War Dispatches 1971

Pak Surrender to

Indian Army 1971

War

Dispatches

1971

28NDA/37IMA/21Tech

set in Eastern & Western Sector

by

Officers of

June 15, 1966 Commission from IMA

Edited by

Officers of 28NDA/37IMA/21Tech

EDGE

2021

Special thanks to:

•

•

Cover

• Surrender Photo (1971)

Contents

Review Things To Do: Ed Team 3

Foreword 5

Preface 7

I The Prelude 9

1 How the War was Precipitated 13

2 The Opposing Forces 17

II Eastern Theatre 27

3 Liberation of Bangladesh by Mahendra Singh Joon 29

4 The “KILO” Flight- A Chronicled Personal Account by Arun

Karandikar 33

5 Letters to my wife –1971 War of Bangladesh by Shimi Kanbargimath

43

6 My Most Memorable Learning Experience by Rana Kapur 55

7 Armour on Land and Water 1971 by B S Mehta 61

8 The Burinda Bash by BS Mehta 69

9 A Flashback of 1971 War by Mohinder Puri 85

i

10 The Solitary Sapper by Pradeep Sharma 89

11 1971 War in The East: Through the Eyes of a Pigeon By

Arvind Sharma 103

12 1971 was really busy and eventful by Sukhdev Singh 109

13 A Nation Is Born 1971 by Trigunesh Mukherjee 125

14 Forward Maintenance Area in Barmer by C P Tewari 145

III Western Theatre 151

15 Appropriate title here By Jaspal Alag 153

16 My diary by S Balasubramanian 159

17 The Little Giant Stands Tall: 72 Armoured Regiment - Battle

of Chhamb 1971 by PPS Bhandari 171

18 Tribulations of Amn Supply Chain in War: 1971 An Experience

by Subhash Bindra 189

19 A Naval Story from Southern Naval Command by Jai Chacko197

20 Reminiscing Events In BATTLE ZONE OF LONGEWALA :1971,

Ram Chandra Chhetri 199

21 From the hinterland to the war zone by Ujjal Dasgupta 213

22 Battle of Jarpal by Mahendra Singh Joon 221

23 After Cease-fire Battle of 1971 War by Tarlochan Singh Kalra231

24 Some Recollections of 1971 by Satish Kukreja 239

25 My Experiences of the 1971 War By KC Kuruvilla 245

ii War Dispatches 1971

26 On Ferozpur Border- KK Nanda 253

27 Valour Beyond The Call Of Duty by KK Nanda 273

28 Capture of Mamdot Bulge in 1971 INDO-PAK WAR by Vijay

Rai 277

29 1971 War As I Saw It by PJS Sandhu 295

30 SIGINT During the 1971 War by Chandra Nath 301

31 1971 NAVAL OPERATIONS: ACTION IN THE ARABIAN SEA

BY WESTERN FLEET by SS Sethi 311

IV Epilogue 329

32 Capt RN Gupta,Vr.C by Mohinder Nath Mahajan 331

33 Capt GGK Panicker by Pradeep Sharma 343

34 Capt Daljinder Singh, Deccan Horse by Gautam Tandon 353

35 Honours, Awards & Achievements by Arvind Sharma 363

Bibliography 371

Index 373

36 About the Authors 375

Colophon 393

War Dispatches 1971

iii

iv War Dispatches 1971

List of Figures

1 Sketch: East Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

2 Bangladesh Liberation War:Refugee and Troop Movement 15

3 Pakistani Eastern Command plan for the defence . . . . 19

4 Bangladesh Liberation War:Troop Deployment:Opposing

Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

5 Bangladesh:Sectors of Liberation War . . . . . . . . . . 25

6 Late Capt. Balbir & Shimi Kanbargimath having lunch with

the Mukti Bahini . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

7 I am the boss now- Address by a member of the Mukti

Bahini . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

8 Occupation of Sherpur by Our Troops . . . . . . . . . . 47

9 Sherpur after liberation 8 December . . . . . . . . . . . 48

10 General Nagra lands at Tangail with food for the men. . 48

11 Self standing in front of Gen Niazi’s residence, Dacca . . 49

12 Self with Brig Kler & Gen Nagra in Dacca . . . . . . . . 49

13 Surrender of Pakistani troops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

14 Surrender of Pakistani troops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

15 Gen Manekshaw’s visit after the surrender of Pakistani

troops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

16 Gen Manekshaw’s visit after the surrender of Pakistani

troops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

17 Jubilant Bangladeshi friends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

18 Self with Capt. Anand and GLO IAF . . . . . . . . . . . 53

19 Map of Jessore district . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

v

20 The three approaches to Jessore with the Burinda axis in

the centre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

21 The Garibpur-Burinda linkage... . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

22 Pakistani army soldiers study a map at Burinda (Getty Images)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

23 My T-55 tanks in action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

24 Pakistani soldiers brutally dragging a dead Indian soldier 83

25 “Map 1: South Tripura has a small bulge named Belonia

Bulge” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128

26 Accurate air attacks by our Air Force and aircrafts from

Vikrant damaged warehouses etc but did not touch a single

crane at Chittagong port. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

27 Commanders at Chittagong : L to R Lt Col Ajit Chopra 3

Dogra, Lt Col D R Dutt 2 Rajput, Brig Bhupi Sandhu 83

Mtn Bde, Lt Gen J S Arora Army Commander, Maj Gen R

D Hira 23 Mtn Div, Lt Col M S Virk 57 Mtn Regt, Lt Col

O P Bisla 8 Bihar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130

28 Chauddagram defences with bunkers; and minefields and

panjiis in front . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

29 Felicitation organised in honour of Maj Gen R D Hira, 23

Mtn Div . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

30 Accurate Artillery fire knocks out a train carrying enemy

troops and supplies from Belonia to Feni . . . . . . . . . 133

31 Enemy gun positions at Parikot with overhead cover . . 134

32 Taking a break at Peerbaksh Haat railway station. In the

centre is Maj Anoop S Gahlaut who was awarded the MVC

later(posthumously) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

33 Our Bde had to turn South and capture Feni. . . . . . . . 136

34 Pucca houses were reinforced by Pakistan Army as defences) 137

35 Sappers quickly construct a bypass next to a bridge blown

up by the Pakistan Army over Parikot river . . . . . . . 138

36 Shore guns at Chittagong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

vi War Dispatches 1971

37 Greek ship Avlos was suspected to have carried weapons

and ammunition from Karachi. First the MB approached

it through the river and attacked it with explosives. Thereafter,

an aircraft from INS Vikrant split it in half. . . . . 140

38 Bangladesh Flag: At that time the BD flag had the map of

Bangla Desh in yellow/gold inside the red round . . . . 141

39 Lts Menon and Nanaya next to the command post . . . 142

40 A tracer lighting up the sky by night . . . . . . . . . . . 161

41 View of Ground from 200 to 300 feet . . . . . . . . . . . 164

42 How an airfield looks to a pilot climbing up to an attack run 165

43 Ack ack shell puffs - shrapnel from one or two hitting an

aircraft could mean the end . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165

44 Aircraft on the ground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167

45 Aircraft in the air . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167

46 Bala with colleagues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168

47 Bala (as in 1971-72) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169

48 Initial Team on 01 Jul 1971 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172

49 Defence Minister Babu Jagjivan Ram visits, given Ceremonial

Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173

50 Shashtra Pooja on arrival of T-55 Tanks on 17 Oct 1971 174

51 Arrival of Tanks at Kathua by Special Trains on 27 Oct

1971 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175

52 Tanks negotiating Chenab River on Make-Shift Ramps on

Night 05/06 Nov 1971 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175

53 Importance of Chhamb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176

54 10 Inf Division Deployment Night 3 Dec 1971 . . . . . . 177

55 Pak Offensive Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178

56 Pak Attack along three thrust lines: Northern, Central and

Southern, Night 03/04 Dec 1971 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

57 Pak 4 AK Bde attack across Manawar Tawi, 05 Dec 1971 180

58 Counterattack by ‘C’ Sqn 72 Armd Regt and 7 Kumaon . 180

War Dispatches 1971

vii

59 ‘B’ Sqn contesting Enemy Central and Southern thrusts in

support of 191 Inf Bde, 06 Dec 1971 . . . . . . . . . . . 181

60 Enemy Sabre Jet shot down . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182

61 Deployment of 10 Inf Div and 72 Armd Regt East of Manawar

Tawi, 07 Dec 1971 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183

62 Sqn Leader D Keeler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184

63 Counterattacks on Darh and Raipur crossings . . . . . . 184

64 Abandoned enemy tank at Darh Crossing . . . . . . . . 185

65 Battle Honour Chhamb 1971 & Theatre Honour J&K, . . 186

66 72 Armd Regt War Memorial at Kachreal . . . . . . . . 187

67 Homage to the fallen comrades by Col of the Regt . . . . 187

68 Old Priest in Durga Mandir in Tanaut . . . . . . . . . . 205

69 Monitoring Progress in Operation Vital Store . . . . . . . 205

70 Physical Checking and Stacking of Stores . . . . . . . . . 206

71 1000 Lb Pak bomb created a crator . . . . . . . . . . . . 206

72 Capt R C Chhetri explains functioning of weapons . . . . 207

73 Glimpses of captured Pak weapons and equipment . . . 208

74 Capt Chhetri with captured weapons . . . . . . . . . . 209

75 Foreign Reporters with captured Pak weapons . . . . . . 209

76 Pak assets destroyed by IAF fighters. . . . . . . . . . . . 210

77 Capt Chhetri and men on destroyed Pak tank . . . . . . 210

78 BSF post destroyed by Pak shelling. . . . . . . . . . . . . 211

79 After Operation celebrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211

80 Spontaneous send-off for 71 ops to SODE Course at Indore

Rly Stn – December 1971 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215

81 Sketch: Indo-Pak War 1971 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229

82 Pulkanjri Assault – 17/18 Dec, 1971 . . . . . . . . . . . . 233

83 L/Nk Shangara Singh, MVC (Posthumous) . . . . . . . . 238

84 Gen S H F J Manekshaw M C honouring Maj N S Koak

with Sena Medal for heroic action on 03/04 Dec 1971

Right:Pulkanjri Memorial at Battle site near Attari . . . . 238

viii War Dispatches 1971

85 Air Cmde KC Kuruvilla(Retd) with Indian Defence Forces

Gallipoli Campaign flag 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251

86 Air Cmde KC Kuruvilla(Retd) with Indian Defence Forces

Gallipoli Campaign flag 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252

87 Map MAMDOT BULGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259

88 ‘ALPHA’ COY OF 13 PUNJAB (JIND) AFTER CAPTURE

OF JALLOKE HITTAR IN MAMDOT BULGE (PAKISTAN)

DURING 1971 WAR. CAPT KK NANDA STANDING

LEFT OF THE SIGN BOARD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268

89 CAPTURE OF ARMS AND AMMUNITIONS BY 13 PUN-

JAB (JIND) AT JALLOKE HITTAR (PAKISTAN), DEC

1971 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269

90 CAPT KK NANDA STANDING IN CENTER WITH BLACK

CAP WITH MAJ KS SIDHU ON HIS LEFT. AFTER CAP-

TURE OF PIRA KANA + JALLOKE HITTAR DEC 1971 270

91 CAPT KK NANDA SITTING NEXT TO MMG POST

AFTER CAPTURE OF MAMDOT BULGE OF PAKISTAN,

DEC 1971 WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271

92 Capt KK Nanda and Maj KS Sidhu with ‘ALPHA’ coy and

supporting detachments after capture of Pira Kana and

Jalloke Hittar in Mamdotbulge (Pakisan) on 16 Dec 1971 272

93 Sketch: Mamdot Bulge, 15 Dogra.1971 . . . . . . . . . . 293

94 At Amrudwali on the evening of capture. . . . . . . . . . 293

95 At Jaloke Dhuan. Day after ceasefire. . . . . . . . . . . 294

96 COAS at Hussainiwala Headworks soon after ceasefire . 294

97 The Chandigarh Tribune Monday, 06 Dec 1971 . . . . . 312

98 WESTERN FLEET TRACK CHART . . . . . . . . . . . 324

99 OPERATION TRIDENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325

100 OPERATION TRIDENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326

101 OPERATION PYTHON TRACK CHART . . . . . . . . 327

102 Citation Capt RN Gupta VrC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332

War Dispatches 1971

ix

103 RN at 27-C DEGREE, CME PUNE . . . . . . . . . . . . 333

104 Gazette Notification OP catus Lilly . . . . . . . . . . . . 337

105 Capt RN Gupta VrC Posthumous . . . . . . . . . . . . 338

106 Mr JW Gupta (RN’s Father) at Regimental Ceremony - 9

Engr Regt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339

107 Lt Gen BT Pandit at the War Memorial saluting the plaque

of IC 16871 Capt R N Gupta, VrC, 9 Engr Regt . . . . . 340

108 Maj Reen (9-ER) Lays Wreath - 15 Dec 2020 . . . . . . 341

109 Renovated Grave: Capt RN Gupta VrC (Posthumous) . . 342

110 Capt Daljinder Singh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 356

111 Daljinder with his parents and sister . . . . . . . . . . . 357

112 Deccan Horse officers killed in action in1965 & 1971 . . 357

113 Destroyed tanks of C & B Sqns during the failed Pak attempt

to establish BrHs across the Munawar Tawi on 10/11

Dec 1971 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 358

114 Destroyed tanks of C & B Sqns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 358

115 Destroyed tanks of C & B Sqns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359

116 Destroyed Pak tank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359

117 Deccan Horse War Memorial at Pahun Da Chak ( Jaurian) 360

118 Deccan Horse War Memorial at Pahun Da Chak ( Jaurian) 361

119 Wg Cdr S Balasubramanian VrC . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375

120 Lt Gen PPS Bhandari . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376

121 Maj Gen Virender Budhwar AVSM,VSM. . . . . . . . . . 377

122 Cdr E Jai Chacko IN (Rtd) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 378

123 Lt Col Ram Chandra Chhetri(Retd) . . . . . . . . . . . . 379

124 Brig Ujjal Dasgupta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 380

125 Col Mahendra Joon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381

126 Col Tarlochan Singh Kalra . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 382

127 Brig Shimi Kanbargimath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 383

128 Lt Gen Rana SK Kapur, PVSM, AVSM, SM, VSM, Veteran 384

129 Brig Satish Kumar Kukreja . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 385

130 Brig Mohinder Nath Mahajan (Retd) . . . . . . . . . . . 386

x War Dispatches 1971

131 Brig NR Naidu (Retd) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 387

132 Lt Col CPC Nath (Retd) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 388

133 Brig V K Rai,VSM (Retd) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389

134 Major General PJS Sandhu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390

135 Capt Surinder Singh Sethi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 391

136 Lt Gen Arvind Sharma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 392

War Dispatches 1971 1

2 War Dispatches 1971

Review Things To Do: Ed Team


Pending TTD Reminder

1. Complete SIGINT article:Self

2. Ed Team:Decide content for

(a) Foreword

(b) Preface

(c) The Prelude

i. Ch1 How war was precipitated

ii. Ch 2: The opposing Forces

(d) Bibliography if any Page 215

(e) Index Page 219

(f) About the authors Page 221

(g) Colophon Page 223

3. Await other articles

4. Include when received:Self

5. Await: Editing work by editorial team

6. Agenda for Editorial Meet Sat 28 Feb 2021

(a) Barebone Essentials for Editing

3


i. Org of book

A. part 1: Eastern theatre b01.tex

B. part 2:Wastern theatre b02.tex

C. part 3: Epilogue e01.tex

D. Book Keeping

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Foreword

Foreword

5

Foreword


Preface

Preface

7

Preface


Preface

I. The Prelude

9

Pradeep article not yet included. Under editing.



Chapter 1: How the War was Precipitated

1. How the War was Precipitated

Note for the Editorial Team: The idea for the Part was conceived on the

lines from the book The History of the Second World War by Liddel Hart.

See https://www.google.co.in/books/edition/A_History_

of_the_Second_World_War/FQZHCgAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&printsec=

frontcover

This note will be deleted once an ideal resource is identified for authoring

the Chapter and after approval of the editing team is ascertained.

13


Figure 1: Sketch: East Pakistan



Figure 2: Bangladesh Liberation War:Refugee and Troop Movement




Chapter 2: The Opposing Forces

2. The Opposing Forces

Note for the Editorial Team: The idea for the Part was conceived on the

lines from the book The History of the Second World War by Liddel Hart.

See https://www.google.co.in/books/edition/A_History_

of_the_Second_World_War/FQZHCgAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&printsec=

frontcover

Indian Army Eastern Command draft plan: May

1971

Indian Eastern Command began drafting an operational plan 1 for military

action in Bangladesh from May 1971. Indian planners assumed th

at Pakistani army would try to defend the whole of the province to

prevent Mukti Bahini from establishing the government inside Bangladesh.[10]

The main objectives of the May draft plan were:[11]

The capture of Dhaka was the final goal. A winter campaign would

reduce the chance of Chinese intervention as passes over the Himalayas

would be snowed shut and the ground in Bangladesh would be firm and

most favourable for armour and mechanised movements. Some troops

deployed on the Chinese border can be used in Bangladesh. October –

April period was the best time to launch an offensive, while the Monsoon

rains (May – September) turned the country into a morass.[12] Axis

of advance should aim to isolate and bypass Pakistani forces – which

1

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_plans_of_the_

Bangladesh_Liberation_War

17


meant a minimum superiority in numbers was needed. Fortified positions

should be bypassed. Subsidiary objectives should be picked to occupy

communication centres and destroy Pakistani command and control

ability. Preliminary operations (by Mukti Bahini and then Indian forces)

should aim to draw the Pakistani forces near the border, so key areas in

the interior are left undefended.

Proposed axis of advance

Eastern Command had concluded that The major rivers divided Bangladesh

into 4 sectors 2 :

North – Western Sector (Pakistani designation Northern Sector):[14]

The area north of the Padma and west of the Jamuna river. Bogra was

the main communication hub and the sector is connected to the western

sector through the Hardinge Bridge. The Shiliguri corridor, which is

vital for road and rail communication with Eastern India, borders the

northern tip of this sector.

A division size attack along the Hili – Gaibandha axis, expected to be

heavily defended, aimed to capture Bogra. Later an alternative road was

identified, and it was decided to launch a secondary attack on Hili while

the main attack bypassed Hili, along the Parvatipur – Phulbari – Pirganj

– Palashbari – Bogra axis.[15] Two brigade groups were to operate from

Shiliguri area and from Cooch Bihar as needed.[16]

Western Sector (Pakistani designation Western Sector):[17] This area

lies south of the Padma and west of the Meghna. The main communication

hub is Jessore, along with Jhenaidah and Magura, and Khulna is a

vital sea port. From Jessore a road runs east to Faridpur, and via ferry it

is possible to approach Dhaka.

Two divisions were to attack along the Boyra – Garibpur – Jessore

and Darshana – Kotchadpur – Jhenaidah axis.[18] The natural thrust lines

2





Figure 3: Pakistani Eastern Command plan for the defence



along the Benapol – Jessore and Meherpur – Chuadanga – Jhenaidah,

were expected to be heavily defended and was not considered. An infantry

brigade was to move along Murshidabad – Kushtia line, capture

the Hardinge bridge, then move south to Jhenaidah. Then the whole

force would move towards Magura, cross the Madhumati and capture

Faridpur. With the help of the Inland Waterways Flotilla, an assault

towards Dhaka across the Padma would be launched.[19]

North Eastern Sector (Pakistani designation Dhaka Bowl):[20] This

area sits to the east of river Jamuna, north of Padma and west of the

Meghna and contains the city of Dhaka. A branch of the Jamuna flows

to the north of Dhaka between the Jamuna to the Meghna rivers, while

a rail bridge at Bhairab connects this area with the south eastern sector.

A division would advance along the Kamalpur – Jamalpur –Tangail

– Dhaka axis.[21] An additional brigade would support the advance while

a Para battalion could be airdropped to Tangail to cut off Pakistani forces.

South Eastern Sector (Pakistani designation Eastern Sector):[22] This

lies to the east of Meghna, contains Sylhet, Comilla and the main seaport

Chittagong. Control over Ashuganj, Chandpur and Daudkandi was vital

to approach Dhaka.

3 divisions were to secure the area between Ashuganj and Chandpur,

then if possible approach Dhaka by crossing the Meghna using

helicopters or ferry – whichever was available.[23] Indian Navy would

blockade Chittagong.

Mukti Bahini support was expected in all phases of the operation.

Proposed Force allotment

Indian Army HQ initially allocated the 9th infantry division, 4th Mountain

division, the 50th Para Brigade (army HQ reserve), and the 340th brigade

group for operations in the east alongside whatever forces Indian Eastern



Command could assemble 3 . Eastern command proposed the following

allocation of forces:

1. The XXXIII corps would guard the Shiliguri corridor with the 71

Mountain brigade, which could also move against the North Western

Sector, while the 20th Mountain division and the 340th brigade would

bear the burnt of the fighting. The 3rd armoured brigade can also be

employed as needed.

2. The IV corps (8th, 57th and 23rd mountain divisions) would be

responsible for the South Eastern Sector, while a rear HQ looked after

Assam, Mizoram, Nagaland and the Chinese border.

3.A new corps (4th Mountain and 9th divisions) was slated for the

Western Sector operations.

4. The 6th Mountain (part of Army HQ reserve designated for operations

in Bhutan against Chinese moves) and the 9th Mountain brigade

would be used in the North Eastern Sector.

Seven divisions, 3 independent brigade groups, one armoured brigade

and the Mukti Bahini was earmarked for the draft plan, which was

shared with the DMO, Lt. Gen. K.K. Singh. During May – November,

while Mukti Bahini engaged Pakistani forces, Eastern Command, having

never contemplated or anticipated large scale military action against

East Pakistan[24] began building up logistical infrastructure while army

support services (Engineer, Ordnance and Medical) began to build up

capacity to sustain a 4 week long campaign.

3





Troop Deployment of Opposing Forces in Bangladesh

Liberation War

“The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 was a military

confrontation between India’s Mitro bahini forces and

Pakistan that occurred during the liberation war in East

Pakistan from 3 December 1971 to the fall of Dacca

(Dhaka) on 16 December 1971. The war began with

Operation Chengiz Khan’s preemptive aerial strikes on

11 Indian air stations, which led to the commencement

of hostilities with Pakistan and Indian entry into the

war for independence in East Pakistan on the side of

Bengali nationalist forces. Lasting just 13 days, it is one

of the shortest wars in history.” 4

4

https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Indo-Pakistani_War_of_1971



Figure 4: Bangladesh Liberation War:Troop Deployment:Opposing

Forces



Sectors of War of Liberation

“In the War of Liberation in 1971 the whole geographical

area of the then East Pakistan was strategically divided

into eleven sectors with a sector commander for each of

them. For better efficiency in military operations each of

the sectors were divided into a number of sub-sectors

under a commander.” 5

5

http://en.banglapedia.org/index.php/War_of_Liberation,

_The



Figure 5: Bangladesh:Sectors of Liberation War





II. Eastern Theatre

27

Chapter 3: Liberation of Bangladesh by Mahendra Singh Joon

3. Liberation of Bangladesh by Mahendra

Singh Joon

1

“When Sheikh Mujib’s Party won absolute majority, instead of

inviting him to form the Govt. Yahya Khan ordered his arrest

(23/25 Apr 1971).

Commando wing, at that time, was being shifted from Mhow to

Belgaum. I was also an Instr in Commando Wing then.

On reaching Belgaum on 28 Apr, we received orders (on the Railway

platform ) to move 50 % strength to Calcutta and were airlifted to Barrackpore.

From there we were heli lifted to various Sectors like Silchar,

Dauki and Tura etc ( 8 in all ).

Beside the normal staff and manpower of a Brigade HQ headed by

a Brig. each Sector was given 2 Offrs, 3 JCOs and 6 NCOs instructors

from Commando wing. By 5 May we were ”operational”.

There was exodus of refugees from Bangladesh including their East

Pakistan Rifles ( akin to our BSF ) Battalions. They had crossed over to

India with their arms, ammunition and rations (less their Offrs ) in their

first line transport.

We started organising EPR, Police personnel and any one else, who

had some weapon training or handled weapons, in to small raiding parties.

We planned their missions, armed them with arms, ammunition and

explosives and sent them in to Bangladesh to destroy bridges/ culverts,

raid police or isolated Army posts. But one shot fired and they would

drop everything and run back. So, like other instructors, I too personally

1

Short Author sketch here

29


led their missions from South of Tura ( Capital of Meghalaya ) to as deep

as Raj Shahi.

EPR battalion man power was augmented by our own men and

Officers and were given the name ” Mukti bahini”

Mrs. Gandhi and Chief Of Army Staff Gen. Sam Maneckshaw visited

each Sector during last week of May. Convinced by breifings in each

Sector that Mukti Bahini by itself will not be able to liberate Bangladesh,

it was decided to wait for the Monsoons to be over and swollen rivers

to recede before moving Indian Army in.

Pinpricks continued, Sardar Sawarn Singh was despatched on a

whirlwind tour of the world to build favourable world opinion for Indian

intervention.

Beginning Oct, Indian Army moved in to Bangladesh in the garb of

”Mukti Bahini”. On 22 Nov, two Pak planes were shot down and we

claimed that they were flying over Kolkatta and fell in to Bangladesh

when shot down.

However, later on, when 4 Pak tanks were destroyed in Bogra, we

could not claim that they were flying over Indian Territory and fell in to

Bangladesh. We called it offensive defence.

By end November most Pak Army concentrations in Bangladesh (

including Dacca ) were surrounded by Indian Army and Mukti Bahini.

It was at this point that Pak decided to attack on our Western front

by air strikes on 3 Dec night to draw our forces away from beleaguered

Pak Army in Bangladesh.

India was prepared for this and launched its I Corps in Sambha

Sector. I got my forthwith posting order to TRIUMPHANT THIRD on

30 Nov 71. Joined the THIRD at Bhaironath Temple on 5 Dec morning.

Participated in famous battle for the capture of Jarpal as A company

commander of 3 Grenadiers under Lt. Gen. VP Airy, MVC along with

Col. Hoshiar Singh ( C company commander ) and Arun Khetrapal (

both PVCs ),

Dacca fell on 16 Dec and Pakistan had no option but to seek cease

fire which became effective at 8 pm on 17 Dec 71.



Every thing stated above is openly ack by India now, but majority

still think Bangladesh was liberated in 14 days.”

I thought I should refute this by putting down my first hand account

of actual sequence of events that led to liberation of Bangladesh, for the

benefit of those who are still ignorant about.




Chapter 4: The “KILO” Flight- A Chronicled Personal Account by Arun Karandikar

4. The “KILO” Flight- A Chronicled Personal

Account by Arun Karandikar

1

KILO Flight was the name given to a clandestine unit formed

with a few Pakistan Air Force pilots who escaped from East

Pakistan during the refugee influx into India after the genocide inflicted

on the local populace from 1970 onwards.

I was posted to No 43 Sqn in Jan 1971 after the Command Conversion

Course. In early May, Fg Offr KS Rajan, Myself, Flt Lt PL Chopra

(Nav) and Flt Lt Biswas (Flt Sig) were selected by the Commanding

Officer, Wg Cdr KC (Koka) Sharma for a detachment to fly for Eastern

Command. As per him, we could pass off as Bengalis! Not very convincing

to me! For about 15 days, we airlifted bridging and other equipment,

Army/ Mukti Bahini personnel wearing civilian clothes, lungi, to generally

unused landing grounds like Ambari, Coochbehar, Balurghat on

the border, and to Agartala and Bagdogra. We were told to keep quiet

about what we did or saw. These places were also in proximity to the

training camps where the Indian Army was training the Mukti Bahini.

It entailed a lot of flying in the notorious pre-monsoon weather of that

region including, from June onwards, a massive airlift of refugees. This

was undertaken by a variety of transport aircraft to relocate the lakhs

streaming into India. The force was supplemented by two C-130s of

1

Air Cmde Arun Karandikar, VM, VSM, (Retd) is an alumnus of the 28th NDA

Course and a Bronze Medalist. He was commissioned into the Indian Air

Force with the 97th Pilots’ Course. He was in the first batch of pilots trained

on the Boeing 737-200 inducted for VIP operations. He was listed in the

‘Limca Book of Records, 1996’ for maximum hours in military flying.

33


the USAF. They were mostly lifted out of Agartala, the most convenient

entry point. They used to be herded into the aircraft, seated on the floor,

herded out, and the aircraft was cleaned and disinfected after every sortie.

I knew nothing about ‘Kilo’ Flight till I was detailed to join them on

01 Dec 71, from No 43 Sqn (Ibexes) along with a Sqn Ldr SK Chaudhary,

a senior pilot and QFI, flying in to Dimapur where they were based. The

raison d’etre of creating this unit was essentially to give these pilots

a sense of participation in the war to liberate East Pakistan from the

Pakistani rulers. The aircraft I was allotted was HJ882. It had nosed

over the previous day during a full power run by a technician and both

propeller tips got bent! They just changed the propellers and declared the

aircraft serviceable with a lower maximum RPM! The aircraft was like a

personal possession till 16 Dec. As I remember, there were 9 PAF pilots,

the senior-most was Sqn Ldr Sultan Mahmud who later became the CAS

and was a helicopter pilot. I remember a Flt Lt Alam who had flown

F-86, another Flt Lt Alam who was a C130 pilot, a Capt Shahbuddin

from a regional airline and one Sharafuddin. Sultan Mahmud and the

fighter pilot, Badrul Alam, were trained on an Allouette helicopter by Sqn

Ldr CM Singla, the rest on Otter by Sqn Ldr Ghoshal. Both aircraft were

fitted with 30 mm rocket pods and a machine gun firing sideways in the

rear, the door being removed on the left side, operated by an airman crew

member. There had been talk of equipping a Dakota in a similar fashion,

but it was never done. Nor was any pilot trained to fly a Dakota at that

time. Their tales of the unique privileges enjoyed by military officers in

Pakistan was the cause of some envy!

Gp Capt Chandan Singh, VrC, then Station Commander Jorhat, was

the Task Force Commander. A dynamic go-getter, an AN-12 pioneer

and a Vir Chakra awardee for his role on AN 12s in the 1965 war with

Pakistan. He was the one who, when Air 2, Western Air Command, sent

me, a newly commissioned Pilot Officer, to an AN-12 squadron to train

and fly as a co-pilot. Till then, these aircraft were flown by experienced,

relatively senior pilots. I logged about 1200 hours in 2 years there. That

actually jump-started my flying career.



There was a sense of impending war as the monsoon receded, particularly

around Diwali, but nothing happened. We had assumed visibly

aggressive postures both on the Eastern and Western borders, waiting

for Pakistan to make the first move. There had been undeclared attacks

on Paki forces in some sectors, in late November, supposedly by Mukti

Bahini, but with major Indian Army involvement.

On 2 Dec71, we moved from Dimapur to Kailashahar Airfield. A

small 3000 ft strip, usable only in daytime, unmanned. A low level sortie,

about 300 ft AGL, an ultra-low run over the strip to drive away the cattle,

as we did on a daily basis at Lilabari, a short circuit and a short field

landing! Flying without restrictions of any kind was enjoyable! There

was an AOP Auster already on the small apron. Capt Kripalani, ex-22

NDA, and Capt Grewal were the pilots. They had been directing artillery

fire of the field guns supporting the initial raids in end November, behind

enemy lines, to secure some tactical advantage for the attack on Shamshernagar,

just across the border. The space in the terminal was limited,

the Bangladeshis and Sqn Ldr SK Chaudhary occupied available office

space; there were only two toilets, other than the one with the Aerodrome

Officer’s room which was occupied by Gp Capt Chandan Singh.

The Bangladeshi airmen had tents. We managed a transistor radio from

the aerodrome officer on which we could listen to the news broadcasts.

There was an army field telephone. My bed was the ubiquitous holdall

of those days, to roll open and sleep on, wherever there was space in the

building. In the morning, roll it up and put it in the aircraft! My flying

suit was a 24 hour attire!

The balloon went up on 3 rd Dec 71 with Pakistan attacking our

airfields in the Western theatre! To give the Bangladesh pilots the privilege

of firing the first shots in East Pak, Gp Capt Chandan Singh sent

the Allouette with Sultan Mahmud and Alam around midnight to attack

the oil tanks at Chittagong Port, the Otter with the other Alam and

Sharafuddin to the fuel depot at Narayanganj. Their rockets set the tanks

on fire at both places. However, both were uncertain of their position

while returning. The Alouette was recovered at Teliamura near Agartala



with petromax lamps and the Otter at Kumbhigram on gooseneck flares.

Luckily both places had air traffic controllers and homers. I had to fly

into Kumbhigram in the wee hours of that night with essential spares

for the Otter. Other than that, my task was to undertake sorties on an asrequired

basis between Kailashahar, Kumbhigram and DImapur. One

sortie to drop a few troops at Shamshernagar, just across the border on

5 Dec, resulted in Pak artillery targeting the airfield, as informed by Capt

Kripalani who saw the explosions. All sorties were flown at 300 ft to 500

ft AOL till 6 Dec, when we got official word that there was no enemy

Airforce threat in being. Then on, we flew as we pleased but above 5000

ft over enemy territory to stay clear of ground fire.

All the flying was on verbal instructions from Gp Capt Chandan

Singh. Only hours were filled in the Form700.

Special Heli-Borne Operations

On 5 Dec, while all of us were sitting around during the evening meal,

Gp Capt Chandan Singh mentioned his idea of using helicopters for

quick induction of troops. Lt Gen Sagat Singh, GOC 4 Corps, dynamic

and bold, was a close friend of his and like the other formation commanders,

wanted to be the first to reach Dacca! Their first objective was to

contain the Pak garrison at Sylhet. So, the first operation was to helilift

4/5 Gurkhas of 59 Mtn Bde, with a SHBO. No 110 HU Mi4s flew into

Kailashahar on 7 Dec from Teliamura where they had first assembled

from dispersed locations. They initially inducted these troops in two

waves of three vics each to a football field south of Sylhet. The CO, Sqn

Ldr CS Sandhu, led the first wave and Flt Lt PK Vaid the second. The

first ever night SHBO was planned on 8 Dec from Kailashahar. With the

chopper guys around, it was great to have some familiar guys to chat

with, all excited about the event and first ever night SHBO. But I had to

find a new spot to roll out my holdall to sleep!



Flying the Dakota all Alone

On 7 Dec, I was summoned by Gp Capt Chandan Singh to undertake an

urgent flight to Kumbhigram for some essential stores for the next SHBO.

Then to my surprise, he asked if I was confident to fly the Dakota alone!

Apparently Sqn Ldr Chaudhary was not available. That was quintessentially

Chandan Singh! I cannot imagine any other Commander taking

such a decision even in wartime. It was an eerie feeling to be all alone

in a cockpit meant for four! I had two E Pakistan airmen to look after

the load. There was great flow of adrenaline the first time! I had to

execute all that the co-pilot would normally do, like reach out across

the right-hand seat to operate the gills, operate the flap lever and raise

and lower the undercarriage (wheels). The only complicated part was

the undercarriage as it required me to take the right foot off the rudder

immediately after take-off, kick off the lock of the latch lever, leave the

throttles, pull up the latch lever with the right hand, then reach out and

raise the gear operating handle. We barely cleared the trees after take-off

on that short runway, and at about 85 to 90 mph an engine failure could

cause serious problems if the foot was not on the rudder or the wheels

were down! The sequence was reversed for lowering the wheels but it

was not critical like on take-off. All the flying was manual, the autopilot

was primitive and normally unusable, but the Dak could be trimmed to

fly a very steady heading and altitude. The ground crew at Kumbhigram

were shocked to see the right seat empty when I taxied in! The next

night, I had to repeat the same trip! It gets much lonelier at night with

nothing to see, a few towns that had lights were blacked out and Assam

was generally a black hole those days. It gave an eerie feeling to see

vacant cockpit seats of co-pilot, navigator and signaller bathed in ultra

violet light. There was radio silence too as no one else was flying at night

in that area. Quite an experience! At least we had clear skies; the moon

rose around 8 pm and progressively later as the days went by.



I flew six such sorties, solo!

On one flight to Silchar and back, Capt Shahbuddin of Bangladesh, who

had Pilatus Porter experience, asked to accompany me. He was allowed

to do so.

Operations after 9 Dec

On 8 Dec, the SHBO was completed ex Kailashahar by 110 HU including

a first ever night operation. I did my last solo flight late at night to

Kumbhigram, returning early morning, and then flew with Gp Capt

Chandan Singh to Jorhat. On the return, the Squadron detailed Fg Offr

Nanu Narayan to fly with me. The helicopters flew to Agartala that

morning for operations ex Agartala.

Over 8 and 9 Dec, we airlifted Kilo flight to Agartala and did a

couple of flights to Kumbhigram. Our accommodation again, shared with

the helicopter pilots, was whatever space was available in the terminal

building, the men had tents! The next SHBO by 110 HU was to lift troops

of 57

Mountain Division (4 Guards, 10 Bihar and 18 Rajput and their Arty

and Engineers) across the Meghna River near Brahmanbaria, to Narsingdi

and Bhairab Bazaar. Gen Sagat Singh, Gp Capt Chandan Singh, CO and

Flt Cdr 110 HU flew in an Allouette to recce the area for suitable helipads.

They were fired upon, but realized it only when the co-pilot, Fg Offr GPS

Sidhu, got a bullet in his leg. There were many bullet holes seen on the

chopper after landing back. However, subsequently the entire helilift of

57 Brigade went off without a hitch or casualty. Mi4s of 111 and 105 HU

also took part. The operations were both by day and night over the next

four days.

At Agartala, there were numerous casualty evacuation sorties by

Dakota and Packet aircraft during the day. Hundreds of casualties would

arrive, and the stretchers were laid out along the tarmac area. It was

distressing to see a large number of mine-blast injuries. Their physical

state would be assessed and their transfer to various hospitals organized



by the medics. It was surprising to see no civilian welfare effort, unlike the

western front, except the Red Cross, to provide any assistance while they

lay there. Some of us aircrew used to go around with water and orange

juice. When not busy with Kilo Flight commitments, I was tasked with

a couple of casevac trips with sitting casualties, as the aircraft was not

modified with stretchers. From Agartala, we mainly had commitments to

Kailashahar, Dimapur and Kumbhigram for logistic support of the Mi4s,

and Allouette and dropped some leaflets en route too on a couple of

flights. We got news of the Para Brigade being dropped at Tangail,

north of Dacca on the evening of 11Dec. That resulted in 2 Para Bn

(Col Pannu) getting ahead of 4 Corps, to enter Dacca first!!

On 15 Dec, I was directed to fly at dawn to Kailashahar to airlift

troops to Agartala. I am not too sure of the battalion/companies that

were airlifted. Probably de-inducted elements of 81 Mountain Brigade,

likely 4 Kumaon from the physical appearance. One Dakota from my

squadron joined us and flew three sorties during the day before returning

with casualties from Agartala. Flying virtually nonstop through the

day and till near midnight, the task was completed. I carried out 15

landings in all, seven at night. At Kailashahar, the short airstrip had only

six goose necks on each side for night landing. At Agartala, the available

flares were laid out along only one edge of the runway to mark its length!

Depth perception and perspective assessment was very difficult. Except

the lights at Teliamura, there was no other lighting which made it easier

to spot.

Surrender Ceremony at Dacca

On 16 Dec, I flew to Jorhat to pick up Gp Capt Chandan Singh and

return to Agartala. There was a buzz about a ceasefire/ surrender. There

had been an air strike on Government House at Dacca when a highlevel

meeting was on. On the way, he confirmed that there would be

a surrender ceremony at the Race Course in Dacca and that I could go

in one of the Mi 4s to witness the same. I went with Flt Lt Jayaraman

and Fg Offr BLK Reddy. It was an amazing experience to fly over fully



manned anti-aircraft guns, see the Paki troops formed up on parade with

all their weapons, and get cheered as we alighted and carried on the

shoulders of the local public as we got out of available vehicles, to the

venue. I was standing at the table moments before the historic picture

was taken, as I gave my place to Sqn Ldr Aujla, the S Ad O Jorhat, the

Sikh officer in the picture, who had come along with Chandan Singh.

Met some army coursemates, Pradeep Sharma of the Engineers who

came in on a PT76 tank with the leading elements, and Ashok Choudry,

ADC to General Krishnarao of 8 Mountain Division, who flew in on a

Mi 4. It was evening when we arrived and we had to leave in a hurry

after the ceremony for the return trip, to get airborne before nightfall.

It was an absolutely exhilarating experience for all to see Gen Niazi

signing the instrument of surrender and Gen JS Aurora counter-signing.

I flew back to Jorhat that night with Gp Capt Chandan Singh, missing

the celebrations at Agartala with the chopper boys.

The war had ended! I had flown a total of 49 sorties, 5 as a single

pilot on the Dakota, in 14 days including 15 on one day! Throughout

we never thought of rest or food, just did what was required

and sustained ourselves with what was at hand. Though no enemy

bullets were faced it was a great experience for a fledgling pilot to

undertake these flights on short runways with less than basic facilities

and almost no lighting at night.

On 20 Dec, I flew with Gp Capt Chandan Singh to Dimapur for the

formal handing over of the Allouette to Sqn Ldr Sultan Mahmud, and the

winding down of Kilo Flt. As a piece of memorabilia, I got my Bangladesh

flag inscribed on 16 Dec 1971, signed by him (see photograph below). His

request for rockets on the Allouette, for settling some personal scores, was

firmly turned down by Chandan Singh. We went to Agartala overflying

Dacca runway, and Dimapur again, before returning to Jorhat late that

night. I also flew to Dacca during the subsequent days for various reasons

after the runway had been somewhat repaired.

Kilo flight was now history!

1. Gp Capt Chandan Singh was awarded the MVC, bf



2. Sqn Ldr CM Singla and Sqn Ldr SK Chaudhary got VrCs.

3. Sqn Ldr CS Sandhu, CO 110 HU, and Flt Lt PK Vaid, Flt Cdr, got

VrCs.

Most of the Bangladesh pilots also got gallantry awards from their

government.




Chapter 5: Letters to my wife –1971 War of Bangladesh by Shimi Kanbargimath

5. Letters to my wife –1971 War of Bangladesh

by Shimi Kanbargimath

“When my wife, Girija, and I decided to write the Biography of

my late father, Lt Col S S Kanbargimath, we started our search

for all the old documents. What a treasure trove of letters diaries and

documents we found – all of them meticulously preserved by my wife

and me for the last 50 odd years!!! And among them, serendipitously, and

much to our delight, out tumbled a bundle of letters that I had written to

Girija when I moved from Belgaum to take part in the 1971 war for the

liberation of East Pakistan, which later became Bangladesh. My letter of

14 Nov 1971 was the first one of the series of letters that I wrote my wife

as we moved to Eastern Command and thereafter into East Pakistan.

Five decades ago, letter writing was the only popular mode of being in

touch. We in the infantry especially had a special attachment to the red

inland letters issued by the Army Postal Unit.

I was serving with the Commando Wing as an Instructor, just married

to Girija and we were in the midst of our excitement in setting

up our first home with our first child on the way!! Barely after a few

months of bliss we were given the orders and I started to pack. The war

clouds started gathering over East Pakistan and by September/October

1971 we were certain war was imminent. Our task was to train and

lead the Mukti Bahini (Freedom Fighters of Bangladesh) for commando

tasks once the war started. By November 1971 The Commando Wing

was ordered to move to Headquarters, Eastern Command for further

instructions. Letters now would be our only means of being in touch.

The first letter is dated 14 Nov 1971. We had departed from Belgaum

Railway Station. The letter reads. Dearest Girija, well here I am sticking

43


to my promise that I made to you last night. The train journey so far

has been comfortable. I shall keep writing to you. I have bought a dozen

of the Inland postage letters and am waiting for the changing over to

broad gauge here. Be cheerful and I am sure God will have everything

working right for us. (For convenience sake I will use “Dearest Girija”

only once. What I have typed has been censored by Girija! No mushy

expressions! Only details regarding my movement have been narrated)

16 Nov: Dearest Girija, we have reached Nagpur. It’s a longish wait

here as we have to change trains tomorrow, 17 Nov, at 4 pm for Calcutta.

We went out for dinner and thought of seeing a movie but decided against

it. After a post dinner stroll near the station we got into our compartment

and are preparing ourselves for a good night’s sleep and our onward

journey to Calcutta. Lying down I read the book “Love Story” by Erich

Segal. (I could not complete the letter) As I am writing (17 Nov) waiting

for our breakfast to arrive, Khatri and Kanwar are also writing letters

home and Dogra (all Commando Instructors) is with the morning local

newspaper. 19 Nov. We have arrived in Calcutta and in HQ Eastern

Command. There are hectic activities, officers running all over with files.

Col Das Gupta has gone over to meet the General for a briefing. I and my

team of Commando instructors have been instructed to fly to Guwahati

on 20 Nov.

20 Nov. I am writing to you from Dum Dum airport getting ready

to board our flight, a Packet aircraft to Guwahati. The wait here is comfortable.

The airport is nice and I am feeling excited at the prospect of

joining the units deployed for operations.

25 Nov. I reached my destination after an interesting road journey

from Guwahati to the border town TURA. I could not write earlier

as I was busy getting my briefing and settling down. I hope you have

been receiving my letters and also my telegram sent yesterday from the

local post office. Morale is high. Everyone seems relaxed and getting

ready to take off for the long-awaited war. I am with 95 Bde which is

being commanded by a flamboyant commander, Brig Kler. I am looking

forward to exciting times.



30 Nov. It was such a relief when your telegram was read out to

me over the telephone as I am now at a place where there is a civil

post office. I hope this letter reaches you quickly. I am eagerly waiting

for a letter from you. There is not much news to give at the moment.

I am sure you all are tuning in to the AIR news. There is heavy firing

going all over the border. As usual Pakis are exaggerating the casualties

on our forces to boost their morale. They are being hard pressed in all

sectors. Pakis know they are fighting a losing war. The Mukti Bahinis

are playing merry hell into them now. Their action has confined the Pak

troops to their heavily fortified defences. It’s a pity we are losing men in

this damned undeclared war. How I wish war is declared soon so that

action can start and the ordeal is over. I am taking the liberty to inform

you where I am located. If you look at the map I am on the Northern

border of Bangladesh - a border town called TURA in MEGHALAYA

(We all are referring to East Pakistan as Bangladesh now). We have

started greeting all the locals with “JOI BANGLADESH”. Pray for us.

