf’s signifying dog belongs to the “companion species” that marks the boundaries between the human and non-human. 1 My concern, however, is not primarily with the modality, or dogginess, of the dog but with its status as signifi er. It marks the boundary between literal and fi gurative. In exploring the dog’s metaphorical status, I risk its “erasure,” confi rming it as “absent referent,” according to animal ethicist-feminist, Carol Adams. “Could metaphor itself be the undergarment…of oppression?” she asks, since through the reifying action of metaphor “the object is severed from its ontological meaning,” something that also occurs in the discourse of racism and misogyny (209, 213). But what interests me is the behaviour of such metaphors in Woolf’s modernist free indirect discourse. Woolf’s dog is a sliding signifi er representing not least the historic, unequal struggles between men and women over artistic subjectivity and voice. Marking and marked by race, gender, and class, it is a constructed, monstrous, multivalent fi gure whose referent is certainly not just a dog, but nor, contra Adams, does this metaphor cleanly evacuate the dog from its vehicle merely to accommodate “woman” or “slave” (Woolf gestures to both). A few critics note the metaphoricity of Woolf’s dogs, but only as simple allegories of sexuality, particularly lesbianism (Dunn, Eberly, Vanita). My focus is the notorious “fi ne negress” passage (AROO 76), and the performance there of Woolf’s slippery canine metaphors in her free indirect discourse. Th ese elude Jane Marcus’s attention in her fi ne scrutiny of the passage. But, hunting with canine and animal ethicists, I will chase Woolf’s dog in one crucial sentence back through some of the sentences it has previously frequented in Woolf’s and others’ writing. My book, Virginia Woolf and the Signifying Dog learns a trick or two from Henry Louis Gates’s Signifying Monkey (except there’s no originary feminist trickster-dog). It explores the intersection of feminist theory with philosophical interests in animal ethics: Marjorie Garber’s Dog Love; Donna Haraway’s companion species manifesto; Emmanuel Levinas’s essay, “Th e Name of a Dog.” Giorgio Agamben, in Th e Open: Man and Animal, considers the aporia in Western thought’s shifting caesurae between man and animal. Woolf’s signifying dog may occupy the very “zone” Agamben identifi es: the empty interval between man and animal that is neither animal life nor human life (Agamben 38). Th e “anthropological machine,” Agamben shows, in seeking to identify the evolutionary bridge between animal and man in fact “functions by excluding as not (yet) human an already human being from itself, that is by animalizing the human, by isolating the non-human within the human: Homo alalus [signifi cantly, man without speech], or the ape-man,” and conversely by the “humanization of an animal: the man-ape [or nonman], the enfant sauvage or Homo ferus, but also and above all the slave, the barbarian, and the foreigner, as fi gures of an animal in human form.” Th is model made possible the Nazi identifi cation of the Jew as “the non-man produced within the man, or the néomort…the animal separated within the human body itself” (37). Interestingly, a dog-ape is identifi ed
Virginia Woolf and the Signifying Dog 101 as a phase in the evolution of the pre-human. Agamben touches on human sexuality, but is silent on the status of women in the anthropological machine. Presumably a non-speaking pre-human ape-woman is posited as giving birth to the non-animal Homo sapiens, man, “the animal,” according to Linnaeus, “that must recognize [or read] itself as human to be human” (cited Agamben 26). I correlate Agamben’s “open” with the shifting caesurae between subject and object in Woolf’s metaphors and free indirect discourse, and read Woolf’s mobile signifying dogs through Levinas’s stray dog. I invite you to think of Paula Rego’s Dog Woman (1994) as the opening narrator of A Room of One’s Own, who, it is not diffi cult to infer, has been chased like a dog from the hallowed ground of patriarchal learning: It was thus that I found myself walking with extreme rapidity across a grass plot. Instantly a man’s fi gure rose to intercept me…. His face expressed horror and indignation. Instinct rather than reason came to my help; he was a Beadle; I was a woman. Th is was the turf; there was the path. Only the Fellows and Scholars are allowed here; the gravel is the place for me. (AROO 9) Haraway makes only a little more explicit this famous Woolfi an analogy in recognising: “Woolf understood what happens when the impure stroll over the lawns of the properly registered…when these marked (and marking) beings get credentials and an income” (88). Th at animals and women are excluded from traditional notions of enlightenment is inferred in the “instinct” rather than “reason” that assists the speaker to realise her ironic identifi cation by the Beadle, himself only one consonant away from the canine, as alien to the institution of education. As patriarchy’s dutiful watchdog, he has hardly been secured on the side of “reason” in this sentence. His double designation of the trespasser as both a woman and, implicitly, dog shocks the wandering “I” who fi nds herself merely “walking,” a self-defi nition by action and process, before she is so rudely hailed. A Room of One’s Own becomes a lesson in how to resist this interpellation. But what may have slipped our notice is that Woolf’s canine trope has already been initiated in the previous paragraph, where the narrator refers to the burden of her agreed talk: “Th at collar I have spoken of, women and fi ction…a subject that raises all sorts of prejudices and passions, bowed my head to the ground” (8). Th e very invitation to speak has already interpellated her as a dog. Yet this collar metaphor speaks also of the shackles of human slavery. 