7 Dec. From Bakshiganj. The war started on 3 Dec. On the evening

of 3rd Dec I was told to report to the Commanding Officer of 1 Marathas,

Lt Col Brar. He told me to take 30 Mukhti Bahini men from a nearby

camp and briefed me to establish a road block to facilitate the attack on

Bakshiganj. I along with my JCO and an NCO moved in with the Mukti

Bahini men for our task. We established the block but it seemed to be

away from the road from where the Pakis started withdrawing the same

night. I heard the rumbling of vehicles and I tried to get in touch with

CO 1 MLI. I thought our Artillery guns have a very lucrative target to

engage. But alas I could not establish contact. Our wait was in vain. Next

morning the leader of this force got us blankets and arranged some lungis

for us as he wanted us to look like the locals. Bakshiganj is a built-up

area and our forces had to clear these defences to advance. There was

not much of opposition here as the Paki troops decided to withdraw

to the depth areas. Everything is OK with me and we are moving in

fast. I have joined up with the Brigade HQs and am moving along with

them. Sherpur was bypassed and cleared. The attack on Jamalpur is



Figure 6: Late Capt. Balbir & Shimi Kanbargimath having lunch with

the Mukti Bahini

being planned. I have been tasked to lay a roadblock once again. I am

so happy when your letter dated 25 Nov was handed over to me.



Figure 7: I am the boss now- Address by a member of the Mukti Bahini

Figure 8: Occupation of Sherpur by Our Troops



Figure 9: Sherpur after liberation 8 December

Figure 10: General Nagra lands at Tangail with food for the men.



Figure 11: Self standing in front of Gen Niazi’s residence, Dacca

Figure 12: Self with Brig Kler & Gen Nagra in Dacca



Figure 13: Surrender of Pakistani troops

Figure 14: Surrender of Pakistani troops



Figure 15: Gen Manekshaw’s visit after the surrender of Pakistani troops



Figure 16: Gen Manekshaw’s visit after the surrender of Pakistani troops

Figure 17: Jubilant Bangladeshi friends



Figure 18: Self with Capt. Anand and GLO IAF




Chapter 6: My Most Memorable Learning Experience by Rana Kapur

6. My Most Memorable Learning Experience

by Rana Kapur

1

This short article is a humble attempt of mine to pay my tribute

and homage to one of the greatest Soldiers and Formation Commanders

of our times, of not only our Army but also of the World Armies.

This write up is straight from the heart to express my deep respect and

adulation for a person I very proudly refer to as a “Soldier’s General”.

I had the privilege and honour of being associated with him on two

occasions. First, for a week in Feb 1971, when he stayed in the Guest

Room of my Regt HQ at Sapper Camp, NEFA and I, who had just joined

the Regt after the Degree Course, was the only Officer present, to look

after him. The General Officer had just taken over IV Corps and had

to familiarize himself with the 5 Div Sector. In view of the restrictions

due to acclimatization, he decided to camp himself at Sapper Camp,

fly every day to the areas of interest and return by early evening. It

was indeed my good fortune to get this opportunity to look after a bold,

audacious and highly professional strategist and soldier. This was proven

by his immense contributions as Brigade Commander 50 Para Brigade

in the liberation of Goa in Dec 1961. Although his Para Brigade was

tasked with merely assisting the main thrust of 17 Infantry Division, its

units advanced rapidly across road blocks, minefields and four riverine

obstacles to be the first to reach Panjim on 19 Dec 1961. Thereafter,

as GOC 17 Mountain Division he taught the Chinese Army a lesson

of their life time during the clashes at Nathu La and Cho La, wherein

1

Lt Gen Rana SK Kapur PVSM, AVSM, SM, VSM, Veteran

55


he defeated the Chinese forces in these clashes and achieved decisive

tactical advantage. His firebrand statement, in response to messages from

the Army HQ to cease fire was, “Message not received. Let them have

it”, which was followed by salvos of artillery fire on the Chinese. These

clashes displayed his grit and determination as a soldier to win battles,

come what may.

It was a God sent opportunity and an honour for me to be blessed

with his company for an entire week. Though nervous when I received

him at the Helipad, I truly felt I was on cloud nine in the company of

a great human being, with a very positive and cheerful vibe. I did not

feel overwhelmed or intimidated by his towering personality because of

his immense humility and his quality of being gentle with subordinates,

so as to not only make them feel at ease but also to open up and chat

with him. I vividly remember the first evening when I asked him what

drink I could offer him, he told our Mess Waiter Bhagirath that I was a

guest in his room and that he should serve me a drink instead. Though I

was a teetotaler then, I had my first whisky that evening. His simplicity

was evident when he asked me which city I belonged to and I replied

that I was an ‘Allahabadi’. He promptly asked me if he could also call

himself an ‘Allahabadi’ since his wife had done her B Ed from Allahabad!

The week just whizzed past and left behind some very pleasant and

satisfying memories and giving me an insight into the human side of this

exceptional military leader.

The second time was for nearly six months at the Operational HQ

of IV Corps at Teliamora, Tripura from Apr to Dec 1971, where all the

planning and preparations were undertaken for the operations of 1971

War for the Liberation of Bangladesh. I was the Company Commander

of 67 Field Company which had the singular honour to construct its

Field HQ. The site selected was a totally barren undulating area with no

local resources. My task included construction of Basha Accommodation,

for offices and residential, Air Conditioned Ops Room with an appropriate

size Sand Model, Signal Centre with a portion of it air conditioned,

Alfa and Bravo Officers Messes, Corps Commanders Pre War Den, a



Field Hospital with an air conditioned Operation Theatre and ICU and

finally a Helidrome with nearly eight to ten helipads and all these to be

completed in a couple of months. The accommodation provided had

round-the-clock electric supply and running water supply from overhead

water tanks with a well marked/sign posted road network as means of

access. It was my first war experience, hence the most challenging yet

professionally satisfying. In fact the experience was exhilarating because

I was also exposed to the human face of the Corps Commander behind

the military façade. Every evening he would take a walk around the Campus

to see the progress of its construction and its quality assessment, with

me often in attendance and sometimes accompanied by the Corps Chief

Engineer. On one such occasion, he asked me what were the factors I

had considered while designing his Hut in terms of sunrise/sunset, wind

direction etc. Being a Dapodi Engineer, I had no other choice but to

respond as a soldier – “Sir, all those are peace time criteria for designing

accommodation but this is the Operational Hut of the Corps Commander

IV Corps to liberate Bangladesh so your HUT must therefore – Always

Face the Enemy”. He approved the idea with a great laugh and a good

hug and shake up for me. I shall never ever forget that moment.

The most memorable compliment I have received through forty years

of service was from The General. One fine morning there was a message,

from the Command HQ that the Army Commander would be visiting our

HQ after two days. This came out of the blue since it was not expected

for some time as we hadn’t been there for long. During the evening walk

that day, he mentioned to me that all aspects of the HQ were perfect to

receive and conduct the Army Commander but how he wished that he

could have lunch with all the Officers in a proper Mess rather than the

two of them eating in his caravan. I assured the General that his desire

was my command and the Mess would be functional for the visit. He

was very apologetic and felt guilty for pushing me. He insisted that I

reconsider and suggested that they would lunch at his Caravan Complex.

I worked tirelessly through those two days and on the morning of the

visit, when he saw the Mess ready and in place, he asked his MA to call



his son. The surprised look of the MA prompted him to clarify that he

wanted him to call me. His tight hug and “Well Done, Son”, said it all. I

am choked with nostalgic emotions just reminiscing about the Greatest

General I have ever served with. His passion for soldiering was evident

from the fact that whenever there was an important battle fought, he

would spend the next evening with us in the Bravo Mess to share his

thoughts about it, whether complimentary or anguish, when units did

not perform up to his expectations. On one such occasion he was ‘on

top of the world’ since an Infantry Battalion had achieved a great victory,

after having not done so well the previous night. He insisted on reposing

his confidence in the Battalion much against the advice of a few staff

officers. A decision to the contrary would have destroyed the morale and

image of a very good battalion. That he was a big-hearted General was

also evident when, in reference to the 2IC of the Battalion who had to

spend the night in the no man’s land during that battle, he said “How I

wish I was a Maharaja and I could weigh the Officer in gold” and that

my name was recommended for a Sena Medal, a great complement for

a young Sapper officer.

My association with him taught me some very important character

qualities which are essential for being a Perfect General Officer in our

Great Army :-

a. The first and foremost was to be a good human being and a

Gentleman – he was in fact perfection personified.

b. He was upright, forthright and most importantly had the courage

of conviction to stand up to seniors, whether politicians or in

uniform, for righteousness of a cause.

c. The General Officer was humility personified.

d. He was passionate about soldiering and had genuine compassion

for all ranks. In Oct 1971, the General noticed that I was seriously

sun burnt due to severe exposure to the summer sun/heat of the

North East and was also totally bushed with fatigue. He rang up



my CO and directed that I be sent on Temporary Duty to the

Command HQ for a well deserved break for rest and recoup. I

have not come across a General who took such personal interest

in the welfare and well-being of a young officer.

On a lighter note! All of us are well aware of the great Victory our

Armed Forces achieved, due to the brilliant and very precise planning of

the operations at HQ IV Corps, but what remained top secret until now

is the reason for it, which I need to now declassify – “The comfortable

and conducive working environment provided to the Corps Commander

and his Staff at HQ IV Corps at Taliamora by my very own, indomitable

and second to none, All Ranks of 67 Field Company, 234 Army Engineer

Regiment”.

The performance of 67 Field Company at HQ IV Corps earned us the

honour and privilege of being selected to provide close engineer support

to Kilo Force Brigade in its task to advance to and capture Chittagong.

The task involved mine clearance and other tasks in close support of the

battalions and the brigade. A major task was to keep the main line of

communication open for the move of the formation especially the guns

and heavy equipment, which was really made difficult with the enemy

having demolished all the bridges along the main axis and the road being

at a much higher level than the surrounding area. To achieve this task,

we operated a ferry across the river at Feni, which was later replaced by

an equipment bridge and constructed a number of improvised crossings

by utilizing the railway tracks, sleepers and other resources available at

the Pakistani railway stations. The Brigade successfully accomplished

its operational objective of capturing Chittagong and we were thereafter

deployed therein, at the Naval Base.

I was indeed blessed to have been given such a great operational

learning experience, that too at such an early stage of my career and

most importantly under the bold, audacious and exemplary leadership

of the finest General of our Army – Gen Sagat Singh. No words of mine

will ever be adequate to express my gratitude to him for teaching me the

essential character qualities required of an Army officer. With immense



pride I salute the :-

THE FINEST SOLDIER, LEADER, OFFICER AND GENTLEMAN


Chapter 7: Armour on Land and Water 1971 by B S Mehta

7. Armour on Land and Water 1971 by B

S Mehta

1

Chance , luck, or randomness plays an important role not only in

life but also on the battlefield. Reflect on your own life from the

time you left home for the academy, from college to career, from single

life to family life, from Captain to Colonel, or from the first hole of golf

to the eighteenth and you will agree that success or failure sometimes

arises neither from great skill, nor from great incompetence, but fortuitous

circumstances.

On 20 November 1971 afternoon, C Squadron, 45 Cavalry, received

orders to cross the Kabodak River flowing alongside the International

Border between India and erstwhile East Pakistan and advance a few

km to establish a firm base. Maj Narag,[ ‘Chiefy’] the Squadron Commander,

orders were short and crisp. To add excitement and zing to

the proceedings, Chiefy, in a rare moment of inspiration, gave names

of important towns of Pakistan viz Rawalpindi, Karachi, Lahore to the

tactical bounds selected by him. These were dutifully jotted down by

1

Brig B S Mehta was commissioned into 45 Cavalry in June 1966. During

the 1971 Indo-Pak war, he was pitched into command of the squadron amid

tank vs tank battle as the youngest Sqn Cdr during that war. He has recently

authored the book, The Burning Chaffees’ providing a first-hand account

of a tank battle, which will be the inspiration for a full-length war movie

PIPPA by Ronnie Screwvala and Siddharth Roy Kapur, scheduled for release in

2021. Post premature retirement in 1998 he has served with the Government

of Gujarat, besides functioning as Vice-chancellor of two universities. He

is an advisor to a Gujarat-based NGO looking after Martyrs families and

dependents as also a consultant to Hare Krishna Exports Pvt Limited Surat.

61


the troop leaders but consigned to memory by Chiefy. The briefing was

to end with the usual “Koi shuk ya sawal? ‘’ when the newly promoted

JCO Tp Ldr raised a genuine doubt; “Who will give the orders to open

fire?” The question asked in all innocence, jolted each one into the harsh

reality that this was not another formation-level exercise but the start

of a war. The tank commanders and crews suddenly realized that they

would now have to exercise their training and discretion and no longer

wait for orders to shoot. The transition is easy for trained soldiers but

can be traumatic for the more sensitive. The hesitation or reluctance to

’shoot to kill’ however melts away after the first few rounds have been

fired.

Two companies of 14 Punjab (Nabha Akal) were to ride piggyback

on our PT - 76 tanks while the rest were to footslog to the given RV. The

tank column led by troop leader Lt Teji Sidhu commenced the advance

around 1600 hrs on 20 Nov 71. From the International Border (IB) till the

first bound the advance was deliberate and entailed basic troop level drills

of leapfrog and one leg on the ground. The riverine terrain and bamboo

clusters demanded vigilance and caution as a movement of suspected

Mujahids around the villages was noticeable. With dusk descending, it

became imperative to speed up the advance. Chiefy accordingly gave

orders to Teji Sidhu to change course and now advance towards code

word ’Lahore’ instead of ’Rawalpindi’. Teji was quick to respond and

moved in the direction ordered after checking his map. It was not long

before bedlam broke out on the Sqn radio net. Chiefy was on the air to

correct Teji that he was heading for ’Karachi’ instead of ’Lahore’. Teji

gave fresh orders for change of direction to his tank commanders only

to be berated that he was now heading for ’Rawalpindi’. Much of what

was exchanged as radio messages cannot be put down in writing. Suffice

it to say that memory can sometimes lead you astray when advancing

into enemy territory. The advance was soon resumed by referring to

the cardinal points of the prismatic compass. With dusk, we were in the

vicinity of our given RV when the CO 14 Punjab, Col R K Singh, gave

orders to halt the advance and deploy in darkness.



Before midnight the marching columns arrived followed by the ’F’

echelon of the infantry battalion. The general atmosphere was one of a

formation-level exercise without umpires. 14 Punjab riding piggyback

had slithered off ’C’ Squadron tanks to dig weapon pits and take up a

hasty defence while tanks deployed around infantry company localities.

During the night movement of vehicles on Road Chaugacha -Jessore was

observed from a distance of two / three kilometers. The presence of tanks

was suspected but could not be confirmed as all observations were based

on the sound of engines and vehicle lights were seen. Troops remained

alert but there was no alarm. Past midnight a full moon appeared over

the horizon. In the moonlight, the silhouette of soldiers digging trenches

could be seen followed by the sound of a pickaxe or shovel striking a

rock or the metallic sound of empty water pakkhals ( water container) or

defence stores being unloaded. From the trench close by, one overheard

of the tragic watery grave of nine brave-hearts of the Battalion when

their boat carrying fully armed soldiers capsized while crossing Kabodak

river. One could not help but admire the strength and tenacity of this

Battalion’s personnel, who despite a tragedy stood determined to fulfill

their soldierly duty.

On 21 Nov 1971, we were greeted by heavy dense fog with visibility

limited to 20 m. Tanks adjusted pre-dawn and fire arcs coordinated and

engines switched off when a runner arrived with a message from the

Brigade HQ to detach two troops under the squadron 21C of C Sqn, to

a different location. Teji and self walked back towards Chiefy’s tank. He

read the message and reacted in the typical cavalry tradition: important

orders for att / det must come from the Commandant directly. His quick

riposte, no move till further orders; return to your tanks. By the time we

returned to accept a cup of piping hot tea from Ris Chakraborty, Lt Gen

AAK Niazi, was ready to launch his biggest attack of the 1971 war in

East Pakistan to teach India and the Mukti Bahini a military lesson. For

this attack, he had marshaled two infantry battalions, supported by 3[I]

Armoured Squadron with 14 Chaffee tanks and the normal complement

of other arms and services under Brig Mohd Hayat, Cdr 107 Inf Bde.



Chiefy, full back of the NDA football team playing the Durand Cup

final in 1953, was now called upon to play his destined role. His team consisted

of talented and well-trained troop leaders and tank commanders

and crews from Other Indian Classes (OIC). The OIC virtually represented

all classes of personnel who were listed as non-martial by the

British and therefore denied the honour to enroll as combatants till 1947.

Post Independence the Government corrected this anomaly by raising

this sub-unit under the OIC category. This OIC Sqn now formed the

forward line in the battle zone not only of the combat group deployed but

of the entire Army and country. The dice was about to roll and Chance,

Luck, Kismet, would determine the fate of soldiers deployed along the

borders but also 10 million refugees deprived of home, hearth, human

dignity, and justice.

Dawn comes early in the East. On 21 Nov 71, the winter sky was

enveloped with dense fog and a thick blanket of cumulus nimbus clouds.

An eerie silence permeated the morning gloom with not a bird chirping

or flying in the skies above. It was as if the entire battle zone had frozen

into inactivity. Each tank crew and section deployed on the ground

was encased in a cocoon surrounded by dense fog and limited visibility

creating the feeling of isolation. The tank crew formed small groups

of early morning tea tasters enjoying this elixir of life and nursing the

warmth of the enameled tea mugs to ward off the bitter cold when

suddenly the sound of gunfire triggered every one into action. A heavy

barrage of artillery shells were all over us as we quickly mounted our

tanks and switched on our radio sets to hear: “Enemy tanks advancing

Fire, Fire”. Looking through the gun-sights you could only register the

flash of the Chaffee tank as it fired from behind the shield of dense fog.

The tanks came belching fire, tearing through the screen of fog to be

greeted by the PT 76 Sqn. Every flash from the enemy guns was picked

up by our tank crews and soon each one was claiming ‘Ek tank barbad

kar diya’ over the radio net. Bedlam had broken loose. The full-back

footballer of yore moved his tank up and fired the standard HE round

pre-loaded in the gun chamber, followed by the AP shot which ricocheted



off the Chaffee and finally the HEAT projectile which got the Chaffee

ablaze. Chiefy was all excited and his Shaabash to the crew got carried

over the sqn net, “Maro, Maro, Shaabash”. Like all tank commanders

Chiefy too had his head and torso exposed and the tank cupola open.

“Reference last kill, right, 2 o’clock, Tank”, — A random MMG burst caught

Chiefy in the chest while the gunner waited with his thumb on the firing

switch and the enemy Chaffee within the crosshairs of his gun-sight when

he felt warm blood splash all over him. Distracted he looked up when

suddenly Chiefy collapsed and slumped over. The crew, ready to engage

the enemy tank were shocked and stupefied by this grave tragedy. While

the tank versus tank battle was raging outside the Gnr LD Dineshwar

Nath, now drenched in blood, with the Sqn Cdr’s head resting on his

lap was to pass the most unfortunate radio message, delivered with a

heavy, grieving heart, in his Assamese accent “Saab ab aur nahin hai”!

The message would have shocked and numbed the minds of all tank

crews. Momentarily it appeared as if the Sqn had been overwhelmed by

this tragedy till the Sqn 2IC’s voice came on air to announce: ’Delta 40

for all station Delta, I have assumed command’.!! The battle continued

till enemy 3[I] Armd Sqn was destroyed and two battalions badly mauled.

Hours later the tank crews would extricate Chiefy’s body from the tank

and line up on both sides of a dirt track to bid their final farewell to

their beloved Sqn Cdr. In a different setting we would have been singing

“He is a jolly good fellow, so say all of us” but on 21 Nov ’71, we felt a

deep pain inside at this loss. In a fitting tribute, crew members fired a

21 pistol salute to a fallen comrade as the vehicle carrying his body left

for the RHQ while the rays of the setting sun spread over the battlefield.

The enemy artillery fired a salvo as if to pay tribute to this fallen brave.

Chiefy had made the supreme sacrifice He lived and died as a soldier

bringing honour and glory to his family and unit. Chiefy’s decision to

delay the move of two troops was critical to the outcome of the Garibpur

battle. Chance, Kismet, Luck had played its hand. The rest is history. It is

exceptional and rare in tank warfare for one sqn to destroy an enemy sqn

of 14 tanks at the cost of the loss of one tank. During this battle, planned



and orchestrated by Gen Niazi, who a few days earlier had boasted to

foreign correspondents “We have never lost. Look in the history books.

I challenge you to find in history anything but victories. We have never

lost and the Indians have never won. I can easily take them on, three to

one”. Besides the loss of a complete Armd Sqn, two Battalions and the

Recce & Sp Coy of Pakistan were badly mauled and prisoners captured.

In the air battle over the same battlefield on 22 Nov 71, three Sabre jets

were downed by our Gnats and two pilots were captured. As this battle

took place before the open declaration of war it had a significant impact

on the Pakistani military leadership as also influenced the power play

and diplomacy between nations such as the USA, USSR, China, as also

deliberations at the United Nations.

In his book ’The Betrayal of East Pakistan’, General Niazi laments:

“On 21 Nov I tried to speak to Lt Gen Gul Hassan however he had gone

to Lahore to celebrate Eid! I tried to contact Gen Hamid, COAS, only to

learn that he and President Yahya Khan had gone for a partridge shoot.

Like Nero, they played while East Pakistan burned”. The Pakistani officers’

fraternity openly expressed their angst by chanting ’Allah -O- Akbar’

when Gen Yahya Khan visited Sialkot on 22 Nov 71 while reviewing

troops. The officers pushed for the declaration of war as a matter of

pride, prudence, and necessity. Gen Hamid held a meeting with other

commanders to declare that war had become inevitable and mobilised

the troops while the Air Force was placed on “Phase two” alert. After

the battle of Garibpur, Pakistan President Yayha declared that a “grave

situation” had arisen following a “threat of aggression” and soon after

declared a state of emergency in Pakistan. Bhutto’s caustic, graphic, and

primitive details of what Mrs. Gandhi was doing to the military leaders

of Pakistan and threat of “lynching by the people” would be the only

alternative unless Yahya declared war. Gen Yahya had earlier shocked

international opinion by calling Mrs. Gandhi “that woman”; a little later:

“she is neither statesman nor woman”. Use of such crude and intemperate

language shocked the western media. Though aware of aggression

by India the world media responded with increased appreciation and



sympathy for India’s handling of the refugee crisis and battle for human

dignity.

On 22 Nov 1971 morning at the White House, Henry Kissinger,

Secretary of State, USA, relying on Pakistani radio broadcasts, informed

President Richard Nixon about the attack “heavily backed by the Indians.

. . .It is a naked case of aggression, Mr President”. Nixon directed

Kissinger to “lay it out thick” and suspend aid to both countries which

would “hurt the Indians more” This affected $17 million in military spares

and $ 100 million funding in the food programme. “They want Pakistan

to disintegrate”, snapped Nixon. He then ordered Kissinger to “tilt” their

policy towards Pakistan “Those Indians are bastards anyway”. Despite

the ban, the Washington Group of bureaucrats found ways to encourage

some countries in the Middle East to supply arms, ammunition, aircraft

to Pakistan. It was not long before the commander-in-chief of the Pacific

Command, Admiral John McCain was tasked to secretly prepare plans to

direct the aircraft carrier task force towards the Bay of Bengal. Kissinger,

along with George Bush, Alexander Haig, and Winston Lord were to

hold their first meeting at a CIA safe House with Chinese Delegation led

by Huang Hua, the new Ambassador at the United Nations. A military

briefing on the battle of Garibpur was arranged, tantalisingly suggesting

that India had left its Northern borders with China exposed. At the

United Nations deliberations in the General Assembly, India found itself

isolated even from the Non- Aligned group of nations. The only solid

support would come in the form of veto power exercised by the USSR

in the Security Council.

The battle of Garibpur fought on 21 Nov 1971 represents a significant

and radical change in the political and military mindset of the country.

India humbled in 1962, fought an unfinished war in 1965 prepared itself

for 1971. Garibpur acted as the viagra to infuse not only our defence

forces but the citizens with a new spirit of being second to none. As

a country, we were about to shed the ’historical baggage’ of our past

to soon emerge as an assertive regional power capable of projecting its

cultural identity, human values, and military might.



On 24 Nov 71, Indira Gandhi made a historic statement in Parliament

on the Battle of Garibpur, informing that it resulted in Pakistan’s 13

Chaffees Tanks and three Sabre jets destroyed and two pilots captured,

sending shock waves across world capitals. This early victory served as

a trumpet call across the globe virtually announcing the birth of a new

nation - Bangladesh- and India emerging as a regional power.

A word about the tank PT-76. The Russians called it Palavushi Tanka-

76. The Indian troops referred to it as ’Pippa’, a tin can floating on water.

With light armour no thicker than a steel helmet, small calibre 76 mm

gun, three-man crew, amphibious tank shaped like a matchbox with

water-jet propellers did not win favor with the glitter of Black Elephants

and White Tigers or the balance of the Risala fraternity. The tank Inducted

in the 1965 war by 7 Cav, soon after allotted to 63 Cav, was

discarded by these illustrious Regiments to re-equip their independent

squadrons, the balance relegated to the new raising of 45 Cav and 69 AR.

These regiments grew up as poor country cousins of the mainstream

Risala, forming part of Armoured Division and Indep Armd Brigades.

PT 76 Regiments played out their destined role in the riverine terrain

of East Pakistan and became a symbol of military pride having played

a significant role in what the Indian PM Narendra Modi called as the

“biggest battle for human dignity and humanitarian cause fought in the

previous century”, during his speech on 8 Apr 2017 at the Manekshaw

Centre in New Delhi. 45 Cav takes pride in that it led the Eastern Army

supported by other arms and services in the creation of a new country

- Bangladesh. The ’Pippa’ won the only tank battle in the Eastern theatre

and the only tank battle that our ‘Kharga’ strike Corps has seen as

yet. This was India’s finest hour and the biggest victory the Army has

achieved by humbling the pride of Pakistan army/armed forces, when

93,000 of its personnel laid down arms in surrender on 16 Dec 1971 at

Dacca, re-spelled/re-pronounced Dhaka.


Chapter 8: The Burinda Bash by BS Mehta

8. The Burinda Bash by BS Mehta

1

Following the destruction of the Pakistan 3 (Indep) Armd Sqn at

Garibpur on 21-22 Nov 1971, the successful, hard-fought combat

group Battle of Burinda, a hamlet in Jessore District of Khulna Division,

Bangladesh, opened windows of opportunity for us to capture Dhaka.

That this opportunity went unexploited is another story of intriguing

possibilities and “what if’s” awaiting narration...

The lay reader is apt to be astonished by the peppy title of this article

but is surely not to blame for his unfamiliarity. This is because for 50

years now, a flood of braveheart stories about the Western front in the

Indo-Pak War of 1971 have invaded the sensitivities of readers across India

and the world at large, almost blocking out the war’s Eastern front and

its stories of exceptional grit, courage, sacrifice and understated achievement.

At the end of that war, the general opinion was that, whereas the

Western had yielded a “No Victor No Vanquished” status. . . India, in the

Eastern front had stunned the world by delivering in a mere 13 days, a

brave new Nation, Bangladesh; over 93,000 Pakistani prisoners of war

and revival of maneuvre as opposed to attrition based warfighting. . . a

no-holds-barred directive style of command and control as opposed to

the vintage hierarchical style as was exhibited by us on the Western front.

The untrammeled success of the Eastern front had broken Pakistan politically

and militarily. However, “the 13-day war” is a bit of hype; an

oversell really, as Garibpur happened on 21 Nov 1971 and Burinda a few

1

Brig B S Mehta was commissioned into 45 Cavalry in June 1966. During the

1971 Indo-Pak war he was pitched into command of the squadron amid tank

vs tank battle as the youngest Sqn Cdr during that war.

69


days later. . . we don’t count it as “war” since neither nation had formally

declared it and that is where veterans of the Eastern front have lost out

as the recognition that has come their way has come decades later after

the pretence of acknowledging commencement of hostilities before the

wars formal declaration was set aside a few years ago. So here is a war

the story beyond the Garibpur carnage of Pakistan’s armoured strength

that might now command the focused attention of the lay reader. . . To

get the Burinda Bash right, one first needs to understand the background

setting. Jessore District, now part of the Khulna Division once belonged

to the ancient Janapada kingdom of Banga Janapada going back to the

hoary Vedic period.

With the vicissitudes of time, the district was eventually transferred

in 1765 to the East India Company along with the rest of Bengal; British

administration being firmly established in Jessore District by 1781.

Jessore District topographically forms the central portion of the delta

between the Hoogly, the united Ganges, and the Brahmaputra. It is a

vast alluvial plain intersected by rivers and watercourses which in the

southern portion where Burinda hamlet is located has large marshes.

The northern part is heavily populated, prosperous, and has extensive

groves of date-palms. In the central portion the population is sparse, the

only part suitable for dwellings being the elevated land on the banks of

rivers. The principal rivers are the Madhumati (which forms the eastern

boundary of the district), with its tributaries the Nabaganga, Chitra, and

Bhairab; the Kumar, Kabadak (which we crossed to attack Garibpur),

Katki, Harihar, Bhadra, and Atharabanka. The tide from the southern

port city of Khulna side 65 km reaches as far north as Jessore town

which is the centre of sugar manufacture from date palms.

In 1947, Jessore was divided between India and East Pakistan. Except

for the Bangaon and Gaighata Thanas which merged into India, Jessore

District became part of East Pakistan.

Bengali soldiers stationed at Jessore Cantt mutinied against the Pakistan

Army on 29 March 1971 a few days after the Pakistani genocide

began. 300 soldiers were killed, the Bangla rebels killing 50 West Pak-



Figure 19: Map of Jessore district



istani soldiers. On 6 December 1971, Jessore became the first district of

Bengal to be liberated from Pakistani forces. This was the direct fallout

of the Burinda Bash but more of this a bit later. . . .

Jessore was the location of Pakistani HQ 9 Inf Div and its 107 Inf

Bde; its Cantt housing these formations and the airport protected by

permanent defences and a ditch. This key communication hub had three

approaches leading to it from the Indian side and the competent 107

Inf Bde Commander, Brig Mohd Hayat was tasked to deny all three approaches

by occupying strong, fortified strong points/delaying positions

astride each based on an approximate Battalion strength. These troops

were later expected to fall back after imposing maximum attrition to

fight the coordinated battle to defend Jessore city/Cantt. The Burinda

approach being the Western one; the Jhikargacha approach to Jessore

being the Southwestern one and the Northwestern or Chowgacha approach

were each defended by a Pakistani Battalion each or major part

thereof. Our allotment of formations was 32 Inf Bde for Jhikargacha; 42

Inf Bde for Chowgacha and 350 Inf Bde and my squadron for Burinda

approaches.

Burinda in Jessore District is 148 km southwest of Dhaka. It was,

in 1971, banana and bamboo enclosed hamlet of 1000 odd inhabitants

littered with ponds, narrow mud lanes, dense foliage, and 15 feet high

bunds protecting the hamlet’s central water body with defence works

integrated into the bunds. The mud thatched huts were spread 1000 m

by 800 m in an essentially marshy area. This profile gave it substantial

defensive potential and 107 Inf Bde had developed Burinda as a strong

point; a Vital Point (VP occupied) by a company plus of Pak 12 Punjab

to deny the Western approach to Jessore city, 08 km away. The balance

Battalion was deployed around the Burinda VP.

During the tank versus Tank battle of Garibpur on 21 Nov 1971 ‘C’

Squadron 45 Cavalry had destroyed 14 counterattacking Chaffee tanks

of Pakistan’s 3 [Indep] Armoured Squadron for the loss of two of its

PT-76 tanks. As a replacement, the Squadron was allotted 3 x T-55

medium 45-ton tanks as the Army had not catered for any PT-76 war



Figure 20: The three approaches to Jessore with the Burinda axis in the

centre

reserves. These tank crews underwent quickfire conversion training

in driving, radio, and gunnery inside East Pakistan. The drivers and

operators gained confidence and the Gunners were itching to fire a few

rounds of the 100mm gun. This critical need was met by innovative

‘Battle Zeroing’ - aligning the gunner’s sight with the axis of the gun

barrel – thus circumventing the need to access field firing ranges through

convoluted staff procedures. Within 72 hours the T-55 tank troop was

proactively made battle-worthy before Pakistan declared war on 03 Dec

1971.

Our Garibpur success in tank versus tank battle and the quick conversion

and induction of a 45 ton T-55 medium tank troop into an

amphibious 14 ton PT-76 tank Regiment had spread like wildfire within

the Corps zone. The warm reception accorded to tank crews of ‘C’ Sqn

45 Cavalry placed under command HQ 350 Infantry Brigade for the

capture of Burinda added to my troop’s sense of pride and achievement.

Burinda...A Tough Nut to Crack Well sited and organised for all-round

defence, Burinda had taken a heavy toll on us. 1 J & K Rif in attempting



Figure 21: The Garibpur-Burinda linkage...

to take Burinda on night 28/29 Nov had suffered 3 JCO’s and 16 OR

KIA and 50 OR wounded. Thereafter, the famous “Saragarhi” paltan 4

Sikh attacked Burinda, this time as a combat group on 30 Nov/1 Dec

supported by the entire Divisional Artillery and their Mortars and my

reinforced squadron and we had our task cut out for sure.

Burinda lay on the shortest of the three axes to Jessore which was

the Division the objective in the Corps Phase 1, so there was palpable

excitement and anticipation because taking Burinda had become the key

to taking Jessore in the minds of the military hierarchy.

After an operational briefing from Commander 350 Inf Bde Brig B

S Sandhu, I joined the 4 Sikh “Operations Group” while our tank crews

“married up” with the infantry companies. The immediate task set by the

CO was to launch a preliminary operation to occupy an enemy section

held high ground dominating a minefield that obstructed our advance.

Two tank troops were tasked to provide fire support and shoot in the

infantry company the same evening. A quick-fire plan was prepared, the

company launched and success reported. The ‘D’ Company Commander

received a big shabash as reports of enemy withdrawing came in.



Figure 22: Pakistani army soldiers study a map at Burinda (Getty Images)



The Engineers (Sappers) commenced clearing mines for safe lanes

for Infantry and tanks. The Infantry Safe Lanes was reported clear; the

Sappers were clearing the far more extensive tank lanes when the just

lauded assaulting Infantry company commander reported enemy building

up for a counter-attack. His frantic calls for tank assistance drove

the Battalion 2IC, an ex Cavalry officer, arbitrarily ordering my tanks

to negotiate the un-cleared minefield. I passed a curt radio message to

troop leader Risaldar Limbu to freeze movement and await my orders.

The 2IC snarled that I had no right to countermand orders issued by the

CO. I had to remind him firmly that the reserve company which was

to have launched through the cleared Infantry lanes hadn’t done so. He

was advised, with his aghast Adjutant listening in, that orders for tanks

would be passed through their designated commander, I. Unlike deeply

ingrained Infantry training which was based on unquestioned compliance,

tank commanders flourished in an environment where questioning

an order didn’t amount to insubordination but, instead, contributed to

operational efficiency.

Disregarding the command-and-control spat, I ensured through Risaldar

Limbu and a joint on-ground Tank-Sapper check that the tank lane

was clear. Induction of tanks speedily followed; the fear of a Pakistani

riposte being put to rest. That the CO was offended by my tactically

sound action was an issue that sadly surfaced when my CO and the

GOC arrived to validate the final Burinda attack plan the next day.

The capture of Burinda had become a prestige issue. The Pak defences

were sited to tackle all enemy approaches with mines, coordinated

and interlocked MMG fire hinged around a high embankment enclosed

water body stretching 400m in cross- section. The absence of cover over

the last 100 yards made the task of capture even more difficult as also the

ability of troops to advance and finally charge through a barrage of accurate

MMG and air burst artillery fire. With most shells exploding in the

water body, air strafing and bombing had to be specially tailored keeping

given earlier failures. The fire plan was supplemented and now included

a dozen air sorties and carpet bombing of the objective to stun the en-



Figure 23: My T-55 tanks in action

emy. For the final close support, my troop T-55 tanks would shoot in the

infantry. The PT-76 squadron would establish a road-block in Phase 2

to prevent enemy withdrawal and thus cause psychological dislocation.

My experience of Infantry attack plans was that they followed a standard

template of phased attacks by a single company in assault mode

with another company in reserve for each phase. This one was no different.

Phase I have launched one hr before last light, immediately after

pre-bombardment. The success of Phase I was tentative. The determined

enemy followed soon after with a counterattack. The assaulting ‘B’ company

was reporting heavy casualties. The CO took a command decision

and preponed the launch of Phase 2, planned for launch later that night.

I left the Battalion command post, dashing my tank harbour, 600m

away, through murderous artillery shelling. The shrill whine of the shells

helped determine the likely direction and point of the explosion. Survival

instinct guided me and my radio operator went to dive for cover. We thus

cheated death including lethal splinter ricochets from two tree bursts. In

one lucky escape, I was hit by splinters, while cocooned in a shallow



ground depression; their energy to injure fortunately spent before they

tore through my black overalls. This experience of escape and evasion

from lethal splinters/steel debris is a nightmare that torments me to date...

I feel that God sat on my right shoulder for sure... My operational review

noted the precarious situation in which the Infantry had landed itself

necessitating preponement. The mine obstacle was carefully described

again by Sapper Lt Purshottam. The tank commanders had assembled

for the briefing. My tank crews knew from monitored net radio messages

all about the critical situation in which the infantry company had placed

itself, necessitating preponement of attack by two hours. It was crucial

to brief them again about the extent of the minefield described by Lt

Purshottam and carefully follow the outer periphery of the tree line. I

would lead the tank column with the Engineer officer and a ‘C’ Company

platoon commander traveling on my tank for better coordination to cut

off the enemy withdrawal route. Our ability to do this without alerting

the enemy was germane to overall operational success.

The Capture of Burinda

It was near dusk when the Phase 2, road-block establishment commenced.

The tank column with the Infantry platoon riding piggyback negotiated

marshy area using a bullock cart track through it with the Infantry securing

a narrow log bridge. My skilled driver was the first to cross the

bridge, with his 14-ton tank, its tracks overhanging by inches across the

rickety bridge...all my tanks crossed except the last; Dfr Ishwar’s, which

slid off and was later recovered. In the fading, false light before darkness,

a rocket-launcher opened fire but was blown up by my gunner Harish

Chandra with his first round. A sharp firelight followed which we dominated

although the tank behind me appeared to have got hit, a black

puff of smoke rising from below the hull, but more on this supposition

later. My gunner had spotted a few bunkers and engaged it with HE and

MMG fire, forcing an enemy withdrawal.

A message from the Infantry CO that my tanks hadn’t reached his

beleaguered ‘B’ company commander made me get him to speak to



his Platoon Commander and Sapper Lt Purshottam. That put an end

to future pesky calls from the CO. Navigating in enemy territory is

hazardous in any terrain but negotiating a Bengali village in East Pakistan

takes the cake...Thick with lush greenery and water bodies; the main

village pond and smaller ponds outside each homestead, there could be

rocket launchers, or MMG’s anywhere...On top of that bamboo, clusters

lined the winding narrow lanes and mud huts, the Infantry guiding us

through with repeated reversal of the tanks to crawl along the tenuous

lanes. The bamboo whipped back like high-strung bows as tanks pushed

past them, hitting the crews and infantrymen holding on to safety ropes

while the tank savagely rolled and pitched moving over water channels,

steep bunds, making the tank ride a convulsive experience. One such

savage sweepback shattered the cupola hinge resulting in my nose, a

few teeth falling out. Bleeding and in pain, I focused on reaching the

roadblock behind enemy deployment and did. Duggal, the Company

commander, had done a laudable job despite suffering fresh casualties

as the enemy artillery had started firing airbursts. The infantry platoon,

riding piggyback, had by now jumped off to secure the roadblock site.

The noise of the tank engine, the gun, and MMG fire was enough for

the enemy to withdraw in gathering darkness under cover of murderous

airburst fire. I had moved over to the driver’s seat unable to stand on

my legs. The combination of a lacerated nose, two displaced teeth, cut

lips, blood loss, and pain made me very delirious which my compulsive

smoking did not ease, I had barely handed over responsibility to Capt

Saighal, the FOO, as the green Verey light flare announced the success of

Phase 2. The short catnap revived me as I straightened up to be greeted

by Shibe Lal the operator to answer an incoming call from CO 4 Sikh.

Unable to get thru to the tank troops on the radio, Duggal helped

by giving me a Mukti Bahini guide who had accompanied his company.

He helped me retrace my steps to track my tanks under the ambient

moonlight. As we had advanced line ahead following my tank tracks

was the only logical course. Barely a kilometre away the silhouette of a

tank loomed and then another, with no signs of life or activity and with



tank guns at unnatural angles. I was within shouting distance, worried,

angry, and tense, and had barely taken a few steps off the tank track

when the guide held my overcoat, firmly from behind, whispering an

urgent warning. He was pointing to regularly excavated mounds of earth

on one of whom I would have stepped...an anti-tank mine wired with an

anti-personnel mine...I was that close to instantaneous death or grievous

loss of limb/eyesight. Had the anti-tank mine blasted under the tank, the

vehicle would have been destroyed with death/serious crew injury...And,

God, my tank had negotiated 800m of this minefield of Density 1 (Kill

probability 66%)...I realised that we had been protected by Almighty who

had sent this life-saving guide too...A close shave...

We kept moving past my two disabled tanks, now back on my tank

track, my worry levels heightened by my rapidly depleting strength, due

to exhaustion and dehydration, causing dizziness, but walk we did...And

then another hulk loomed that chill early morning...and my men...I was

relieved to find out that there were no deaths in the mine-blasted tanks.

A serious head concussion with troop leader Chakraborthy, a tall, steely,

soccer and basketball player who remained operational with grit and

aspirins, refusing evacuation...He had set standards for the Regiment to

follow. My interaction with my men despite my joy, made me break out

in cold sweat. Unable to stand I slid down against the tank bogey wheel.

One of the tank crew members offered a water bottle which poured life

back into me as I felt the sweat on my brow gradually evaporating and

the pulse returning to a normal rhythm. Refusing evacuation, I became

strong enough to once again get up and take charge of my responsibilities.

Burinda had been taken but at cost. My losses had been two tanks

blown up by mines and one damaged by a rocket launcher. Tank driver

ALD Biswas had been killed and four men wounded two seriously. The

Pakistanis fought bravely from well-coordinated defences but we outfought

them forcing their withdrawal. The Battalion had fought bravely

and bore heavy casualties doing so but emerging triumphant assisted by

my tank squadron.

The immediate task was to move the serviceable tanks through



the minefield to the ‘B’ Infantry company location and secure it against

counterattack. I instructed the T-55 tanks to position themselves at the

mouth of the minefield so that they could dominate the areas across and

deny the enemy a pot shot at my disabled tanks. My good friend and

knight in shining armour, the civilian guide was still with me to guide

me back to my waiting crews. We had barely advanced when a chill

went through my heart...An automatic weapon had cocked and a loud

voice had challenged us: Tham! Kaun Aata Hai! Haath Upar. Pehchan ke

liye Aage Barh! Aaj ka Password! (Who goes there...Hands Up...Advance

for Identification... What’s today’s password?).

Hearing “Load Jaldi Kareen” in Punjabi (Load quickly) I yelled at

the two dimly silhouetted Sikh soldiers that we were friends.“Oye main

sadde Risale da afsar haan”! Bereft of the password, we were close to

getting shot till the Sikh NCO decided to hold fire and ask us to advance.

This is when I left fly with choice Punjabi expletives including his CO’s

and 2IC’s names. “Ehe bada tej lagdae Minu”, said the startled NCO

(This guy is a smart cookie) as he finally stood down and said, “Sat Sri

Akal Saabji” with a wry grin. This time my move forward was with a

Sikh guide escorting us to prevent further mishap!

It was evident that the only safe lane across the minefield was that

created by my tank tracks. A guide was to be positioned on each tank

track and ordered to use a torch to illuminate the track and help the

driver in keeping the correct alignment. The tank commander would sit

near the driver’s hatch to keep a watch on the track and guide the driver

from drifting away by exercising control, till the tank had crossed the

minefield. Precision driving and tight control comprised the key to safety

and success. The ability of the driver was most crucial to the success

of the operation. The most experienced driver was to take charge. This

was easier said than done because tank crews, particularly drivers, tend

to get deeply attached to their vehicles and do not appreciate it, especially

in difficult situations, somebody else taking charge of their tank.

This was a deliberate exercise where ensuring vehicle and men’s

safety not speed was the overriding necessity and I set the stage with



professional acumen. Dfr Ramnath’s tank was in the lead, followed by Lt

Narain’s. After some start-up glitches between the driver, track guides,

and tank commander, we started the 800m move across the minefield in

a tightly controlled manner. With the leading tank safely across and Lt

Narain within 100m of crossing, I was quietly satisfied. My testing times

were however not over. Saighal had it conveyed to me that my roadblock

tank while being re-positioned had slid into a marsh and needed expert

recovery. Assuming the minefield crossing to be well under control, I

left Narain in charge, intending to oversee my tank’s recovery. Narain,

tired, cold, and exhausted, handed over guidance to his NCO to get cosy

inside the tank, dozing off cocooned in a blanket.

The mine explosion, in his own words, found him flung against the

turret roof and in excruciating pain. He was paralysed and found the

tank hull bottom with a two-foot hole ripped by the exploding anti-tank

mine. His effort to find a comfortable sleeping posture ironically saved

his life as the main axis of the blast escaped him. He was rushed to

the ADS but the tank had been ripped apart with two crew members

injured and a guide.

Burinda was a hard nut to crack. It became a symbol of the Pakistanis

gumption to fight against heavy odds, not witnessed elsewhere in East

Pakistan during 1971 War.

4 Sikh cleared Burinda on December 6, after suffering 62 casualties

of 2 JCOs and 12 ORs killed, and 2 JCOs, 44 ORs and 2

Non-Combatants Enrolled (NCsE) wounded. Besides, 1 OR each of

45 Cavalry and 96 Field Company were killed; 1 officer, 1 JCO and

3 ORs of 45 Cavalry and 1 OR of 96 Field Company wounded. This

loss makes one wonder as to why so much hype was created over

Burinda...and towards what end?

“It may be worthwhile to remember that two battalions had been

tasked for the capture of Burinda. They had made a concerted bid and

sustained losses as had the affiliated troops. This gives us a truthful picture

of military incompetence and scant regard for the loss of lives to

achieve glory” Quoted from Surrender at Dacca by Lt Gen JFR Jacob,



Figure 24: Pakistani soldiers brutally dragging a dead Indian soldier

p.73).This extract by the redoubtable Lt Gen JFR Jacob who planned

and helped execute the Bangladesh War from its beginnings to its victorious

end is an open indictment of the quality of higher-level planning,

execution and leadership during the Battle of Burinda and that too from

an unimpeachable source.

I find a quote from Shakespeare’s famous play “King Lear” worth

quoting here because it highlights the relevance of Gen JFR Jacob’s

sarcasm:

As flies to wanton boys are we to the gods;

c They kill us for their sport.

Gloucester speaks these despairing words as he wanders on the heath

after being blinded by Cornwall and Regan (4.1.37–38). Gloucester’s

philosophical musing here offers an outlook of stark despair: he suggests

that there is no order—or at least no good order—in the universe, and

that man is incapable of imposing his moral ideas upon the harsh and

inflexible laws of the world. Instead of divine justice, there is only the



“sport” of vicious, inscrutable gods...the good die along with the wicked,

and no reason is offered for the reasons for such sacrifice.

These thoughts were floating in my mind while I was sliding off

my tank, to stretch out on the sun-drenched battlefield. In the background

I could hear the sound of artillery guns blazing away while the

planes dropped their payloads over the designated targets, in support of

trustworthy devout, infantrymen charging into the jaws of death, with

Regimental war cry on their lips, not knowing ‘for whom the bells toll’.

9 Infantry Division was now ready to launch their attack for The capture

of Jessore...an attack which was unnecessary as Jessore was found

empty; the enemy having departed for Khulna Port city, 65 km away...


Chapter 9: A Flashback of 1971 War by Mohinder Puri

9. A Flashback of 1971 War by Mohinder

Puri

I

was posted as GSO 3 (Ops) in 25 Infantry Division in July

1971 and my battle account is therefore from the perspective of

a young staff officer of an operational formation. Following the March

1971 genocide by the Pakistan (Pak) Army in East Pak, which we are

all too familiar with, the war clouds were gradually building up in the

sub-continent. Our GOC was Maj Gen Kundan Singh, a diehard infantry

officer who kept the Formation on a tight leash. Since I was the fresh

inductee into the Ops Branch, I had to accompany the GOC on his visits

to the subordinate headquarters and units deployed on the Cease Fire

Line (CFL), as it was referred to in those days. There were many posts

which were neither connected by choppers nor by any semblance of

a road. Visiting these posts was an exhausting experience as at times

one had to walk 4-5 hours to reach ones destination. While at the road

head, the GOC and his entourage would comfortably seat themselves on

mules, lesser mortals like me had to be contended by walking behind the

convoy of mules, puffing and panting to keep up with the column. With

experience, I learnt the best way to keep up with the pace of the convoy,

was to hold the tail of the mule which effortlessly kept you moving with

the column.

25 Infantry Division was a large sized division deployed South of

the Pir Panjal Ranges, with each brigade having five to six battalions.

The area was politically sensitive with District Headquarters located at

border towns of Poonch, Naushera and Rajouri. The close proximity of

these towns to the CFL made them attractive objectives for Pakistan,

more so since their capture was denied to them in the first J and K War

85


in 1947-48 and later in 1965. Poonch scored higher in the list of priorities

for capture, mainly due to its closer proximity to the CFL, its largely

muslim population with ethnic affiliations with the people across the

CFL and its fertile agricultural land. Also, the alignment of the CFL gave

Pak the advantage of occupying posts on higher ground with the ability to

observe the town and its military airfield. Both the armies were deployed

more or less in an eyeball to eyeball confrontation with a second tier in

depth on lesser dominating heights. Over the years the defences on both

sides had been considerably improved with proper defence works and a

well coordinated obstacle plan. It was quite apparent to us that Poonch

was a lucrative objective as its capture would link up with the Haji Pir

Pass and give options to the enemy across the Pir Panjal into the Valley.

Co located with the Div HQ was the UNMOGIP (United Nations

Military Observer Group in India and Pak) team of officers and men, who

were tasked to respond to complaints by the respective hosts against the

opposing side. They were free to move around with prior intimation to

the HQ’s. A similar team, albeit on a reduced scale was located with

the Brigade (bde) HQ’s at Poonch and Naushera. Since the UN team

was not empowered to resolve routine issues, like, Cease Fire Violations

(CFV’s), or transgression of the CFL, their presence was more of an

irritant. Nevertheless, they were there and we continued to report to

them the increase in CFV’s from July-August onwards, without any

substantial reduction in the firing.

It was more or less clear that war was imminent and the probability

kept increasing with the increase in the number of refugees from East Pak

who kept pouring in. It was also obvious that while the concentration of

the war effort would be in the East, the ferocity of the operations would

be matching in the West, if not more. The period from July onwards

was spent on planning for the war which was appreciated to start in the

winters when the passes would close and reduce the collusive support of

China. 25 Inf Div was a defensive formation with very limited offensive

capability. With the passage of time, in the latter half of 1971, intelligence

reports were indicating a larger than usual concentration of forces biased



towards an offensive by Pak against Poonch. The intelligence inputs led

the GOC to ask for additional troops for the defence of Poonch, a request

which was denied by 15 Corps on the grounds that any reinforcement

of troops into this sector would reduce options of the Corps in the rest

of the Corps Zone. However, since the GOC was insistent to the extent

of telling the Corps Cdr that he would not be responsible for the loss of

Poonch, 33 Inf Bde ex 39 Mtn Div was inducted into the Div Sector on

25 Nov .

War clouds in Nov were building up and getting darker, when on 03

Dec Pak finally launched a pre emptive airstrike on our airfields which

led to the declaration of the 14 Days war. While the border towns in

25 Inf Div were of strategic importance in the hill sector, the towns of

Chamb and Ahknoor in the 10 Inf Div Sector were of equal importance in

the plains of 15 Corps, as their capture opened the option to the enemy

to cut off the hill sector and threaten or attempt to capture Jammu.

From the Indian point of view, the Chamb Sector was also of significant

importance as it was a launchpad for an offensive into Pak’s soft under

belly by cutting of the main lines of communication on the Grand Trunk

Road. However, Pak took the initiative and after a couple of days of bitter

fighting, we managed to stabilize the front, although we lost Chamb in

the process.

With the declaration of the war, 25 Inf Div on night 03/04 Dec

was subjected to heavy artillery fire throughout the Sector, with the

concentration of ground operations on the Banwat heights held by 6

SIKH and some diversionary actions in the Balnoi sector. Lt Col Rattan,

later, Maj Gen, the Commanding Officer of 6 SIKH, was an intrepid leader

who had well appreciated the importance of his battalion’s deployment in

the plan for the defence of Poonch. The enemy attack commenced with a

heavy concentration of artillery fire followed by a determined attack of a

bde plus against the FDL’s of the battalion. Bold leadership exhibited by

the Bde Cdr, Brig AV Natu, later, Maj Gen, and Col Rattan stalled Pak’s

attack and forestalled their third attempt in capturing Poonch. By 06 Dec,

Pak had shot its bolt in this sector. The Bde Cdr and CO were awarded



the MVC. Infact the award of the Bde Cdr was announced on the radio

the minute Field Marshal Maneckshaw’s helicopter landed at Poonch

airfield, while he was on his visit to the station soon after the ceasefire

to congratulate the troops for their success. Good and meticulous staff

work.

While the situation had stabilized in the Poonch Sector, 21 Punjab

launched an attack on a feature called Nangi Tekri in the Krishna Ghati

sector, which was dominating the Poonch River in POK. The attack was

successfully executed by the battalion on 10 Dec and by 11 Dec they

had succeeded in capturing their objective. Col Sharma, the CO, led the

operation from the front and was also awarded the MVC. With this

success, the GOC planned a bold raid on night 13 Dec by a team of

9 Para Commando on the enemy gun position at Mandhol, a village

approximately 19 kms south west of Poonch. This daring and successful

offensive operation by the special forces later became a case study in

Schools of Instruction. The Commandoes destroyed the enemy battery

and returned with two dead and a couple of casualities. A commendable

action indeed.

As a part of improving our defence posture, limited actions were

planned for across the CFL. After the capture of Nangi Tekri, 14 Grenadiers

were tasked to capture a feature called Daruchian which was dominating

the Balnoi neck of the Kotli-Balnoi Road between the Poonch River

and the CFL. The attack was launched on night 13/14 Dec from three

directions, leaving negliglible reserves for various contingencies on each

of the prongs. After stiff resistance from the enemy, the battalion’s attack

fizzled out with very heavy casualties, particularly amongst the officers.

The ceasefire was declared to be effective from 17 Dec. A number of

lessons were learnt, which are well documented for the future generations

and need not be addressed in this write up. However, suffice to say that

intelligence continues to remain a weak spot, though our acquisition

capabilities have vastly improved since 1971 and 1999. As we are in the

Golden Year of our victory against Pak, we pay homage to those who

made the ultimate sacrifice for our better tomorrow.


Chapter 10: The Solitary Sapper by Pradeep Sharma

10. The Solitary Sapper by Pradeep Sharma

1

“My first and only war ended in 1971. What happened then

hazy, but with vivid recall of small bits of action that are

crystal clear. Tough to recall names of people, places and even the exact

sequence of events. There being an almost total absence of access to

recorded unit history and other available data . Very little material could

be located despite repeated searches off the internet. Bits and pieces

were collected from a variety of sources and put together for penning

the narrative below.

Almost ten million refugees walked across from then East Pakistan

into India as Pak Army’s infamous Op Searchlight (among others) and

a devastating cyclone caused perhaps 2 million deaths there. A new

country was born and possibly the world’s largest surrender of military

men took place. All this happened in less than one year. Yet lack of

reliable historical record is suppressed possibly due to Pakistan’s alliance

and collusion with the West. Besides there is a disdain for history and a

general indifference to what happens in this part of the world.

Post Degree Course at College of Military Engineering (CME) Poona,

I was posted to 3 Engineer Regiment just after New Years Day in 1971.

The Regimental Headquarters (RHQ) was at Tamalpur, a short drive from

Rangiya (Assam) where 23 Mountain Division headquarters were located,

Three Regiment being the Divisional Engineers. General ‘Rocky’ Hira

was GOC commanding 23 Div. Our Regiment was housed in bamboo

bashas. Life was going on in a typical, lazy way with a peacetime routine

and training with occasional flood relief duties. Little did we realise how

1


89


eventful and momentous 1971 was going to be.

A new CO, Lt Col (later Maj Gen) Joginder Singh took command of

the Regiment in July, 3-4 months prior to the ‘balloon going up’. There

were some questions of ‘crossing sheets of water’, ‘when would monsoon

waters in paddy fields dry up’ and the like asked of us by middle of the

year. Our Regiment was ordered to move to Tripura in July/ August. It

took 5 special trains carrying all ranks with equipment and stores for a

rail journey from Rangiya to Dharmanagar. Divisional HQ & Regimental

HQ were located around Kakraban, a small village near Radhakishorepur

in South West Tripura. I was assigned to the Regimental Head Quarters

as the Field Engineer/ Adjutant. Once we reached Kakraban, Operational

Works was the main activity for a couple of months.

Huge cash payments running into lakhs of Rupees were being made

virtually daily to refugees and other muster roll labour employed for

track construction. Drawing cash from the treasury a 2 hour drive away,

handing it over in bulk to individual sub-units/ sites and depositing back

the undisbursed amounts beyond “CML” before close of cash hours was

a major assignment and headache over several weeks.

The CO was on a daily ‘early out/ late return’ routine from recces

and visits to Field Companies every day. The three Field Companies of

the Regiment (58, 60 & 375 Fd Coys) were attached to and located with

the three brigades of 23 Division (83, 181 and 301 Mountain Brigades).

Operational areas/ objectives within a couple of days of the war stretched

all the way from Comilla to Chittagong, over some 150 kms aerial distance

or 200 kilometres by road.

50 Field Park Company was at Dharmanagar the railhead (a 4 hour

drive from RHQ, some 180 kms away). With all sub-units widely dispersed

and scattered over some 100 kms, Regimental HQ had barely 10

all Ranks available as its total strength. We were housed in dug-in tents

in Kakraban not far from the Divisional HQ. The border and Comilla

Cantonement (in then East Pakistan) were barely 10 kms away.

The first skirmish/ action in which we took part was in ‘Belonia

bulge’ on 15 Nov 1971, coincidentally also, the day I turned 25. The



actual war ‘Op Cactus Lily’ commenced 18 days later on 3rd December.

A somewhat humorous exchange took place on the D-1 radio net

after Parasuram (the Division’s objective in Belonia bulge) was captured

on night 15/16 November 1971.

Gen Hira excitedly told Colonel GS of the Division, Col Rawat (Gunners)

in clear on the radio net

“Rawat, we got P”. Rawat -’Sorry sir I dont understand’. Hira –

‘Dammit, we captured P’. Rawat -’Sorry sir I dont follow’. Hira – ‘We

captured Papa’. Rawat -’Sorry sir I am unable to get that’. Hira – ‘We

captured, I spell Papa Alpha Papa Alpha’ !!

The only real excitement in November (for me) was a low level high

speed sortie flying in an Alouette chopper painted with “Bangladesh

colours” with the CO and a Flt Lt Singla (one of the trainers of ‘Kilo

Flight’ which became the Bangladesh Air Force) in the 2 seats and self

with legs dangling outside the chopper’s canopy, an MMG slung between

the legs. The task was to assess condition of roads and count the number

of bays of decking needed on Bailey bridges on roads we were likely to

use after the war commenced in what was then East Pakistan !

Col Joginder casually asked me on 2nd December “How are you

liking the war?”. Truthfully, I answered, “Not much seems to happen -

it is far more exciting and action-filled in movies !”

Little did I know that within a day or two of this, I would be in the

thick of action.

Late on 4 December afternoon, Col Joginder told me to get ready for

an immediate move. From what transpired over next few days, the aim

was to provide ‘engineer support’ to 1 Independent Armoured Squadron

(7th Light Cavalry) attached to the Division. My CO had volunteered to

go as ‘Engineers in support’ but was turned down as being too old - a

youngster being required for the task. PT 76 of the tank Squadron had

assaulted the Lalmai hill feature near Comilla cantonement. Surprised

by an unexpected minefield, several of the squadron’s PT 76 tanks got

blown up. The squadron was left with barely 6-7 serviceable tanks to

be an effective spearhead for the advance of 23 Division. The Squadron



Commander had therefore insisted on adequate close Engineer support

before continuing any further advance. A lot of information gathered

over subsequent days allowed me to grasp what had happened.

Asking my Thambi ( Batman/ Sahayak in a Madras Sapper unit)

to get my FSMO ready, I went in vain looking for maps/ instructions/

anything at all to prepare for the task for which I had been detailed.

Nothing whatsoever of the sort was available. “Reach Div HQ helipad

soonest possible” was the sum total of instructions. The Helipad was not

too far from our location and I foot slogged to it soon as I could.

Within an hour of receiving orders, kitted out in FSMO, with sten

gun and prodder in hand, I cut a solitary figure at the helipad. A Mi-4

helicopter landed there soon. From inside the chopper came a shout -

“Where are the Engineers?”. The crew asked me to jump in, the rotors

never having been switched off. As I climbed in, the Pilot shouted down

‘Where are the others ? Are you the only guy they sent us to drop off

?’ Recognizing the voice of my 28 NDA course and Kilo squadron mate

Bani Kant Sarma I tried calling him down from the perch above. We

were meeting after years. Even for that there was no time, as Bani Kant

had to drop the Sappers (meaning me !) and be back at his base before

last light. Sadly, that was also the last time I saw him.

In about half an hour, just before last light, I was dropped off by the

Mi-4 at an improvised helipad amidst paddy fields at an unknown place.

No idea of where I was. Ditto for task I was required to do. Within a

minute of my alighting, the helicopter - whose rotors never stopped -

took off back to its base.

It became almost fully dark shortly. Two soldiers approached (who

later identified themselves as being from the tank squadron) and asked

in chaste Punjabi ‘where are the Engineers ?’. All I could reply was –

‘tell me what needs doing”. The duo took me a short distance away and,

pointing in a vague general direction, told me that a few of their tanks

had got blown ‘there’ by mines and some survivors on those tanks had

gathered near a damaged tank and needed rescuing and guiding back

out of the minefield.



No compass, no map, no landmark and a vague direction to proceed

into a minefield. In darkness. Lack of information and clarity was rapidly

increasing by the hour!

Faced with a situation never visualised, all that occurred to me was

to proceed in the manner one had been trained. Clearing a minefield is

done after a detailed reccee of the edge and/ or extent of the minefield,

types of mines laid found out plus an appreciation of likelihood of the

enemy on the other side of the minefield firing upon anyone attempting

to clear mines.

The only way to locate a plastic mine (as of 1971 and probably even

now) was to ‘prod’ the ground. Imagine a thickish metal needle pushed

into ground, in a grid every few inches (so that no mine is missed out).

Whenever resistance to the prodder is felt, the person prodding checks

if the object that stops the prodder from going into the ground is a stone,

a mine or whatever. That is how one was trained in the sixties. A very

slow and deliberate activity to be done diligently a few inches at a time,

going forward after making safe any mines encountered. Being careless

is virtually guaranteed to result in injury or death, instantly.

Clearing a safe lane in a minefield is also normally done by well

trained closely knit teams of some 6 to 8 persons, 2-3 of them ‘prodding’

the ground ahead of two persons who mark either edge of the ‘lane’

cleared of mines with a broad white tape staked to ground every few

paces. Teams are rested every hour or two to ensure fatigue and tension

does not endanger their safety.

Of course tanks/ flails/ lane clearing explosive hoses can be used

but none of these were available or deployable in this situation. In the

present case, this was to be done at night in virtually zero visibility. Doing

a perfect job of clearing and marking a lane is absolutely vital – one must

not forget that one walks back in the safe lane once it has been cleared !!

Having read of and being aware of consequences of stepping on

or driving over mines, I was of course fully aware of risks of injury/

death that possibly lay ahead. The only sure thing was, presence of

mines had already been absolutely, positively confirmed by several of



the tanks having been blown up. The simplest option would be to ask

for reinforcement in form of an adequate number of trained Sappers to

do the mine clearance and await their arrival.

That would mean halting advance of the tank squadron (which itself

was the spearhead of the Brigade, 23 Division and IV Corps in advance to

the objective Chandpur, the inland port on River Meghna). Abandoning

casualties awaiting rescue from inside the minefield to their fate was not

something contemplated or acceptable.

Foolhardy, unthinking, stupid - trained to think only of accomplishing

the mission or task allotted. Just following orders and carrying on to

best of one’s ability. Something like that flashed through my mind and I

decided to proceed single handed with ‘whatever one possessed’ - just

a prodder and the will to rescue those stranded (and possibly wounded

inside the minefield) and assist in the advance with least delay.

Telling the tank squadron reps to hold on to my big pack and sten

gun, I started to ‘prod’ in whatever I could make of the direction pointed

out by the duo.

I had forgotten to wear my watch and all idea of time is as recalled

from hazy memory. After possibly an hour or more, it seemed pointless

to keep bending over, prodding and proceeding in an indeterminate direction.

I had covered probably 25 metres and of course not encountered

or located a single mine. It would be hours before advancing even a few

hundred metres. Making headway and that too without any person or

tape to mark the path checked and found free of (anti-personnel and

anti-tank) mines was equally futile. So would anything worthwhile be

achieved by continuing further prodding through the night ?

Realising the futility of the task in hand considering time, tools and

resources available, it seemed that just walking in the generally correct/

indicated direction was the only course open. Dangerous, hazardous plus

fraught with risk of loss of limb or life as it may be. Could easily turn

out to be that or worse, with no assurance success or survival. Hopefully

“it could and would be better” is what drove me.

By putting one’s head closer to ground, some slightly taller objects



seemed to be vaguely apparent against the night sky, some distance away

in roughly the direction I had been proceeding. Abandoning “prodding “

entirely, I started walking in that general direction, albeit hesitantly. After

an hour or two, I must have made some noise because I heard a shut

“Oye Kaun haiga. India kay Pakistan ?” in the same chaste Punjabi doaba

accent as the two cavalrymen who had met me some hours back ! After

assuring them that I was indeed ‘India’, I told them to get off the tanks

they were perched on top of and walk behind me in the general direction

taken to reach them carrying any of those injured with them. I had yet

to report arrival of ‘Sappers’ to the Squadron Commander. Assuming the

duo who met me earlier had done the needful !

Just before first light next morning, we somehow managed to get

back to the two Cavaliers who were still waiting for us. I put on my big

pack, picked my sten gun and was escorted to Major Inderjit Singh (the

tank Squaddie), sitting on a culvert with bloodshot eyes, worry writ large

on his face.

“Where are the Engineers ?” was his first and only question. When I

told him that Sappers detailed/ available comprised of just me, he askeded

‘And what the hell will you do by yourself ?”. I answered “Whatever

needs to be done by the Sappers.” By then he had apparently received

more than his share of radio messages asking the Squadron’s remaining

tanks to start leading the advance of 301 Brigade towards Chandpur.

Major Inderjit decided that as ‘the Sappers’ answerable for safety of his

remaining squadron of tanks, I would be positioned on the leading tank.

At least I would stay alert and hawk eyed might have been his reasoning

!

A file picture of a PT76 showing limited space outside the cupola

is below. The 3 man crew inside is also pretty cramped. A rope is tied

around cupola to allow any accompanying infantry soldiers to stand and

hang on to the moving tank. That is what I held on to for dear life as

the tanks advanced.

I don’t know if I was expected to discern mines while hanging on

outside the cupola of a PT 76 tank. Or it was reckoned in the fitness of



things for the Sapper(s) to be the first casualty in case of any untoward

happening ! So here I was, hanging on to a rope outside the cupola of

the lead tank, commanded by their Squadron 2IC whose name I learnt

later to be Freddie Singh Deo. There were just six tanks and we were

moving in stages, awaiting infantry on foot to catch up between short

moves.

An extract from a book by Gen Hira will broadly paint the prevalent

situation that night/ day : .. .. and met Inderjit, the squadron commander.

He seemed somewhat depressed in spite of having assaulted the enemy

positions earlier in the day and scattering them in the process. On query,

he informed me that he had already lost one third of his squadron during

the first days fighting and that there was a lot more fighting ahead. I told

him of the success and the enemy’s reverses caused by the bold action

of his squadron and comforted him. He had enough tanks. I added, to

support the divisional offensive. The following day, he was a different

person and there was just no holding him back.” Perhaps I can justifiably

claim to be part of what transpired that night and in some small way

the reason for Inderjit being “a different person the following day” !

Hanging on to a moving tank off a rope strung around the cupola of a

tank is scary. The slightest negligence (or falling asleep) would make one

fall off, with good chance of getting run over by the tank tracks. Hearing

the sound of bullets from a machine gun bouncing off the cupola is the

scary icing on the cake ! Nothing is possible for survival except to try

and move a bit towards rear of the tank and hope there was no bullet

was flying around with my name on it !

Later the next day, we were nearing a town in area Hajiganj-Mudafarganj.

The lead tank (with me on/ outside of) approached a river with a Hamilton

girder type bridge. I soon found it to be a road-cum- rail bridge

with timber decking allowing wheeled vehicular movement on what

essentially was a railway bridge. My hair stood on end when a medium

machine gun burst from the far bank bounced off the cupola of the tank

I was hanging outside of.

Surprisingly, after the first machine gun burst, no more bullets flew.



Freddie fired the main gun suddenly without any warning in the direction

from which the MMG burst had come. In the process I became totally

deaf in the right ear for some time. He then stopped the tank, opened

the hatch and asked me to check and confirm if the bridge was safe to

cross.

I dismounted from the tank, discarded my big pack, sten gun and

prodder. Warily walked forward to check, dreading walking into another

MMG burst – while unarmed in the open. Reaching the brige safely, I

found to my dismay, what looked like black safety fuse poking out from

some loose soil in the middle on the near abutment. One could also

see that piers (5-6 brick masonry piers) were appeared to have been

prepared for a deliberate demolition with (possibly explosive packed

?) boreholes connected by orange coloured detonating cord. A bridge

that, to all appearances had been, prepared for deliberate demolition ‘in

face of the enemy’ . Such preparations for demolition of a bridge takes

many days/ weeks of effort. Securing and saving this bridge was vital. Its

destruction would delay the advance for hours or days until equipment

for a substitute bridge was brought forward from the rear.

Constant radio messages asking the tanks to secure the far side of

bridge so that infantry could also cross and resume our advance were

promptly, regularly and loudly relayed to me. A bit nonplussed, I was

wondering what to do. The bridge to all appearances was thoroughly

and painstakingly prepared for a deliberate demolition. The far bank

had been “held” till just a few minutes back by at least a machine gunner

who had fired on us. He, or any other person, could as well have set off

the demolition charge as firing a machine gun burst.

There were no Sappers besides your truly. That too without digging

tools or implements. Or real world experience of dealing with such a

situation beyond the YOs course at CME in 1966. Borrowing a mess tin

from the tank crew, I started removing the loose soil from the abutment,

hoping against hope that the fuse had just been planted to delay us while

we (I) thoroughly checked out the bridge – something that would need

an hour or two at least.



I scooped out more loose soil and went further into the ground. To

my horror, I saw the fuse going lower and lower into the ground, even

beyond 2 to 3 feet. It did not now seem to be a decoy or delaying tactics.

Keeping on digging as fast as possible with a mess tin, I encountered

gun cotton slabs with primers and detonators inserted. By now I was

really sweating with not just the effort but more due to worry and fear

as this did not appear to be a decoy safety fuse planted solely and merely

to delay us.

It was impossible to understand why the bridge (at least its abutment)

had not been blown up by the same enemy troops who had fired with

automatics on to our tanks. All it would have taken is simply a match

stick or a cigarette or pressing a plunger on a generator. My fear now

was that this was a booby trap with some kind of release switch below

the explosives. That is usually done to not just blow up the bridge

along with any Sappers trying to defuse a prepared demolition. With

shaky hands, I kept removing all kinds of explosive materials including

explosive slabs, artillery shells and bags of god knows what explosive

materials. Meanwhile there were constant reminders from Freddie and

crew to hurry up so that the advance could resume. Reaching carefully

and gingerly under the last and lowest explosive material I was relieved

to find anything that suggested a booby trap.

‘Guess I was very lucky that day and finding nothing untoward, I

quickly removed the detonators and primers and chucked them into the

river and proceeded to fill up the excavation as best as possible. Finally,

I walked across the bridge and motioned the tanks to cross. Thankfully,

no booby traps or other such lethal stuff were encountered. All in all,

very tense and tiring few hours – but with a happy ending !

Around dusk, the advancing tanks with a small amount of infantry

and elements of the leading Brigade HQ reached an embankment leading

off to right of the road to the river port of Chandpur, objective of 23

Division. As we later found out, this was a microwave repeater station

of sorts, abandoned except a caretaker who showed his face when he

something reassured him that we were not planning to shoot any locals



offhand.

With something over a day without any food (except shakarparas

scrounged off tank crew) and no rest or respite from hanging off a rope

outside the PT 76, it would be great if one could get a bit of rest, something

to eat and maybe a wash or a bath. Poking around the area, I found a

caravan, a nicer civvy version of what we had seen many Shaktiman

trucks converted into. Wonder of wonders, there was a foam mattress

to be able to lie down upon on which I laid a ‘finders keepers’ claim till

hunger pangs and a desire to wash overtook. With barely any visibility

in the almost total darkness, in a search for some food and water, I felt

what seemed to be generator control panel right besides the caravan.

Pressing one of several switches, the generator roared to life. Putting it

off at once, I thought of getting permission to start it and get some light/

electricity at least.

Walking across to the Brigade Commander, I asked ‘Sir how would

you like Sappers to provide you light ?” His answer was an incredulous

“Can you do that ?”. So the genset came on and after throwing a few

switches, lights along the road on embankment leading to the microwave

station came on. Soon we had bright lights illuminating the area all

around us. Looking inside the now lit-up caravan, I found a huge sack

filled with American and European tinned food (intended most likely for

the firangi occupant of the caravan who had long since decamped). The

tank crews and I had a terrific feast. There was even a small electric

geyser in the bathroom built-into the caravan. Unpacking my big pack I

found a towel and a white kurta pyajama which my thoughtful Thambi

had packed for wearing at night! After a hot bath, on a full stomach, I

went to sleep on a soft, comfortable bed, clad in white kurta ! Worried

that the fuel in genset would run out plus allow us to have some light

before our advance recommenced at first light, I switched off the genset

and slept.

Three or four hours later, the Pakis hit us. Starting with small arms

fire, then LMG, then MMG and finally the whizz of incoming mortar

rounds woke up everyone. There was some hurried shouting about



whether sound of tank engines would draw RCL fire as the four or five

tanks could be vulnerable sitting ducks parked along a straight narrow

road leading off the highway. Finally, it was decided to start and rev up

the tank engines. Lucky again. The Pakis ran off upon hearing the tank

engines without causing us any damage.

By now speed of advance accelerated remarkably with no resistance

and along a highway. I was asked to get back to my unit. A couple of days

later, driving down in a Jeep to convey some instructions, stopped at 375

Field Company location. Even as we tried to hurry off after conveying

instructions, Major Kewal Anand (OC 375) forced us to wait ,saying that

it was a 375 tradition that any person passing through during operations

had to have at least a cup of tea before leaving, delaying us for about 10

minutes. As we were leaving, we heard loud sounds of firing. Unknown

to us, while we waited for the unplanned “tea break”, a platoon from

375 had left with its stores loaded to the gills on 2 one tonners, all the

transport available at that point.

Overloaded vehicles were a given. 23 was a Mountain Division, now

operating in the plains with no extra vehicles. The two vehicles were

ambushed by the Pakis a kilometre ahead (we would have been the

victims if not for the ‘tea break’). We sadly lost as many as 11 Sappers

(and 5 wounded) from the Regiment in just this ambush. Along with

BK Oberoi (2IC, 375), we ‘evacuated’ the wounded including a Havildar

George in a cycle rickshaw with a field dressing improvised out of a lungi.

George had been hit by a MMG burst in the abdomen with horrifying

results of innards scattered in a recently harvested paddy field. It was

truly a miracle to see him a few months later when he came back to the

unit, albeit in a low medical category.

The next day, walking along road to Chandpur, the Corps Commander

Lt Gen Sagat Singh landed in a chopper and hailed us. His orders

‘Chandpur has fallen. Turn around and head for Dacca’! Thus were

orders given and received in those good ole days !!

The final adventure was on 16 December when (then) Maj Nirmal

Mitra, 2IC of our Regiment and self were foot slogging along a road



towards Narayanganj en route to Dacca. Somewhere near Chandina (if

memory serves) a grey Jeep stopped besides us. Maj Mitra recognized

the occupant - Maj Gen Shubeg Singh (in civvies with a patka) who was

with the Mukti Fauj. Once introduced as part of the 23 Div/ 3 Engr Regt,

he told us “there will be a ceasefire in Dacca this evening, hop in if you

want to be there”. Hop in we did, and late afternoon saw us at the Race

Course, among the very small strength of the Indian Army ‘contingent’.

We were hopelessly outnumbered not just by Pak Army troops but also

a huge crowd of locals.

Within a short while, a few choppers carrying officers from HQ

Eastern Comd led by the Army Commander Lt Gen JS Aurora landed

nearby and the surrender ( of some 93000 troops, the largest since World

War II) was signed, minus any pomp, show or significant gestures.

Just before the actual signing, I was approached by an “old” lady

who introduced herself as a Time magazine correspondent. She asked

me “Captain, why did you guys win this war ?”. Surprised, I told her

to ask any of the many Generals present. She refused to take that as

an answer and instead brought Maj Gen Gandharv Nagra in tow. Gen

Nagra wanted to know why I was not answering a lady and whatever

happened to the Army’s chivalry ! I told him I had really nothing worth

saying – but the lady said she would still want an answer. Meanwhile

Gen Nagra had made the officers present (me among them) to fall in in

threes to the right as we faced the table laid out for signing the surrender

documents. We were on the ‘wrong side’ so did not appear behind the

Generals signing the documents in famous photos !

As the surrender document was signed and Gen Niazi’s sidearm

handed over to Gen Aurora, locals started taking off their chappals, brandishing

them to the chant of ‘Bastard, Niazi’. Gen Aurora and Gen Sagat

Singh quickly asked all of us standing in threes to form a cordon of sorts

around them and Gen Niazi and they were whisked off before something

uglier happened.

The lady correspondent again came and asked me for a quote on why

we won the war. All I could think of (and what I said to her) was “We



guys were bad but they (Pakis) were worse”. Don’t know if this makes

sense or appeared in Time magazine – to me at that time it seemed to be

a concise and accurate description of what happened in the Bangladesh

War. —

Was I dumb, foolhardy, not experienced, just doing the job assigned,

courageous or plain lucky ? A bit of each for sure. Would I do the same

again ? Maybe, but hopefully with some improvement in information

and intelligence.

Main lesson “learned” were that war will usually be a period of

confusion and lack of information. Resources will be stretched, if available

at all. ‘When in doubt, do’ will need translating. Into ‘stop worrying, overthinking

and instead start doing whatever you are trained for and able

to do’.

Prodding for mines 2019 :-

Soldiers using prodders to locate mines (the 10 men, shoulder to

shoulder) are possibly clearing a ‘lane’ wide enough for vehicles to drive

through. At night the only clue to a mine being found is resistance to the

pointed end of a prodder hitting a hard object! Notice absence of metal/

mine detectors.


Chapter 11: 1971 War in The East: Through the Eyes of a Pigeon By Arvind Sharma

11. 1971 War in The East: Through the

Eyes of a Pigeon By Arvind Sharma

1

In the 1971 war which led to the creation of Bangladesh, I was

holding the appointment of GSO3(Int) in Headquarters 81 Mountain

Brigade which was located at Chakabama, in Nagaland (In radio

telephony parlance, my appointment is referred to as ‘PIGEON’) was

part of 8 Mountain Division, which was responsible for counter insurgency

operations in Nagaland and Manipur, directly under HQ Eastern

Command.

It was on 09 July 1971 morning, when the Intercom in my office

squawked and the Brigade Commander told me to get his Jonga immediately,

as he had to go to the helipad, where the GOC was landing

in a few minutes. We managed to reach the helipad as the helicopter

was landing. Soon as the GOC, Maj Gen KV Krishna Rao disembarked,

he accompanied by the Commander, Brig RCV Apte, walked off away

from the helicopter. They were engaged in a “pow wow” for about 10

minutes, after which the GOC boarded the helicopter and flew off. As

we got into the Jonga, the Commander said “You want to go on some

leave and meet your fiancée”? I was stumped, as I had come back from

1

Lt Gen Arvind Sharma was commissioned in 2/4 GR. During his service of

four decades plus, he has served in J & K, Ladakh, Sikkim, and the North

East. He was an instructor at the NDA and the DSSC, Wellington; he was the

Defence Attache at Kathmandu, Nepal. He has served in Counter Insurgency

operations in Nagaland, Manipur, J & K and Punjab. He commanded the

Division in Manipur, a Corps in Ladakh and was the Army Commander,

Eastern Command prior to superannuation.

103


casualties leave just three weeks back and had got engaged. Without

waiting for my response, he said “We are going to war, you can go for a

few days leave now if you want, as after this, there will be no leave for

anyone”. The Brigade, thus got the ‘Warning Order’ to prepare for war.

The Battalions of Brigade were 3 PUNJAB, 4 KUMAON and 10 MA-

HAR. Being on the Counter Insurgency grid, the units had to reorganise,

handover Counter Insurgency duties to Para military forces and the local

police; thereafter, move to area Bokajan near Guwahati for four weeks

training. After training, the Brigade moved into the Cachar –Tripura area,

by road and rail between 14 and 20 Oct.

While the Battalions were doing training, the GOC and Brigade Commanders

were doing reconnaissance of the likely operational areas. On

a number of occasions, the Commander accompanied the GOC for the

reconnaissance (I used to accompany my Commander, whereas Ashok

Choudhary(5053/J), ADC to GOC 8 Mountain Division, used to accompany

the GOC). During one of the reconnaissance our Signal officer, Capt

Jagannath spoke out “We are going around with weapons, in Jonga’s,

why are we wearing civvies? You think the enemy cannot make out

we are Fauji’s”. Before anyone of us could say anything, Gen Krishna

Rao turned around and said” Yes, young man they can make out that

we are Fauji’s, but they don’t know at what level the reconnaissance is

being done”. First lesson for us youngsters! Quite a few reconnaissance’s

were done in MI 4 helicopters by the GOC and my Brigade Commander,

where Ashok and I used to tag along. On a few occasions we were flown

by Flt Lt Banikant Sharma(5179/K) of 105 Helicopter Unit (incidentally,

one helicopter of this unit was always based at Chakabama, in support of

8 Mountain Division; I therefore knew most of the officers of this unit).

Battalions of the Brigade were deployed in Y Sector towards end

Oct, covering road axes coming into the Cachar area of Dharmanagar

– Kailashahar, from Sylhet District of East Pakistan. The Border Out

Posts held by the BSF were placed under operational control of the

Brigade. The Brigade was providing artillery support to the Mukti Bahini

operations, besides administrative backing. 8 East Bengal Rifles Battalions



was placed under command of the Brigade; the CO of this Battalions

then was Maj Zia ur Rehman; later, the Chief of Army Staff and then the

President of Bangladesh! I did meet him quite often there but none of us

knew then, that a leader of that stature walked amongst us!

As part of the operation plan of 8 Mountain Division, 81 Mountain

Brigade was to advance on the Axis Kailashahar -Shamshernagar- Munshi

Bazar- Maulvi Bazar- Sherpur/Sadipur Ferries – Sylhet. The attack to

capture area South of Shamshernagar was launched on night 29/30 Nov

by 10 MAHAR and 3 PUNJAB. Initially, the enemy put up stiff resistance,

but was overwhelmed by the ferocity of our attack(s). The enemy artillery

was very effective and resorted to shelling at every locality that they lost.

The Commander, with his Rover group always moved immediately behind

the leading Battalions and thus we also shared many an experience

of enemy arty fire and at times, small arms fire. The Battalions did suffer

a number of offrs and men killed and wounded during this attack.

On 2 Dec afternoon, two Pakistani aircraft strafed our positions

around Shamshernagar; fortunately, there were no casualties. On 04

Dec, Air Commodore Chandan Singh landed in a helicopter at Shamshernagar

airfield and met the Brigade Commander. He told him that the

Pak Airforce had been wiped out and we need not worry about an air

threat.

3 PUNJAB captured Munshi Bazar on 06 Dec, suffering quite a few

casualties. A couple of hours later towards dusk, a Company Commander

of the unit, raised an alarm that he could see about 200 enemy forming

up to attack his location! Fortunately, by the time guns were ready to fire,

they realised that it was the local villagers who had gathered and were

coming towards our troops, to escape the wrath of the Pakistan army!

On the 8 Dec, an air strike was planned at Maulvi Bazar. After necessary

approvals, the air strike was scheduled at about 1400 h. The

Forward Air Controller (an Air Force Officer) who had moved up and

joined the Commander’s Rover group, decided to place himself at a small

mound, for better observation. I also accompanied him, as we were fairly

close to the road. A few minutes before the aircraft were to reach the



Contact Point, the Forward Air Controller realised that his stomach was

not behaving and it was an emergency for him. He dashed off behind a

bush, about 20 metres away leaving the radio set with me. Soon the pilot

called up and I had to respond. With the officer yelling out instructions

from where he was squatting, I was giving instructions to the Pilots! We

had a successful air strike on the target! (This experience helped me

in the Part D examination in Oct 1972, which had a full question on

planning and execution of an air strike!).

The attack on Maulvi Bazar was launched on night 8/9 Dec by 10

MAHAR and 4 KUMAON. Heavy shelling preceded the attack; one of

the shells perhaps hit an ammunition dump, resulting in a thunderous

explosion. When 10 MAHAR reached the objective, they found no enemy,

but found a lot of untouched cooked food lying in the Tourist Lodge,

which was perhaps the Officers Mess of HQ 313 Infantry Brigade. Next

morning, they found Name plates of the Brigade Commander and his

staff, hanging outside the rooms, confirming identity of the Brigade. I

became the proud owner of a name plate; on which was emblazoned

in brass – “CAPT ZAFAR IQBAL GSO3”. He was my contemporary

in the enemy Brigade HQ! This name plate did cause some confusion

later. Posted at NDA in 1976, I put it in the veranda of my house; when

Rajinder Singh, (4672/H, 3 GR) came to my house, he saw the name plate

and was about to go away thinking it is the wrong house, till I came out

and stopped him.

Advance to Sylhet was resumed on 10 Dec by 3 PUNJAB. No resistance

was met at the Sherpur ferry but enemy had damaged the ferry

site and all other means of crossing were destroyed. The troops manged

to cross the Manu River in local boats, but the ferry needed repairs and

the Engineers had to construct rafts to cross vehicles. When we reached

about 500 meters short of Manu River, we found the road blocked, as

all vehicles were trying to get as close to the river as possible. I had to

get down and walk ahead of Commanders jeep clearing traffic for him

to move. What a sight it was, with more than 50/60 vehicles clogging

the narrow single lane road; it presented a lucrative target to enemy air-



craft, as even one pass would have caused immense damage! Fortunately,

enemy aircraft had been shot out of the skies earlier. The leading elements

of 3 PUNJAB contacted the Sadipur ferry, where again no enemy

was encountered as he had withdrawn to Sylhet to give a fight there.

3 PUNJAB eventually was in contact with the enemy by midday of 13

Dec.

On 13 Dec, around midday, orders were received that the Rover

Group of the Brigade and 10 MAHAR were to move to Agartala to act as

Corps reserve, for operations against Dacca. This was to be followed by

the Brigade HQ, 4 KUMAON and 93 Mountain Regt less one battery. Next

morning, the Rover group of the Brigade Commander, CO 10 MAHAR

and CO 93 Mountain Regt drove down and reached the Corps HQ at

Teliamura by late evening. Lt Gen Sagat Singh, GOC 4 Corps briefed

them on their task, which was a helicopter lift ex Agartala to a place

in the vicinity of Dacca and the capture of a vital area, to be indicated

later. On the evening of 15 Dec, the Brigade Commander told me that I

should hitch a ride on a helicopter with one of my Airforce friends next

morning, to find out the location of leading elements of 57 Mountain

Division, as it would help us in planning for the next task.

In the early morning of 16 Dec, I proceeded to Agartala airfield, in

search of a pilot who would help me in my task! Fortunately, I found

Banikant Sharma, preparing to take off to the forward line of troops of

57 Mountain Division (It appeared that God had sent his messiah for me

to accomplish my task). We took off at about 0630 hours. After we had

flown for about 15/20 minutes, the helicopter descended and landed in a

stadium! On landing, Banikant told me that he had got orders during the

flight, to pick up a few casualties. He would be back in about 30 mins

and then we will embark on my task. I got down from the helicopter

and found myself in a sports stadium. I could see some troops in OG

uniform, on the other side of the stadium. I walked up the stairs, where

spectators are normally seated and sat down. After sometime, a JCO

walked up to me. He was the B Echelon JCO of a RAJ RIF Battalion

(regrettably, I cannot recall details, as it happened almost five decades



ago). I had landed in the stadium at about 0700 hours and after a cup

of tea, arranged by the JCO, I waited. The wait was rather long (almost

seven hours by myself, sitting alone in a stadium, with nothing to read

and nothing to do)! At about, 1400hours the helicopter landed; as I was

walking towards it, I could see Banikant, signalling to me to hurry up!

On boarding the helicopter, he told me that they had to ferry about 20

casualties and we had to return to Agartala as they were low on fuel;

my mission was thus aborted! While flying back towards Agartala, we

noticed 4/5 helicopters flying in the opposite direction! It was the next

day, that we learnt that those helicopters were taking the big wigs, for

signing the ‘Instrument of Surrender’ at Dacca!

81 Mountain Brigade fought the war in East Pakistan, successfully

completing allotted tasks, killing and capturing Pakistani army soldiers,

losing our comrades in battle, but when the surrender took place, ironically,

we found ourselves back on Indian soil, in Agartala, lonely as - a

Garrison left out of battle!

On 19 December towards the evening, the Brigade Commander told

me that he wants to go Dacca the next morning, to meet the Corps

Commander! Once again, 105 Helicopter Unit came to my rescue and

they took the Brigade Commander and myself, to Dacca on 20 Dec. We

landed at Dacca, amongst a lot of joy and merriment that was taking

place; loud cries of “Joy Bangla” were heard and firing of shots in the air

by jubilant Mukti Bahini cadres. It was a sight which remains etched in

my memory. We went to the Corps HQ which was then in the location

of Eastern Command HQ of Pakistan Army, in a commandeered jeep and

saw a number of their officers roaming in the corridors there, sans their

belts and weapons! After returning from Dacca, the Commander ordered

move back to Nagaland. Civil transport and trains were requisitioned

and move back commenced. We were back in Chakabama, to herald

the New Year 1972!


Chapter 12: 1971 was really busy and eventful by Sukhdev Singh

12. 1971 was really busy and eventful by

Sukhdev Singh

1

Upon completing the Degree Course at College of Military Engineering,

Khadki, Pune and promotion to Captain, I rejoined my

parent unit 58 Engineer Regiment and took over as the Commander of

73 Field Company in January 1971 at Lucknow.

In March 71, the Regiment moved to Purnia in Bihar, by road from

Lucknow to render Aid to Civil Authority in the run-up to 1971 Elections.

Two months later upon return to Lucknow in May 71. we were

scheduled to be relieved by 9 Engineer Regiment and move to our new

location in Misa, in Assam.