2 “Like a good deal of feminist protest literature,” Marcus reminds us, A Room of One’s Own “uses the tropes of slavery to make the case for women’s oppression,” “brilliantly link[ing]” scenes of violence against Englishwomen to violence against slaves (48). It would however limit the resonance of Woolf’s rhetoric here to confi ne this convergence of racially marked and gendered tropes of oppression to the prior historical record of the centuries of Atlantic slavery, or indeed to the continuing British imperial context she was writing in. Th e slave economies of classical Greece, and of Biblical times, are cited too; Woolf also addresses, directly in places, the emergence of fascist and Nazi powers in Europe and their attendant racism and misogyny. Woolf’s elusive narrator, who refuses a stable nomenclature or identity, is doubly yoked by the metaphors of “dog” and “slave,” but the third yoke is surely “woman.” Th e three terms coalesce at several points in the book, most strikingly in the clinching argument on the prospects for women’s writing, which rearranges and amplifi es
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Virginia Woolf and the Signifying Dog<br />
101<br />
as a phase in the evolution of the pre-human. Agamben touches on human sexuality, but<br />
is silent on the status of women in the anthropological machine. Presumably a non-speaking<br />
pre-human ape-woman is posited as giving birth to the non-animal Homo sapiens,<br />
man, “the animal,” according to Linnaeus, “that must recognize [or read] itself as human<br />
to be human” (cited Agamben 26). I correlate Agamben’s “open” with the shifting caesurae<br />
between subject and object in Woolf’s metaphors and free indirect discourse, and read<br />
Woolf’s mobile signifying dogs through Levinas’s stray dog.<br />
I invite you to think of Paula Rego’s Dog Woman (1994) as the opening narrator of<br />
A Room of One’s Own, who, it is not diffi cult to infer, has been chased like a dog from the<br />
hallowed ground of patriarchal learning:<br />
It was thus that I found myself walking with extreme rapidity across a grass plot.<br />
Instantly a man’s fi gure rose to intercept me…. His face expressed horror and<br />
indignation. Instinct rather than reason came to my help; he was a Beadle; I was<br />
a woman. Th is was the turf; there was the path. Only the Fellows and Scholars<br />
are allowed here; the gravel is the place for me. (AROO 9)<br />
Haraway makes only a little more explicit this famous Woolfi an analogy in recognising:<br />
“Woolf understood what happens when the impure stroll over the lawns of the properly<br />
registered…when these marked (and marking) beings get credentials and an income”<br />
(88). Th at animals and women are excluded from traditional notions of enlightenment is<br />
inferred in the “instinct” rather than “reason” that assists the speaker to realise her ironic<br />
identifi cation by the Beadle, himself only one consonant away from the canine, as alien to<br />
the institution of education. As patriarchy’s dutiful watchdog, he has hardly been secured<br />
on the side of “reason” in this sentence. His double designation of the trespasser as both a<br />
woman and, implicitly, dog shocks the wandering “I” who fi nds herself merely “walking,”<br />
a self-defi nition by action and process, before she is so rudely hailed. A Room of One’s Own<br />
becomes a lesson in how to resist this interpellation. But what may have slipped our notice<br />
is that Woolf’s canine trope has already been initiated in the previous paragraph, where the<br />
narrator refers to the burden of her agreed talk: “Th at collar I have spoken of, women and<br />
fi ction…a subject that raises all sorts of prejudices and passions, bowed my head to the<br />
ground” (8). Th e very invitation to speak has already interpellated her as a dog.<br />
Yet this collar metaphor speaks also of the shackles of human slavery. 2 “Like a good<br />
deal of feminist protest literature,” Marcus reminds us, A Room of One’s Own “uses the<br />
tropes of slavery to make the case for women’s oppression,” “brilliantly link[ing]” scenes<br />
of violence against Englishwomen to violence against slaves (48). It would however limit<br />
the resonance of Woolf’s rhetoric here to confi ne this convergence of racially marked and<br />
gendered tropes of oppression to the prior historical record of the centuries of Atlantic<br />
slavery, or indeed to the continuing British imperial context she was writing in. Th e slave<br />
economies of classical Greece, and of Biblical times, are cited too; Woolf also addresses,<br />
directly in places, the emergence of fascist and Nazi powers in Europe and their attendant<br />
racism and misogyny. Woolf’s elusive narrator, who refuses a stable nomenclature or identity,<br />
is doubly yoked by the metaphors of “dog” and “slave,” but the third yoke is surely<br />
“woman.” Th e three terms coalesce at several points in the book, most strikingly in the<br />
clinching argument on the prospects for women’s writing, which rearranges and amplifi es