My course mate & friend, (late) Capt RN Gupta came with advance

party of 9 Engr Regt and it was really nice being able to spend a fortnight

together, little realising what the future held in store in balance of the

year, or that this would be the last time we would get to spend more

than a few hours together.

The influx of refugees from the erstwhile East Pakistan had become

a veritable flood and refugee camps housing them were proliferating. In

July I was detailed to report at a Mukti Fauj Training camp located near

village Jarain on road Jowai- Dawki in Meghalaya. Another officer and

a few Sappers were part of this “training team”.

I reported to 5/5 Gorkha Rifles(FF) at Shillong along with my detachment.

We were subsequently transported by road to the Camp which

was located in thick bamboo forest about a kilometre off the Jowai-

1

Brig Sukhdev Singh

109


Dawki road & about 10 kilometres from India- East Pakistan Border.

The Camp Adjutant was a course mate, Richard Khare, of 5/5 GR (FF).

The camp closed down in the last week of September and we returned

to Misa for a fortnight. This was a first and a brand new experience for

all of us, training Bengalis/ East Pakistanis to fight the Pakistan Army for

liberation of their motherland. Each course had a strength of about 50

odd & training concluded in 3 weeks with a passing out parade. Weapon

training & field craft training was carried out by Instructors from the

Infantry whereas my job was to impart field engineering training with

special emphasis on use of Explosives.

In first week of October, Orders were received for the Regiment to

move to Kanchrapara near Calcutta in anticipation of impending Ops

codenamed Op Cactus Lily. 58 Engr Regt was initially in support of 9 Inf

Div but was subsequently moved to Barrackpore in integral transport,in

support of 4 Mountain Div.

In third week of October, I was however ordered to move to Krishnagar

along with 73 Field Coy to provide engineer support to HQ 2

Corps which was under raising at Krishnagar. Apart for routine Engr

Support to the Corps Headquarters, 73 Fd Coy constructed an ALG for

fixed wing Air OP flight & established the Corps Bridge Point which

received bridging equipment from various locations in the country. It

was very likely that in the contemplated area of operations, construction

of new or damaged bridges would be more than likely. 4 Mountain Div

was allotted two (rather than the usual authorisation of a single Engr

Regt). 58 Engr Regt was placed for close support to the three brigades &

63 Engr Regt, for line of communication tasks with special emphasis on

Bridging tasks. The longest composite (Bailey Pontoon & FBE) bridge,

over River Madhumati, measuring 1388 Feet was constructed utilising

bridging equipment assembled at Corps Bridge Point at Krishnagar.

In mid November, 58 Engr Regt moved to Krishnagar & my company

rejoined them in the Assembly Area. My company was allotted to 41

Mountain Brigade of 4 Mountain Div.We moved for operations on 2 Dec

71 & were tasked for providing Engr Support on the road Axis, Darsana-



Aundla Bari- Jhenida- Kushtia - Hardinge Bridge on the Ganges, the

objective where the Ops were planned to and did actually terminate.

Thereafter we returned to Police Lines, located in Kushtia, prior to return

to India on completion of Ops. 1971 was indeed a busy year, moving from

Pune, Delhi(on leave), Lucknow, Purnea, Misa, Mukti Fauj Training Camp,

Misa, Kanchrapara, Barrackpore , Krishnagar, East Pakistan/ BanglaDesh

& finally back to India.

I and the rest of the family suffered a personal tragedy right on the

very first day of the war of 1971. My brother in law, Maj SPS Waraich, a

forward company Cdr with 15 Punjab, was missing in action during the

first Enemy attack on evening of 3rd Dec 71 at Hussainiwala, Ferozepur.

My father came to know immediately but decided to not inform me

during the Ops, but instead requested my CO to send me on leave on

completion of Ops. I arrived in Delhi in last week of December 71. Maj

SPS Waraich, 15 Punjab, figures as the first name in the list of 54 missing

POW of 71 War whose whereabouts and well being are to this date

unknown.

I started the year in Delhi & ended the year in Delhi, but a lot happened

in between.

The Jaintiapur Episode

. I was tasked with providing combat engineering training to Mukti Fauj

trainees at a camp located near village Jarain on road Jowai - Dawki in

Meghalia. We were located about a kilometre off the road amidst a thick

bamboo forest. Training imparted consisted mostly of use and safety

while handling grenades and explosives. Trainees selected were young

boys who were trained over a short period of three weeks after which

there was a passing out parade during which they sang their anthem

‘Sonar Bangla’. Trainees passing out were then taken to Shillong where

they were issued weapons & were sent to launch pads along the border

for induction into East Pakistan.



We were about 10 kms from the International Border. We were in

the hills just adjoining the northernmost plains of East Pakistan. From

our elevated position along the border we could look into a fair distance

of some tens of kilometres into East Pakistan on a clear day. One prominent

white building which drew our attention was in a village named

Jaintiapur on the border, located on the forward spur running from India

into East Pakistan. It was rumoured that this building was the Rajbari,

(Jaintiapur Palace), the residence of erstwhile rulers of the capital of the

kingdom of Jaintia comprising of Khasi Hills and the plains of Jaintia.

Jaintiapur was located in a sort of an enclave bounded by a river

which ran from Dawki in India, encircled Jaintiapur & meandered back

into India. Jaintiapur was linked to Sylhet by a main road which had a

bridge on the river encircling the town.

Our Camp was under operational command of GOC 101 Com Zone.

During one of his visits to the area, the GOC visualised the vulnerability

of Jaintiapur. It was therefore decided that Mukti Fauj would be used to

roll down into Jaintiapur using the Spur from a hill top named Mahadev

Tilla. The Engineers would thereafter blow the only bridge on the road

connecting Jaintiapur to Sylhet leaving the enclave in control of the Mukti

Bahini. The task was allotted to 2/IC , 5/5 GR(FF).

The troops were Mukti Bahini led by a Capt who had defected from

East Pakistan Rifles. Two radio operators were to be provided to the

Mukti Bahini Capt by 5/5 GR(FF) for communication with control HQ.

My 2IC, Lt JS Judge was tasked to blow the bridge. He would

be provided with BSF Personnel to carry the explosive required for

demolition. The training started earnestly under 5/5 GR & the selected

Mukti Bahini was adequately motivated to capture Jaintiapur. D Day

finally arrived & all concerned moved to Mahadev Tilla during the night

with H Hour set to be at first light. Lt Judge, along with BSF personnel

& explosives, moved to the launch pad at Muktapur, on the border close

to Jaintiapur .At first light, in mid September, the attack was launched

from Mahadev Tilla. There was concentrated small arms fire from both

sides. Considering the volume of fire, I felt a bit depressed thinking of



the casualties on my trainees. There were sounds of mortar fire as well.

The first communication we received from the Gorkha radio operators

attached to the attacking party was “Captain Sahib Mar Gayo”!

Apparently, a 2 inch mortar shell had landed near by and a splinter had

knocked the Captain unconscious. The Mukti Bahini was therefore leaderless

but having been launched, the assault continued nevertheless. The

Pakistanis being outnumbered, gave way & left Jaintiapur in vehicles.

Lt JS Judge had meanwhile started as planned from Muktapur and

proceeded towards the bridge with BSF personnel carrying the explosive

on their heads. We assumed that the operation was a success & Jaintiapur

enclave would fully be in our control, once the bridge was blown. The

retreating Pakistani vehicles could be seen in the far distance and we

thought we had seen the last of them.

To our surprise and consternation, the vehicles soon stopped and

turned around. The white building location was possibly their Coy or Bn

Hq. Another 2 vehicles joined them and the convoy with reinforcements

started the return journey of about 4 kms to Jaintiapur. We had lost

communication with the Gorkha radio operators & could not ascertain

the latest situation. The Mukti Bahini, upon capturing Jaintiapur, decided

to celebrate by looting Jaintiapur bazaar. Without a leader, they failed

to hold the bridge or take up the all round defence necessary in such

a situation. When they saw the Pakistanis returning, they immediately

retreated into Indian territory.

The Pakistanis now held the bridge once again while Lt Judge along

with BSF & explosives kept advancing towards the bridge, oblivious of

the fact that the bridge was now held by a Pakistani MMG Det.

When the Pakistanis saw Lt Judge at a distance, they fired upon

the demolition party. Owing to the distance, the bullets went overhead.

The BSF dumped the explosive & ran back. Lt Judge went into dead

ground in a nala & kept moving, but had little sense of direction as the

day ended and darkness fell.

Meanwhile the Mukti Bahini returned carrying the spoils of war

returned. Despite my apprehension & foreboding, the Mukti Bahini had



only one casualty, a bullet wound in the stomach. The casualty was

carried back by his colleagues.

The end result in sitrep form was: Jaintiapur back in the hands

of Pakistan Army, 2 Gorkha Operators on radio silence & missing, one

Captain of Mukti Bahini/ East Pakistan Rifles, injured and presumed dead,

location unknown; and Lt Judge of 73 Fd Coy, 58 Engr Regt, missing

in action.The Capt & Gorkha radio operator duo were located on own

side of border on spur leading down from Mahadev Tilla once they

established contact with us in darkness. That left only one person in a

quandary, yours truly, Capt Sukhdev Singh.

I was really worried and fully expecting the news that an Indian

Army Officer , Lt JS Judge had been captured inside East Pakistan in

September. He could possibly be produced before the world and in the

UN as proof of India’s complicity. What bothered me most, was, ‘What

would I say to my CO if this case to pass’?

We waited for 2 days anticipating the worst. However good tidings

awaited us on the third day. The BSF post on the border about 15

kilometres from Muktapur (location from where Lt Judge was launched),

reported that Lt Judge had managed to reach the border. He rejoined us

the same evening. I was most relieved and welcomed him back with a

warm hug. This was indeed a fiasco but benevolent to the participants.

I vaguely remember someone saying that GOC 101 Com Zone had

promised the Army Cdr, lunch at Jaintiapur Palace on a particular date.

Hearsay as the sole basis of recalling a failed adventure runs the peril

of being dangerous ‘fake news’.. Note. Richard Khare was the Camp

Adjutant. He may be able to throw more light on the incident.

The Kushtia Episode

My experience during the War was confined to movement as part of

Bde Hq of 41 Mtn Bde. I was initially as Commander and later Second

in Command of 73 Field Company of 58 Engineer Regiment. The three



platoons which comprise a Field Company were in support of the three

Inf Bns of the Bde, namely 5 Guards, 9 Dogra & 5/1 GR. The platoons

saw action first hand along and intimately married with the Infantry

whereas the Coy Hq came on the scene later, as a part of the Bde Hq.

We moved on the orders of the DAA& QMG ( Dy Bde Cdr, were

not yet auth to a Bde Hq in 1971), because the Brigade Major was located

ahead with the Bde Cdr as part of a Tac Hq, which usually moved

ahead of the main Bde Hq, whenever an offensive action was to be

executed.The axis of advance of 41 Mountain Brigade was Darshana-

Aundlabari- Jhenida-Kushtia- Hardinge Bridge. We advanced successfully

& after overcoming enemy opposition at Darsana & Aundlabari, we

captured an enemy Brigade Hq at Jhenida, on 9/10 Dec.

Jhenida was a medium size town in which, during peace time, housed

the East Pakistan, Army Cadet College. It was now occupied by a Pak

Army Bde Hq with many buildings containing rear elements & heavy

luggage of the Inf Battalions , which had been either defeated or bypassed

by the advancing Indian Army. Our advance to Jhenida was so swift

that the Pak Bde Hq, Cdr & Staff barely managed to escape towards

Kushtia in the nick of time.

Our next objective was Kushtia about 40 kms away & linked by

a good Class 9 road. 41 Mtn Bde had a troop of PT 76 Tanks, ex 45

CAV, commanded by 2/Lt Chandravarkar, in support. This troop of PT

76 Tanks had been with the Bde since commencement of Ops & had

performed commendably in all the battles that the Brigade had been

engaged in so far. 41 Mtn Bde advanced towards Kushtia but was not

tasked for capture of Kushtia. The task for capture of Kushtia was allotted

instead to 7 Inf Bde with a Troop 45 CAV in support.

My Coy Hq as part of Hq 41 Mtn Bde was located astride the main

road about 2 kms short of Kushtia. A canal extended along the entire

length of the City on the line of approach to Kushtia. The bridge on

the main road was fit but other multiple approach bridges were very

narrow making it difficult for Tanks & Heavy Vehicles to cross safely.

The Bde Cdr, Brig Zail Singh wanted to enter Kushtia on a wide front



but the GOC , emboldened after the success at Jhenida, felt that there

was no opposition in Kushtia. Besides the state of minor bridges on

secondary entry points, decided in favour of a single approach on main

road into Kushtia. My Coy Cdr, Maj JS Gill (Late Lt Col JS Gill),told

me that the GOC along with Cdr 7 Inf Bde had landed by helicopter in

Kushtia stadium, the Pakistanis were there but played possum, thereby

giving the impression that Kushtia was unoccupied. If true, this could

also have been the reason for entering Kushtia along a single Axis on the

main road from Jhenida. The plan was for Lt Chandravarkar in a PT

76 Tank to lead an Inf Bn, 22 RAJPUT, in vehicles along the main road

into Kushtia. The road was elevated, owing to the terrain in erstwhile

East Pakistan. As it entered Kushtia, there was a level crossing & to the

rear, about a km short of Kushtia, was a bridge over a canal.

When Lt Chandravarkar reached the level crossing, he found it closed.

He was deciding whether to open it or smash through it, when a RCL

fired from close range, disabling his tank and killing the Officer and

possibly the tank crew. Simultaneously, the bridge over the Canal, in the

rear of the vehicle mounted convoy of 22 Rajput, was blown owing to

a prepared demolition, unknown to us. Mortar Fire was brought along

the road thereby causing damage & casualties to 22 Rajput vehicles &

Personnel.

The attack was a failure. The entire 4 Mtn Div then concentrated on

this Axis. After a delay of 3 to 4 days, the Indian Army entered Kushtia.

The approach to next objective, Hardinge Bridge on the Ganges was

uneventful as the Pakistan Army had withdrawn across to the far side

of the Bridge. One span of Harding Bridge was damaged by the IAF,

hence only personnel could cross by rope across the gap in the bridge

created by the Bomb. On home side of Harding Bridge, we found the

Arty Mortars which had been firing on us during previous battles . All

vehicles which had escaped our road blocks, some with radio sets were

also lined up on the home bank.

The Bde Hq thereafter returned to Kushtia where the War ended

for me, on 15 Dec 71. Balram Mehta 45 CAV was with the Regiment but



in 9 Inf Div Sector. From 45 CAV sources, he would likely have a better

version of the Kushtia Episode & Lt Chandravarkars demise. I was a km

away from the bridge on the main road & have given my impression

based on own observation, per data fed to me & what I experienced in

subsequent days when the whole Div concentrated on this Axis.

I have included it in my war experience as a two part lesson,Never

underestimate your enemy & Do Not violate basic SOPs.

Had we entered Kushtia on multiple fronts, it would have been a

success story , similar to capture of the Enemy Bde Hq at Jhenida.

Fog of War - A Raid by the Enemy on a Brigade

Hq

On the night of 7/8 Dec 1971, I did see enemy action first hand in

the form of a Pak Raiding Party with 41 Mtn Bde Hq, as their target.

The axis of advance of 41 Mtn Bde was Darsana - Aundlabari-Jhenida-

Kushtia-Hardinge Bridge. Darsana was captured on 4 Dec & Aundlabari

on 6 Dec. The Brigade Tac Hq had moved ahead for the next battle

& the remainder of the Bde Hq comprising of the A & Q Branches

under the DAA& QMG along with the B echelon of the Inf Battalions,

supporting Arms & Services ie Signals, Engineers, EME, Ord, Medical,

moved into & around village Aundlabari, at last light on 07 December.

The Artillery in Support of the Brigade, was not a part of the Bde HQ.

They harboured in their Wagon Lines, which moved forward on orders

of respective command & control elements, as the Battle progressed. All

harbour procedures were completed & we settled down for the night, in

an area which was predominately a bamboo grove with houses scattered

infrequently.It was around midnight, when I was woken up by my Coy

Subedar, Subedar Beant Singh. He woke me up & stated, “Sahib, Appa

under attack Han”, Sir, We are under attack. My Company Subedar had

27 years service & was a Veteran of both Indo-Pak wars in 1947 & 1965



whereas I was under fire, for the first time, in barely 5 years of Service.

I heard the sharp crack of MMG Fire but the bullets were well above

our head. Thereafter, a mortar shell landed nearby with a splinter hitting

a Bull Dozer Blade with a loud sharp noise. I could smell the cordite

in addition to intermittent sharp crescendo of MMG bullets hitting the

bamboos, above our heads.

My Subedar informed me, that his reading of the situation was, a

Pak Jeep with MMG mounted, was circling the Bde Harbour & firing

intermittently whereas the Mortar was firing from a fixed location. Having

no idea of what I should do, I asked Sub Beant Singh to arrange

an armed escort to accompany me to the Bde Hq to consult with the

DAA&QMG. In the harbour,The Bde Hq used to be located in the centre

with the elements of supporting Arms & Services on inner perimeter &

B Echelons of the three Inf Bns manning defences on the outer perimeter.

It was pitch dark but self & escort reached the Bde Hq, only to find

that the Bde Hq had vacated the location & I was on my own. I was

not aware of any other officer amongst the B Echelons of the Inf Bns or

Supporting Arms & Services, hence I returned to my own location.

Meanwhile, owing to the MMG fire coming from different directions,

the troops vacated inwards, away from direction of fire resulting in troops

of various units getting mixed up, in the interior of the harbour. Some of

my troops reached Inf Bn B Echelons & some of theirs reached my area.

The enemy Mortar appeared some distance away & the MMG mounted

Jeep was circling our location but maintaining a fair distance away from

us. We could either wait for them to go away on their own or take some

action. My war experienced Company Subedar had no solution hence I

decided to investigate for myself, to ascertain the strength of enemy raiding

us. I do not remember exactly why, but I decided to take a patrol in

the direction of the Mortar fire to locate exact location of enemy mortar

position.

We had reached about 200 yards from the village when we heard

a soft “Tham, Kaun ata hai”. We went to ground & replied “Dost. Hum

Bde Hq se aa rahen hain. Aap kaun hain”, Halt, who goes there, we



replied, We are from Bde Hq. Who are you. He replied. “Hum Arty Regt

ki Wagon Line Hain. QM Sahib hamein chhod kar aur Ammunition

lene gaye hain”, We are Wagon Line of Supporting Arty Regiment, the

Quarter Master has left us here & has gone to get more Ammunition.

We got up & moved forward to find the Religious JCO, the Unit

Pandit Ji, along with about 4 OR, very scared but maintaining fire discipline

in not firing in the direction of the Enemy. In front of them were

Barrels full of Petrol/Diesel & behind them a large stack of Artillery Shells

required for the next days battle.

When the Mortar started firing & the MMG fired from a distance,

PanditJi told the OR not to fire because that would give away their

position & would assist the enemy in ranging onto their position. If even

one shell hit the Fuel or the Ammunition, they would be finished. Since

it was dark, the enemy could not know their exact location, hence he

maintained his distance. The Mortar Shells landing in our Area were

overshooting this location whereas the intended target of the raid party

was the Arty Regt Wagon Line.

We were too few to take any offensive action against the mortar

position & were wary of the MMG mounted Jeep which kept changing

location while firing from a distance. Since Pandit Ji’s strategy had been

successful, we decided to follow it, wait & watch. After some time, we

heard the Mortar Vehicle starting & receding into the distance followed

by the MMG mounted Jeep, soon after. The situation became clear when

I spoke to Pandit Ji. The Regt QM had reconnoitred the location in the

forenoon & had brought first lot of Ammunition & Fuel in the evening &

left Pandit Ji with a few OR & went back to get more Fuel & Ammunition.

The location was seen by a Pak recce party & a raid was planned for the

same night.Bde Hq moved in, on the other side of the village at last light

& had no idea of the presence of the Artillery Wagon Line, the intended

target of the Raiding Party, being located in close proximity. Had the

raiding party known the presence of a few hundred of us, comprising

the Bde Hq with atts & dets, we may not have been witness to a Raid

& subsequent chaos that followed.



I returned to my Coy Hq location & had a restless night. At first light,

all concerned were sent to their respective units. Despite the MMG &

inaccurate Mortar Fire, we were lucky in that we had no casualty except

some Bamboo groves being damaged & a Bull Dozer Blade slightly nicked

by a lone wayward shell which fell in our vicinity. Hats off to Pandit

Ji & Fire Discipline of the Regiment of Artillery. Thanks to a Wagon

Line of the Arty, whose location was initially not known to the Bde Hq, I

experienced live small arms & mortar fire, from close range & can now

boast in the words of my Coy Subedar “Appa under Attack Haan”. In the

ultimate analysis, a raiding team consisting of two vehicles, an MMG, a

3 inch Mortar & 6 to 8 enemy soldiers, had around 300 armed personnel

of the Indian Army on tenterhooks for 2 hours. A classic example of

“The Fog of War”.

Exuberance of Youth. Disposing a 1000 pound Unexploded

Bomb (UXB) in Quick Time.

The operations were over and I, being in support of 41 Mtn Bde of 4 Mtn

Div was relaxing in Police Lines, Kushtia. We had chased the Pakistanis

across the Ganges at Hardinge Bridge & thereafter returned to Kushtia.

The date was 17 December & we were awaiting orders for return to

India. The platoons were of my field company were dispersed in support

of the Infantry Battalions & still co-located with them. The manpower

available to me were 15 OR from the Coy Hq & operators of Earth

Moving Plant, attached with the Company for the duration of Ops.

Around 1000h, my Coy Cdr, Maj JS Gill informed me that we were

required to dispose off a UXB lying at Kushtia Railway Station. I informed

him that we were not equipped and this was a task for a Bomb Disposal

unit. He curtly informed me that he was well aware of the tasks of Bomb

Disposal Unit, but there were no such units available. To add urgency

to the situation, a train with PsOW from Dacca was expected to pass



through the train station by 5 PM within a few hours, hence we would

best get on with the job at the earliest.

I quickly referred to Bomb Disposal Procedure as contained in the

“Sappers Field Engineering Bible”, termed ERPB (Engineer Reconnaissance

Pocket Book). This Bible stated that a UXB should be preferably

detonated in situ. In case it must be moved, a deep enough trench should

be dug at a suitable distance. Thereafter the bomb should be pulled along

the ground by means of ropes, while the troops engaged in the disposal

task stay well inside the cover of the trench. Armed with this knowledge,

self along with my team of 15 proceeded to Kushtia Railway Station.

The UXB was easy to locate and found in a jiffy. It was lying between

the rails at a distance of barely 50 metres from the Station building. There

was nobody at the Railway Station except us. With no tools to dismantle

the Railway Line. It would be impossible to drag the UXB from the

spot we had found it in. The trench disposal method could therefore not

be applied nor was there time to try such methods since 1700 hrs was

fast approaching. I studied the UXB from reasonably close. It seemed to

be a 1000 lb bomb dropped by the IAF. The outer body of the bomb

was intact but upon hitting the ground, the fuse seemingly had got bent,

preventing the firing pin from striking the percussion cap and letting the

bomb do its intended job. I assumed that even if I moved the UXB there

was little chance that the firing pin would be activated.

I looked around & observed that the area around Kushtia Raiway

Station was elevated with respect to Madhumati River which flows close

by, within 100 metres. I recceed the area & decided the location where I

would detonate the UXB. Had I detonated the bomb above ground, the

Railway Station building would be badly damaged. The bomb detonation

would be safest if done underwater which would tamp down the

explosion and reduce amount of shrapnel resulting . Too bad for any

fish!

I checked the depth at chosen location, it was about 10 feet. My other

reason for underwater explosion, was a hope, that we will get some fish

for the unit Langar. I had never seen or heard a 1000 lb explosion from



close by, hence I could only relate it with a few Gun Cotton slabs that

one was more familiar with. The plan was to lift the UXB , carry it over

the decided route to the river for detonation. Being aware of the danger

involved, I asked all married personnel and only sons in the group of 15

Sappers with me to step aside. Out of the 15, four were ineligible leaving

self & 11 OR to carry the Bomb. The load per person was 90 pounds

which is heavy but manageable. A Bailey Panel weighs 560 pounds &

even as Officers, six of us have carried umpteen panels during YOs

Course, during bridging classes.

Poles & Ropes were arranged & the dirty dozen carried the 1000 lb

UXB to the river bank where it was prepared for detonation. I personally

attached the Explosive, primer, detonator & extra length of fuse to the

UXB and lit the fuze. We rolled the UXB into the water. I had measured

the fuze to allow us 3 minutes to move far enough from the UXB. I

waited and observed the UXB settle in the water. Some bubbles on the

water surface gave an indication that the fuze was still burning.

Thereafter we charged as fast as our legs could carry us towards the

Railway station & sat under cover below a goods wagon on an adjacent

track. We were now about 50 feet above the level of the UXB and

about 100 metres horizontal distance. We waited apprehensively for the

explosion & when it came, it was far worse than what we had imagined.

There was a tremendous explosion, the Railway Wagon working as our

overhead protection shook as if in a major earthquake. Electric Poles in

and around the railway station were partly uprooted & tilted. A huge

crack emerged on the Kushtia Railway Building. We were rewarded

with a huge crater about 50 feet across & 10 feet deep. Most depressing,

No fish.

The UXB level at point of detonation, was well below the level of

the Railway Station. Pressure wave of an explosion supposedly travels

at some 45 degrees from point of explosion. The entire embankment

on which the Railway Station stood, came in the path of the pressure/

shock wave, causing extensive damage, short of flattening the building.

The sound of the explosion and subsequent damage it caused was scary.



I resolved never again to attempt to kill fish using a 1000 lb UXB!

Next day we received further requests for disposing UXBs around

Kushtia. Remembering our previous day’s experience, we politely refused,

leaving it to the Bomb Disposal units to do the needful, whenever they

arrived. PsOW on the train when it passed that evening would probably

wonder as to how Kushtia Railway Station was in such a War Ravaged

State. What we did was foolish. Had the UXB exploded during handling,

all 12 of us would have been history. It was the exuberance of youth

which made us oblivious to the danger of what we were attempting

dreaming of the bonus of free fish for the unit Langar!




Chapter 13: A Nation Is Born 1971 by Trigunesh Mukherjee

13. A Nation Is Born 1971 by Trigunesh

Mukherjee

1

News came often about crackdowns in erstwhile East Pakistan,

after Mujibur Rehman’s election being unacceptable to West

Pakistan. By April 1971, it seemed that we would be required to be

involved in some operations there. Being a G3 at a brigade headquarters

(HQ), had its information advantages. Since we were part of the division

not deployed, it was very likely that our division would be one of the

first to be tasked.

83 Mountain Brigade, like other brigades, was tasked to organise

training for the Mukti Bahini cadres. There was some fluidity in the

circumstances, therefore, people were moved overnight in covered vehicles

from the border areas to our location. The units of the brigade

did a fantastic job in finding suitable areas, in the jungles, and setting up

camps with hardly any notice. Later, transport, equipment, instructors,

logistic support were pooled from various formations.

Getting maps was a very difficult task and we could get only a few

copies of the relevant maps, even after sending a person to the Survey

of India, Dehra Dun. We needed to get maps of many areas because it

was not clear, at this stage, which area would finally be our ingress point.

Remember photocopying hadn’t come in. Battalions, of course, had to

have maps; and essential personnel in the HQ. At the HQ, therefore, we

decided to have only table working maps – for the Commander, BM and

G3 (DQ was very annoyed).

1

Brig Trigunesh Mukherjee

125


Detachments from our battalions supported operations launched by

the Mukti Bahini from our side of the border. The volunteers in the

Mukti Bahini were a mixed lot. The younger lot was very spirited and

took to training very well. A percentage of people seemed to be there

because they had nowhere else to go. However, the intensive training

made even the latter ready for operations.

Around this time (June) I asked the Commander (who was from my

unit though he had commanded a different battalion) to let me return

to the battalion saying, “Sir, this may be the only chance to be in war

with the battalion”. He said that he would think about it After a day he

said that though he understood my urge to join my battalion he didn’t

want to upset the HQ functioning adding “We definitely will have to

go to war but I am not so sure about how much the western front,

especially the valley, will be involved.” The urge to be with my unit was

understandable but I think I experienced and learned a lot over a longer

period.

Finally, in August we got orders to move. Commander’s party (as G3

managing the details was my job) left early from Tamulpur and stopped

at Shillong. Commander was hoping that HQ 101 Comn Zone would

assist us with more info and perhaps some maps; so we had planned to

stay for two days. The stay turned out to be very fruitful; and was very

comfortable at the Holiday Home (turned out to be our last comfortable

stay till we reached Chittagong) before we moved on to Tripura.

Shantirbazaar, close to Sabrum was our location. 23 Mountain Division

HQ was at Udaipur slightly North of us. The Mukti Bahini (MB)

Sector commander Maj Rafiq (ex Pakistan Army, who had managed to

get out of the cantonment) linked up with us. They had already established

camps with training areas and firing ranges. Some of the weapons

they had been able to bring but mostly our army had to support them.

Rafiq was a professional and he had a few others from the erstwhile

Pakistan Army; but he also had quite a few young volunteer officers who

were keen to do very well and did not shy away from hard work.

Plans were quite flexible at this stage, therefore, as the G3, I was



almost constantly looking for covered routes to different areas since

points of ingress had not been finalised. This also helped to keep the

enemy guessing, denying him possibilities of reinforcing some locations.

I think all units and HQ were quite prepared for sudden changes; this

led us to be pretty open to ideas and variations. One sensitive issue was

how much to share with the MB forces till operations were launched.

It was important to keep in mind that quite a few had people across

the border, and many of their relatives were collaborating with the Pak

Army. It was not easy for them to mentally accept that.

Our HQ camp had troops from 4/5 GR; and the Intelligence section

boys were excellent. They were kept very busy (sometimes we had to

lend a hand too) as plans changed frequently, therefore, enlargements

and sand models had to be remade quite often.

The International Border wasn’t clearly demarcated in this area.

Once while on a recce, the Sparrow (Lt PKK Menon) and I, almost drove

straight into an erstwhile Pakistani BOP. The Sparrow compared the

speed of my reversing the jeep out of harm’s way with an incident at

Kanha sanctuary when their vehicle was charged by a bison!

South Tripura has a small bulge of the neighbouring country coming

in and a narrow piece of Tripura jutting in like a tusk into East Pakistan

(Belonia is at the tip; this area is referred to as the Belonia Bulge). Final

plans that evolved for our Brigade were to straighten out this Bulge.

Belonia was at the tip and two battalions (2 Rajput and 3 Dogra) were

tasked to reduce the Bulge. The third battalion leaned from the direction

of Belonia and was in reserve. These operations commenced on 6th

November. The battalions progressed very well and by morning they

had linked up around Parshuram. However, though the enemy had pulled

back it was not certain that there no “stay behind” parties to harass us.

The two battalions had to slowly check every village. The railway line

came up to Belonia and the Pak Army had used the railway to pull

out troops and equipment. As the enemy had vacated the area opposite

Belonia, the Commander went in to see it for himself. The JCO, who

was located there, indicated that there was sporadic MMG fire but its



Figure 25: “Map 1: South Tripura has a small bulge named Belonia Bulge”

location couldn’t be determined; perhaps the MMG post was on a tree.

The JCO had a detachment of 106 Rcl there. Having been the Rcl platoon

commander in my unit, I suggested that I should go forward and give it

a shot. Before Brig Sandhu could react, I was off with the detachment,

sitting at the gunner’s seat. We went forward and took up position and

listened carefully to the MMG fire. Then I decided to fire at the tree

that seemed to be holding the MMG post. It was quite thrilling to be

able to actually fire the rcl in that situation. We stayed on for a while

– but didn’t really know what happened, but the MMG went silent. In

hindsight, it was foolish of me to take off like that but one does foolish

things when one is young. When I returned the Commander only said,

“This is not your job but I am glad you acted in this way”.

Since war had not been declared the Pak Air Force could strike at

will and pull up vertically at the border so that they would not violate air

space. Our brigade had been allotted two L40s but they weren’t much



Figure 26: Accurate air attacks by our Air Force and aircrafts from Vikrant

damaged warehouses etc but did not touch a single crane at Chittagong

port.

of a deterrent. However, MMG of one infantry battalion damaged an

enemy aircraft which was excellent for morale.

An education for a lot of us was how to handle PsOW. Processes

become visible beyond a brigade level so we were really learning on

the job and remembering all our teachings. Casualty evacuation was

more streamlined except we learnt how to handle enemy casualties. We

actually saw Geneva Convention being followed.

To speed up operations, we were allotted another battalion for one

offensive (Nileki). That night for three hours or so, our radio communications

went awry partially due to jamming and partially “it just happened”.

I learnt a big lesson about how critical communications are for any operations

– for that matter any smooth functioning.

Dighis (or ponds) usually had high bunds and since the area around

was like a table top, any defences on the bunds dominated the area.

Chauddagram (on the Dhaka – Chittagong highway) defences were



Figure 27: Commanders at Chittagong : L to R Lt Col Ajit Chopra 3

Dogra, Lt Col D R Dutt 2 Rajput, Brig Bhupi Sandhu 83 Mtn Bde, Lt Gen

J S Arora Army Commander, Maj Gen R D Hira 23 Mtn Div, Lt Col M

S Virk 57 Mtn Regt, Lt Col O P Bisla 8 Bihar

based on a couple of dighis. The bunkers were built into the bunds.

One attempt to attack it during daylight ground to a halt and the unit

suffered some casualties. They needed the night to regroup. At the Tac

HQ, that night the arty regiment CO and one of the other COs suggested

to the Commander that the attacking unit should continue the next day.

The CO said, “Not during the day, we will go after last light”. Egged

on by the other Lt Cols the Commander asked, “Are you refusing to

attack?” The CO calmly said, “I will attack Sir, but after last light”. Being

in the proximity (G3’s privilege!) I heard the two COs suggesting to the

Commander that the CO should be sacked. Fortunately, Commander did

not immediately act. After the COs had left, I utilised my unit affiliation to

say, “Sir, you will be very wrong if you listen to these COs.” Prompt reply

was, “Who the hell do you think you are, telling me what to do?”. I said,

“Sir, please think calmly – firstly, it was an error on your part to push



Figure 28: Chauddagram defences with bunkers; and minefields and

panjiis in front

them into attacking during daylight hours, when recce had indicated

fairly strong and dominating defences protected by minefields. They

still went and suffered casualties. Now that they have a good idea of

the defences, please let the CO follow his plan. He surely wants his

unit to succeed more than you do”. I was chased out of his room and

thought that it was time for me to get sacked. But a successful attack was

launched the next night. Much later, in Chittagong, Brig Sandhu thanked

me for not letting him make the “sacking” decision. This made me think

even more highly of him as a mature senior officer

A few incidents worth mentioning:

• As a mountain brigade we had been very stretched as the operations

developed. One day, from the Tac HQ (in a BOP), the

Sparrow and I took off to lay a line to 2 Rajput, leaving Commander

alone with the radio operator and our driver. There was no



Figure 29: Felicitation organised in honour of Maj Gen R D Hira, 23 Mtn

Div

manpower, but having learnt the lesson of criticality of communication,

Menon and I thought we would quickly link up with

the battalion and return. While walking we thought it was not

correct to have left the Commander on his own, but we had not

still reached the unit. Menon and I decided that he would carry

on with one drum of cable and I would return. Thinking back,

one realised it was amusing that two officers singly, were walking

around without any confirmation that the enemy had been cleared.

Later, we shared a big laugh about our stupidity. When Menon

reached the battalion HQ, the CO was surprised and told him,

“the enemy has not been fully cleared and you are loafing around

on your own?”. But our communication was through. Menon was

‘Mentioned in Despatches’ but his work and contribution deserved

more.



Figure 30: Accurate Artillery fire knocks out a train carrying enemy

troops and supplies from Belonia to Feni

• We had established our advance HQ inside a BOP that had a fair

amount of space. The BM was a very intelligent and sharp person

but simply did not know how to rest. One morning, when he went

inside a basha, to freshen up, we locked him in because we were

really apprehensive that he may just fall asleep when he was really

needed. I ran across to Commander and told him – fortunately,

he also agreed that the BM definitely needed to rest. The BM, of

course, screamed at us but we had to ensure he rested, which he

did. All food, etc went through the window.

• One day at the same BOP (we stayed there for a few days) when

the DQ visited us he told the BM, “See now I have a proper map

so I have no problem getting here.” The BM obviously knew of

the scarcity so he wondered how I had organised a set for the DQ.

He picked up the DQ’s map and after one glance came running

out of the ops room to me. “You idiot, you must tell me when you



Figure 31: Enemy gun positions at Parikot with overhead cover

play such pranks! I would have burst out laughing when I saw

the DQ’s map.” I had to confess that since the DQ was always

wanting a set I should give him a nicely marked map even though

it covered the area about 200 kms north of us. But the DQ was

happy.

• It was still November – one day quite a few staff officers from the

Div HQ came to visit us. While they were still around, the Pak

Air Force came in to attack troops on the ground. Commander

and I were observing the air attacks from the top of two bunkers.

The Commander asked, “Do you see anything different?” I used

the binoculars to see better; but the Commander said, “Not there

– look behind”. Not one person from the higher HQ was around.

The brigade made steady progress and cleared the bulge; and we

were West of the tusk across a river. Our Field Company had rebuilt

the bridge destroyed by the enemy when they pulled out. I think the

place was Parikot. The village huts had been converted to spacious and



Figure 32: Taking a break at Peerbaksh Haat railway station. In the centre

is Maj Anoop S Gahlaut who was awarded the MVC later(posthumously)

strong bunkers but the roofs had been left so that it looked like a village.

This was after 3rd Dec and now we could see our Air Force going in

for attacks. The Pak Air Force was neutralised; and they had moved out

a number of aircrafts to erstwhile West Pakistan.

The brigade was on its way to Laksham and then to Chandpur to

provide a bridgehead for another brigade to cross the Meghna river.

Out of the blue we received information that the Corps Commander

would brief, our Commander during a helicopter recce the next morning.

Commander took off from the ad hoc helipad with the 4 Corps Commander

and the Div Commander. The BM was left wondering what and

which area he should prepare for and what to tell the units. Div HQ had

no information to share. Commander returned around 1600hrs, pretty

close to last light.

Our brigade had to turn South and capture Feni before moving towards

Chittagong. The only way to move the units quickly was to get

hold of civil transport. 2IC Dogra was made responsible and I was his



Figure 33: Our Bde had to turn South and capture Feni.

sidekick (because I could speak the language). We left as darkness fell

and decided to try along the Laksham – Noakhali road, as also the Dhaka



Figure 34: Pucca houses were reinforced by Pakistan Army as defences)

– Chittagong Highway South of Chauddagram. Needless to say, we had

absolutely no information about what was available and where (trucks,

buses anything). We were fortunate to find a few vehicles at the first

stop. People were extremely helpful and since they knew the area it was

not difficult to send the vehicles to the HQ.

As we were driving along at speed, with parking lights, visibility was

rather poor. We suddenly saw a few lanterns waving frantically and

coming towards the road. Frankly, we had no idea what was in store

but we slowed down. We realised that a few villagers were running

towards the road with lanterns still waving them. I stopped the vehicle

but kept the engine running. When they came close, I hailed them in

Bengali. They came closer and said that the bridge about 40 metres in

front of us had been blown by the Pak Army. Both Maj Jaswant and I

thanked our stars and the villagers who then guided us cross country

back to the road. Three or four towns gave us all the vehicles we needed.

We could thus return to the HQ by early morning.

Just before the assault was launched on Feni, we got information



Figure 35: Sappers quickly construct a bypass next to a bridge blown

up by the Pakistan Army over Parikot river

that the biggish town had been vacated. Not taking any chances the units

moved with deliberation and captured Feni. For the artillery, there was

a bonanza because the enemy had left behind quite a few guns. After

cannibalisation we had a battery of enemy 105 field guns with adequate

ammunition to be used in our attack on Chittagong.

The Mukti Bahini and locals confirmed that “most” of the enemy

had pulled back towards Chittagong. The brigade moved astride the

Highway (Dhaka – Chittagong) and concentrated, for the attack on Chittagong,

around Zoraganj. The plan was to utilise the hill tracts and

outflank Chittagong with one battalion; the other two battalions would

operate astride the highway. We had to ensure the battalion outflanking

was always within range for artillery support. By the morning of 16th

December, blocks established by the outflanking battalion were in position;

the other battalions had also established themselves for the advance.

Artillery regiment had deployed; and the Field Company had created

task forces to deal with obstacles especially destroyed bridges.

Late in the evening the Sparrow told me that a Flash message was



Figure 36: Shore guns at Chittagong

coming in. The BM was not with us in the Tac HQ, so we were wondering

who would open it. I went to the Commander – he said, “You may

never get a chance to open a FLASH message so go ahead and open

it”. It was about the surrender the next day and all hostilities to stop at

midnight; and that the Chittagong brigade commander was travelling to

our location to discuss plans for the next day. There was much jubilation

among the few of us at the Tac HQ.

Immediate requirement was to tell the battalion whose blocks were

already in position not to shoot up any vehicles coming along the highway

from the South. Murphy’s law – we got through to all the battalions, but

the battalion was not in touch with the block closest to the Highway.

Sparrow and I spent a harrowing half an hour trying to reach the officer

on the unit net; climbing a hill, getting on to the highway, changing

locations. Ultimately, we contacted the officer who said, “Busy! About to

take a shot at vehicle with red light flashing”. Any way we managed to

get him to not take the shot otherwise it would have been an unsavoury

incident.



Figure 37: Greek ship Avlos was suspected to have carried weapons

and ammunition from Karachi. First the MB approached it through the

river and attacked it with explosives. Thereafter, an aircraft from INS

Vikrant split it in half.

Brig Taskinuddin arrived at our Tac HQ around midnight to meet our

Commander. They sat on two chairs across a table (I was in attendance

– G3’s job) and exchanged pleasantries. Suddenly our Commander stood

up and saluted the enemy Commander and said, “Sir, you were my

platoon commander at the IMA”. Talk of coincidences. Then the modus

operandi for the next day was firmed up. Brig Taskinuddin promised

to send vehicles to a place where the bridge had been destroyed so that

we could proceed further.

Maj Rafiq, the Mukti Bahini Sector Commander came to the HQ

late at night and said to me, “please don’t refuse what I am about to

give you”. I was naturally taken aback. He said, “I know you don’t drink

but when you do, you like Black Dog, so here’s a bottle. And this is the



Figure 38: Bangladesh Flag: At that time the BD flag had the map of

Bangla Desh in yellow/gold inside the red round

Bangla Desh flag. We had made two, one each for the Circuit House

and the Commissioner’s office – he will have to make his own.” I was

overwhelmed by this show of affection. At that time the BD flag had the

map of Bangla Desh in yellow/gold inside the red round.

On 17th Dec we moved to Faujdarhaat Cadet College early in the

morning. While the Engineers will building a passage, we crossed the

nala and got into Pak Army jeeps that had been sent. Bigger vehicles were

also sent to transport one of our battalions into Chittagong to protect

the Bihari colonies. Since they had collaborated wholeheartedly with the

Pak Army and had perpetrated crimes and atrocities, they would be the

first target of the Mukti Bahini and locals. In fact, they were hated even

more than the Pak Army. Brig Sandhu did not want further bloodshed

on his watch.

At Faujdarhaat Cadet College bulk of the Chittagong garrison was

lined up with their arms and equipment. Our Commander met the senior

most officer and indicated that one of our battalions would soon arrive to

formally take over all the arms and equipment; and they would be transported

to camps. After that Brig Sandhu was keen to get to Chittagong

and ensure quick return to normalcy. In our hurry we didn’t realise that

Sparrow (Lt Menon) had been left behind at the Cadet College. For a

couple of hours, he was the only Indian at Faujdarhaat with the Pak

Army all set to formally surrender. I would never hear the last of that



Figure 39: Lts Menon and Nanaya next to the command post

and Menon had every right to be annoyed with me for not ensuring that

he was with us.

Entering Chittagong was a momentous occasion with jubilant crowds

carrying flags of India and Bangla Desh, flowers, garlands welcoming

us all through. The Commander asked the Commissioner to arrange

a meeting at the Circuit House which was on a hillock in the centre

of town. The Pak Army did not have the time to clean up the torture

chamber (inside the Circuit House) and it presented a terrible sight.

At the meeting of Chittagong officials, the Commander crisply indicated

the following :-

• “This is your city and you have two days to get your act together.

During this period some of our columns will be moving around

the city. Thereafter, my troops will not be in the city”.



• After two days the city must function normally including markets

and services.

• No violence would be tolerated.

• All arms and ammunition recovered from non – army personnel

were to be deposited with the nearest Indian Army unit.

While the meeting was on, some of us were outside on the lawns

and felt like “exhibits”. People were keen to just see us, shake our hands,

garland us and joyfully welcome us. It was truly an incredible experience

for all of us. One young man asked me, “how come you are not carrying

any weapons?” I simply said, “we had come for you and now that we are

with you, we don’t need weapons, do we?” There was a roar of approval

which made us happy.

The Commander told COs that no unclaimed civil cars and vehicles

were to be used by us. There was more than enough of fuel left behind

by the Pak Army so we could use that. There were no restrictions on

moving around in our vehicles. At the Cantt helipad (pretty large) we

had scores of unclaimed vehicles. They were later handed over to the

BD Force HQ.

There were a number of felicitation ceremonies for our Bde and later

for VIPs like GOC 23 Mtn Div (Gen Rocky Hira), the Army Cdr (Gen

Arora) when they visited. All were organised very well and indicated

genuine happiness. Initially, the HQ officers stayed in a building which

had been abandoned; and fortunately, there were some other vacant

buildings close by to house the offices and our boys. We waited till the

cantonment was absolutely clear before moving in.

We went around inspecting the destruction caused by our air force

and fighters from INS Vikrant. The docks (along the Karnaphuli River)

displayed a model of accurate bombing; so much destruction but not a

single crane had been hit since they would be needed to work the port.

A lot of people came to us, at the HQ, with really sad stories and

requests about their close ones. Being the only Bengali speaking officer,

I was tasked to listen and give them some replies. Most complaints



ran “My father was picked up on 23rd October and taken to the cantt;

we have no information after that. Will you please check the cantt?” or

“Have you found any mass burial grounds?” or worse “My sister and three

friends were taken away from the market and we don’t know if they

are alive”. It was very difficult to stay calm. I had to repeat the requests

to the Commander – made it doubly painful. By now, others had come

in to handle the civil administration and look after the movement of the

surrendered forces back to POW camps in India. Our units provided

help as and when required.

Our “war” correspondent arrived on the 20th or 21st; the Time and

Newsweek correspondents moved with the troops through all the actions.

The last of our authentic war correspondents possibly were Melville De

Mello, Victor Langer and Situ Mullick. Much later (1987) I had the opportunity

of interviewing Melville de Mello and I will never forget his words,

“If you don’t love the Army one can never be a war correspondent”.

Units went back to their daily routine of training, games, etc. Our

moving around town for good food (Chittagong used to be world famous

for the cooking. In fact, on ships bulk of the cooks/chefs were from either

Chittagong or Goa), playing tennis, etc were restricted to the evenings

and Sundays. We spent time well. Finally, in March we started our move

back to our permanent locations. It was a very happy send off by the

people, again with flags of both countries and lot of cheering. 12th of

March 1972, we were on our way back.


Chapter 14: Forward Maintenance Area in Barmer by C P Tewari

14. Forward Maintenance Area in Barmer

by C P Tewari

1

“I

raised an Independent Supply Platoon just before the 1971

Indo-Pakistan conflict in Jodhpur. Around October 71, two

Independent Supply Platoons co-jointly established a Supply Depot in

the FMA (Forward Maintenance Area), Barmer along with other logistic

units, namely the EME workshop and the Ordinance Ammunition depot.

It was the first time that a FMA was established by the Indian Army. All

officers use to stay within their respective unit areas and dine from the

jawan’s cook houses as no Officers’ Mess was established. Everything

was being hurriedly put in place on adhoc basis. Very few people, on the

need to know basis, knew the plans. General rumor amongst the men

was that we were out on an exercise.

Build up

Our unit personnel were very hard pressed, heavy receipts of stores

was taking place as part of the build up, everyone was busy sorting

out the stocks and we were as it is on peace system of accounting. All

paper work had to be completed on daily basis. The FMA Commander

would insist we looked into our security aspects, the perimeter defence,

trenches, arcs of fire, patrolling and the like. One often heard the men

talking amongst themselves, “Scheme par ayen hai”(we are on exercise

only), so they found rest of the tactical jobs of no consequence they would

1

Maj Gen C P Tewari

145


devote more time to their technical jobs. The induction of the formations

started, their maintenance had commenced, now the troops had literally

no time to dig trenches, over head shelters and the crawl trenches.

Induction Of Extra Troops

In Oct 1971, the FMA (Forward Maintenance Area) at Barmer in Rajasthan

sector was a scene of hectic activities. The build up of logistics in

anticipation of an Indo-Pakistan conflict had started off at a feverish pitch.

There were heavy receipts of full railway rakes of rations, petroleum

products, ammunition and engineer stores. In November 71, a Infantry

Division was inducted in addition to the existing Para Military forces.

Units which were already located there and drawing their ration from

our supply depot were nearly more than 15,000 troops. Maintenance of

troops in a desert is a phenomenal task, everyday there were new challenges

which had to be resolved by us. There is an old military saying

that feeding troops in the desert is a quarter-master’s night-mare. The

consumption of petroleum products was far in excess of the estimates.

We started moving fuel in road tankers of the Indian Oil Corporation in

bulk; the product was decanted into barrels by resorting to adhocism in

absence of proper container filing machines. The dependant units were

all on field system of accounting but the supply depot continued on peace

system of accounting. We had to be very careful and meticulous in our

accounting procedures, keeping in view the impending audits at a later

date.

THE WAR

On 3rd December 1971 night, the balloon went up. Uttarlai airfield which

was adjacent to our location was bombarded by Pakistan Air force planes.

Uttarlai Airfield which was about 3 kms from our location was attacked,

the anti-aircraft guns opened fire, Pakistani aircrafts were firing machine



guns and bombing all over the area around our unit. The whole sky was

lit up and general chaos took place. The jawans were running towards

their trenches which were half heartedly prepared. A miracle took place,

within a few hours the whole unit was under the ground level, with

overhead shelters, the excuses of limited digging implements was all

forgotten, people just dug with anything which came in their hands,

plates and mugs were also good enough to scoop the loose desert sand

out. Someone has rightly coined the adage ‘A week in the battle field is

more than years of training in peace’.

RAJA RAM FIRES

A raw recruit got hysterical on seeing live ammunition being fired. He

went berserk and started running towards Jodhpur. He was caught and

had to be slapped a couple of times to get him back into his senses. The

next morning there was another air raid, the Pakistani aircrafts flight path

was over our depot and everyone was in the trenches. After sometime all

clear signal was sounded. The Havildar Major came with two ‘Kohkhas’

(fired rounds), “Sir, Sepoy Raja Ram fired two rounds at the Pakistani

aircrafts which just flew over our location”. Here was an example of

two opposite psyches, one jawan got hysterical and wanted to run away

from the battle zone and the other was brave enough to look up and

fire at the low flying aircraft when everyone was literally hiding in their

trenches with their heads huddled in between their knees.

Brave Hearts

I had another singular opportunity of operating a Petroleum Point for

refueling a company strength of jeeps belonging to the 10 Para Commandos,

who were launched from Chachro to go behind the enemy

lines on the night of 4 Dec 1971, led by no less than Colonel Bhawani

Singh (Maharaja of Jaipur) who was seen off at my Petroleum Point by

the then Army Commander Lt Gen GG Bewoor, who later become the

Army Chief. There were about one hundred and twenty old refurbished



Pakistani jeeps captured during 1965 war. The commandos of the 10

Para were dressed in Pakistani uniforms; it was a very exciting and a

thrilling experience.

Move up of Logistics

Our ground forces pushed into the enemy territory. Indian Air Forces

planes mounted unprecedented pressure on Pakistan’s land forces which

were facing our troops and also carried out deep strikes on their ammunition

dumps and other logistic installations. Our land forces met good

success and were able to go deep into Pakistan. The ASC Battalion had

to establish forward supply, petroleum and ammunition replenishment

points. We on our part as the Supply Depot ensured that there never

was any shortage of rations or petroleum products.

The Cigarette Packet

Major Krishen Bhatia was the second in Command of the ASC Battalion.

Later he retired as a General and was our DGST (Director General

Supplies and Transport). He was an old friend of mine, we had first

met during 1969 in Arunachal Pradesh. He was DQ of a brigade, where

I had joined as the Composite Platoon Commander. He would often

visit us in the FMA to oversee the drawal of rations and petroleum

products by his unit from our supply depot. One night he came in a

tearing hurry and asked us to issue seven days rations for entire Division.

This was in addition to the normal maintenance and reserve rations

already held by the units. The requirement was in anticipation of opening

a replenishment point further into the Pakistan territory as they were

visualizing a deep thrust by our troops. The problem was that there were

no indents (demands) and also no authority for us to make such an issue.

Major Bhatia insisted that we oblige him, come what may, because his

CO had already made a commitment to the Divisional Commander and

now Major Bhatia’s job was at stake. The other officer sitting with me

Capt Nawal Kishen said, “Sir, what if these rations get destroyed in enemy



action, then the noose will be around our neck, we will be questioned as

to how did these rations leave the Supply Depot for forward areas when

there was no authority to make such a huge issue of rations”. Major

Krishen Bhatia was exasperated but not be out done, he pulled out a

Charminar cigarette packet from his pocket, threw away the two left

over cigarettes from the packet, he tore the packet and flattened it, on

its reverse side he wrote a receipt for the advance drawal of seven days

ration for the complete Divisional strength and put his signature on it

and said, “ Here, Chottu, keep this receipt, it is Krishen Bhatia’s word of

honour. If anything goes wrong, I will stand by you guys”. I do not know,

suddenly, me and Nawal Krishen threw our caution to the winds, maybe

it was the innovative receipt on the packet and the sentimental way in

which Major Bhatia gave his word of honour, more so we all were at

war and in war nobody wanted to be seen as impeding the requirement

of the troops. We have to uphold the motto of our great corps, “Seva

Asmakam Dharama”.

All Lights On

Cease fire was declared after few days and the life was more relaxed,

normal maintenance of troops resumed, we had a dependent strength

of nearly two Divisions. We actually required three times the strength

and capability which we had then. With God’s grace there was not a

single occasion when the ASC failed, not only in this sector but elsewhere

too. We even arranged to airdrop water, fuel and ammunition in

helicopters. I and Captain Nawal Krishen were sharing the same tent.

Our Sahayaks and the jeep drivers use to live in a tent at a stone’s throw

distance from our tent in the Supply Depot Administrative area. At dusk,

a peculiar silence would descend on our campsite when everyone used

to be preparing to rest for the night. At times one could hear our drivers

and Sahayaks talking amongst themselves. In the silence of the desert

sound travels far and clear. I remember one day both the drivers were

talking and like all MT drivers of ASC, they were also gossiping in their

typical driver lingo, “ Yaar, jab se cease fire hua hai mera to 4*4 top



gear laga hua hai, sare din saab forward area mein ghumta hai”. (Friend,

ever since this cease fire I am in 4*4 top gear, my sahib is touring the

whole day in the forward areas. Yes, friend even I have no time for my

maintenance, either to bathe or wash clothes). Then there was this one,

“ Jab sae yeh naya langri (cook) aaya hai khaana bahut suwad hai”. The

second driver interjected, “Khaana to suwad hai par khatae wakt head

light on ho jati hai aur subha Saali tail light on ho jati hai”. (Ever since

this new cook has come the food is really good. Yes, agreed, but at night

when we are eating, the head lights get switched on and in the morning

the damn tail light gets on).

The Noose Tightens

After 3-4 days, OC Charlie Company of the ASC Battalion, Maj RP Singh

came with a long face and dropped a ton of bricks. The seven days

advance ration dumped ahead had been straffed by the Pakistani Air

force planes and Major Krishen Bhatia was also injured during that

straffing. It was a calamity for us in the Supply Depot. The noose which

we were dreading seemed to be tightening around our necks. Major RP

Singh conveyed Major Bhatia’s assurance that we need not worry, come

what may, indents will be placed on us and the units will be asked to

take the rations on charge and then write them off as destroyed due to

enemy action. Relief was in sight but not till we got our indents. After

a fortnight of the cease fire we did get the indents, not only us but our

complete staff also sighed a relief. But what if things would have gone

wrong, well so what? There is an old saying that,

“All is fair in love and war.”



III. Western Theatre

151

Chapter 15: Appropriate title here By Jaspal Alag

15. Appropriate title here By Jaspal Alag

. 1 The month of December is always reminiscent of those wintry uncertain

fourteen nights that now we share with great pride and elan. we

fought the 1971 war being part of 54 Infantry Divison...a newly raised

Divison that acquitted itself admirably while being part of 1 Corps.

Organization

54 Infantry Divison was organised as under a.47 Infantry Brigade,74

Infantry Brigade, and 91 Infantry Brigade b.16(I) Armoured Brigade with

a troop of Trawls. c. 54 Artillery Brigade had three Feild Regiments

equipped with 25 pounders and Medium Regiment with 130 mm guns.

44Light Regiment that I was part of was equipped with 120 mm mortars.

It also had 122 mm an A incremental single barrel 122 mm Rocket Battery.

d.401 (I)Artillery Brigade was a reinforcing Artillery with three130 mm

Medium Regiments. It also had An Air OP flight. An MBRL Battery

equivalent of 13 Medium Regiments worth was also allotted but good

luck of Pakistanis it reached only once the operations were over.

1

Brig JS Alag has had great interest in learning and teaching through out

his army career. After completing Long Gunnery Staff Course was posted

as instructor at School of Arty Devlali. He completed Defence Services Staff

course and was also instructor at JC wing College of Combat Mhow. As Chief

Instructor ran two Eastern Command Prestaff courses while commanding

his Brigade at Binaguri

153


Affiliations

a. 47 Infantry Brigade had 69 Field Regiment b. 74 Infantry Brigade had

161 Field Regiment c. 91 Infantry Brigade had 162 Field Regiment d.

16 ( I) Armoured Brigade had 70 Medium Regiments. e. 44Light Regiment

Motors we’re employed in Counter Bombardment role from roving

positions. Balance of Regiment was employed as Obstacle Crossing Control

Organisation: that played an important role during the operations.

The Divison was confronted with four mine fields ranging from 600 to

800 meters in depth. Pakistan outsmarted our thinking of 400 meters

mine fields that were within Indian Army capability of clearing with

CLMC. These mine Field were laid between River Karir & The Basantar

River.These rivers did not have much water thankfully.

Topography

The general area was plain with alluvial soil as obtained in the plains of

Punjab. While the area on our side was fairly developed, Pakistan was

poorly underdeveloped. There was no electricity in any village that we

captured. The villages in contrast presented a poor state of affairs and

state of Pakistan’s economy. The general area was cultivated and was

riddled with standing crops of wheat and sugar canes.

These sugar canes came in handy in creating an axial alongside

duckboards used by two Engineer Regiments. Some of the sweetest

tracks came for administrative and logistics sustainability. The tanks had

churned the area and it became impossible for the following echelons

to traverse without the assistance of Engineers throughout ..these tracks

became the lifeline till the Divison gave back the captured area after the

Simla agreement. There was no axial or metalled road, unfortunately,

such as the degree of underdevelopment on the Pakistani side. There

was no irrigation system nor electricity, the area was bereft of any development!!

The area between Karim and Basantar River was interspersed

with hastily laid-out Anti Tank minefields to check the progress of the

operations.



Preparations For War

Preparations for war started fairly early. I recall we were on our excursion

to see our country along with my Subaltern friend on a newly

acquired scooter, we had barely completed a journey of 3000 km, we

were recalled for reasons then unknown. 54 Infantry Divison was newly

raised formation ....it was more of a training divison engaged in collective

training honing skills in concept viz Deep Thrust. Essentially penetration

by a balanced force with a view to achieving surprise by moving a large

force in such areas where enemy forces expect you least. We became

fairly dexterous in moving cross country and operations at night. In short,

the Formation became a well-oiled machine that was to prove handy in

those fateful days.

Our critical deficiencies were taken care of. Our Regiment was selected

to be converted to 160 mm Heavy Motors. A team of all ranks

critical to gun end went to Talbet where a team of Israeli officers had

come to train us on this new powerful equipment. Some officers were

also posted during this time to Artillery units in the Eastern Command.

Around May June of 1971,it was getting clearer that something was

brewing up. Visit of Our Prime Minister to various countries with a view

to appraise the world community of the atrocities being committed by

Pakistan Army in East Pakistan. We also began to hear the creation of

Mukti Bahini and our involvement.

Move to Operational Location

Colonel Avtar Singh was hitherto fore Colonel (General staff) of the Divison

was given the command of 54 Artillery Brigade; this had sobering

effect vice dipsomaniacal earlier commander posted out!!! Artillery acquitted

well under the new commander who had a thorough understanding

of the subject that he was to deal with in days to come.

Move of Divison to Samba Sector in J&K. The Divison, ab inito

deployment was akin to like in Assembly area, some three to four kilometers

from Border. My Regiment even gave a lecture and demonstra-



tion since we were to work as Obstacle Crossing Control Organisation

during the war. There was active patrolling by the units along the International

Border. One thing was common that Pakistan had laid an

extensive network of mines. By end of November 1971, Pakistan had

sent two Photo-Reconnaissance missions. At brigade headquarters, we

were getting intelligence summaries detailing activities more of what

was happening in the Eastern Sector. By end of November, our Airforce

had achieved complete air superiority in the East. Pakistan was now getting

impatient and ordered interdiction of all strategic targets..counter-air

operations had begun on 3 December 1971.; war was finally declared

on 3 December 1971 at nocturnal hours by the prime minister through

all India radio in a broadcast to the nation.

Pakistan had attacked our airfields aimlessly some of their bombs fell

in our rear echelons of no consequence, yes some of our personal belongings

were damaged including some base stores. Our religious teacher

brought this news at a time when pay was being distributed to some

men near Regimental Headquarters command post..the uncertainty of

war was looming large in Western Sector was getting clearer By a special

courier from Brigade headquarters operational orders were received that

guns were to cross Starting Point at 2000 hours on 5 December 1971.

The advance was led by mechanised columns of 16(I)Armoured Brigade

with 16 Mechanised infantry in Topaz Armoured Personal Carrier and

Infantry Brigades following the trail over 2-3 kilometers

As has been mentioned earlier the general terrain did not have much

defence potential. It neither had dominating features nor worthwhile

natural obstacles that could hold the preponderance of determined mechanised

forces numbering some 100 tanks and an equal number of guns

supporting. But that was not to be. Pakistan had very imaginatively laid

antitank minefields of great depth unheard of till then in recorded military

history. We had barely crossed two to three kilometers axially when

the forward edge of the minefield was encountered. The problem with

such huge minefields is that you must be able to protect the minefield

both by observation and fire. Pakistan suffered on both accounts, it could



neither observe nor had enough Artillery to bring the fire at a critical

point and time.

The mechanised columns bounced on the first minefield. The 5 &

9 Engineer Regiments did a great job throughout the operations. On 7

December at about 8 pm, Commander 91 Infantry Brigade was checked

by one of our JCO who was manning his own home side of the minefield.

Since the minefield had anti-tank and anti-personal mines it was not

cleared for the following echelons. Commander paid no heed to the fact

that minefield was not cleared carried on. His contention was if the tanks

have gone so could his jeep go. Lo and Behold commander 91 Brigades

jeep had barely gone 50 yards inside the minefield, his jeep flew up in

flames. Commander was not available to his Brigade for the rest of the

operations of the 91 Infantry Brigade.

Battle of Basantar

The date of the Basantar crossing was fixed as 13/14 December but

was postponed by 24 hours by the General officer Commanding. The

battle of Basantar was a decisive Indian victory. The Artillery true to

its motto: Everywhere with Honour and Glory, provided intimate fire

support to both Infantry and Armoured units in their relentless pursuit

and capture of critical objectives. Throughout the fourteen days, Artillery

units viz, 44 Light Regiment was employed as Obstacle Crossing Control

Organisation to facilitate Infantry and Armour crossing these minefields.

After the establishment of the bridgehead at Basantar, my op and BC

parties were employed with two companies of 9 Engineer Regiment in

their holding role near village Harmal.

The concentration of firepower has always been the battle-winning

factor. The immense and timely contribution of the 40(I) Artillery Brigade

with 4 Medium Regiment guns and that of flanking formation, viz 36 Artillery

Brigade on left and 26 Artillery Brigade on right was critical and

decisive for the success of the operations. Artillery can not operate itself

and to facilitate its function the newly introduced ANPRC 25 and

Divisional Net R5 acted as a force multiplier in making Artillery op-



erations timely and decisive that brought the battle of Basantar to its

logical conclusion by enabling the Infantry and Armour to achieve their

tasks without any hesitation, fear or delay. Artillery was in fact was everywhere.

It can be safely said in retrospect that the success of this operation

also forced Pakistan Army to accept graceful Surrender in the East. 54

Infantry Divison had entered Pakistan deep inside to pose threat to its

main vital defence works at Zafarwal.In all, it captured approximately

388 square kilometers of real estate of Pakistan in a matter of 14 days.

The havoc Artillery played during the battle hypnotised the Pakistanis

who had come to collect their dead on 17/18 December 1971. Artillery

proved itself as a weapon decision and Pakistan knows it best. The Battle

of Basantar revolved around firepower and mobility.


Chapter 16: My diary by S Balasubramanian

16. My diary by S Balasubramanian

. 1 My diary – 4 Dec 1971

The old Phillips transistor crackled into life in the late night of 3 Dec ’71.

Huddled around it were over a dozen pilots of ‘The Lightning Tribe’,

No. 20 Squadron of the Indian Air Force. All ears were glued to capture

the words as they came along with the occasional static. None of it was

missed as the voice of our Prime Minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi, came

through. loud and clear. “The wanton and unprovoked aggression of

Pakistan would be decisively and finally repelled”. Her voice was firm.

In the past few hours, Pakistani Air Force aircraft had attacked Amritsar,

Pathankot, Srinagar, Avantipur, Uttarlai, Jodhpur, Ambala, and Agra and

some Indian heavy military vehicles near Sadik in Punjab. Across the

border, their Air Chief had been telling their military’s public relations

officer not to bother about conjuring up a justification. “Success is the

biggest justification”, he boasted. “My bird should be right over Agra

by now, knocking the hell out of them. I am only waiting for the good

news.”

1

Wing Commander S Balasubramanian VrC (Veteran) 28th Course NDA, 4905

C/K Born on 15 Dec 1945. Commissioned 04 Jun 1967. Retired May 1985.

Served in Air India 1985 to 2017 Instructor/Examiner on Airbus. Simulator

Instructor B 787 Trustee with Indian Development Foundation: Serving the

needy women and children (NGO recognised by the UN) idf.org.in

159


We were at war

Our location was a small airfield far from our home base of Pathankot.

A pre-emptive strike had been expected. To avoid substantial losses

whenever such a strike came through, our squadron’s planes had been

dispersed to safer havens. Now, it was time to get back to where the

action was. We prepared for a 3 AM take off in the morning. Our planes

were most certainly not designed for night flights and operations, as they

did not have taxi or landing lights. In the absence of any lights on the

taxi tracks, I and other pilots of the squadron had to taxi with help of

airmen guiding us with hand held torches cycling alongside all the way

to the runway! Cycling a few feet away from a hurtling fighter jet, all 8

Tons of it, takes some courage!

The night was dark. Northern India was invisible due to strict compliance

of black out norms. Around 4 AM, our fourteen aircraft approached

overhead Pathankot, our base, in a formation. With our bright red and

green wing tip lights, it must have been an elegant sight to watch. Then,

suddenly, all hell broke lose. The sky was lit up with red tracers in hundreds

and thousands!! Mistaking us for enemy aircraft, our anti-aircraft

guns had opened up. One could hear the pop of the exploding shells

around! This triggered an unplanned peel off of planes from our formation

in all directions. Unprintable words that followed on R/T cleared

up the skies soon. We had had our first taste of war! One by one our

pilots landed and luckily without any damage!

A fighter squadron, normally, has sixteen single seater and two twin

seater trainer aircraft. The trainer is used for training and not normally

used in combat. Our unit was equipped with Hunter Mk 56A fighters

and 66D trainers. These were manufactured by the Hawker Aircraft

Company of UK. We had about thirty pilots to fly these planes. The

total manning level of the squadron varied between four to five hundred.

Three technical and a medical officer ensured good health of the aircraft

and the unit personnel respectively. The personnel of other ranks are



Figure 40: A tracer lighting up the sky by night

trained to handle specific trades like technical (mechanical, electrical and

electronics), administrative, catering and health services. Unlike the army

and the navy where almost the entire strength went on to fight, in the

air force only the pilots, numbering thirty odd pilots, went in for actual

combat! Our aircraft needed just one person to fly it but that person is

also was its navigator, gunner and radio operator! Fig 2 shows a Hunter

aircraft of the IAF.

The Hunter Mk 56A was undoubtedly the most docile looking fighting

bird ever built. Powered by Rolls Royce Avon jet engines the modified

first prototype broke the world air speed record in 1953, achieving

a speed of 727 mph (1,171 kmph, 632 knots). Initially inducted as a day

air defence airplane, these were moved to a ground attack role with the

induction of Gnats (Ajeets) and MIG 21s into Indian Air Force. With its

eight underwing weapon stations and four internal 30mm Aden guns,

each capable of firing 20 rounds of ammo per second, it turned out to be

a formidable ground attack aircraft, something that the Pakistani forces

were soon to find out. With fuel in its internal and four external tanks

it had the longest reach when compared to the other aircraft then in



our inventory. Basing them at Pathankot threatened most of the distant

enemy airfields by bringing them within our easy reach.

Back in the crew room of our squadron, the atmosphere was remarkably

calm. It was fun as pilots exchanged views on the ineffective enemy

attacks the previous evening even as we sipped our chai. Frantic shouting

and screaming replaced the calm every time the flight commander

walked in with a strike mission order. Seniority, experience and what

not was hurled at each other in order to be included in the formation

for the task! A cell phone video camera (yet to invented or available in

1971) would have been best to capture those golden moments - words

fail to describe the frenzy. We had, after all, lived for this day.

The squadron was well prepared. We had worked for over months.

Maps for various airfields had been meticulously prepared. Navigation

consisted of drawing pencil lines to the target and back with running

times at important and visible points along the track. The route avoided

major cities and danger area. Keeping fuel requirement in mind, tactical

routes were selected so that even if spotted by radars or forward ground

observers, the enemy would remain unsure of our target airfield. One

had to hold the rolled-up map in the left hand besides controlling the

throttle. The thumb would be locked on to a place one had just flown

over (TPS, Thumb Positioning System – predecessor of a modern day

GPS!). From time to time the thumb was moved over the map as the

aircraft travelled ahead. We had been busy for months studying the maps

and going over the briefings, possible targets and different eventualities

of missions.

Standard operating procedures were created to ensure that every

member knew his actions. Thus, it would be easy to maintain total R/T

silence through the most part of our missions. This would preclude

interceptions of our radio transmissions by the enemy that might leak

out our intentions. Dummy briefings of the missions were carried out

going down to the minutest detail. These included target description,

attack patterns and action in case we were to be intercepted enroute or

over the target. Escape plans for different sectors, in case of an ejection,



too were covered. In short, nothing was left to a guess. We were ready.

It was after lunch that I got lucky to be included as a wingman of

my flight commander in a four aircraft strike mission over an enemy

airfield at a given time. Since the navigation time is known, a takeoff

time and thus a start-up time was calculated. Nearing the aircraft,

registered as A-475, I was mobbed by my airmen, the magnificent lot,

the unsung heroes, who kept these machines flying. Along with good

wishes came a special request from one of them for destroying a ‘yellow

building north of the airfield’. He would not have any Pakistani living

in his grandfather’s home! Working backwards for a TOT, time over

target, our four Hunters took off on time. Soon, we got into a broad

front formation and were on our way. Expecting an air threat from

anywhere, this formation provides good 360 degrees view of the skies.

Flying westwards, at low level, skimming the trees we hugged the ground

in order to avoid radar detection. Total R/T silence was maintained

throughout. Crossing the international borders without a passport, as

briefed, I fired a short test burst from my guns – the vibration was

reassuring. I could defend myself! We were now flying at 420 knots. The

speed would increase to 480 knots (almost 900 kms per hour) as we

approached the target airfield.

Closing in onto the target almost bang on the scheduled time, I could

see the control tower and hangar roofs come into view. I craned my

neck around to look for enemy aircraft that would generally be on a CAP

(Combat Air Patrol) higher up to defend the airfield and would threaten

us. It was time and my leader pulled up for his attack. I followed after

a few seconds. The pull up point is always to the left or right of the

target since the frontal view is blocked with a high nose during the pull

up. A higher altitude provides a better view for target selection on the

left or right as the case may be. This also allows the aircraft to be put

into a turn towards the selected target and achieve the perfect dive angle

needed for accuracy of weapon impact. The view of an enemy airfield

unfurling in front while in the cockpit of a fully armed plane is a fighter

pilot’s dream – and here I was, actually living it! Fig of clear view of a



Figure 41: View of Ground from 200 to 300 feet

dummy target airfield.

The sky started filling up with tracers and black/white puffs of exploding

anti-aircraft shells all around us. That is deadly, but in a way

beautiful. Through the dense puffs I located just the nose of an aircraft

parked in a concrete pen. It turned out to be even better than a dream!

I rolled the plane almost on to its back to arrest the upward trajectory

and while turning lowered the nose on to my target. Unmindful of any

enemy aircraft and the bursting anti-aircraft shells all round, I knew that

now it was me and the target. Correcting my dive angle and speed I

gently eased the gunsight on the visible part of the enemy aircraft. Closing

in, at the correct range I pressed the trigger. My ears could not hear

anything even as my eyes took in the magnificent view of the aircraft

exploding, spewing flames and smoke along with debris! It had been

less than fifteen seconds since I had pulled up for the attack! Clearing

through the smoke, as I pulled out of my dive, I spotted my leader and

soon caught up with him as we headed home.

Actual combat for a fighter pilot, whether on ground attack or air

interception, lasts but for a few seconds or minutes. It is generally a do or

die situation and rarely gives a second chance. However, the skill required



Figure 42: How an airfield looks to a pilot climbing up to an attack run

Figure 43: Ack ack shell puffs - shrapnel from one or two hitting an

aircraft could mean the end



can only be achieved only through tons of ground work, hundreds of

training missions and remembering each and every minute nuance of

handling the aircraft and its weapons- all honed over years. The flight

lasting around an hour and culminating in an attack is finally the ultimate

test of a fighter pilot.

The formation caught up and with our watchful eyes looking for

threats, headed home. The men were thrilled to see me back. On hearing

about the ‘kill’ I was lifted off the ground and carried on their shoulders

to the waiting jeep. It was indeed a memorable welcome. The yellow

building, however, remained intact!

Back in the crew room, there were spirited discussions on the day’s

successes. Post flight reports were filed in. Some of our aircraft had

returned with bullet holes in them. Indeed, our squadron had done remarkably

well. However, the evening was marred when news came

in that we had lost my roommate, Fg Offr Muralidharan, an ace pilot.

Flying Officer Sudhir Tyagi, a very dear friend a course mate operating

from the same base also did not return from another offensive operation

conducted the same day.

Glory and danger lie before the ones who fight a war. A soldier

knows this too well. It takes years of training and raw courage to stand

up to your enemies and perform your duty irrespective. It is not easy but

a serviceman craves for this opportunity.

As evening fell, I knew I needed my sleep to rest and be ready to

perform yet again.



Figure 44: Aircraft on the ground

Figure 45: Aircraft in the air



Figure 46: Bala with colleagues



Figure 47: Bala (as in 1971-72)




Chapter 17: The Little Giant Stands Tall: 72 Armoured Regiment - Battle of Chhamb 1971

by PPS Bhandari

17. The Little Giant Stands Tall: 72 Armoured

Regiment - Battle of Chhamb

1971 by PPS Bhandari

1

Having finished my tenure as Instructor Class ‘C’ at Armoured Corps

Centre and School, Ahmednagar, I was eagerly waiting for my reversion

to the Regt, Hodson’s Horse in Jun 1971. Instead, to my utter disbelief, I

was posted to be part of a new regiment, 72 Armoured Regiment on its

raising on 01 Jul 1971 at Ahmednagar itself.

Consequent to the decision to go to war with Pakistan, Army HQ

ordered its raising on “Operational-Immediate” basis. Such was the urgency

that several other officers from various regiments already posted

or on courses in Ahmednagar were also side stepped to form the New

Raising.

For me this turning point was a life time experience of not only going

through raising of a regiment with no resources in shortest possible time

but also rushing into battle and earning the prestigious ‘Battle Honour

Chhamb’, one of the only two units to be so honoured. Yes 72 Armoured

Regiment was blooded in war on raising. While still bonding amongst

ourselves, the Regiment was rushed smack headlong into the fiercest of

battles – “Battle of Chhamb” Dec 1971.

Despite totally unfamiliar surroundings and terrain, fighting alongside

unknown formations and units, the Regiment blunted enemy’s offensive,

destroying 29 tanks and a Sabre Jet in a matter of 7 days. This is what

earned the Regiment the name, ‘The Little Giant’, thus the title of the

1

Lt Gen PPS Bhandari

171


by PPS Bhandari

Figure 48: Initial Team on 01 Jul 1971



by PPS Bhandari

Figure 49: Defence Minister Babu Jagjivan Ram visits, given Ceremonial

Guard

article.

This personal narration of challenges of raising and annihilation of

the enemy in battle is enshrined in the regimental ‘Digest of Service’ and

the ‘War Diary’ recorded personally in my own hand as the first adjutant

of the Regiment.

It was a tall order to be operational under four months. Due to the

importance, besides senior officers from Army HQ, the Defence Minister,

Mr Jagjivan Ram himself made a special visit causing further pressure

and disruptions in raising.

While amalgamating the heterogeneous lot, I was hard pressed even

to set the basics like SOPs, load-tables for tactical echelons, mobilisation.

Besides administration of the Regiment, getting soft vehicles, stores,

ammunition released, collected and stored in a matter of days was nightmarish

when the depots were yet not geared up.

Such was the workload that I was forever looking for more than 24



by PPS Bhandari

Figure 50: Shashtra Pooja on arrival of T-55 Tanks on 17 Oct 1971

hours a day to integrate, convert and train men coming from different

regiments with tanks other than T-55. But then where were the tanks

-still in Poland! First lot of 25xT-55 tanks arrived only on 17 Oct, more

than three and a half months after the raising commenced.

After quick traditional Shashtra Pooja, we were on our way to Kathua

commencing 25 Oct by special trains on ‘White Hot Priority’. To add

to our problems, hurriedly extended railhead from Pathankot to Kathua

did not even have the ramps for the tanks and B vehicles to get off the

train rakes. However, scary make shift arrangement of literally jumping

off the rakes with mobile girders became a default training event.

Due to such late arrival of tanks, I could only organise ‘battle zeroing’

of tank guns by firing on boulders painted white at Ismailpur ranges

between 01- 04 Nov. Despite such zeroing we destroyed 29 Pak tanks

in battle later.

Our woes were not over yet. On 05 Nov we were ordered to move

to Palwan between Akhnoor and Jaurian across Chenab River under 10



by PPS Bhandari

Figure 51: Arrival of Tanks at Kathua by Special Trains on 27 Oct 1971

Inf Div as part of 3 (I) Armoured Brigade.

Figure 52: Tanks negotiating

Chenab River on Make-Shift Ramps

on Night 05/06 Nov 1971

Deep, fast flowing Chenab

had a class 18 bridge only and

was unfordable. Tanks had to

be perilously ferried across on

makeshift rafts. As soon as the

front of the tank would mount the

raft it would sink deep down (so

would our hearts), before suddenly

reappearing once the complete

tank mounted the raft. Goosebumps

notwithstanding, the Regiment

was in Palwan by 0745 hrs

06 Nov.

Organising ourselves at Palwan

was the toughest part for me

- to ensure not a speck moved yet

all personnel to be trained for the

then visualised offensive task, virtually

without reconnaissance.



by PPS Bhandari

Figure 53: Importance of Chhamb

10 Inf Div under 15 Corps was

responsible for the Chhamb – Jaurian – Akhnoor sector up to Chenab

River. The initial offensive role of the Div was changed to holding a

proper divisional defended sector at the eleventh hour. 72 Armoured

Regiment which was to earlier spearhead the offensive towards Marala

Headworks literally had no knowledge of the terrain of the Defended

Sector. Importance of Chhamb. Being on enemy’s route to Akhnoor, was

strategic to Pakistan and so was it for India due to its proximity to the

GT road communications and Marala Headworks.

Deployment of 10 Inf Div was mainly 191 Inf Bde less a battalion

West of Manawar Tawi, 28 Inf Bde in the hills sector, 52 Inf Bde reserve.

9 Horse was the integral armoured regiment. 68 Inf Bde (additional) in

depth for counterattack tasks. 72 Armoured Regiment was to be prepared

for various contingencies in the defensive battle.



by PPS Bhandari

Figure 54: 10 Inf Division Deployment Night 3 Dec 1971

Pak Offensive Plans

On Night 03 Dec 1971 Pakistan attacked with the reinforced 23 Inf Div

Group with five inf bdes (one in the hills). 26 Cav was integral with 11

Cav, 28 Cav and 12 (I) Sqn ex 2 Armoured Bde. Its plan was to attack

with 66, 111 and 20 Inf Bdes supported by armour. 8 AK Bde was for

the bridgehead across Manawar Tawi.

On the evening of 03 Dec, our CO while still in HQ 10 Inf Div attending

operational briefing, ordered me to immediately move the entire

Regiment to a new designated forward location next to Palanwala, East

of Manawar Tawi.

While on the move at night the first enemy arty barrages were heard.

It had commenced.

Hereafter the Regiment was in the thick of the battle contesting and

blunting all three thrusts of the enemy with heavy casulties and delay

on him totally up-setting his plans and eventually stalling his offensive.



by PPS Bhandari

Figure 55: Pak Offensive Plans

Some of the war winning actions of the Regiment are narrated following.

By early 04 Dec, along its Northern thrust, enemy 11 Cav Group

broke out through the lodgement gained by Pak 66 Inf Bde and captured

strategic Mandiala North Heights. Mandiala crossing on Manawar Tawi

was occupied only by a company of our 9 Para Commandos.

Next 24 hours enemy consolidated its position, posing direct threat

to Mandiala Crossing.

Simultaneously, onslaught of enemy 111 Inf Bde had commenced

along the Central Axis putting enormous pressure on 191 Inf Bde.

It is at this stage that 72 Armoured Regiment was rushed across

Manawar Tawi to reinforce the Sector and restore situation.

While ‘B’ Sqn was moved across Manawar Tawi on Ni 4/5 Dec and

placed under 191 Infantry Brigade in area Chhamb, ‘C’ Sqn was moved to

Chhapreal to checkmate enemy’s Northern Thrust along Mandiala. On

05 Dec fighting major actions at Phagla, Goghi, Barsala, ‘B’ Sqn stabilised

the situation along Central Axis.



by PPS Bhandari

Figure 56: Pak Attack along three thrust lines: Northern, Central and

Southern, Night 03/04 Dec 1971



by PPS Bhandari

Figure 57: Pak 4 AK Bde attack

across Manawar Tawi, 05 Dec 1971

In the North, early morning 05

Dec, Pak 4 AK Bde consisting of

6 AK, 13 AK, 47 Punjab and armour

launched an attack in the

Area Mandiala Bridge. Enemy 6

AK lost its way and 13 AK having

crossed Tawi blundered into gun

areas 216 Med Regt.

This is when ‘C’ Sqn swung

into action. It along with 7 Kumaon

ex 68 Inf Bde launched

a counterattack and pushed the

enemy back to the West of

Tawi. Counter penetration position

adopted by the squadron thereafter, blocked the most threatening

Northern Thrust of Pak 23 Inf Div. Retreating enemy was mauled by

the elements of ‘B’ Sqn by edging forward from Gurha.

Figure 58: Counterattack by ‘C’ Sqn

72 Armd Regt and 7 Kumaon

Along enemy’s Southern thrust,

the advance of Pak 20 Inf Bde

Group towards Area Mangotian

was fiercely contested by ‘B’ Sqn.

Despite the officer Troop (Tp)

leader having been severely injured

and evacuated, the NCOs,

who too were successively injured,

did not allow an inch to the enemy.

The same very Tp thereafter

moved to Goghi, Barsala to save

the day for 5 Assam under attack

from Pak 111 Infantry Brigade.

On 06 Dec desperate enemy

came in with unprecedented

heavy air attacks. In our regimental HQ near Palanwala, while away from



by PPS Bhandari

Figure 59: ‘B’ Sqn contesting Enemy Central and Southern thrusts in

support of 191 Inf Bde, 06 Dec 1971



by PPS Bhandari

my tank, controlling actions of the sqns from adjudant’s Van (modified

command B vehicle), had a providential escape. Luckily I had stepped

out of the vehicle seconds before it was strafed out of shape. Preserved

remains of the radio set and the type-writer still cause chill in the spine.

In these air strike, ‘B’ Sqn cdr contesting enemy along its Central

axis was severely wounded and evacuated.

Figure 60: Enemy Sabre Jet shot

down

It was to the credit of the officer

Tp leader of ‘B’ Sqn who shot

down an enemy sabre jet to rid

the skies of enemy air.

After midday 06 Dec enemy

had captured tactically critical

Gurah Heights making defences

rather untenable. Before the enemy

could reorganise, ‘A’ Sqn,

which had also been inducted

West of Manawar Tawi by then,

launched a counterattack by last

light with ‘half sqn’ and a company 5/8 GR and successfully recaptured

it.

Unfortunately on 06 Dec itself, along enemy’s Northern thrust, fighting

gallantly, the sqn cdr and the 2IC of C Sqn were killed in action.

However the sqn continued to resolutely block enemy’s Northern thrust.

While the Regiment had caused heavy attrition and huge delay to the

enemy yet by now Pak 111 and 20 Inf bdes were able to break-through

the defences of the forward battalions which had fought gallantly since

03 Dec. GOC 10 Inf Div therefore decided to pull out to better defensible

position East of Manawar Tawi, to be deployed as shown on the map.

While pulling out, OP (Arty) tank was surrounded by enemy infantry.

The driver of the tank was killed while the gunner, ALD Katar Singh was

captured. Taking advantage of incessant shelling, alert and bold NCO,

freed himself, got into the tank and killed the surrounding enemy with



by PPS Bhandari

Figure 61: Deployment of 10 Inf Div and 72 Armd Regt East of Manawar

Tawi, 07 Dec 1971



by PPS Bhandari

machine gun fire before driving across Manawar Tawi. Exemplifying

resilience of our young Regiment, the NCO was decorated with VrC.

On consolidating after tricky

replenishment of individual tanks

spread all along the Eastern bank

of Manawar Tawi, on 08 Dec, Mig

21 of Sqn Leader D Keeler, IAF

was shot down by the enemy.

Seeing pilot parachuting South of

Buchcho Mandi between the opposing

forces, the officer Tp leader

Figure 62: Sqn Leader D Keeler ‘C’ Sqn, daringly, waded through

the river in full view of the enemy

and rescued the injured pilot. Keeler is the guest of honour of the Regiment

till today. Resuming their offensive, Pak 111 Inf Bde launched a

two-pronged attack along Darh and Raipur crossings and established

footholds By 0600 hrs09 Dec.

Figure 63: Counterattacks on Darh

and Raipur crossings

No 3 Tp ‘A’ Sqn and A Coy 3/4

GR successfully counterattacked

Raipur Crossing preventing further

expansion of the bridgehead.

Along Darh Crossing, one Tp

each of ‘A’ and ‘B’ sqns counterattacked

and denied expansion of

bridgehead.

Being the right situation, a

force of an adhoc sqn and two

companies of 5/8 GR was formed

to launch the deciding counterattack

on the Darh Crossing on 10

Dec The Counterattack was personally

approved by the GOC 15

Corps who had specially flown



by PPS Bhandari

Figure 64: Abandoned enemy tank at Darh Crossing

into the Div Sector.

Coordinating this most critical counterattack put to test our nerves

and composure. This completely successful counterattack indeed was

the final nail in Pak’s coffin in the Chhamb Sector.

Having completely blunted and blocked enemy’s offensive, 72 Armoured

Regiment left no room for manoeuvre to the enemy beyond

Manawar Tawi till the ceasefire on 17 Dec.

Recognitions

For its exemplary performance, 72 Armoured Regiment, the youngest to

be blooded in battle, was bestowed with the prestigious “Battle Honour

Chhamb 1971”, in addition to the award of “Theatre Honour J&K”, one

of the only two combat units to be so honoured.



by PPS Bhandari

Figure 65: Battle Honour Chhamb 1971 & Theatre Honour J&K,

War Memorial.

In recognition of the valour of the ‘Little Giant’ that stood tall in the battle,

later, as the then Colonel of the Regiment and GOC 1 Armd Div, I had

a War Memorial erected in the battle zone at Kachreal.

Vivek Veerta Vijay



by PPS Bhandari

Figure 66: 72 Armd Regt War Memorial at Kachreal

Figure 67: Homage to the fallen comrades by Col of the Regt



by PPS Bhandari


Chapter 18: Tribulations of Amn Supply Chain in War: 1971 An Experience by Subhash

Bindra

18. Tribulations of Amn Supply Chain in

War: 1971 An Experience by Subhash

Bindra

. 1 The Shakargarh salient is favourable to Pakistan as there are multiple

launch pads possible for reasonably attractive Objectives in India.

Concomitantly it required IA to put on ground a larger quantum of force

for the Defensive ops.

In 1971, to support the IA operations the ammunition echelons were

located along the line of communication NH 1A ; Pathankot-Samba-

Jammu Road. This is a slender strip of flat terrain with no depth, hence

the amn stocking units were located practically in the show window.

For protection of these VPs, AD cover had been provided as also few

infantry elements for ground protection.

On 4th Dec 1971 at the outbreak of hostilities, I was posted at AOC

School, Jabalpur. The Adjutant sent for me, and informed that I was to

proceed to Unchi Bassi, (strange-sounding name). For what and when

?? Nothing added (I was to assume). Blissfully, I continued to float in

the thought that as Instructors were selected to proceed abroad for eqpt

orientation and earlier had got an AX on a course,that “mera number

bhi aagya”. Military establishments anywhere are in remote unheard of

locations; and Unchi Bassi was to be no exception be it in USSR , US or

wherever, ‘Sanu Ki’.

Alas, a few hours later, the Mungheri Lal ka Sapna , quickly vapourised,

as I collected the Move order and the Railway Warrant , the NRS was

1

Maj Gen Subash Bindra,VSM (retd)

189


Bindra

entered as Unchi Bassi , the clerk explained the details,a station after

Jalandhar, so we were in India, Thunder Clap, Bolt of Lightning, Downpour

on Ashaon, all together. . . . As it was to be the first separation after

marriage, went to see 6-9 pm movie show and then at 10 pm boarded

the train to Delhi. Next night,a change of train and journeyed for another

6 hours to disembark at 4 am. It was pitch dark, and a straight drop of

7 feet from the rail compartment to terra firma, there was no platform.

The receiving officer handed over a Sten 9 mm, as that was to be my

personal weapon thereafter, till the end. On reaching the unit, a km away,

the first air raid siren, at 5 am broke me in. This was no WWII training

film or “Longest Day” that we had seen in the Academy, it was for real.

The 18 FAD, containing 30,000 tons of amn, was rightfully isolated.

Being in-depth, there was no threat by enemy action on ground, other

than sabotage. The only damage that could take place was by air raids,

hence the emphasis on ‘Trench Drill’, rehearsed time and again till the

end of ops.

The CO would take rounds both by day and night to ensure, the

troops were in their trenches. However, on night 6th Dec, at 10 pm, the

siren went off, it was just too cold to even move a muscle in the brain,

let alone elsewhere. But certain as Death the CO came on the round

and shone the torch into the trench outside our tent, there was no one

inside. . . .then where were the two new arrivals? The reality of us not

being in the trench but elsewhere, the CO surmised better, he too was

JSW. Next morning I had left early and was away to Jalandhar station

to escort important items. My tent-mate was in front of the CO and in

his nonmilitary, explanation was unhelpful he said, “Sir, in the dark, had

I jumped into the trench, then perhaps I would sustain an ankle injury or

land on a snake, thus I assumed it was prudent to remain in bed. As also

that air raids, were either at dusk or dawn and on this occasion being 10

pm, the alert perhaps had been sounded by accident”. The CO peeved,

it was not even funny. ‘Chatak’ .

By the 7th Dec morning, the action was hotting up ahead on the

front, and orders for me to move to the next destination were given at



Bindra

11 am. That afternoon the few of us dining in members (three junior

officers) were at the Mess albeit decided to host a farewell lunch, as

customary, notwithstanding that I had been there barely for 48 hours.

Any excuse to enjoy the winter sun in Punjab with a glass of beer in

hand. The froth in the second round had just about settled when the

enemy Sabres appeared for real and flew right overhead, this time there

was no pre-warning. However the siren did go off but after the fly-past

by enemy aircraft, it was low and deafening. The Payload of bombs

was released after overflying the Mess, 700 meters away and outside the

perimeter fencing. We were just about recovering from the close shave,

the CO walked in, and once again found that we were not in trenches,

OMG not again. Ignominy, perpetuated, he saw that each of us had a

glass of beer in hand, the Last Post had been sounded. . . .. . . .. I guess

the Bhoot of H sqn at NDA had passed out with me and continued to

accompany my shadow, in trouble forever.

With the IAF CAP by Gnats, that which would arrive in a few minutes,

it gave little time to the Pakis to turn around for the second run,

nevertheless, we did have many large craters, as visitors remarks, but

all outside the perimeter. Gnats in aerial combat were superior to the

Sabres. . . PVC Nirmaljeet Sekhon.

Aerial Threat, so what was with the Sabre aircraft bomb runs, twice

a day, both at dusk and dawn, that with so much of effort on one single

VA, why no hits? Despite the enemy GLO (a hawker) positioned outside

the depot, (later captured). The interrogation revealed, that whilst the

GLO aligned the aircraft run-in with the Depot, the pilots on arriving at

the target area, could not Visually confirm the target. The recently built

married accommodation was not shown on the maps in their possession,

as being of an earlier vintage. The topography had changed, new

landmarks had emerged, leaving the pilot perplexed about the Bomb

release line. So in effect, they simply would unload, by approximation,

towards the end of their run. Guess the lesson learnt is the importance

of Real-Time int, as is now available, Balakot type.

God forbid even if one bomb had dropped on the stocks, the entire



Bindra

assets of explosives would have gone off, making Disney land fireworks

a phuljharii in comparison. It would have be seen at Jalandhar and by

the enemy across in the Bulge, and I would not be alive recollecting, as

now.

Amn Sub Depot (ASD) at Pathankot

This subunit had been intended to abinitio look after the Comn Z, Sub

Area units with about 2000 tons. With the induction around the Bulge,

the dependency of units on this amn ech shot up Thus when the build-up

started we had fewer Dugout and Plinths and less area to give us the

luxury to maintain prescribed Safety Distances.. An ASD is designed to

hold 7000 tons, with 4 Officers and cater for a Corps, but that’s in an

ideal situation, that which then was beyond the normal and I was sent to

augment the staff, it had only an officer. Likewise, the ground area of an

AP was extended to hold an increased tonnage, everything got stretched,

Make-Do, with what you have, was the magic word. Amn could not

be kept as per UN Hazard Division Classification Safety norms, Safety

Distances required to be maintained were simply not possible.

Now, with a Corps plus dependency on the sub depot, it was business

akin to pre- Christmas Sales at Macy’s or Harrods. We were receiving

vehicles filled with amn to replenish the Expenditure in the Defensive

Battle and stock Build up for the subsequent Offensive. (Blissfully, the

norms for calculation were only in terms of Second Lines. I recall when

later at Col Com Mhow, teaching the 30:30 concept, all hell would break

loose in the discussion of answers to the total number of rounds required)

On any one night we had about 75 vehicles moving about, and

without lights switched on, attempting to reach designated Plinths, in a

small area of an ASD, luckily we had no accidents. The only parallel

of dense traffic in a small area, I draw is from Tokyo’s famous Shibuya

Crossing - simply known as ”The Scramble”. (An iconic landmark, where

upwards of 1,000 people cross the multi-cornered intersection at a time.



Bindra

Despite converging in mass from all directions, pedestrians skillfully

manage to avoid colliding with one another).

The biggest the challenge for any amn holding ech is to ensure safety

of stocks. It is guided by the United Nations Organization (UNO) Hazard

Class and Division (HC/D) and consequently, Safety Distances are to be

calculated and maintained, intra storage sites (magazines) and outside

infrastructure, to limit damage. It demanded watchful control on the type

and quantity of amn, there were no computers.

Next, the hot spot was, the vehicle marshalling area outside the depot,

where the drivers would take rest and hot meals and prepare to move in

some direction. . . . This activity threw up its own set of challenges, that

which could not have been earlier imagined and therefore planned for.

The darkness contributed to the confusion. Vehicles that had collected

amn would await the others to complete their numbers and then move

out, as a convoy. Easy?? No way! At night the marking tapes to guide

vehicles, into predefined Arrival and Departure areas, would be run

across and over. Thela driver, did not have the Sanu ki, attitude, but

simply these were unfamiliar controls. . . set up by Faujis. The closest

example to depict the scenario, imagine the T3 Terminal at IGI airport,

with Arrival and Departures on the same floor level. Flights only at night

and lights in the Passenger area switched off. This very scenario on each

of the 14 nights.

Accounting went for a SIX. The vehicles from supplying base depot,

loaded with fresh amn would arrive at the Marshalling area around 2

am. At about the same time, the convoy commander of collection party

from the fmn up ahead, having finished collection, whilst looking for

his vehicles would commandeer the incoming vehicles that were yet to

unloaded, and merge it along with his departing convoy. For a Thela

driver, a fauji in uniform was enough authority, they all looked similar.

It would be interesting to understand the impact on accounting. Who is

to clear the receipt voucher. The vehicle which was to be unloaded had

erroneously moved on ahead to the fwd AP without entering the ASD

and getting duly documented. How was the ASD expected to trace the



Bindra

missing amn? That which it was in fact not so.

The other examples of vehicle mix up, were when an empty vehicle

having arrived from the fmn to be replenished would wait out in the

marshalling area, and the driver would stay put and avoid entering the

depot for days. As he had found a sanctuary of no work and reduced

threat. We also had instances when drivers of vehicles with amn loaded

from our sub-depot, would join the convoy of returning empty vehicles

to the main depot at Unchi Bassi.

By now the reader would surmise that there were plenty unintended

opportunities for vehicles moving IN and OUT, and not necessarily to

the desired destination. There were no MPs or traffic control. At the

forward APs similar instances were replicated.

Such mix up of convoy vehicles resulted in arty Shells reaching and

the matching fuzes reaching the neighbouring arty unit. Towards the

end, Mines went to an Engineer Regiment and the Mine Fuzes to another,

such were arising’s of our Bermuda triangle, the marshalling areas. Oh

boy when it all ended, we had dealt with 19000 trucks IN/ OUT. Of

these about 500 truckloads of amn had been unaccounted for simply

Vanished. . . .there were No Receipt Vouchers.

Finally, in late January we started tracking each of the 18000 vehicles

journey. Linking each vehicle registration number, to its entry in at which

amn ech , there were 6 of them. where on earth did it reach? 36 or 39

or 54 Div AP or Corps AP , Amritsar Sub Depot or the units directly.

Attribute it to Initiative, expediency and exigency.

Auditors were set upon us by February 1972 and our second round

had begun. We managed to track the vehicles and their loads and obtain

All Clear, in 4 weeks time.

Whilst we are proud to have done well, only we can give ourselves

a pat. No logistician returns after the war, with scalps in hand, to be

lauded and applauded. Anyways, it was full of experiences previously

not encountered , that which I am proud to record.

Our success would not have been that which it was, as also that

we are around today alive to tell the story, Big Thanks to Gp Capt VK



Bindra

Bhatia (late) H Sqn, and his band of pilots who were located at the airbase

Pathankot. They were flying Gnats and provided the Combat Air Patrol

(CAP), and kept the Paki mosquitoes at bay, we had been put out of

harms way and were safe. . . .

Amen what a pilot, what a soul VK. We were able to meet often

during and after the ops, whilst at Pathankot.

Worthy of mention, were two more Ordnance est close by, their

contribution was equally noteworthy viz. The Mobile Bath and Laundry

Unit and the Dry Cleaning Section each with its own WE. These are

mini units but well thought of as part of Corps Z, entity. The troops

would look forward to their visits to these and get indulged upon. Whilst

they did not match the creature comforts of renowned Bathing houses

for troops as Baden Baden in the Black Forest for the Roman soldiers, or

the Onsen of Japan, with regular hot water supply. . . nevertheless they

were a welcome indulgence.

Life gives you opportunities to live on the edge. It is easy, walk

through with the honest commitment of a soldier. What is destined will

come your way.

This is not anon, but mine. The recollections came in easy, being at

Goa, away from the business of doing nothing, in retirement at NOIDA



Bindra


Chapter 19: A Naval Story from Southern Naval Command by Jai Chacko

19. A Naval Story from Southern Naval

Command by Jai Chacko

1

“On 2nd December 1971, we set sail from Kochi, INS Godavari

under the Command of Captain Hardev Singh along with

INS Ganga and INS Amba were given the task of Trade Warfare and

Contraband Control in the 8 and 9 degree channels about 300 to 400

nautical miles west of Colombo (I was the senior engineer).

The task was to choke the traffic of Pakistani merchant and naval

ships going to and the from East and West Wings.

On 4th December morning, MV Pasni, a Pakistani merchant ship

disguised as ‘Tokyo Maru’ was sighted approximately 350 nautical miles

west of Kochi. Our ship hoisted the battle ensign and asked the ship to

stop. With her not obeying orders, two 4-inch salvos were fired across

her bows, this brought Pasni to a standstill. On close examination, it was

found that the ship was transporting a large number of troops to the

Western Wing.

The crew of the Pasni were asked to embark life boats and abandon

ship, the process was chivvied up by raking the upper deck with 40/60

fire.

After the crew and troops embarked Godavari, a boarding party,

along with key members of Pasni’s engine room crew, took over the ship

and sailed her to Kochi under Godavari’s guns.

On interrogation of the Pak troops, it was revealed that they were

1

Commander E Jai Chacko(Rtd) with the help of Vice Admiral Vijay

Shanker(Rtd)

197

Chapter 19: A Naval Story from Southern Naval Command by Jai Chacko

from the 23rd Baluch Regiment, the infamous regiment that executed

‘Operation Torchlight’, the massacre of intellectuals in Dacca University.

Pasni was brought to Kochi under the command of Lt Commander

P P Nandi, the Executive Officer of Godavari, and Lt Biswajit Roy, on

6th December.

The Pasni’s crew and troops were handed over to the civilian authorities

who, after the War, were repatriated.

P.S. The Supply Officer of the ship, Lt Cdr Castelino gave a sumptuous

meal to the Pak crew, who were in a state of shock thinking that they

would be shot. In fact, the Captain of Pasni, when taken to our Captain’s

cabin defecated in his pants.

Note: I have taken the help of Vice Admiral Vijay Shanker (Retd),

who was the Asst Navigating Officer at that time, to narrate this episode.


Chapter 20: Reminiscing Events In BATTLE ZONE OF LONGEWALA :1971, Ram

Chandra Chhetri

20. Reminiscing Events In BATTLE ZONE

OF LONGEWALA :1971, Ram Chandra

Chhetri

1

Introduction

Pursuant to an Op Immediate posting order, consequent to completion of

my High Altitude Area (HAA) tenure in Sikkim, I left HQ 164 Mountain

Brigade the next day. I drove down to Bagdogra Airport to board IL-

76 Transport Aircraft are best known as Assam Courier Flight. There

were about 85 senior and junior officers and 200 JCOs and men hailing

from NEFA region and Sikkim. The flight landed at about 1700 hours

at Palam Airport. I rushed to Delhi Railway Station to board Jodhpur

Mail and reached Jodhpur before noon on 14 Oct 1971. I reported my

arrival at the Rear Divisional HQ where I received instructions to board

a vehicle of ASC Transport Company leaving for operational location in

the afternoon of the same day. After roughly six hours of road journey, I

arrived at the 12 Infantry Division Ordnance Field Park area. The officer

whom I had to relieve, Capt NS Kandra, and two other officers, including

my course- mate Late Capt SK Tiwari, and Lt IS Rao, were waiting for

me. After a brief conversation, we had our dinner and retired to our semi

under-ground tented accommodation.

1

Lt Col Ram Chandra Chhetri (Retd)

199


Chandra Chhetri

The next morning, while it was ‘Stand To’ time, I, along with Capt

SK Tiwari, went around the Divisional Administrative Area. Surprisingly,

I found that one of the companies of 23 Punjab had been deployed for

the protection of the flank and the Divisional Administrative Area. The

regiment was one of the Infantry Battalions of HQ 164 Mountain Brigade,

where I was posted as the Brigade Ordnance Officer. Lt Col MK Hussain

was the Commanding Officer and Maj Kuldeep Singh Chandpuri was

the A Company Commander. The regiment had moved out from High

Altitude Area for their peace tenure. After a brief conversation with Maj

Kuldeep Singh Chandpuri at the location which was approximately 300

meters away from my unit area, it was time scheduled to meet Commander

Army Ordnance Corps (CAOC) who was also the Officer-in-

Charge Divisional Administrative Area. I, along with Capt NS Kandra,

met the CAOC. After discussion for a few minutes, the CAOC asked his

Second-in-Command to take me to HQ 12 Infantry Division for a formal

introduction with the staff officers. That liaison visit was extremely

helpful as I understood the impending divisional tasks and certain grey

areas of logistic issues. It was time for the lunch break, so we rushed to

the Officers Mess which was housed in a large EPIP tent covered with

a camouflage net. I met all the Services heads who were seated in the

modified ante-room.

Ordnance, the silent Service, functions in the Combat Zone. Within

a few hours of my stay in the operational location and meeting with

the people I could, I realized the onerous tasks lying ahead for effective,

efficient, and responsive material and logistic support to the dependent

troops. The subject is explained in a nutshell in the following paragraphs.

Inventory management and stocking process: This entailed detailed

provisioning, procurement, storage, and subsequent issue of spares of

armaments from small arms to guns, engineering, and signal equipment,

‘A’ and ‘B’ vehicles, major assemblies, viz engine assemblies, expendable

stores, tyres, tubes, batteries for Mechanical Transport and signal equipment.

Other important tasks at hand were the receipt of unserviceable

and repairable stores from the dependent units and their further disposal



Chandra Chhetri

to dependent depots.

The above-mentioned functions were very essential for the support

and the success of the campaign. I took over the charge of inventory

management and stocking process bearing in mind the fundamentals of

logistic support i.e., right item in the right quantity, at the right place, and

at the right time.

The process of Inventory Control was to commence on the precedence

of The vital, essential, and routine nature of requirements of the

dependent units. The conventional methodology of inventory control

had been very cumbersome, tedious, and time-consuming in comparison

to modern computerised control systems which are faster, accurate,

and devoid of human errors. Now coming back to conventional inventory

control which involved vetting of account cards of each item. One

account card was assigned to one item which had data like Cat/ Pat

N, Nomenclature, Accounting unit and other transaction details and total

dependencies of equipment/ vehicle. There were about 3,500 items

of supply responsibility of the OFP. The process of vetting the abovementioned

account cards continued for 15 days. In case any account card

showed A shortfall in the item/ quantity, the same was simultaneously

covered with Op Immediate indents on the dependent depot. After hectic

and dedicated efforts put in the earnest and right direction, stock levels of

total holdings surged to more than satisfactory levels by mid-Nov 1971.

Traffic duties: This primarily entailed receipt or collection of stores

ex depots and further issue/ dispatch to dependent units. Lt IS Rao

was assigned the task of organizing two outpost detachments to deliver

the The material at Unit Repair Organisation (URO) and Light Repair

Workshop (LRW) in forward locations. He was also entrusted with the

task of collecting indented stores from the dependent depot and Jaisalmer

Railhead for collecting the consignments of sand tyres for B vehicles and

heavy-lift stores like engine assemblies.

Unit Administration: Man-management was a very essential aspect

especially in field conditions. Food, Clothing, shelter for the men, safety,

and security of men and material were to take top priority over every-



Chandra Chhetri

thing else. The responsibility of administration was entrusted to Capt

SK Tiwari.

Tactical Situation prevalent in the Battle Zone

Primarily,12 Inf Div was entrusted with the task of overall diversionary

tactics in the event of possible assaulting Pak forces and defending the

border post of Longewala in the Thar Desert of Rajasthan. It all started

with a pre-emptive air strike by PAF launched on a number of Indian

airfields on 03 Dec 1971. That was seen as a prelude to the Pak’s intentions

of declaring an all-out war against India. The partial mobilization

in the initial stages on the Western front was turning out to be full-blown

mobilisation with appropriate scales of reinforcements. Activities in the

border post had increased manifold as threat perception from Pak forces

seemed inevitable.

On the side of Longewala, 20 Lancers with Centurion tanks were at

Stand To for swift move and fire at the intruding Pak formation. Major

Kuldeep, Company Commander of A Company of 23 Punjab was holding

fast in his defensive position with his men. RCL gun-mounted jeep, light

and medium machine guns, and mortars were all set to take on any

attack from the Pak formation. Artillery Field Regiments were deployed

to cover the likely axes of the enemy advance. The troop of Air Defence

Regiment with their 40 mm anti-aircraft guns was in place to deter the

enemy aircraft from intruding into the air space.

Violation of AirSpace by PAF

On the night of 4/5 Dec 1971, Pak transport aircraft intruded into the

Divisional Administrative Area. The pilot first fired illuminating flare

ammunition to enable him to observe the targeted area and after an

interval of a few seconds jettisoned a 1000 lb bomb and returned home

immediately. In the meantime, the troop of the Air Defence Regiment



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located in the proximity started firing 40mm anti-aircraft ammunition

bringing about a barrage of fire with tracer rounds. The low-flying enemy

aircraft with a large fuselage was certainly an easy target. Unfortunately,

due to the lack of radar equipment for early warning of approaching

aircraft with regards to its identification, speed, and direction, it survived

from becoming a hit by our anti-aircraft guns.

Undoubtedly, it was a bold move on the part of Pak pilot who sprang

utmost surprise using advantage of darkness, moving stealthily amidst

Divisional Administrative Area and dropping the bomb. Fortunately,

the bomb did not explode as it struck against soft sand making a 30

ft deep. crater and laid there live, posing a threat to lives and assets

in the vicinity. The next morning, my friend, Capt Garudacharya, an

Ammunition Technical Officer defused the bomb in situ. However, Pak

media was rife with fake news claiming destruction of Indian military

base in Rajasthan Sector. Truly speaking, in case the huge bomb would

have exploded, there would have been widespread destruction within

the Divisional Administrative Area as the bomb had fallen in the vicinity

of Engineer Field Company holding their mines, explosives, and other

stores.

The Battle of Longewala

After the initial failed attempt by PAF, on 07 Dec 1971, an enemy infantry

brigade, supported by a regiment of armour (mixed T-59 and Shermans),

was about to launch a dawn attack on our defensive position held by Maj

Kuldeep at Longewala. IAF was requested by our Air Controller for direct

support of the post at the earliest possible time. In a bold early dawn

attack, HF-24 pilots pounded on the tanks of Pak 27 Cav. IAF started

shooting at the moving columns. Sortie after sortie went into attack destroying

enemy tanks. We could see the tanks engulfed in flames and

amidst bellowing smoke, tank crews jumping off the tanks and running

helter-skelter to save their lives. A maximum number of enemy tanks



Chandra Chhetri

were destroyed. The retreating tanks, moving columns of soft vehicles,

and troops were bogged down in the sandy Terrain, thereby becoming

easy targets for IAF. After the disastrous offensive in Longewala,

our forward border outposts were under continuous shelling by Pak Artillery

and Infantry. Our Artillery field regiments and infantry battalions

responded with courage, grit, and determination. Our formation could

not afford to lower guard at this critical juncture because Pak offensives

were continuing in other sectors. Within the next few days, it became

clear that Pakistan was fighting a losing war.

Conclusion

By and large, it was evident that the strategies of defensive or offensive

postures, or combination of both by Indian forces in various theatres

of war during 1971, paid rich dividends. Finally, after surrendering of

Dacca on 15 Dec 71, the war came to an end. The victorious Indian

leadership - political and military were accoladed in the various national

and international fora. In fact, the victory of India against Pak was a direct

result of all arms cooperation. Indian fighting troops displayed a very

high sense of discipline, professionalism, resilience, and determination

during all the campaigns. The conduct of operations, both tactical and

logistical excellence, will go down in the military history of the country.

Importantly, the Liberation of BanglaDesh was a great achievement

with the resultant factor of sending back hundreds and thousands of

refugees back home. India’s support in establishing an independent

BanglaDesh was applauded by the member nations of UNO. Indeed,

independent Bangla Desh would ever remember the generosity, moral

and material support of the Indian people in their fight for an independent

nation during 1971.



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Figure 68: Old Priest in Durga Mandir in Tanaut

Figure 69: Monitoring Progress in Operation Vital Store



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Figure 70: Physical Checking and Stacking of Stores

Figure 71: 1000 Lb Pak bomb created a crator



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Figure 72: Capt R C Chhetri explains functioning of weapons



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Figure 73: Glimpses of captured Pak weapons and equipment



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Figure 74: Capt Chhetri with captured weapons

Figure 75: Foreign Reporters with captured Pak weapons



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Figure 76: Pak assets destroyed by IAF fighters.

Figure 77: Capt Chhetri and men on destroyed Pak tank



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Figure 78: BSF post destroyed by Pak shelling.

Figure 79: After Operation celebrations



Chandra Chhetri


Chapter 21: From the hinterland to the war zone by Ujjal Dasgupta

21. From the hinterland to the war zone

by Ujjal Dasgupta

1

The experiences narrated in this book are heroic tales of valour.

Fierce tank battles, dauntless infantry attacks, daredevil airstrikes,

and so on. And with good reason. Our course went into the 1971 operations

with 5 years of commissioned service, with just the right blend of

adequate experience and loads of grit and leadership qualities. We were

indeed at the cutting edge of operations by land, sea, and air.

Alas! Not all of us were as fortunate! By mid-1971, when it was clear

that the balloon was to go up, most schools of instruction terminated

their ongoing courses, and officers were dispatched back post-haste to

their units. For some inexplicable reason, our degree engineering course

continued. Everything that a military man trains and prepares for culminates

in the hope of getting to participate in active hostilities. We were

desperate not to miss this opportunity of a lifetime, but 3 December

1971 saw us still chasing electrons in the classroom! With all hope lost,

we were resigned to our fate. But a week later, telephonic instructions

were received terminating the course forthwith, and we were asked to

choose our posting between the Eastern and Western Sectors. Jessore

is my native place, a place where my grandfather spent most of his life

and my father had seen as a young lad, but one that I had never hoped

to see. And now this once-in-a-lifetime opportunity had come my way!

Joyously, I opted for the East; and true to form, Army HQ issued my

marching orders for the Western Sector!

1

Brig Ujjal Dasgupta

213


The hinterland

The next two days, as we made our way to our units, I got a rare firsthand

view of the situation in the hinterland during active hostilities. The

spirit of all our countrymen, the way the nation rose as one and stood by

the forces, is something I have never seen either before, or since. Every

man, woman, and the child was fully involved, and the rallying cry “Jai

Jawan, Jai Kisan” given to the nation by Lal Bahadur Shastri was on

everyone’s lips.

The next afternoon found us at Indore Railway station, ready to board

the 3-tier compartments that would take us en masse to Pathankot or

Calcutta. A large crowd had materialized on the platform. They insisted

on garlanding us and were eager to shake hands and wish us well. The

press also reached there and the next day’s local newspaper covered

the ’send off to the brave soldiers going to war’, complete with pictures!

All of this attention made us feel special indeed, but also rather silly.

We were still at Indore with more than a week of hostilities already

over, while the real heroes were those already deep inside East Pakistan

or West Pakistan! But those heroes were not accessible to the average

man on the street, while we were. At one point, when I was standing a

bit away from the others, a frail old beggar made a beeline for me. He

reached me even as I was reaching for my purse. What happened next

was unexpected. He appeared to stand a bit taller, his eyes shone with

some inner light, and reaching out his hand, he grasped mine in a firm

handclasp and said, “Jeet ke aana, Sahib”! With that, he turned on his

heels and walked off! There were goosebumps on my hand and I felt

humbled, proud, motivated, and thankful, all at the same time. This one

incident remains vivid in my mind to this day. It succinctly sums up the

feelings that coursed through the veins of every citizen when the nation

was at war.

New Delhi Railway station was semi-dark by night. The feeble minimal

lighting in deference to the blackout just about allowed us to see.



Figure 80: Spontaneous send-off for 71 ops to SODE Course at Indore

Rly Stn – December 1971



People were also talking in muted voices. I embraced my parents and

sister who had come from Lucknow to meet me as we passed through.

The first rays of the morning sun found us moving at a sedate pace

through Punjab. It was bitterly cold. Nothing prepared us for the onslaught

that followed. Even as the train was steaming into a small station,

hordes of villagers stormed into every compartment armed with buckets

of steaming daal and baskets of rotis, all the while shouting “Jai Jawan,

Jai Kisan”. We were unceremoniously made to get up, 2–3 thick rotis

were thrust into every hand, followed almost immediately with a ladle

of steaming hot daal on top. It was all we could do to keep the daal from

spilling. And the train was off. We took the only option available, ate that

delicious food. This very same procedure was repeated at every stop

thereafter – gruff, taciturn hordes of poor villagers waiting impatiently

at each station to feed all soldiers passing through en route to the war

zone. After about three rounds of this, we were forced to decline any

further generosity.

This was a profoundly humbling experience. These villagers, who

had so little to start with, were giving us so much more than the food

from their tables – they warmed us with the warmth in their hearts

and overwhelmed us with their generosity. They were quite obviously

very poor. Their womenfolk would have woken up at some ungodly

hour to scrape up whatever was in the house and prepare that delicious

food. What prompts a person to deprive himself of his meagre fare and

unstintingly give to total strangers? Patriotism? We were to see many

more such true patriots before we reached our units. We ruminated in

silence, each lost in his thoughts.

The railhead Pathankot was a welter of organized confusion. An

NCO went around asking each of us the names of our units and we were

accordingly led to a long line of civil hired transport (CHTs) and asked

to board particular vehicles. “Civil” and “hired” were both misnomers!

These scruffy, sleep-deprived drivers and cleaners were fully committed

to getting us to our units at the earliest, as much military as any of us. They

knew the locations of the units on the national highway. And “hired”?



These thela wallahs had just materialized voluntarily from everywhere

with one single objective, to ferry troops and stores as needed, when

needed. No one counted kilometres or litres. No rest, no time for food.

All through the hostilities, they kept this up endlessly.

The “fog” of war

The commanding officer of the Corps Signal Regiment at Samba was at

a loss as to what to do with the three of us who reported for duty on

13th December! It was decided that each one of us would be sent to one

of the Divisional Signal Regiments under the Corps, to take care of the

rearward communication to Corps HQ.

At last light, I was teamed up with a lineman, a despatch rider (DR)

with his jeep, a sackful of dak meant for the Div HQ (Corps of Signals

was responsible for the Scheduled Despatch Service [SDS]), and armed

with the assurance from the DR that he knew the location of the Div

HQ, we set off into the night. It was an uneventful trip along the national

highway past Kathua and Pathankot up to Dinanagar, where we had

to turn sharply towards the west on kucha tracks. The going became

tricky. Trying to follow the tape left by the Sappers did not work since

it was snapped at many places. We made our way ahead as best as

possible. After an interminable time, the DR stopped the vehicle in the

middle of nowhere and announced, “Sahib, kal to Div HQ idhar hi tha,

aaj pata nahin kahan giya”, and that was that! The Div HQ had moved

on ahead in the last 24 hours. It was pitch dark. With no idea of the

new location, I decided to look around in the present location hoping

to run into some rear elements to guide us. Once off the track, it was

somewhat forested and we proceeded single file. Suddenly from the

darkness came the harsh cry, “Tham! Kaun aata hai?” We froze in our

tracks. Our “Dost” was responded to with the next command “Haath

upar! Pehchan ke lie aage barh”, and finally, “Tham. Password?” The

sudden shock of being thus accosted froze the blood in our veins. It



certainly froze our memories, and we remained mum. By now we could

make out the shadowy outline of the sentry and his weapon pointed

towards us. In a quivering voice that gave away his young years, he

repeated, “Password bolo!” and simultaneously, the ominous double click

of his weapon indicated it was now cocked. He was trying to steel himself

up to press the trigger if he had to. It takes a lot to shoot a person in cold

blood. Be that as it may, he was determined to do his duty. Cold sweat

trickled down between my shoulder blades. As it transpired later, the

password was “Kalam” and the counter-password was “Hathi”. The DR

was in the lead and would receive the first bullet. Desperately, he tried

to recollect the password. Perhaps in the dim recesses of his memory,

he recollected that there was a large animal somewhere in the password

or counter-password and decided to take a leap of faith. He blurted out

“Ghora”. There was a few seconds of silence as the sentry pondered this.

Perhaps he too decided that one large four-footed animal was as good as

the other, never mind whether it was the password or counter-password.

Peevishly, he said, “To aisa bolo na!” and lowered his weapon. Waves

of relief poured over all of us, the sentry included. I assure you, it was

not funny at that time!

By first light, we managed to reach the Div HQ just short of Nainakot,

and thereafter time passed by in a daze as we were caught up in our

tasks. I had become a forced third occupant of a shelter meant for two.

Thank God they were friends. When we could get some rest, we would

sleep packed like sardines in a can. Any attempt to turn sides resulted

in a pile of mud falling upon us!

My rearward Radio Relay communications to Corps HQ (we were

totally dependent on Radio Relay) functioned beautifully even at the

extreme ranges at which we were operating, a result of careful siting. In

the fast-moving, fluid battle, Radio Relay was our lifeline. This gave us

multiple voice and data channels between Corps HQ and Div HQ so

there was no queueing for the important operational calls and messages.

An extremely busy three days later, the ceasefire was declared.

One incident comes to mind. One morning, a Paki aircraft streaming



smoke, flew low over our HQ desperately trying to reach its base. Right

over the Div HQ, he jettisoned his auxiliary fuel tanks. As these silvery

tubes came down, everyone dived for the nearest shelter, not knowing

whether they were bombs or what. The tanks landed with a thud, one

right within the HQ and the other a bit further. No one stirred. We were

waiting for the “bombs” to explode. Then two Gurkha johnnies from our

defence and employment company ran up smartly to the tank, picked it

up under their armpits, and trotted back with their war trophy! Senior

officers finally crept out from their shelters, feeling very foolish!

The Pakistani village was perhaps a little over half a kilometre ahead

of us. The very next day after the ceasefire, hundreds of our villagers went

there and literally stripped and brought back everything they could get

their hands on – mattresses, quilts, charpoys, utensils, et al. The villagers

on both sides of the border were equally poor, but this was war – no

quarter was given, none asked for. It saddened me to see this sight. The

next day, a couple of us went to the village. Every possible movable item

had been carted away. Only the bare huts remained.

The aftermath

Ceasefire brought about a sudden reduction of tension. The adrenaline

rush that had sustained all of us through many sleepless nights and days

now subsided. We were relaxed and had all the time in the world on our

hands. Then started a flurry of “calling on” other units in the vicinity to

meet friends and make friends, and maybe share a drink and a meal. One

day, three of us accompanied the CO to the neighbouring Signals unit.

We asked for the CO and were directed to his location. We found the

gentleman standing inside a small 4’ by 4’ enclosure of hessian cloth and

bamboo, completely in the altogether, having a glorious head bath (he

was a Sikh) as his helper poured water from just outside the enclosure.

The strip of hessian barely covered his unmentionables. He greeted us

warmly thus, at ease with himself and the world, and promptly invited



us to stay back for lunch. Sundry jawans went by at some distance, quite

habituated to this sight. We learned that he was not averse to even giving

directions to his Subedar Major from here!

Another minor hilarious episode occurred a few days after the ceasefire.

Most of the officers in the unit were smokers, and we ran out of

cigarettes. All the local village could offer were “Kool” cigarettes, a horrible

mentholated abomination that we were forced to smoke, with disastrous

results on the throat and vocal cords. I was woken up by the

exchange one early morning at 4.00 am on orders of the 2IC. He had

managed to get the missus online from Mathura with considerable effort,

and while her voice came through clearly, his hoarse whisper did not.

There followed a hilarious 3-way conversation with me relaying what

the 2IC said and being an unwitting listener.

A few weeks later, our degree course was resumed and we found

ourselves back in Mhow just 3 months after leaving.

Such then were the experiences of this “Signaller”. While they are

most mundane as compared to many coursemates, I saw the situation

in the hinterland and the way the whole nation rallied at that time. And

I also saw that even war has its funny moments!


Chapter 22: Battle of Jarpal by Mahendra Singh Joon

22. Battle of Jarpal by Mahendra Singh

Joon

1

“To refresh momories of those who fought 1971 war and are still

alive today and for the information of later Generation, I am

posting day to day actions of the historic war of Jarpal ( also referred to

as Battle of Basantar ). Please refer to the map to understand the Battles,

fought, by TRIUMPHANT 3 Grenadiers, better.

30 Nov 1971

On de-induction of Commando Wing Instructors from Sectors around

Bangladesh ( East Pakistan ) to Belgaum, I had been moved to Weapons

Leg of Young Officers’ course and had barely settled down, when I received

my forthwith posting order to TRIUMPHANT 3 GRENADIERS

on special request of CO Lt. Col. VP Airy as ”Hard Core” officers. Brig.

NL Poonia was the other officer whose posting, however, did not materialise.

01 - 02 Dec 1971

Having participated in training and leading Mukti Vahini missions

from Tura ( Meghalaya ) Sector, I knew, PAKISTAN would start a War,

any day, on our Western borders ( to draw out our forces from Eastern

front ) and I was going to join it as part of TRIUMPHANT THIRD.

Since my wife, alongwith my 10 month old son Amit, was admitted

in Command Hospital Pune for post burn surgeries. anxiety, uncertainity

and fear of unknown occupied my mind on 01 Dec as I did the packing.

While I could leave it on the Infantry School staff to take care of

1

A Short sketch on the author here

221


heavy baggage, I had to decide about what to do with my car and son.

Finally I decided to drive my car alongwith KIM ( my Springer Dog )

to Pune, leave the car with a friend in Pune, pick up Amit and catch

a train from there to New Delhi. Some how, I was able to contact my

elder brother in Faridabad and requested him to meet me at New Delhi

railway station so that I could hand over Amit and Kim to him. So there

I was driving to Pune at 0800 am on 2 Dec 1971.

3 - 4 Dec 1971

Leaving my wife in Command Hospital Pune, Self, Amit and Kim

boarded the New Delhi bound train.

Managing a 10 month old child, who could walk but had not started

speaking, and Kim, was not easy. It worried me to think, how Amit will

adjust to my parents whom he was meeting for the first time since he

was born.

Past midnight on 3 - 4 Dec, I got up on hearing loud noises around.

Some one had heard on the Transister that Pakistan had attacked our

Airfields all along the Western front. So, its not calendestine missions

along with Mukti Vahini and skirmishes in Bogra, Hilly etc. ( East Pakistan

), its an all out war now.

My father Major Mehar Singh ( a Grenadier ) and my elder brother

received me at New Delhi Railway station. Seeing my worried looks,

my father said, ” Don’t worry son, l have been through similar situation

when I had left your elder brother and sisters behind ( I had not been

born then ) when I had to go to fight in Abbysynia ( Second World War

), every thing will be alright, leave your worries here and go and do what

is expected of you. Fight.

They took Amit and Kim away to our village Nuna Majra ( near

Bahadurgarh , Haryana ) and I continued my journey to Pathankot.

After 6 Dec, all actions of A coy, (that I commanded during war ) , and

in which I physically participated, are facts as I recollect today. Actions

of other coys, armour squadrons and rest of TRIUMPHANT THIRD

elements are as per information assimilated by me from conversation on

the THIRD’S radio net.



5 - 6 Dec 1971

I had no clue about the location of TRIUMPHANT THIRD. My

posting order had mentioned Pathankot as NRS. So on reaching there,

I contacted MCO who directed me to a group of vehicles with Tactical

sign ’ W ’ instead of normal three numerals. This was the first letter of

GOC 54 Inf Div, Maj. Gen WAG Pinto’s name.

I got into a 1 Ton and the convoy of 4 - 5 vehicles left for Sambha.

Enroute we had to stop a couple of times, dismount and take position to

avoid being straffed by enemy aircrafts.

Late in the evening, same 1 Ton took me to ’ B ’ echlon of TRI-

UMPHANT THIRD, where I was received by Capt. DP Sharma, i/c ’ B

’ echlon.

DP briefed me. 1 Corps had been shutling between Pathankot and

Sambha and finally had firmed in Sambha to undertake its first strike.

THIRD was part of 47 Inf Bde under 54 Inf Div. On the night of 5/6 Dec

THIRD was to attack and capture PAK BOP at Bhairon Nath.

In a pre dawn attack on 6 Dec, D Coy under Maj. Kartar Dalal and

Lt. Meharban Singh Negi captured the BOP, taking a couple of Psw.

TRIUMPHANT THIRD with a Sqn of Hudson Horse was then tasked

to protect the western flank of the Div and deployed as shown on the

map.

0n 6 Dec, DP and Self with lunch and F echlon vehicles reached

TRIUMPHANT’S location at 10 am. On meeting CO, Lt. Col. VP Airy (

MVC and later Lt. Gen ) first thing he did was to ask me to remove my

Capt’s pips and made me wear Major’s pips.

I was then asked to familarise with the deployment of TRIUMPHANT

and be available in the Bn HQ. Barring occasional shelling in the vicinity

and enemy aircraft trying to straff, everthing was peaceful.

In the Bn HQ, I met the 2i/c Maj. PS Grewal, Maj. SH Qasim , Adjt

and IO Leiut. Sarabjit Dhillon and Leiut. JS Lidder as EVC column

Commander. (Both Sarabjit and Lidder retired as Lt. Gens. )

In the Coys, A Coy was commanded by Maj. Khazan Singh with

Leiut. Peter Swami as Coy Offr, B Coy by Maj. SS Cheema with Leiut.



BS Pathania as Coy Offr, C Coy by Maj. Hoshiar Singh with Capt. Mukul

Verma as Coy Offr and D Coy by Maj. KS Dalal with Leiut. MS Negi

and Leiut. AS Chauhan as Coy Offrs. Maj. SS Punia was the Mor Pl

Commander.

On getting back to the Bn HQ, I dug a 6 ft by 2 ft by 2 ft trench for

myself and after comparatively hot dinner supplied to us by DP, I tried

to take a nap.

7 - 9 Dec 1971

At 0300 hrs on 7 Dec, I was woken up by a runner who told me

that the CO wanted to see me. When I met the CO, he asked me to go

and relieve Maj. Khazan Singh ( 3 years my senior ) and take over as

OC A Coy. It was after relieving Maj. Khazan that I learnt the reason for

change of Coy Cdr.

A Coy ” F ” echlon truck was parked in a sugarcane field. At midnight,

a jawan wanted to relieve himself and entered the sugarcane field. The

rustling sound of moving through sugarcane field, woke up the 1 Ton

driver who took it to be enemy activity. In a hurry he tried to start the 1

Ton, but it misfired. He made a couple of other attempts and everytime

it misfired. A vehicle misfiring makes a sound similar to gun shot.

On hearing these ” gun shot ” sounds, the jawan who had gone to

relieve himself shouted ” Re mar diya ” Since all this happened in the

rear of Coy HQ, the Coy Cdr assumed it to be enemy attack and reported

it to Bn HQ. The CO ordered C Coy to move and be ready to counter

attack A Coy location. Fortunately the faux poss was discovered before

C Coy launched the counter attack.

From then on, my Coy along with rest of 3 GRENADIERS continued

guarding the Western flank of 54 Inf Div till 7 pm on 9 Dec.

Since Bari and Darman further South had fallen to 16 Dogra and

other Bns of 74 Bde, 3 GRENADIERS was asked to cross the mine field

and redeploy South of it and continue guarding the Western flank of the

Div.

At 7.30 pm on 9 Dec, when we lined up to cross the mine field,

suddenly enemy fired Artillery salvo all along our side of mine field. We



were caught in the open and suffered 15 odd casualties. One shell burst

very close to me and stunned I fell on the ground. When I recovered,

I realised that a splinter had hit on my back. Luckily I was carrying

sleeping bag which absorbed the shock and saved me.

After evacuating the wounded and dead we crossed the mine field

and took defensive position on the South of the mine field.

10 - 15 Dec 1971

We continued protecting the Western flank of the Div and dominating

area upto Lahri Kalan and Khurd by patrolling till 15 Dec.

On 10 Dec night, one of my Coy patrol led by Hav Hawa Singh

reported that there was enemy whistling in front of him. I asked him

why would enemy whistle at him and told him to move left / right

and observe. He again reported that the enemy was still whistling. The

area was full of tall ” sarkandas ” ( grass ) and there was a breeze. I

realised what was happening, I asked Hawa Singh to cover the ” flash

hider ” of his rifle and then let me know if the enemy was still whistling.

Sure enough the enemy had stopped ” whistling ”. What actually was

happening was that air passing through the ” flash hider ” was making

a sound like a whistle.

15 Dec 1971

After Bari and Darman villages were captured, it was planned to

capture JARPAL and SARAJ CHAK by Hudsons and Poona Horse in a

pre dawn attack on 15 Dec. Since Pakis had laid extensive mine fields

with depth of up to 1500 meters, though the density was not even 1/6,

the Armour Regiments refused to attack unless a safe lane was provided.

It was, therefore, decided to cross Basantar Nala and capture JARPAL

and SARAJ CHAK by 3Grenadiers and 16 Madras ( 47 Inf Bde ).

At 10.00 am, 3 Grenadier ”O” Group crossed the mine field near

Lohra Kalan and hit another one near Saincha. Just as we hit the mine

field, an MMG ( Pak Recce & Support element ) opened fire and bullets

started landing up barely 20 meters short of us with in the mine field.

Despite the fact that none was carrying a rifle or wearing Steel Helmet

( a practice followed by all Officers through out the war ), all of us took



up positions alighning our bodies to the direction of fire .

The CO, Lt. Col VP Airy directed Lt. Jasbir Lidder to run up to a

tank barely 200 meters to our right and rear and ask it to engage the

enemy. While, Maj.Thoru, the Battery Commander, was through to his

Battery and was getting Artillery fire on the MMG position, we all got

up and dashed as far back as we could in one sprint.

Now the bullets were landing at the exact spot where we had taken

position earlier. After regaining our breath, we again made yet another

sprint rear wards. Sure enough bullets were now landing at the spot

where we had taken second position. Apparantly the MMG crew had

not adjusted the sight to the correct distance and after opening fire, started

resetting the site but not before we made the two sprints rear ward.

By now Tank and Arty fire had engaged the MMG position and area

around it and the ” O ” group was able to extricate itself without any

casuality.

By 1945 hrs on 15 Dec, 3 Grenadiers moved in the FUP. B and C

Coy were to cross Basantar and capture Jarpal in Phase 1. A and D Coys

were to attack in phase 2 with A Coy capturing Lohal and linking up

with 16 Madras in the North and B Coy in the South while D was to

capture area South East of Jarpal between Basantar Nala and C Coy.

B and C coys apparantly did not hit any Recce and Support elements

and captured Jarpal without much opposition but when A and D Coys

launched their attack, they came under heavy enemy MMG fire. Lt. MS

Negi, Coy officer of D coy got an MMG burst in the jaw but the coy

managed to link up with C Coy.

After leaving FUP, I, who was Commanding A Coy, heard some

noises infront of us. Assuming it to be our boys of B / C Coys ( who

had gone ahead in phase 1 ) shouted ” Oye fire mat karna, hum hain

A Coy 3 Grenadiers.” No sooner had I said that, an MMG opened up.

Fortunately for us, it was having tracers and we could see where the fire

was coming from and where it was directed.

Few men including me went to ground but most ran backwards.

Sub Rup Chand crawled up to me and said ” Saheb ek MMG hai, ise



capture kar lete hain.” Seeing only a handful of men around I replied, ”

Saheb hum is position par to kabja kar lenge par baki Coy Pathankot

mein baithi hogi. Pahle Coy par kabja karen.”

We caught up with the Coy at Jhambian Manhasian. Having rounded

up the Coy, I gave them choicest abuses in Jatu ( It was a Jat Coy ) and

again formed up the Coy for attack. After going few steps, everyone halted

saying there was minefield. I hit the jawan infront of me, asking him to

move aside and started leading. I then shouted ” BCs mein age chalta

hum, jo mere piche nahin ayega us sale ko mein goli marunga.” After

some steps, Grenadier Gajendra Sirohi took the lead saying, ” salo doob

maro, Coy Cdr age chal raha hai ” The boy subsequently got commission

through ACC.

16 - 17 Dec 1971

By now daylight was breaking and we could see a bunker ahead.

An MMG ( probably same that had fired up on us earlier ) opened fire.

Nk Ram Kumar ( VrC ) with his Section rushed to its top and shoulted ”

Bahar niklo nahin to Grenade andar phaink raha hun.” Myself with radio

operater also reached the top of the Bunker. 1 Subaltern, 2 JCOs and 9

ORs came out of the Bunker with hands raised. Some jawans tried to

bayonet them but were stopped by me and were taken PsW. We also

captured a MMG and RCL Jeep with RCL gun. ( The jeep is retained

and maintained in running condition by 3 GRENADIERS as war trophy

)

Capture of Lohal village and link up with B Coy in the South and

16 Madras in the North followed. Success signal was given at 0700

hours on 16 Dec . Soon own armour crossed Basantar through a hastily

created lane by Engineers A squadron each of Hudson and Poona Horse

were inducted in the Bridge head. Passing behind my Coy, 2 Lt. Arun

Khetrapal’s troop moved South and took up position in the grove between

my and B Coy.

Enemy reacted very quickly and launched Counter attack. Brunt of

the counter attack was borne by B Coy led by Maj. SS Cheema and C

Coy led by Maj. Hoshiar. Since enemy could reach Bara Pind unobserved



by ground troops and assemble / form up behind it, subsequent purely

Armour / combined Armour and Infantry counter attacks also came from

same direction. No counter attacks came on A Coy since the area to West

and North West of it was open right up to Gazipur Forest, and the enemy

could not form up un observed and attack.

In the heavy shelling, flat end of a splinter hit my forehead above

the left eye. Refusing evacuation, I continued with my Coy after applying

field dressing and using morphine. Major Hoshiar Singh got an MMG

burst in his thigh. He too refused evacuation and continued after field

dressing ( Finally he was evcuated on 18 Dec morning ). There were a

total of 6 more Counter attacks to recapture Jarpal on 16 and 17 Dec, but

every attack was repulsed by B and C Coys. 2 Lt Arun Khetrapal’s Tank

to my left was hit in one of these counter attacks after he had destroyed

four Pakistani tanks. Both Hoshiar and Khetrapal ( posthmously ) were

awarded PVCs for their gallant action in this battle.

Throughout 16 and 17 Dec, Artillery from both sides constantly kept

firing to support or repulse the Counter attacks. Both Air Forces also

were active in straffing our or Pakistan troops or tanks. A Bullet from a

Pak air craft that straffed us, had landed just a foot away from me, was

dug out and is still presetved by me. Our Air OPs in their fixed wing air

craft were in the air all the time directing Arty fire.

Last counter attack by 35 FF on Jarpal was also repulsed. By now

Dacca had fallen and cease fire to be effective from 8 pm on 17 Dec

had been announced. After the cease fire how many walking wounded

walked back or Pakistani dead or wounded were taken away by them

on the night of 17 Dec is not known. But on 18 Dec morning, body of

35 FF CO Lt. Col. Mohmad Akram Raja, 2 Majors and 93 other ranks

were handed over to them by our CO Lt. Col. V P Airy with a citation

for Col. Raja, based on which he got the second highest gallantry award

of Pakistan.

Finally it was ” All quite on the western front ” at 8.00 pm on 17

Dec 1971.



Figure 81: Sketch: Indo-Pak War 1971



All Quiet On The Western Front

Victor and the Vanquished meet.

There was pin drop silence at 8 pm on 17 Dec 1971. No shelling /

firing of small arms. For good half an hour no body moved for fear that

the ceasefire may not last.

At 7.00 am on 18 Dec 1971, with no room for moving forward South

West, West and North West of Jarpal, D, C and B Coys stayed put in

their locations while A Coy advanced in extended line North of Jarpal

and stopped when they came Face to Face with Pakis. This was done

with a veiw to occupy as much additional area as possible.

Pakis and all our Company Commanders and men met and hugged

each other as if they were lost Brothers meeting after a long time. Coat

Parkas were exchanged. I exchanged my Wills Filter Cigs with theirs

made in Pakistan.

Col. VP Airy handed over body of CO ( Lt Col Mohamed Akram

Raza ), 2 Majors, 2 Subalterns and 88 ORs of 35 FF along with Citation

for Col. Raza.

One thing astonished me. We the Victors were looking beleaguered

- unshaven for 3 days, knee down mud on our feet, socks still wet in the

boots. Pakis on the other hand ( especially Officers ) were impeccably

dressed with starched uniform, their Sahayaks carrying Thermos Flasks

filled with steaming Hot Coffee and Tea.

And this I think was the reason for their defeat.


Chapter 23:

After Cease-fire Battle of 1971 War by Tarlochan Singh Kalra

23. After Cease-fire Battle of 1971 War

by Tarlochan Singh Kalra

Pulkanjri is a legendary village on a high ground located near

Attari- Wagha border in Amritsar. It is relatively a more dominant

feature in the entire area and was held by our BSF Coy Headquarters

for administrative purposes before the start of 1971 war. On commencement

of hostilities by Pakistan on 3 Dec 1971, Higher Headquarters

ordered vacation of this location to make defences more compact on

DCB and area ahead. It was, at about 5.45 pm on 17 Dec 1971, 2 SIKH

deployed on DCB was ordered to recapture Pulkanjri since ceasefire between

India and Pakistan was to become effective at 8pm that evening

. Maj NS Koak,SM and valiant men of 2 SIKH not only captured back

this locality in time but remained undeterred and held on as a solid rock,

in spite of a series of fiercely fought counter attacks by Pak forces. Major

part of action took place after cease-fire between the two countries

became effective on night 17/18 December 1971.

In the evening of 3 December 1971, Pakistan declared war on India.

Pakistan extensively started shelling and attacking border outposts.

On directions of Higher Headquarters, all units deployed on the border

started consolidating their defences and making them more compact and

effective . In a similar requirement , Lt Col S C Puri, CO 2 SIKH assigned

Major Koak to lead a patrol to Pulkanjri forward outpost and retrieve

BSF strength deployed and under attack and get them to main defences

on DCB. Maj Koak did this tedious task with great elan and courage. He

was successful in not only leading and guiding BOP to repulse attack

by Pakistanis on this post but also caused casualties on the assaulting

enemy troops. In spite of very heavy shelling and continuous automatic

231

Chapter 23:


enemy fire Maj Koak successfully retrieved about two section strength of

BSF personnel safely along with heads of two Pakistanis soldiers killed

during their assault on BSF post. He thus accomplished this task with

tremendous grit and determination wherein there was no casualty on

our side. Maj NS Koak was awarded Sena Medal for this very bold and

courageous action and timely successful accomplishment of this task.

With continuous pressure built up by Pakistan forces against BSF

Coy Headquarters at Pulkanjri Base , orders were received to get the

base also vacated and get BSF troops moving to main DCB. 2 SIKH

defences were meanwhile consolidated on DCB with two coys strength

deployed as screens ahead of the drain. From 4 Dec till 17 Dec 71, there

was no effort from Pakistan side to venture further and take any sort

of major ’Panga’ with the SIKHS . However, it did indulge in sporadic

shelling throughout this period and got back their share of shelling from

us in more than equal measure.

In anticipation of the ceasefire between India and Pakistan which

was to be effective from 8 pm on 17 Dec 71, orders were received

from Higher Headquarters at 5.45pm to recapture Pulkanjri Base which

had been got vacated by BSF earlier. Maj Koak was tasked once again

to muster maximum strength from his C company at Dhanoya Kalan

without denuding its responsibility of keeping adequate strength to hold

on to coy defences. Since time available for this task was very limited,

Maj Koak made a quick but simple plan to send a section strength under

2/Lt Choudhary to area of Temple for deception purposes and himself

lead mustered strength of 30 to move along a drain, going from Dhanoya

Kalan to Pulkanjri 800 metres away. Fire plan was made hastily.

Pulkanjri Assault – 17/18 Dec, 1971

At 7 pm troops which were to simulate attacks were in position. They

opened fire on the enemy along with ‘Jaikaras’. The josh and high spirits

of these troops made enemy to believe that main attack was coming


Chapter 23:


Figure 82: Pulkanjri Assault – 17/18 Dec, 1971


Chapter 23:


from that direction. Enemy shifted few MMG and some other weapons

to this direction and opened up with artillery and mortar fire. Maj Koak

had meanwhile set off for the task with meager strength he had. While

enemy’s attention was diverted by section at Temple engaging with fire

from its location, Maj Koak moved with his 25 -30 men frontally. He

and troops with him were greeted with enemy illuminating the area

and heavy shelling. Nevertheless, undeterred all kept moving slowly but

steadily towards the objective. They came across a mud-wall just 20

metres from the objective. Maj Koak realised that at that juncture he had

only 24 men with him and just 10 minutes more before Ceasefire time

became effective. He could not afford to lose any more time. He saw a

Pak MMG detachment located close to mud wall. It could have played

merry hell with our assaulting troops. However, seeing the Khalsas so

close, it seems it got jittery. The detachment uprooted itself from there

and started running homewards. In a split second decision Maj Koak

shouted ’Jo Bole So Nihal’ and led whatever strength he had for an

assault on to the objective , infiltrated into enemy’s defences and started

fighting it out with small arms and hand grenades.

In Phase 1, Section plus strength was sent to clear trenches on his left

flank. Hand to hand fight ensued. It threw the enemy off balance thus

forcing them to abandon their bunkers and flee rear wards, while with

other section he reached close to the village. It seems enemy suddenly

woke up from their slumber and opened all their weapons against assaulting

troops. It was at this particular movement that 6’4” tall, with good

built and handsome looks, L/ Nk Shangara Singh pounced at loop hole of

enemy bunker and silenced two machine guns which were stalling our

move further. With a pulled out machine gun from a loop hole still in his

hands, L/ Nk Shangara Singh attained a real hero’s death. Some others

too lay wounded. During this phase itself Maj Koak, got bullet wounds

in his arm while Nb Sub Gurcharan Singh, his platoon commander and

Hav Gurdev Singh, platoon Hav too were wounded. This surprise attack

had stunned the enemy . Incidentally bullet in Maj Koak’s arm remained

lodged for about 17 hours till he mentioned after firing stopped from


Chapter 23:


both sides at 1 PM on 18 Dec 71.

In Phase 2 In spite of injuries sustained, Maj Koak and some men

kept on moving around and were able to fool the enemy in believing that

a major force had arrived on their defended locality. Having obtained

a foothold , Maj Koak managed to get some more men who got lost

during their move for the attack. 4/5 men sustained minefield injuries

and thus they had to be escorted back to main defences. This further

depleted the available strength with him. Meanwhile, 2/Lt Choudhary

with his section strength and MMG detachment providing fire support

from Temple were directed to also move to Pul Kanjri Base location.

By about 8.15 pm, Maj Koak had only about 19 able bodied men

and a MMG detachment at Pul kanjri base. Suddenly, a counter-attack

came from enemy side. It surprised Maj Koak , but he and his men

took immediate position and fired back . Artillery and Battalion mortars

came to rescue and attack fizzled out. Two more counter-attacks about

platoon plus strength each came between 11 pm and 1am. These also

faded out with accurate Artillery and Mortar support. It seems enemy

suffered heavy casualties and retreated.

Unknown to Maj Koak and his men, Capt Rizvi, Pak Coy Commander

with his entire communications intact (Line and Radio) was still in his

command post. He kept on telling his CO (43 Punjab) to counter attack.

A renewed attempt was made by enemy at 2am with about coy strength.

Enemy did extensive shelling but Maj Koak and his men were lucky to

survive heavy damage because they were widely disbursed. The brave

Sikhs repulsed all attacks. Majority of injured voluntarily stayed back,

manned bunkers and kept shouting JAIKARAS (War cries) in order to

simulate greater strength to the enemy. It seemed that enemy had made

a prestige issue. Having failed in their attempt reinforcements in form

of 15 Punjab were got from Harbanspura near Lahore. A fifth counter

attack with elements from 43 Punjab and 15 Punjab was launched before

first light. This was a three pronged attack with a Coy from each side. In

an hour long fierce battle that ensued, enemy suffered heavy casualties.

However, enemy was able to move to some trenches and positions close


Chapter 23:


to us. Our troops hold on ground became almost untenable. It was at

this critical juncture that Maj Koak asked for Red-Red-Red fire. Ceasefire

having come into play, it became difficult to get permission for Artillery

fire. Seeing the delay, unit mortars came to rescue by firing heavy salvos

on enemy troops still in open. Maj Koak started shouting for imaginary

coys. to surround assaulting enemy troops from various directions. Maximum

artillery and own mortar fire followed. Enemy was caught in the

open and suffered heavily. All this rattled enemy. By day light at about

6.30 am on 18 Dec1971 Maj Koak saw a Pakistan Officer with raised

hands wanting to surrender. Some others also followed. By about 9 am

pressure from enemy side slackened though it was finally only at 1pm

that exchange of fire ceased from both sides. Thus all counter attacks had

been finally repulsed. At about 1.30pm on 18 Dec 1971enemy acknowledged

defeat and raised white flag from their side, wanting to collect

large number of dead bodies. This brought finale to the historic, outstanding

and successful encounter of valour. Brave and courageous men

of 2 SIKH had lived up to prayers of their Tenth Guru and Regimental

motto ‘NISCHE KAR APNI JEET KARON’.

During a flag meeting few days after the war was over, Lt Col Mohd

Iqbal , CO 43 Punjab of Pakistan met Lt Col S C Puri, CO 2 SIKH and

told him ‘ Well Colonel as one soldier to another soldier, I would like

to compliment you on your excellent outfit. Your men fought heroically

and were distinctly superior in the battle.

Pul Kanjri was handed over to Pak forces on a platter at the start of

Indo-Pak war. In its recapture unit suffered over 30 casualties including

five dead. Coy was able to take hold of one officer and 13 OR of Pak

forces as PWs. 25 of their dead bodies at Base location too were handed

over to them. C company was able to recover 14 Machine Guns, 17 rifles,

12 sten guns, 2 rocket launchers , 2 platoon mortars, 9 radio sets and

over 10000 rounds of SA ammunition.

For very conspicuous, courageous, bold and gallant action , L/Nk

Shangara Singh was later awarded MVC posthumously. Some other

awards for this extra-ordinary action against well- fortified defences


Chapter 23:


were as under:-

VrC – One. SM – Two. M-in-D – Four.

L/Nk Shangara Singh, MVC (Posthumous)

On the crucial night of 17/18 December 1971 , it was to the credit

of Major Koak and his handful men that not only lost territory of several

square kms handed over to Pak forces by BSF in initial stages of 1971

war was regained but 2 SIKH troops held on to it tenaciously and courageously

. Troops had fought with tremendous fortitude in spite of very

heavy odds against them.

For a very bold, courageous and gallant action of leading a successful

assault against superior number of enemy forces in well entrenched

defences and subsequently also holding on to the captured objective in

spite of five counter attacks, Maj Koak was recommended for award

of PVC. He was most deserving and commended by the then Defence

Minister, Shri Jagjiwan Ram and so also by Gen SHFJ Manekshaw,

the then COAS for an outstanding and heroic action. However, it is very

intriguing and frustrating to mention that Pak forces coy commander who

could neither hold on to a well fortified locality nor dislodge assaulting 2

SIKH troops in spite of 4/5 counter attacks was awarded ‘Sitare-o –Jurrat’

by Pak while Maj Koak has not been awarded anything for this extraordinary

gallant action . Maj Koak not only recovered part of BSF held

defences that was given away on direction of higher headquarters but

most valiantly held on to it with great grit and determination with a very

meager force in spite of several counter attacks by Pak forces . What an

injustice to such a bold, courageous, tenacious and most deserving officer

who got neglected and got no award for this particular action so far. The

officer is beyond 78 years of age now and not keeping good health. As

we celebrate 50th anniversary of 1971 war this year, is it too much for

Government to honour such 1965 and 1971 wars outstanding soldiers

even at this belated stage. Those officers and soldiers who had put

their lives at stake and led and fought gallantly and given an outstanding

example of courage and bravery surely deserved some recognition. They

are the real HEROES in best traditions of Indian Army and must no


Chapter 23:


Figure 83: L/Nk Shangara Singh, MVC (Posthumous)

Figure 84: Gen S H F J Manekshaw M C honouring Maj N S Koak

with Sena Medal for heroic action on 03/04 Dec 1971 Right:Pulkanjri

Memorial at Battle site near Attari

longer be neglected.


Chapter 24: Some Recollections of 1971 by Satish Kukreja

24. Some Recollections of 1971 by Satish

Kukreja

1

In 1971, a few major events happened in my life. 17 JAT commanded

by Lt Col (later Lt Gen) R Narasimhan under 36 Infantry

Brigade. I was the Adjutant of the battalion. Became a Major and got

command of Bravo Company. I got married and then was despatched

for JC course. No accommodation in MHOW - Newly married -war

imminent - found some unauthorised accommodation in the town – wife

expecting – hardly any concentration on course, which got truncated by

a month and we all left for the unit. I remember the date,16th November

happened to be my birthday – leave denied naturally, so took the train

that day for Jammu.

Unit was already in deployment area, so took over command of the

company on the Jammu by pass. Attended COAS talk, quite impressive.

Replaced D company which had the task of protection of mine field in

front of our Battalion Defended Area opposite Pakistan DCB, in the area

of 32r, Badulion.

We were shifted out of 36 Infantry Brigade just before the war as

relations between Cdr 36 Infantry Brigade, Brig DE Hayde, MVC (Dograi

fame 1965, CO 3 JAT) and the GOC 26 Infantry Division, Maj Gen Z C

Bakshi, MVC, VrC, VSM were not very cordial and it was known to the

elements. Gen Bakshi, shifted out 17 JAT and one more battalion from

36 Brigade, which was then left with only one Battalion - 9 RAJPUT. My

unit was then placed under command 162 Infantry Brigade commanded

1


239


by Brig Ramaswamy (CO and new Brigade Commander both Tamil

Brahmins).

I would like to narrate just four incidents, the first before the war

began and the other three during the war. The First Incident In spite of

the unit having been shifted out of his command, Brig Hayde, continued

taking interest in our activities and showing up in the unit; he therefore,

visited our location frequently. During one such visit, he was driving

along the IB in front of my company Defended Area, in his open jeep

with the star plate and flag fluttering, his binoculars slung on the neck,

accompanied by his dog. The Pakistanis kept waving at him to go back

but he continued driving, till they threatened to shoot him. In panic, he

turned inwards, straight in the direction of my company locality, driving

through an area where there was supposed to be a mine field! This

compromised the whole game plan of our division, as this area had

been earmarked for our tanks to move through to attack Pakistan, if and

when required (this was known to some formation commanders only).

There was complete chaos as the CO and all of us realised that we were

protecting a non-existent mine field! Overnight, the Divisional Engineer

Regiment and others laid mines post haste; one option of our plan was

compromised due to fool hardiness of a decorated soldier (who perhaps

was still in the time frame of 1965 Dograi; this was a possible reason

that the GOC left his brigade with only one Battalion).

The Second Incident

2/Lt UP Singh, one of my platoon commanders, was detailed to go to

the enemy Ditch cum Bund (DCB) to check if mines had been laid and

if there was water in the Ditch. The area from the Border to the enemy

DCB was cultivable barren field with no bushes or mounds to hide his

movement. UP set off with his boys for the task. One strand of wire with

markings of mine fields had been seen by him. UP kept moving, looking

for signs of fresh digging or mine laying. In the last 300 yds, he crawled



to avoid detection. When he was barely 10 yards away from the DCB, he

stopped to observe and listen for sounds of enemy activity. He then threw

a stone to check if there was any water in the Ditch. In the dead of night,

the sound of the stone was magnified and UP thought that he would be

detected; he waited for the enemy to fire bullets and/or para flare. The

mission was still incomplete since neither the sound of stone hitting water

or the ground, had been heard. UP gathered courage and threw another

stone. This time there was a clear ‘thud’ sound indicating there was no

water in the ditch. Relieved, he turned around to get back and saw the

moon about to rise on the horizon. Forgetting that the area was supposed

to be a mined, he just ran across up to the Minefield Marking Wire and

made it back to our location without any reaction from the Pakis. It was

such a relief to be back home in one piece, especially after seeing the

moon rising and then having run across the supposed minefield!

Two days later, UP was tasked by the Battalion headquarters to again

go up to the Pak DCB and throw a grenade on the enemy. He was most

horrified at the stupidity of being so tasked! When he told me what he

had been now tasked for, I realised the futility of it and the danger he

would be put to, without any worthwhile gains. I therefore, gave him

a solution and said “Take a Grenade Rifle and fire at the DCB from it”.

That is exactly what UP did. Even today UP wonders what would have

been his fate, if he had gone up to the enemy DCB to lob a hand grenade

at them.

The Third Incident

When the main battle was being fought in the Eastern Theatre, we

were to undertake only holding action(s) on our Divisional Front. Consequently,

commanders in our sector were instructed to engage the Pakistanis

in different ways. In front of my company (with four platoons and

a troop of newly arrived MILAN missiles, in location during day) was

a gap in the Pak DCB, which they had supposedly kept for their Army



to assault through, in case required. We had the support of a squadron

of CIH. In one such plan, CIH was tasked to destroy the bunkers on

the Pak DCB. CIH troop commanders came to recce and select their

pinpoint target(s). The firing was to be carried out around last light from

my Company location. I was to provide illumination for the tanks to

engage the bunkers for which I had detailed my platoon nearest to the

DCB.

At the given time, the tanks arrived and were ready to shoot, but the

required illumination was not forthcoming. I tried to raise my platoon

commander on the radio but was unsuccessful. Without any thought for

safety, I and my signal operator ran towards the platoon headquarters

and found the JCO hiding in his bunker. I dragged him out, he was

shivering as he seemed to be scared. No words came out of his mouth;

I threatened to shoot him as he was showing cowardice in the battle.

He fell on my knees. Anyway, I had something more important to do

at that time and told him that I would deal with him later. The Platoon

provided the illumination for the tanks to start firing which they did. I

returned to my company HQ and the tanks started withdrawing to their

location; lo and behold, barrages of artillery shells started pouring on my

company specially in the area from where the tanks had been firing. For

the next 20-25 minutes there was no respite in the intensity of firing. As

the shelling reduced, I started moving to the platoons to check if there

were any causalities. Fortunately, there were no major ones. As I was

returning to my bunker, a shell fell a few metres from me, my Sahayak

got a splinter. I was lucky to escape. God was watching.

The Fourth Incident

In this phase of engaging the enemy, all battalions were ordered to select

a target for raiding something, every night. Since our battalion was facing

the Pak DCB, there were hardly any targets for planning raids every night,

instead we were laying ambushes. This was however, not acceptable to



our commanders. On 08 Dec 71, Capt IS Janghu led a raid on Pakistani

Putwal post, wherein we lost one of soldier - Sep Ratan Ram.

Pakistan had one post called Ghug, NW 8130, which was on our

side of their DCB. I cannot say as to why Ghug post was important to

Pakistan and why did the alignment of their DCB not include this post

(wasn’t our prerogative to analyse reasons, at that stage of service). To

avoid clashes between own troops, battalions used to book Ghug post

for the raid with the Divisional Headquarters. First time on 11 Dec 71,

Capt JK Sharma with a platoon raided the post and captured a 2” Mortar,

three Sten gun magazines and some documents. It was fine, but later on

the factor of surprise was lost and it became an ambush site for raiding

troops.

On 13 Dec 1971, our battalion again launched a raid at Ghug with 2

officers and 2 platoons. Pakistan in the meantime, unknown to us, had

laid mines and covered it adequately by fire. Pakistanis started firing

on spotting our boys. In the melee, one JCO stepped on a mine and

when Capt JK Sharma went to help him, he got his own leg blown up.

Maj DPS Randhawa, the second officer, got a 2” mortar bomb on his

face (fortunately it did not explode) and broke his jaw and teeth. Two

JCOs and four other ranks also got seriously injured. One injured OR

was even captured by the enemy. One JCO and 5 OR were missing

after this action; they hid in ‘sarkanda’ in Pak territory for two nights,

before they could extricate themselves. This happened as the JCO was

professionally capable; he had earlier served as intelligence JCO of the

Bn. While the intention of keeping the enemy engaged was fine, but such

actions created a negative impact as nothing tangible was being achieved.

However, my CO was not satisfied and wanted to take revenge. Next day,

the CO took me to a vantage point and asked me to plan and raid Ghug

again, the next night to take revenge for our reverses. The conversation

between us was as follows: CO- “Satish, you know about the results of

raid conducted by Randhawa and JK, we were found wanting”. Self- “Yes

sir, that was unfortunate”. CO - “Now you have to redeem the prestige

of the Battalion and raid Ghug.” Self – “Yes Sir, but don’t you think we



could go to some other place and do some other action to achieve the

aim”. CO – “The GOC has personally asked me and desired that we

raid Ghug. You are an ex NDA, and a smart officer, that is why I have

put you at the most sensitive defended locality in the battalion. I have

tremendous faith in your ability”. Self – “Right sir, if there is no choice

so be it, we will definitely and successfully achieve our aim and prove

that to the GOC”. CO – “That is nice and I expected that from you. Our

hopes are on you”.

I did all the planning in that state of mind and readied my troops.

The ceasefire came in the way and the plan was dropped! Thanks to

the elements.

After the War

As the War got over, we were moved out of war time deployment to the

area of Octroi post on the RS Pura –Sialkot road. There were two posts,

one Indian and the other Paki across the IB. These posts were used for

the UN Observers to cross over to either side under the supervision of

officers from both sides. During war one of our battalions had captured

their Octroi post and an area of about 1Km and a new temporary post

was established in that area. On one occasion, a Paki Major, who had

come to escort the UN team, started conversing with me. The dialogue

went as under -

Pak Maj: ‘You all must be feeling very happy’.

Satish: ‘You all must be feeling very sad about dismemberment of

Pakistan’.

Pak Maj: ‘On the other hand, we are relieved and now the snakes

(In terms of Bengali officers in their army) will bite you’.

Satish: ‘How can you say that’.

Pak Maj: ‘You will find that out very soon yourself’. The results

became obvious.


Chapter 25:

My Experiences of the 1971 War By KC Kuruvilla

25. My Experiences of the 1971 War By

KC Kuruvilla

1

I

went into Boarding School at 5 and came out at 56. An amazing

“Life Schooling” by any stretch of the imagination! This included

the 1965 and 1971 wars, but especially, my experience in the 1971 war

and as a POW that followed. Commissioned as a Pilot Officer in the

Fighter Stream, l was placed First in the 97th PC and 36th Nav Courses.

The President’s Plaque, the CAS Medal for Best All-round Jet Pilot and

the Ramchandani Trophy for first in Academics, landed me in No 7

Sqn, “Battle Axes” at Hindon in 1967. In 1969, I moved on to the latest

Sukhoi 7s, strike aircraft, in 222 Sqn, at Ambala. By 1971, with intense

training and bountiful Operational Flying at Halwara, Punjab (Western

Sector) we were ready to be put to the Test-space ‘Battle Inoculation as

a Fighter Pilot’. What a start to a career as a Fighter Pilot of the Indian

Air Force! No Fighter Pilot could have asked for more. Our training and

preparations paid rich dividends, eventually.

The War

On the night of 03 Dec 71, Pakistan launched airstrikes on all major

Western Airfields including Halwara. The IAF’s retaliatory Counter Air

Strike Missions into Pakistan were quick and commenced early morning

of 04 Dec. My Mission on 06 Dec, was one of them. At 0615, I took off

on a two aircraft Interdiction Strike Mission, led by my CO, Wg Cdr

1

Air Cmde KC Kuruvilla, VC

245

Chapter 25:


Alan D’Costa. We struck the Dera Baba Nanak Bridge and on the way

back, just 2 minutes within Indian airspace, we responded to a Forward

Air Controller, who sighted unusual movements South West of Dera

Baba Nanak. To our surprise, we flew over a large convoy of vehicles

and other camouflaged equipment and proceeded to interdict those using

‘Front Guns’. Unbeknownst to us, the Pak Army’s Strategic Reserve Force,

moving Northeast-wards, had been detected; and, it was here that my

fateful Sortie ended! After the second attack, I got hit. Within seconds,

control loss had set in and my aircraft caught fire. I ejected at high speed,

at about 100 feet, with cross controls, operating just the left side Ejection

Firing Handle. Sighting a tree at eye level, after the blackout, I impacted

the ground in tall elephant grass, very dazed and winded. 2

The intense loud gunfire around me indicated that I was somewhere

on the front line. After lying still for about 10 minutes, I buried my Pistol,

hid my Parachute and ate some Survival Pack Chocolates, which helped a

lot. I crawled towards the Sun, but encountered a low wired fence about

6 to 9 inches above ground level to which spaced out tins with stones in

them were attached. I assumed that this was a minefield and the rattling

of stones in the tins created a warning. Then I crawled back westwards

2

Eye witness account of the incident as narrated by Col Chand (Retd), then

BM of 87 Infantry Brigade at BBN, after nearly 48 years:“I do vividly recall

the shooting down of young Kourvilla at DBN. I was atop the DBN Railway

Station directing the air support with the FAC Flying Officer Aziz(?) at a

rather troublesome Pak heavy machine gun nest at JASSAR. The aircraft

came down pretty low for the attack. However, the HMG continued to fire

at us. The fighter made another low attack and still, the firing continued.

Finally, the pilot came down again almost to treetop level! I exclaimed,

“Yeh kaun diler pilot hai? Lekin is bar mare ga!” The FAC told me that it

was one Flt Lt Kourvilla. Oh. I said. Then the aircraft just sank into the tall

sarkanda very close to Kartarpur Sahib Gurduwara. Kourvilla was taken

POW. I also told AZIZ that he was perhaps a cadet in NDA when I was

an instructor; because the name was unusual. I was Brigade Major of the

attacking 86 Inf Bde. The HMG was silenced by this young pilot’s audacious

action. I requested my Bde Cdr to recommend him for a bravery award. I

am told that Kourvilla came back. I hope he received due recognition for

his bravery. Regards. Col Chand”


Chapter 25:


into the line of fire of an LMG bunker with a sliding iron door. I also

sighted a Paki patrol sent out to search for me. I had no option but to wait

till dark. Three hours later as I lay still, very quiet, three soldiers pulled

me up from the rear. I was strip-searched, blindfolded, shoes removed,

hands tied behind, and taken to the same bunker, where my heavy Gold

Chain with a Cross around my neck was taken away. No officer was

present and agitated soldiers decided to shoot me. Providentially, it was

overruled sternly by a Baluch Havaldar.

Finally, a jeep arrived and I was driven off through very rough terrain.

It was a very painful ride with a swollen right ankle and pain in the right

side of my neck. We stopped after a long ride and by nightfall, I was

lodged in a Cell in the Gujranwala Jail. Around midnight, in the bitter

cold, I was collected by men in Blue, blindfolded, handcuffed to the back

and driven till morning, reaching an Air Force Unit. Here I was put into

a Cell. There one iron grill door, a wooden door, and chicks, ensured

total isolation; but air raid sirens and overflying fighter aircraft told me

that the war continued.

For the next two days, I was not seen by anyone. Toilet visits were

difficult. Guards purposely delayed permission. No medical treatment

was provided but, lying flat on hard cement without a pillow, helped to

heal injuries to the ankle and neck. On the 4th day, I protested solitary

confinement, lack of medical treatment, and bad food and requested

paper and pen to write to the ICRC since Geneva Conventions were not

being followed. Interrogation generally commenced around midnight.

Improper answers resulted in being left out in the open at 2 am in

the bitter cold, bare feet, and forced to stand motionless at attention. Fear

that the guard could shoot and say anything if I moved, was daunting!

The eventual visit of the ICRC, led by Mr. Bablon, accompanied by Pak

senior Officers revealed a lot. My written application was taken by him.

Warm clothes, better food, and other needs were met and by 23 Dec, life

was back to normal.

On Christmas day - 25 Dec 71, in a surprise move, I was dressed

up and taken out of my Cell to a common room. Here I met others, 12


Chapter 25:


Pilots in all! We were very delighted and happy to learn that the war

was over and that India was in a winning position with a large number

of Paki PsOW. Morale was very high - we had won the war. Daily

routine comprised being locked up together in the common room, after

breakfast and returned to our cells by evening. By Feb 1972, without

any newspapers, radio, or reading material, and without any news of our

repatriation, disappointment was real and boredom was setting in. Now,

whispers of escaping from the POW Camp began.

Escape

On 3rd July 1972, the Camp Commandant, Wg Cdr Wahiddudin, walked

into our common room and pulled out a leading Pak Newspaper. To our

utter disappointment, the Headlines read “India Returns 5000 sq miles

of territory, Pak PsOW to return.” This news upset each one of us. And

there was no mention of Indian PsOW! The Pakistanis did not miss an

opportunity to take a dig at us! We were very dejected and the resolve

to escape strengthened.

Later in a meeting of all of us, it was decided that an escape must

be attempted. It was also decided that bachelors only would participate.

Accordingly, three bachelors - Dilip Parulkar, Gary Grewal, and Harish

Singhji volunteered to attempt an escape from the camp. All forms of

information gathering for the escape were initiated and money from

each of us was set aside. The only possible escape possible was from

the daily gathering at the common room. So, digging a hole in the wall

started and proved to be a perfect way out. On my part, I ensnared

Aurangzeb, our lascar, who was very poor. Within days, he smuggled in

a bottle of gin and some meat on payment. Aurangzeb was now on our

side and unsuspectingly, helped us with information on our location, the

roads, proximity to the Chaklala Air Force Base, the name of the building

behind the common room, bus routes, etc.

The “Hole in the Wall” was soon completed and it was decided that

the break out will be done in good weather, over a weekend, and executed

at midnight. According to the plan, at 2355 hours, I would call out to the


Chapter 25:


Guard at the Common Room demanding a toilet visit. This distraction

entailed removing the guard from the common room, walking to the

Guard Room, drawing my Cell Key, and then walking to my Cell located

about 40 yards diagonally opposite to the Common Room. In this process,

the Guard was away for about 10 minutes with the Common Room left

unguarded. The trio had enough time to get out of the Common Room

and Chati had enough time to replace all the bricks to conceal the hole

and recheck, that the other beds looked as though someone was sleeping

in them. The breakout had to be quietly done. Any noise could end up

in the guard getting into a panic and shooting me as I was out, in the

open. The escape drill and my distraction routine were attempted four

times, but finally, the breakout took place on the night of 13 Aug 1972.

on 14th of August was Pakistan’s Independence day and our President

was rumoured to be visiting Kabul on 15 august 1872. what a sensation

it would be if the three officers could make it to Kabul crossing over to

Afghanistan from the Landikotal/Landikhana border and return to India

in the IAF aircraft of the President. The following morning at 10 am, all

hell broke loose. Three prisoners were missing and the hole in the wall

was discovered! All prisoners were immediately locked up in our Cells

by the duty Corporal and Chati was put into the adjacent cell next to

mine since the Common Room was now sealed off.

Aftermath

Pak Air HQ was informed and a Court of Inquiry was instituted. By

noon, all our belongings were taken away. Chati was put into solitary

confinement. Later my involvement in the escape plan was established,

deduced from the midnight toilet visits. I was stripped down to my

bare skin and made to remain in my cell, everything was taken away.

However, by evening my shirt, pant and toothbrush were returned. Of

course, unbeknownst to us, the three escaped officers were apprehended

on the morning of 14th August and taken into custody by Sqn Leader

Osman who was in Peshawar at PAF Headquarters. On 17 Aug 1972, we

were given back our belongings, bundled into Vans with armed escorts


Chapter 25:


and transported to the ‘maximum security prison’ in Lyallpur.

Return to India

In late Nov 1972, we were asked to advise on how to set up a Helipad.

Being the junior-most, I was detailed to assist the Col Comdt’s team.

One morning, we were dressed up and led to a courtyard and seated.

Pakistan’s PM ZA Bhutto walked in, stood a few feet away, and said

“Gentlemen, I want you to go home. Tell your country that we want

peace with India and please return our Prisoners of War. With these

words, he went away! On 02 Dec 1972, we were driven to Wagah Border.

At the Wagah Border gate crossing, while near the line for crossing over to

the Indian side, stood a motionless Pakistani, in civvies. He was dangling

a dark green, moss-covered item in his hand. After I passed him and

stepped into No- man’s land near the Indian side, I instinctively turned

back and rubbed the chain, It was my mother’s heavy gold chain with

the cross at the end. This was unbelievable! I was made to sign for it and

ran back to the Indian side. Since the signing process took some time,

others who had crossed over to India were welcomed by the Punjab

Chief Minister and left accompanied by his convoy. A car was left behind

for me. I caught up and joined the rest; safely back in our Punjab.

In 1973, after evaluation of my wartime films checked, IB clearance,

AF intelligence clearance, etc. in March, I was awarded the Vir Chakra

for Gallantry, in the 1971 War with Pakistan.

—————————————–

PS:

1. Air Warrior’s tribute to and Air Cmde KC Kuruvilla’s reply on

Youtube 3

2. Air Cmde KC Kuruvilla has the record of surviving three ejections

3

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BmDBsSdDG_U&list=PL3rX9_

gU5Fjzpkf3Jnl2p_FXXLvuWy5GY


Chapter 25:


Figure 85: Air Cmde KC Kuruvilla(Retd) with Indian Defence Forces

Gallipoli Campaign flag 1

and remained fit to fly the frontline fighter aircraft of the IAF. 4 He

went on to re-equip and command No: 9 Squadron, IAF with the

latest Mig27 MLSwingwing Strike Aircraft before he retired from

the Indian Air Force.

4

Bird Strike - Indian Air Force Documentary — 1982 https://www.youtube.

com/watch?v=ACAG-nesbtE


Chapter 25:


Figure 86: Air Cmde KC Kuruvilla(Retd) with Indian Defence Forces

Gallipoli Campaign flag 2


Chapter 26: On Ferozpur Border- KK Nanda

26. On Ferozpur Border- KK Nanda

1

My My Battalion(Bn) 13 Punjab (Jind), forming part of 35 Infantry(Inf)

Brigade(Bde), 14 Inf Division( Div) moved from Meerut and

reached Ferozpore in early Nov 71. We were placed under 7 Inf Div for

operations and were put alongside Hussainiwala Defences on the Twin

Canal, emanating from the Hussainiwala Head Works running in South

West direction, generally parallel to the International Border. 15 Punjab

(1st Patiala) one of our sister bn, under the command of Lt Col Shastri,

was already deployed at Hussainiwala HeadWorks, as part of 7 Inf Div,

with two Company’s (coys) deployed across the Satluj River, two Coys

on home side of the River and Bn HQ at the Canal Rest House, South of

the Hussainiwala Bridge.

Attack On Hussainiwala By Pakistan

On 3rd Dec 71 at around 5.50 pm, heavy enemy shelling started on the

Hussainiwala defences, predominantly on the Western side of the Bridge.

The war had formally begun on the Western Front. My bn, 13 Punjab

(JInd) were deployed at the closeby defences, from where we could see

the ferocity of enemy shelling with the sky full of streaking Arty shells,

Para light flares and the ground being pounded by artillery(arty) and

Tank/ MMG fire. The noise was deafening and the scene when watched

from 150 yards was like a war movie. The battle went on all night,

1

Col KK Nanda (Veteran) 13 Punjab (Jind)

253


the attack was concentrated on 15 Punjab (1st Patiala) and BSF Posts

under them. Early next morning the Pakistan Air Force was over us and

one of the aircrafts flew very low over our bn Twin Canal defences. I

immediately jumped into a closeby bunker, where an LMG was placed

in an Anti Aircraft Role and took a shot at the low flying Pakistani aircraft.

To my shock and horror, the LMG did not fire. I cursed my luck. We later

realized that the LMG mechanism was jammed. This happens when we

do not move the firing mechanism regularly. (‘ Chal wale purze jam ho

gaye ’ ). What a big lesson we learnt from that episode, personally it was

a big regret of my life. Though 15 Punjab (1st Patiala) fought gallantly,

the area of Hussainiwala, on the western side of the Sutlej River fell

under the control of Pakistan by 5 Dec 71, after they had put in a Bde

attack supported by a Regt of tanks and a large number of Arty guns on

the night of 3-4 Dec 71, followed by Air attacks on 4 Dec 1971.

CAPTURE OF MAMDOT BULGE BY 13 PUNJAB

(JIND)

RECCE PATROL INTO PAKISTAN BY 13 PUNJAB (JIND)

Introduction

To ease pressure on Hussainiwala area/ Head works, the capture of

which would have resulted in Ferozpore being under threat, 35 Inf Bde

consisting of 13 Punjab [Jind], 3 Guard and 15 Dogra, was tasked to

capture the Mamdot Bulge of Pakistan, which is located southwest of

Hussainiwala.

My bn, 13 Punjab (Jind) was given the task of capturing the Southern

portion of the Mamdot Bulge including Pakistani posts of Pira Kana,

Jalloke Hittar and Dona Betu; and clearing the area along the home bank

of Satluj River. My Company was tasked to capture the two posts of Pira



Kana and Jalloke Hittar. The coy cdrs were moved to our BSF border

post of Raja Matham around 8/9 Dec 71, to prepare for the impending

attack.

I was called by the CO, Lt Col Kul Bhushan, who was very fond of

me, for a briefing on 9 Dec 71, while we were both at the border post

of Raja Matham. He started by saying “ I have selected you to go for a

recce patrol into Pakistan to bring information about enemy posts of Pira

Kana and Jalloke Hittar, proposed to be captured by us subsequently”

I was just about getting excited when he added “Nanda, you must be

wondering why I have selected you and not Suman Sharma, who is

younger and junior to you. Well he is the only son of his parents and you

are three brothers”. I just about frowned at this remark when he added

“ But let me tell you, if you come back alive and successful, which I am

confident that you will; then this experience of going into an enemy area,

will be the most exciting and satisfying moment of your army life which

you have so fondly joined through NDA. “ How true he was, the recce

patrol turned out to be the most exciting and thrilling experience of my

fauji life, to go deep 2km into enemy territory and spend most part of the

night sitting between two Pakistani posts, Pira Kana and Jalloke Hittar

which were just 100 yds apart.

Planning the Recce Patrol

The recce patrol involved almost two days of detailed planning by me. In

the typical NDA/IMA/Commando training style, I worked out the route

in/ route out of the proposed patrol into Pakistan. I took grid reading

from the map, converted it to magnetic reading for each ‘Bound’ selected

by me and memorized the compass bearings. I particularly selected one

Peacock shaped tree ( Mor pankhi drakht ) as one of my ‘Bounds’ as

it was visible from our border post. For calculating the distance to be

covered, I kept a couple of pebbles in my Para Jacket pocket and kept

putting one in the opposite pocket for every 125 steps taken (depicting

100 yards ). In present day of GPS, all this appears so primitive a way to

move, but our generation has gone through this 50 years ago. We also



studied and worked out the timing of waxing and waning of the moon,

so that we could identify the appropriate times when we could see the

enemy post more clearly.

I selected three of my buddies for the patrol, (all were well known

to me as they had worked under me in various commando competitions

led by me in earlier years). Hav Kuldeep Singh, also a Services Level

‘cross country’ stalwart; Bir Singh and Dhan Singh both ace firers and

sharpshooters. They carried their specialized Sniper Rifles and were

nominated as each other’s buddies, Kuldip and myself, carried sten guns

and were buddies. It was decided not to leave our buddies under any

circumstances and to carry back each other if injured, dead or alive. We

also decided not to become prisoners and planned to retaliate and fire

back full blast with our weapons and grenades before we are killed when

overpowered. The fear of becoming POWs of Pakistanis sounded more

dreadful than getting killed. I briefed my patrol about the Route Out

to objective, ‘Bounds enroute’ task of locating and observing the enemy

posts to assess its layout and strength, action on being detected, action

on possible capture, ‘Route In’ back to our post etc. Peacock shaped tree

was particularly shown to all, as one of the important ‘Bounds’.

Conduct of the Recce Patrol

We left at 11.30 pm on the night of 11/12 Dec 71. We were fortunate to

reach the approximate area of our destination between the two enemy

posts of Pira Kana and Jalloke Hittar which were just 100 yards apart,

by following the compass bearings, calculation of distance by steps ( 125

steps equal to 100 yards ) and most importantly by luck, as it was pitch

dark during our outward movement, besides the biting cold of December

winter. We all had loaded our weapons in almost firing position. I was

wearing my Para jacket and our woolen trousers were brownish, akin

to what Pakistanis wear. I kept four hand grenades in my pocket and

kept feeling their release firing pins, just in case I have to pull It out to

throw it at the enemy.

We finally sat down together in a huddle, to give the impression of



a bush (which were many around as we were close to Satluj River). We

sat so close that we could hear each other’s heartbeats. The Pakistani’s

got suspicious and started shouting abuses. With no response from us

they shouted, “ Koi giddar ya suhar lag rahe hai” ( seems these are foxes

or pigs ). After a little while they again got suspicious and fired very light

para flares to illuminate the area but could not locate us and remained

confused. Fortunately these para light flares helped us in seeing the post

more clearly. We waited for the moon to come up and shine at its best

so that we could see the layout of the enemy posts more clearly. Each

second was an experience, every minute passing by seemed like an hour.

Then we heard some footsteps towards us and our hearts sank. One

of the Pakistani signal line repair team went past within 10 yards of us.

That’s the closest we got to them physically. I almost pulled out the pin

of the hand grenade in my pocket to hurl at them in case they detect us.

It was God’s will that they went past without noticing us, we heaved a

sigh of relief. Surprisingly, my other three buddies were unruffled. They

were all battle hardened soldiers having taken part in the Attack on Mile

13 in the Battle of Dograi in the 1965 war (our unit had put in the First

phase of attack on Dograi on the night of 21/22 Sep 65, followed by 3

JAT capturing Dograi in Phase II of the attack). After a while we heard

a jeep passing by, about 50 yards away from us and it went towards

Jalloke Hittar. We deduced that the officer in charge may be returning

back from his bn HQ.

We were to return back at 5.30 am keeping the moon phase and

moonlight in mind. Around 5.00 am we heard some troops coming towards

us. We had more or less seen what we wanted. Though I panicked

in my mind for a moment but then put my Commando training to practice

and organized our move back, ‘bound’ wise. We all got separated by

a few yards from each other but fortunately got together after moving

individually for about 150 yards. We could still hear the movement of the

Paksitani’s perhaps trying to search for us. I then told our boys to now

hit for the Peacock shaped tree ( Mor Pankhi Drakht ) as our next bound.

We reached there after 20 mins of walk. To our horror we realized that



this was not the tree we had selected and willy nilly we had moved back

in the opposite direction, deeper into Pakistan and not towards our border

post. After a panicky heart pounding experience, I composed myself,

decided to change directions, westward towards the Satluj River, so that

we could move along its banks towards the Indian side. We fortunately

hit the river bank, I took a compass bearing to identify the direction and

starting moving along the river.

At about first light, we saw a post to our left around 150 yards away.

All were wearing khakhi dress ( the dress worn by Pakistanis ). We

froze, it seemed we had hit a Paksitani post. We kept moving along the

river hoping for the hand of God, as running back would invite attention.

Somehow they were not firing at us nor seemed to notice us. When we

were a little closer we saw some guys waving at us. My God, it was

actually our own BSF Post (who also wore khaki dress). What a sigh of

relief it was that we had reached back safely. At the post we got war like

hugs from the CO and others waiting for us. I then enjoyed the best cup

of tea of my life, We were back home safely ‘Mission Accomplished’. In

my mind, I got the feeling of passing my first Battle test.

ATTACK ON MAMDOT BULGE BY 13 PUNJAB

(JIND) ON NIGHT 15-16 DEC 1971

As mentioned earlier, my battalion was given the task of capturing the

Southern portion of Mamdot Bulge. In preparation for the impending

attack, two more recce patrols besides mine were conducted; one by

Maj RS Malia in the area of Dona Betu and the other by 2/Lt Andotra

along the Satluj River.

As part of the Brigade plan for capture of the Mamdot Bulge, based

on the information obtained by the three recce patrols, our CO, Lt Col

Kul Bhushan did a brain-storming session with our Unit Officers. The

final attack plan was based on the collective wisdom of the officers going



Figure 87: Map MAMDOT BULGE



in for the attack. Charlie Coy in Phase 1, under Maj RS Malia was to

capture Dona Betu and Alpha Coy, under command of Maj KS Sidhu

with me as the Coy 2IC, was to first capture Pira Kana (an outpost)

and subsequently Jalloke Hittar from the rear. Delta Coy under Maj HC

Sharma was held as reserve in Phase 1 and in Phase 2 they were to clear

the area along the Eastern bank of the Satluj River.

The battalion assembled close to the BSF post of Raja Matham. A

pep talk to the troops by our CO in the evening had everybody charged

up to go. One Hav wanted to report sick; the CO laughingly told him

“Shadi wale din Dulha bimar nahi ho sakta, sab attack mein chalen gey”

(The bridegroom cannot fall sick on his own marriage day; everyone

will go in the attack). He himself accompanied the leading troops. We all

had our anxious moments before takeoff. I placed myself in the forward

most section with only two scouts in front of me, which is normally

the position of a Section Commander(of Havaldar’s rank). I did this as

I knew the route and I felt that I should be right at the front. I wore

a ‘Pagri’ as my coy had Sikh troops. The adage that “the lives of men

under you depend on you and your leadership during war, especially in

an attack operation”, as taught to us and highlighted by our CO, remained

etched in my mind. I was a young bachelor, 25 years old, bubbling with

excitement and had battle tested myself in the Recce Patrol into Pakistan

four days earlier. I enjoyed the full confidence of our men and that added

to my degree of responsibility.

Still there was a thought lurking in my mind, that should I die in the

attack, it will be somewhat sad as I was yet to enjoy the bliss of marriage.

Perhaps that would have been my main regret of dying, besides the

feeling of leaving my parents and siblings. My Coy Cdr, Maj Sidhu (with

whom I had a special bond; we were more like buddies) was recently

married. He kissed his wife’s photo and kept it in his pocket. He was a

veteran of the 1965 War having taken part in the attack on Dograi on

night of 21-22 Sep 1965 as a 2/Lt, where he was wounded in the battle

and Capt Kuljit of our unit, who was just by his side, was killed. He told

me “Nanda, I am not scared but I am somewhat worried about my wife,



should something happen to me”. We both pledged to bring each other

back in case of becoming a casualty and also to take care of each other’s

family in case either of us die. In civil world it is generally believed that

all soldiers are brave and fearless but very few realize that they too have

their anxious moments especially about their family near and dear ones

who are dependent on them.

There was a delay in our move forward from the Assembly Area

due to some last minute changes in resource allocation of Arty Fire Units

to the Bde. While waiting, I squatted and decided to have a cigarette

and asked two jawans to cover me with their raincoats (‘Pani Pallas as

we call them’), so that the enemy may not spot the glow of the cigarette.

Suddenly our CO, with his skeleton protection and ‘O’ Group walked up

from behind. Looking at the smoke screen rising out of the ‘Pani Pallas’ he

probed further and said “Oye Nandiya, sharam kar, pagri paa ke cigarette

peena” (You, Nanda, have some shame! Smoking a cigarette with a Pagri

on!!). I replied “Sir, who knows this could be my last cigarette, please let

me enjoy the last puff”. This was War; my request was accepted and

forgotten with a smile.

After preparatory bombardment of the objectives, we started our

move from the Assembly Area. We first encountered the barbed wire, cut

across it and moved forward with me leading. However, the dark cloudy

night and the fog reduced the visibility to a few feet; I was intermittently

looking at the compass bearing and guiding the two scouts in front of

me. Midway, Charlie Coy under Maj Malia (which was following our

Coy) peeled off to their objective Dona Betu, which was closer to the

Assembly Area than our Coy objective. We had anxious moments to be

on the right route and had to requisition Arty Para Flares to see the area

more clearly. There was pressure from the Brigade to ask for the final

bombardment of the target area, but the CO held his nerve to hold fire

till he was sure of our own position, lest the Arty shells fall on us.

Our Alpha coy first platoon was to capture Pira Kana (an outpost)

and the remaining two platoons were to capture Jalloke Hittar, by an

attack from the Rear. The final attack was planned at ‘first light’. When



we reached Pira Kana, we could hear people running helter skelter and

when we reached the objective, we found that the enemy had fled. We

quickly consolidated and then moved to the rear of Jalloke Hittar. While

we were forming up and bringing fire on them, the enemy troops were

heard running in the northerly direction. By the time we reached the

enemy post, they had all run away leaving behind arms and ammunition.

We chased them with some of our boys using typical ‘Punjabi Adjectives’.

Meanwhile, ‘Charlie Coy’, its leading platoon led by Subedar Bachittar

Singh(a war veteran of the 1947-48, and 1965 wars) was moving in the

area East of the Satluj River. There were a lot of wild bushes (‘sarkanda’)

and small dunes in the area; due to poor visibility and ‘sarkanda’, the

leading platoon while moving forward got separated from the rest of

the Coy. Unknowingly and unmindful, they kept moving. At one stage

in the fog of the night, this leading platoon inadvertently and somewhat

exploringly, entered the outer periphery of their objective - ‘Dona Betu’.

To their disbelief, they did not find any enemy troops there. (Sensing

the impending attacks, the Pakistanis had vacated it in the earlier part

of the night). That is the time they realized that the objective had been

captured without the war cry of “Jo Bole So Nihal, Sat Sri Akal”.

At this stage an interesting drama started. It was now closer to first

light, so Subedar Bachittar started shouting at the rest of the ‘Company’.

“Aa jayo! Aa jayo!! Ethe koi nahi hai”(Come on, Come on, there is Nobody

here). Maj Malia, the coy cdr (having read a lot of suspense and

horror novels) was unmoved and insisted on verifying. He told his Coy

2IC, “Kahin Bachittar aur party Enemy ke kabje mein to nahi hai”(Check

whether Bachitter is in the custody of the enemy and he is being threatened

to shout at gunpoint). He then questioned Sub Bachittar Singh on

the radio set in typical ‘Punjabi language code’ to verify. This issue got

resolved soon after Sub Bachittar swore by God and said “Sirji, Sanu

Baabey di Souh”. As daylight broke, they saw a minefield laid on the

outer periphery of the post and wondered how the leading troops reached

the enemy location without a causality; it was a miracle indeed. Eventually,

rest of the coy reached the enemy post after locating a gap in the



minefield.

The success signal Red over Red was fired by ‘Alpha’ coy at about

6.45 am and Charlie Coy fired their success signal at 6.55 am. The CO

caught up with us at the captured post soon after. We were all given a

big ‘shabash’ and ‘well done’ by him. ‘D’ Coy cleared the area on the

southern bank of Satluj river, by the morning without much resistance.

One of our men lost his leg by stepping on an anti-personnel mine;

during the day we realized that the enemy had strewn anti-personnel

mines, randomly all over the route. It was indeed God’s will that miraculously

we had only one mine casualty. Our CO, who always carried a

small transistor in his ‘pack’ switched it on; he then told us that ‘Cease

Fire’ had been declared! We celebrated the victory, with all of us yelling

our battle cry – “Jo Bole So Nihal Sat Sri Akal, Jawala Mai ki Jai”. Violating

the ‘Cease Fire’ the very next morning, the Pakistanis put in an attack,

to reoccupy the post of Jalloke Hittar. This was successfully foiled by us

and we captured 26 POWs, with their weapons! Thereafter, there was

another encounter with the Pakistanis in the afternoon, wherein there

was heavy exchange of fire. I was almost blown off, when a tank shell

missed my head by a ‘hair’s breadth’ and directly hit the RCL gun, which

was deployed behind me. More about it in the next Section.

Capture of POWs - 17 Dec 1971

After surrender by Pakistan soldiers in Dacca and other places in East

Pakistan, on 16 Dec 1971, ‘Ceasefire’ was declared. We were rejoicing

the victory the next day, when we got a message, that the CO would

hold a review meeting at the Battalion HQ at 1130 hours. However, at

0845 hours, I was ordered to move with a Platoon immediately, to marry

up with Maj HC Sharma, D Coy cdr; who while moving in a jeep to the

Battalion HQ, observed a platoon of Pakistani’s advancing towards our

post at Jalloke Hittar. I rushed to him along with a platoon of ‘A’ Coy

mustered hurriedly, with a 1 ton vehicle.



Meanwhile, Maj HC Sharma showing great presence of mind, challenged

the advancing enemy platoon. He shouted at them that they were

surrounded by our two coys and they should surrender immediately,

failing which they will be killed. In actual fact, when he warned them,

we had been able to muster only a handful of troops and were numerically

inferior. Somehow, the ruse worked and one could see them putting

down their weapons and raising their hands. However, one soldier carrying

an LMG, disobeying his superiors, placed his LMG in ‘Firing position’.

As he was preparing to fire, a JCO of theirs, pulled out his magazine to

abort his attempt, fearing a retaliatory attack by us (though we did not

have enough troops to execute a successful attack at that point in time!).

Soon thereafter, the rest of D Company and I, along with my platoon

fetched up. We quickly got hold of the POWs and put their weapons in

a vehicle (Maj Sharma who managed to snatch the initiative and bluff

the Pakistani’s to surrender, was an experienced soldier who had led a

company during the successful attack at Dograi, in the 1965 war).

While the prisoners were being escorted to our Bn HQ, one of their

‘Havaldar’ walked up to me and complained “Sahib aap ka Havaldar

hamara mazaak urhaa raha hai” (Saheb, one of your Havaldar is making

fun of us). I smilingly told him “Toh kya wo aap ko jhappi mare” (do you

expect him to give you a hug instead). Meanwhile, our CO also reached

the spot. He ordered that no one will harm the prisoners and got some

biscuits distributed to them. Our CO was very humane and fair minded,

besides being brave. We later learnt that the 26 POWs captured by my

unit, were the maximum captured by a unit in Western Command!

Confronting the Paki’s

I was now ordered to remain with D Coy along with my platoon and to

scan the balance area of the Bulge, to clear it of the enemy. Maj Sharma

and myself then started walking in the northerly direction along with a

section and ordered the balance of the troops to scan the area platoon

wise. Suddenly, we spotted some enemy troops ahead and we halted. We

informed our CO and started preparing for a possible attack. We then saw



two Pakistani soldiers waving a white cloth, possibly a handkerchief. We

halted our troops and we too waved a white handkerchief; Maj Sharma

and myself then moved towards them, followed by one Section of ours.

On reaching them we found that one of them was a 2/Lt and the other

was a JCO, both from Baluch Regiment. We then enquired as to why

they were there as the area had already been captured by us and was

under our control. The officer replied “Sir, this is our area”; the JCO

further insisted that they had been there for long and showed us their

platoon bunkers, which were occupied by their troops. He said “Sahib

ye dekho hamari mine field bhi lagi hui hai”. We then told them that our

Brigade had already captured the whole of the Mamdot Bulge including

the area occupied by them and that they should immediately vacate it.

The officer was nervous but the JCO insisted that it was their area. We

then told them “We already had orders to run over you and that our

Battalion has already formed up behind with supporting weapons”. It is

only because of the white flag shown by you, that we are giving you a

chance to withdraw to the other side of the Satluj River. We also asked

our RCL detachments behind to move up and down to make noises to

portray vehicular movement, so as to scare the enemy. I pretended to

taking a call on the radio set from the CO and told Maj Sharma with

a wink “Sir, CO is asking us to commence the attack”; this unnerved

them. The officer then asked us to give him 15 minutes, as he wanted

to speak to his Coy Cdr. We asked him where his Coy Cdr was and

learnt that he was comfortably across the Satluj River, on their home side.

After a while they agreed to go back across the River. They had a ‘Ferry

System’ working with a few boats. We let them move out from their

bunkers with their weapons and let them go unharmed, in conformity

of the white flags shown initially. I asked their JCO to show me the

exact location of the temporary minefield laid by them; which he did

reluctantly.



Unprovoked Firing By Pakistani Troops

Maj Sharma ordered one of his platoons and the company HQs to move

forward and occupy defences vacated by the Pakistanis. As directed by

Maj Sharma, I took my platoon forward and deployed them on the near

bank of the Satluj river, facing the ‘Ferry Site’. The platoon was more

or less in the open, watching the Pakistani’s crossing over in two boats,

each taking three to four persons at a time. I was standing on the bank

with my hand on the hip, watching the scene like a victorious movie

hero. As soon as the boats with the last lot of Pakistanis was about to

reach the far bank, the Pakistani’s started firing at us; my platoon and

I were caught in the open. I had one of my LMG detachment headed

by Nk Issar Singh deployed next to me. I asked him to retaliate and he

immediately fired on the boat which had almost reached the other side.

We could see the occupants scrambling out and felt that perhaps one or

two of them were injured. A full-fledged exchange of fire followed, with

their MMGs, LMGs and even 3” Mortars firing at us. The LMG next

to me was particularly targeted by them and Nk Issar Singh shouted at

me to take a lying position. I immediately did so and ordered my boys,

who were deployed in the open, to quickly dig trenches next to their

positions. Unfortunately, in the din of the battle, we were not carrying

digging tools; the boys started digging with their hands and bayonets,

in the sandy area. The Pakistanis, then started bracketing the area of

the LMG next to me with their Artillery/ Mortar fire. I asked my boys

to hug on to the bank area, knowing by my judgment and experience

of being Mortar Platoon Commander earlier, that if we do so, the shell

would either fall behind us or into the river. The chances of artillery

shells hitting the banks were much lesser.

Meanwhile our Battalion support weapons, MMGs and RCL guns

were deployed at suitable places around, by the CO. One of our RCLs

got deployed right behind our LMG position. While the firing was on,

I felt a burning sensation in the heel of my left leg. I thought it was an

insect bite. Later when I opened my boot, I found that a small mortar

shrapnel had hit the heel of my boot and pierced in to touch my heel.



The thick boot heel had come handy! The firing continued from both

sides but they had an edge as they were firing from bunkers. During this

period, I just happened to take my helmet off for a moment to scratch

my head, when I suddenly felt something zooming past my hair and

when I looked back, I saw that a tank shot had hit the RCL gun deployed

just behind me! I had a miraculous escape! The thought of having my

body blown off into pieces by a tank shot, haunts me till today. What a

proverbial escape by a hair’s breadth! (To date, I celebrate my second

birthday every year on 17 Dec, as for me it was a rebirth, by the Grace

of God). Finally, everything went quiet that evening and there was no

more exchange of fire. We reorganized ourselves in the area cleared by

us.

Later, our bn handed over the captured area of Mamdot Bulge to

the BSF bn and moved to take over defences in area Hussainiwala. Our

Bn continued to be deployed in the Hussainiwala Bridge Area during

the post ‘Ceasefire’ period. During this period, I had the opportunity to

hold a number of ‘Flag Meetings’ with Pakistani Officers. That itself was

a great experience to get an insight into their psyche, behavior pattern

and attitude. We moved back to Meerut in the latter half of 1972, where

we were immediately put to guard the Pakistani POW Camps already

established.



Figure 88: ‘ALPHA’ COY OF 13 PUNJAB (JIND) AFTER CAPTURE OF

JALLOKE HITTAR IN MAMDOT BULGE (PAKISTAN) DURING 1971

WAR. CAPT KK NANDA STANDING LEFT OF THE SIGN BOARD



Figure 89: CAPTURE OF ARMS AND AMMUNITIONS BY 13 PUNJAB

(JIND) AT JALLOKE HITTAR (PAKISTAN), DEC 1971



Figure 90: CAPT KK NANDA STANDING IN CENTER WITH BLACK

CAP WITH MAJ KS SIDHU ON HIS LEFT. AFTER CAPTURE OF

PIRA KANA + JALLOKE HITTAR DEC 1971



Figure 91: CAPT KK NANDA SITTING NEXT TO MMG POST AFTER

CAPTURE OF MAMDOT BULGE OF PAKISTAN, DEC 1971 WAR



Figure 92: Capt KK Nanda and Maj KS Sidhu with ‘ALPHA’ coy and

supporting detachments after capture of Pira Kana and Jalloke Hittar in

Mamdotbulge (Pakisan) on 16 Dec 1971


Chapter 27: Valour Beyond The Call Of Duty by KK Nanda

27. Valour Beyond The Call Of Duty by

KK Nanda

1

Vijendra Malhotra more popularly known as ‘Mallu’, besides being

a course mate, has been my childhood buddy and classmate

since the age of 5.

Mallu was a fearless, adventurous guy who did not believe in treading

the beaten path. He was a man of all seasons. Every action of Mallu

depicted his commitment to the assigned task, however in his own inimitable

style. Bravest of the brave, he fought valiantly in the 1971 War as

part of the elite 17 Poona Horse in the famous battle of Basantar with

Arun Khetrapal and Avtar Ahlawat directly under his command as troop

leaders, each one of them setting examples of exceptional bravery. Mallu

was recommended for MVC for his valour beyond the call of duty. Mallu

passed away in Aug 2007. Mallu went with his boots on and he used to

tell his wife ‘I have lived life with one foot on a bar stool and other on

a banana peel’. Mallu was a man with a golden heart full of adventure

and wit.

On special request, Lt Gen Balraj Takhar who was present in the

Poona Horse during the 71 War as Adjutant of the regiment, has exclusively

narrated a firsthand account about Mallu’s heroic deeds in the

Battle of Basantar. Lt Gen Takhar’s narration is given below. V MALHO-

TRA’S HEROIC DEEDS IN THE BATTLE OF BASANTAR Narration

by Lt Gen BS Takhar, PVSM, VSM, of 17 Poona Horse

Ravi Deol and I joined The Poona Horse a few days after the 1965

1

Col KK Nanda

273


cease fire, in captured Pakistan territory. Six months later Vijendra popularly

known as ‘Mallu’ joined us. While most of our officers came from

small places in Rajasthan, Haryana and Punjab, ‘Mallu’ was from Bombay.

His father was an educationist and Mallu was the first in his clan

to join the Army. A bold decision by his parents and him. He was an

urbanite and he hardly knew anything about the rough and tough life of

the Army. But he sailed through the initial six months to be like one of

us. He could rub his shoulders with his men in sports and training.

Mallu had a terrific sense of humour. He would lighten up the get

togethers with his witty anecdotes. Except for the initial stages in his

career, he lived his life on his own terms. There is a lot to write about

him but I shall stick to his exploits in the 1971 War.

Most of us know and have read the operations of 1971. I shall skip

the back ground and get to narration of actions in operations where

Mallu played a sterling role.

At about 0230 hours on 14 Dec 1971 the Regt was given the task of

breaking out of the Bridge Head established by the Infantry at Lohara-

Mehalwan. We were subject to heavy shelling throughout the night.

Advance was very slow. Mallu was leading the advance. It redounds

greatly to the credit of Mallu who was navigating us under heavy shelling

and the treacherous terrain, that we managed to maintain a reasonably

accurate direction. Where as we were secure to some extent, as we were

closed down but Mullu could not afford to do that. He often had to get

down from his tank to take fresh bearings. Repeating this performance

time and again in the middle of unknown enemy territory with all the

artillery targeting our columns required great nerve and daring on his

part.

We had crossed the minefield and the Basantar Nala on the night

15/16 Dec 71. Our deployment was in general area Sarajchak, south

of Lalial Forest and northeast of Jarpal. The infantry deployed in area

Jarpal and Lalial reserved forest reported enemy tanks building up for

counter attack. Amarjit Bal with his two troops was rushed to Jarpal.

Similar action was taken by Ajai Singh with C Sqn under his Command



in the Lalial Reserved Forest.

Stage was set for one of fiercest tank battle in the annals of armour

warfare. Col Hanut Singh personally coordinated this battle having a

direct contact with each tank Cdr. He ordered Mallu to take two troops

to reinforce Amarjit Bal at Jarpal. One of the troop leaders given to Mallu

was Arun Khetarpal and second troop leader was Avtar Ahlawat. Mallu

immediately took off with Nos 3 and 4 troops following. They had hardly

started the move from Sarajchak when they came under heavy RCL

and Machine Gun fire from the enemy bunkers loc between Sarajchak

and Jarpal. Mallu with his two tps charged the enemy deployed in the

bunkers. He dismounted from his tank. He was not even carrying a pistol

with him. Mallu and his two troops executed a cavalier charge, unnerved

the enemy and they meekly surrendered. These dashing cavaliers cleared

a couple of more positions by charging on them with their Centurions.

Having cleared the enemy pockets these troops continued their speedy

advance to join Amarjit Bal who had managed to hold on to the enemy

counter Attack at Jarpal. Mallu and his tanks continued their relentless

advance and shot up a few enemy tanks. Amarjit at this stage managed

to contact Mallu and got him to deploy in line with his own tanks. He

had expected another Counter Attack by the enemy.

Amarjit with his two troops was deployed North East of Jarpal while

Mallu with his four tanks was deployed between Jarpal and Barapind.

Mallu’s tanks were in the open as he had no cover in that area. As

expected, enemy launched a massive Counter Attack and tried assaulting

our tanks in a very desperate day light action. Mallu and Amarjit took the

enemy head on and destroyed bulk of their tanks. This was a tremendous

blow to the enemy. As the enemy tanks started withdrawing, Mallu, Arun

and Ahlawat moved forward and further inflicted casuality on the enemy.

This fire fight continued in after noon of 16 Dec 71. At one stage, Avtar’s

tank was hit and he was evacuated to Sarajchak.

Mullu and Arun continued to fight valiantly destroying enemy tanks.

Around 1500 hours Arun was martyred. He had shown great courage

and determination before his tank was hit from a range of 75M.



Mallu had been left all by himself and his gun had developed a defect.

He was ordered to hold on till reinforcements arrived.

Enemy was preparing for another Counter Attack. Had the enemy

launched the Counter Attack, Mallu would have faced certain death. He

resolutely stuck to his post and such was the healthy respect that the

enemy had developed for the Poona Horse tanks that Mallu’s solitary

tank had kept the Enemy at bay by its mere presence ( enemy did not

know that Mallu’s gun was defective )

From the day Mallu joined action, he displayed the highest qualities

of leadership, a calm and unruffled temperament under extreme stressful

conditions. He showed great nerve, daring and courage bordering on

recklessness. His valour and his exploits have been beyond the call of

duty and in the best traditions of our Army. For his outstanding performance

Mallu was recommended for the award of MAHA VIR CHAKRA.


Chapter 28: Capture of Mamdot Bulge in 1971 INDO-PAK WAR by Vijay Rai

28. Capture of Mamdot Bulge in 1971 INDO-

PAK WAR by Vijay Rai

1

Some of the incidents that I’m going to narrate are about 15 DO-

GRA’s stellar role in the capture of Mamdot Bulge (South of Hussainiwala

enclave, which was the scene of intense battle). The area had added importance

as the samadhis of Shaheed Bhagat Singh, Rajguru and Sukdhev

are located here and was the direct approach to Ferozepur. It was felt

by our military planners that the Mamdot enclave had to be captured (

rather late, I thought ) to preclude any build up by Pak for opening up

another avenue of attack/buildup towards Ferozepur. This assumed even

more importance after the fall of Hussainiwala. Some of the incidents

where the unit excelled during the 1971 war haven’t been spoken or

written about much in our unit’s history or war diary( or maybe I have

not read about them). The reader is requested to appreciate that at the

time of the war I had 5 years service and had been sidestepped from

the Adjutant’s chair to D Coy cdr. Jayant Mohanty took over as Adjutant

from me. Much water has flown in the Sutlej since then and over subsequent

years having experienced varied assignments the reader may find

me disdainful of some decisions taken at the higher comd level during

the heat of the battle. But this is how battles are fought when higher

cdrs have to take split second decisions—some work and some don’t. As

junior officers we often criticize and snigger at these decisions without

realizing the compulsions/pressures higher cdrs have to go through. And

may I add that its also vice versa.

The first incident that I wish to cover was a patrol I led to the Pak

1

Brig Vijay Kumar Rai

277


posn of Amrudwali along the Sutlej R.

Background

Rangewala had been captured on the night of 10/11 Dec 71). It was at

very heavy cost. 20 dead and 40 odd wounded. Yash Sehgal (27 NDA

ex Foxtrot) died on the spot and Ram Rishi Yadav a couple of days later

in hospital having taken a machine gun burst in the head. Both were

more than friends, they were family. The grief that one experiences in

such circumstances cannot be explained; it can only be felt. Grief is

the strongest emotion one feels—anger and revenge follow much later.

Bikram Rana going out on a patrol out of Rangewala blew his foot on an

anti-pers mine on the morning of 11 Dec. It happened literally yards in

front of me and when I saw the blood, flesh and bones sticking out from

what should have been his foot it presented an ugly picture. I remember

Bikram asking me, “ Sir, is it gone”. What Could I say? Bikram took it

like a man. On getting his prosthetic leg, Bikram served as ADC to the

Prsident Shri Neelam Sanjeeva Reddy.

The GOC 14 Inf Div, Gen Onkar Singh Kalkat came to Rangewala

and after offering the perfunctory compliments to the CO, Lt Col

Keen(KC) Tewari for having captured Rangewala, started chiding and

berating the CO for having suffered heavy casualties. The CO was one

of the most balanced persons I have served with—very humane, practical

and down to earth but a hard task master and it was only his maturity

that avoided an unpleasant situation. We youngsters who were within

listening distance wanted to tell the GOC to go take a hike and let us run

the unit. But then the GOC must have had his own reasons for doing so.

It was with this backdrop that the CO ordered me to take a patrol

to Amrudwali to explore the possibility of attacking and capturing the

position from the west since the map showed Amrudwali on the eastern

bank of Sutlej. One look at the map would indicate that capturing

Amrudwali from the west( i.e., the rear approach) would render Pak



defences in the Mamdot Bulge untenable. D Coy had been tasked to

capture the position so who better than the Coy cdr to lead the patrol. I

was to move out after last light on 11 Dec and be back by the morning

of the 12th. I had my FOO ( Jacob, who, I believe transferred to the

Pioneer Corps later) and the usual signal support and communications. I

remember very vividly that L/Nk Nuklu Ram( who went on to become

Sub Maj) was part of this patrol. We were a total of 10 t0 12 all ranks in

this patrol.

A word about the terrain. Well, there was no terrain, only vegetation—

Sarkanda or elephant grass which meant there was practically

no visibility at night. Of course moving along the banks of the Sutlej

afforded visibility to the far bank where the main defences of the enemy

were existing but it was the same for the enemy as well so one had to

be careful. The eastern bank of the Sutlej was about 15 to 20 ft higher

than the water level where there were numerous channels that could

be easily crossed by a ferry or even waded through at that time of the

year except of course the main river). Unfortunately, I don’t have the

maps of the area so I did a Google search of the Mamdot area and to

my pleasant surprise I found the area extensively cultivated with a lot of

greenery on the Pak side of the border. In Dec 71, however there was

only sarkanda 6 to 10 feet high. The Pakis had just cleared enough area

around their positions to get clear fields of fire. Their observation was

equally restricted which also worked to their disadvantage as you could

creep up to the edge of the sarkanda and observe them unhindered.

It must have been around 2100 or 2200 hours when one of my patrol

party slipped on the river bank and a fair amount of racket was created.

It is surprising how far and how swiftly sound travels on a dark winter

night. While he was being retrieved a volley of fire started from the

far bank—a couple of LMG bursts to start with, then longer bursts, and

then the whole bank lit up accompanied by para flares. Apparently, some

sentry got trigger happy and the entire defence line caught the bug. These

were the defences in the area around Atar Singh Wala. While googling I

could not locate it but did find Jodh Singh Wala which, I learnt later was



the Pakis battalion HQ. We witnessed this Diwali for about 15 minutes

while lying doggo and hugging the ground. The distance between the

two banks was a km plus and there was no way their fire could be

effective( but this is only in hindsight.) In the meantime, the CO had

been trying to get me on ANPRC-25 set and we agreed that once firing

stops we continue our patrol but be more careful and be extra vigilant.

My own hunch is that the Pakis had no clue about the patrol.

After waiting for about 15 to 20 minutes when sanity had returned,

the patrol continued towards our proposed objective. The only problem

was how to do map reading in sarkanda at night. I asked Jacob, the

FOO to help us locate Amrudwali, which as per the map was bang on

the eastern bank of the Sutlej. As per time and distance, we should have

reached Amrudwali but all we saw was elephant grass. Those inch maps

given to us were hopelessly outdated and the compass was not much

help either. It was well past midnight by now and Jacob and I decided

to call for arty fire to get at least some idea of our objective. After getting

in touch with his gun position Jacob gave the coordinates asking for one

25 pounder to be fired. The gunners responded promptly, but the sound

of the shell exploding was too far away and the echo of the bursting shell

confused us even more. We asked for a repeat which was granted. Again

no luck. I reported to the CO who was not amused and asked us to get

back by first light. Despondent for not having completed our task, we

started trudging back to Rangewala. It was later when my coy captured

Amrudwali on 15th Dec 71 that we came to know that we were on a

wild goose chase. It was nowhere near to what had been shown on the

maps. There were at least two large creeks( all dry in winters) between

the Sutlej bank and the objective. There were a few smaller ones as well

; hence the echo of the shells landing and seeming far away. And there

was no GPS or satellite imagery those days. But, as they say, time spent

on recce is never wasted—at least that approach to attack the objective

was ruled out and we would have to go in for another. Also, little did we

know that there were some more fun and games for my patrol party.

It must have been around 0500 to 0530 hours when we were not



more than half hour from the bn HQ, when we suddenly heard a lot of

rustling in the sarkanda and voices that appeared to be in Punjabi. They

could not have been more that 30 to 40 yards away. The voices seemed

to be moving towards the riverbank. We froze, and in a flash realized they

just could not be our troops but it needed confirmation. We got that soon

enough as the voices started descending down the river bank. Here was

our moment— what in military parlance is referred to as an opportunity

ambush. The whispered instructions could not have taken more than

10 secs and we hurriedly took positions on top of the river bank. I think

it was Jacob who let go his carbine burst first. Nuklu was next with

his LMG. For the next minute or so we opened up with all we had. As

can be appreciated visibility of the river bed was very low, because of

early morning fog/frost so characteristic in North India during winters.

During the split sec pauses we could hear loud groans and moaning and

splashing in the water. Apparently, there was a small boat there being

used as a ferry and these were stragglers lost in the sarkanda after the

Rangewala attack. Or they may have deliberately ‘lost’ themselves to

escape the fury and heat of the attack. I was also a listener to some of the

choicest Punjabi abuses I have ever heard—most of them unprintable

here. After a few minutes, we went down the river bank and in the

sandy bed saw two huge pools of blood ; they had, however, managed

to extricate the wounded (or dead) in the boat which we recovered. We

did get one UMG, six boxes of belted ammo and about half a dozen

blankets. These were displayed to Gen Kalkat the next day during a

discussion of the battalion’s attack plan of Jaloke Dhuan and Amrudwali.

The CO had been frantically trying to get in touch with me on the radio

but the situation precluded me from speaking on the radio set. After the

incident, we got in touch and I assured the CO that all was well and

would debrief him on arrival at the Bn HQ. This incident also brought

out the need for good fire discipline. The indiscriminate opening up of

all weapons revealed fairly accurately the layout of Pak defences and the

improbability of the enemy reinforcing his defences east of the Sutlej.

The layout of the defences was also confirmed by Air OP recce flight a



day later.

The Attack on Amrudwali

Background

First, a little background. Dhan Singh Adhikari(Danny), who was awarded

Vir Chakra, was tasked to capture Jaloke Dhuan. He had earlier done

a splendid job of carrying out a detailed recce of the objective. Taking

advantage of the thick sarkanda he had positioned himself within a few

hundred metres during the daytime the previous day and drawn precise

sketches of the defensive layout. This was to stand him in good stead

later and the execution of the attack was praiseworthy.

The plan to capture Amrudwali involved passing through Danny’s

coy after the capture of Jaloke Dhuan ( treating it as a firm base). The attack

was planned on night 14th/15th Dec. My coy’s attack was supposed

to have been completed by 15th first light. The attack on Jaloke Dhuan

got stretched however, and consequently the attack on Amrudwali also

got delayed. The whole night was spent in a trench waiting for executive

orders to proceed to the objective. I remember vividly smoking

my Panama cigarettes—must have finished at least a pack of them: all

this under the cover of a blanket.. My ears were glued to the handset of

the radio throughout the night of the 14th /15th as Danny went through

completing his task in a most professional manner. It was getting close

to first light and I had this strange feeling that the attack on Amrudwali

could well be postponed for the coming night. But at that time one was

not aware of the advantages of maintaining momentum—I mean we all

knew it was an important principle of war but actually executing it in a

battle situation was revealing. While mopping up was going on at Jaloke

Dhuanr, the CO got me on the radio and asked me to execute my coy’s

attack.

Since it was already first light there was little or no problem in



navigation and in half an hour we had reached Jaloke Dhuan. After

getting last minute instructions from the CO we approached the objective;

we had some trouble moving through the elephant grass but by and large

the move was smooth and swift. The CO then sprang another pleasant

surprise for me, allotting a troop of Centurion tanks ( 3 Cav ). He, however,

told me that they were not to used for the assault but only for fire support.

It needs to be remembered that those were the days armour was a very

precious commodity. It would have taken us about an hour or so to

reach Amrudwali and it was close to 1030 hours. When we were about

a km away from our objective I climbed atop the troop leaders tank (

Harry Sud was the troop leader) and it was then that I got a first glimpse

of Amrudwali. It was sprawled over about 500 metres plus and had a

few huts which stood out like eyesores. Fortunately, the medium regt

OP officer Maj Sharma, was also on the same tank and I wanted him to

soften up the objective nice and proper before we physically assaulted

the defences. I told Harry Sud to use the tanks MG fire and even the

main gun of the other tanks of the troop to blast the area. Heck, this was

an attack in broad daylight and I needed to employ all weaponry and

firepower at my disposal to make my task easier and reduce casualties.

The rumbling and earth shaking movement of the 50 tonner Centurions

is enough to put the fear of God amongst the most seasoned soldiers

and with all guns blazing ( literally) this was just my intention. In the

meanwhile, Maj Sharma had carried out ranging of the objective and

the 155 mm guns were spot on. Observation was really good and I was

convinced that the arty fire was truly effective.; we could not also afford

to allow any breather to the enemy. With high explosive plastering the

enemy and tank guns and MG firing I jumped down from the tank where

I was perched watching the neutralization of the enemy. Shamsher, my

coy 2ic, was with me and the platoon leading the attack was led by Sub

Kirpal Singh.

It was so far so good. Now we were just 200 to 300 yards away from

our objective when a couple of blasts indicated that we were walking

through an anti personnel minefield. We had to get out of this quickly.



Fortunately for us this minefield appeared to have been freshly laid

and hence wherever we saw fresh earth piled up or small mounds we

managed to avoid the mines. One wrong step would blow our foot to

smithereens. Two of my coy jawans had their foot blown off. As we

stormed the objective, it became clear to me that the enemy had been

hammered nice and proper. The air was full of the acrid stench of high

explosives and TNT of our guns and tanks. Soon enough we came under

artillery and mortar fire of the enemy. By then we had become’ smart’

enough to know whether we were under arty or mortar fire. The sound

of the arty shell has a peculiar whistling tone while the mortar shell sound

is more subdued. Either way, we knew when to precisely get under cover

or jump into a trench and let the shell explode. The enemy had slid into

the sarkanda and started firing from within the elephant grass, more out

of false sense of security than actual effectiveness. Around midday on

15th Dec 1971 I was certain that Amrudwali had been captured. It was

time for giving the success signal and the feeling one gets when giving the

code word and firing verey light flares in actual battle is a different ball

game than giving it in training exercises. As we started re organizing on

the captured objective my radio operator told me that the GOC would

like to speak to me. The GOC ??? How come? Unknown to me till

then, apparently the entire command lineup, i.e., the GOC, the Brigade

commander, Brig Pran Anand( GUARDS) and the CO Col Tewari had

climbed up the Pak observation post tower of Jaloke Dhuan ( the position

that Danny had captured the previous night) and were observing and

following my attack . The daylight visibility afforded them birds eye view

of my movement and attacking drills, as also the effectiveness of tank

and artillery fire. The GOC complimented me for the flawless execution

and success of the attack (blowing my own trumpet here) and gave me

the usual instructions to prevent re capture by the enemy—dig in, register

your Defensive fire tasks, be extra vigilant etc. etc. After responding with

“Roger” and “ Wilco” to him about half a dozen times, we got down to

reorg ourselves in the objective area.

The warlike stores that we captured at Amrudwali would be docu-



mented somewhere in the war diary of the unit. Essentially it was the

base from where other positions in the Mamdot enclave were being supplied

as was evident from the tons of ammo cartons and boxes of various

kinds that we captured. There were numerous boxes of anti personnel

and anti tank mines which gave us a good idea on the quantum on mines

the enemy had laid in the area. On a lighter note, we also took possession

of large plate called a paraat in our langars/kitchens) of freshly cut lamb

meat for about 30 persons, ready to be cooked. After debating for a short

while whether it could be poisoned and it would be halal meat, all objections

were overrule and the mutton was duly cooked and consumed.

We hadn’t eaten anything, except a few shakarparas since1800 hours the

previous evening.

As appreciated, with the capture of Amrudwali the enemy withdrew

from the remainder two positions— Dona Betu and Raja Mahtam—in the

Mamdot Bulge. About 20 POWs were captured who could not manage

to escape by our sister battalion, 13 Punjab. The war was also about to

end as Pak had surrendered after the fall of Dacca in East Pakistan. It

was on the 16/17th Dec that cease fire had been declared, just two days

after the capture of Mamdot Bulge.

The battalion remained in the Mamdot Bulge for another year plus

till the signing of the Shimla Peace Accord when both India and Pakistan

withdrew to their own side of their international borders.

Other Noteworthy Incidents

At the outset I wish to state that I was not a part of some other incidents

which I want to cover so I cannot vouch for their veracity. But having

been part of the set up and meeting friends, brother officers and men

who were present there it is highly probable that these are correct. As I

said earlier, we remained in the captured area for over a year and as part

of our lesson learning we visited many places in and around Ferozepur

and Hussainiwala headworks where various actions took place.



Ambiguity in Allotted Role

Even a rookie officer would have told you that the strategic aim was to

go on the offensive in East Pakistan and adopt a defensive posture on

the Western Front. While one can appreciate that even in a defensive

role certain limited offensive actions need to be taken for achieving your

aim, the articulation of the same was somewhat woolly. 7 Inf Div was

responsible for the defence of Ferozepur, and has always been so. To

the best of my understanding it still is. On our arrival in Ferozepur, the

first task given to our formation was the defence of the approaches to

Ferozepur township and siting defences around the periphery of the

town. We were all asked to recce the area and coord such defences.

This carried on for about a week after our arrival in the area, in the

third week of October 1971. I mean, surely one was not expecting the

enemy to make headway upto Ferozepur and even if he managed to do

so, there was a formation in situ whose role was precisely this. It was

its primary role. And the Hussainiwala headworks was too strategic an

area too pass on its responsibility to another formation. My own take on

this was that commanders at the higher level were still not clear what

our role would be and hence we were kept busy by moving around

the township. That week after our arrival was totally wasted in moving

in and around the township . Additionally, some other odd jobs were

assigned to the battalion. One of them was to guard an airstrip close to

Ferozepur; I think this was in a place named Kasu Begu. Higher formation

HQ were worried that this disused airstrip might be used by the enemy

for airborne ops and afford it a base to further build up operations. The

reader needs to be reminded that the concept of Strike Corps came into

being only after the !971 war. The Jalandhar corps was fulfilling both the

roles during the war. It also seemed to me that there was this fixation,

which seemed to be purely personality based, that 7 Inf Div would do a

better job for limited offensive tasks. With this as a backdrop, the unit

deployed in the Hussainiwala enclave was to continue there, making full



use of its knowledge of terrain and deployment but would come under

command 14 Inf Div “ when the balloon goes up.” Now consider this; till

the war starts it remains under its parent formation and as soon as the

first shot is fired, its commanders change and start controlling the battle.

Because the parent formation has to be freed for carrying out offensive

tasks. Quite messy, methinks. Nonetheless, we were asked to carry out

recce and understand our roles for counter attack/reinforcement in the

Hussainiwala enclave. The troops deployed in the Hussainiwala enclave

were a thoroughly professional lot, with tremendous esprit de corps and

dismissed the possibility of anyone making headway in their defences or

needing reinforcements. During the recce’s we also visited the samadhis(

the originals) of Shaheed Bhagat Singh, Rajguru and Sukhdev.

Another twist in the tale occurred when the higher commanders (

based on some intelligence input) felt that Ferozepur would be attacked

from the East of Hussainiwala. This was just days before the war started

on 3rd Dec. And so we were post haste rushed to the Dulchike village

East of Hussainiwala to take up defensive positions . It took us 3 to 4

days to dig up our defences and lay our minefields along the Dulchike

bund. There must have been some very authentic source that fed this

information, as even the corps cdr visited us during this preparation

time. The question that keeps bothering me, (and this in hindsight), how

on earth could an attacking formation build up and concentrate West

and North of the Sutlej R without going unnoticed. And then assault

across the Sutlej. The bridging and engineering requirements would

have been colossal. I think we were led up and gave too much credence

and capability to this source of information as also the enemy. The

proverbial fog of war was clearly evident. Till then, Mamdot Bulge had

never been mentioned by any commander up the chain. We had not

even been asked to do a map study of the area.

And then the balloon went up on 3rd Dec; I remember Col K C

Tewari was with me in my coy HQ, sipping tea when the first shells

started landing in Hussainiwala and the township of Ferozepur. It was

getting dark and the artillery shells were pouring in Hussainiwala along



with MG fire; it was my first experience of actual war and let me admit

the feeling wasn’t pleasant. This feeling got all the more accentuated as

the exodus of villagers in the border area began. The locals came in

tractors, trollies, bullock carts, bicycles, on foot and whatever means of

transportation they could lay their hands on. Men, women, and children

with whatever household assets they could take with them kept moving

past us throughout the night, hoping to find safer and more secure areas

away from the international border. Panic and fear had gripped the locals

and they just wanted to make a quick getaway.

We had got into stand to position expecting to be attacked but the real

action was taking place in the Hussainiwala enclave. The attack never

came on us; it just couldn’t have—not that night or the days and nights

that followed. Feeble attempts were made to reinforce the Hussainiwala

enclave but it was pointless—the enemy had captured the Northern end

of the bridge and was effectively dominating any and every movement

on the bridge by observation and fire. During this reinforcement, one of

our tanks fell into the Sutlej R. I learnt later that the crew, or most of it

managed to get away with injuries but the tank was retrieved only after

the ceasefire. To cut a long story short, Hussainiwala fell the same night

it was attacked i.e., 3rd/4th Dec. The unit deployed in the enclave who

was so confident of holding on to the enclave come what may had to

bite the dust, rather unceremoniously. They suffered heavy casualties,

a number of them were taken POWs and some even jumped into the

Sutlej and swam to their safety. I personally met few of such stragglers

while deployed on the Dulchike bund, offered them succour and meals

and told them to report to their rear location in Ferozepur. Throughout

the night heavy firing and shelling continued in Hussainiwala.

There was some reason for cheer the next morning as our IAF got

into action. Countless sorties of aircraft pounded and strafed the enclave

inflicting heavy casualties on enemy tanks and personnel. I witnessed a

number of scenes where the airplanes would fly low, release their bombs

(they looked like huge kitbags) and fly out. While all this was on the

ack ack guns of the enemy would open up aiming to bring down the



aircraft. To the credit of the IAF, I must admit I did not see any of our

aircraft being brought down over Hussainiwala. During those days, the

transistor radio was our constant companion and whenever we got time

we would tune in to find out what All India Radio was broadcasting

(No FM, TV or internet then.) The major focus was of course on East

Pakistan and the Hussainiwala battle was being covered by them as “

ghamasan ki larai jari hai”; this continued for two to three days but the

fact of the matter was that this so called intense battle was all but over

on the morning of 4th Dec, ( only a few remnants were left) barring of

course the pounding of the enclave by the IAF.

I learnt of another development that took place on the night of the

attack on Hussainiwala. This was blowing up one span of the Hussainiwala

bridge. As readers would be aware, strategic bridges are prepared

for demolition that are blown up by the defender in the face of the enemy

to impede or block his further advance/ingress. The strategic bridge at

Hussainiwala was one such reserve demolition wired up with explosives,

to be blown up should the battle situation demand. When the situation

became too hot too handle, apparently, some commander and/or senior

staff got weak in the mind and gave the orders for the blowing up the

bridge. The threat to Ferozepur, it seemed to them had become real

and the enemy had to be thwarted at all costs. To us youngsters, this

seemed too farfetched and was a knee jerk reaction to an imaginary

threat. Ferozepur was still miles away and there wasn’t even a shred of

evidence to suggest a build up by the enemy of that magnitude. There

was, however, no commander or senior staff willing to admit that they

had given the orders for blowing up the bridge. And then another theory

was propounded—sympathetic detonation. The theory was that with

so much explosive material flying around in the vicinity some shell or

shrapnel had triggered of the detonation leading to the blowing up one

span of the bridge accidentally.It was difficult to swallow this line of

argument. Operation Sluice Gate’.

This was not codenamed as such but involved opening up one or

two sluice gates in the Hussainiwala headworks. Apparently, some high



official of the Govt Irrigation Dept. raised a red flag saying that if this was

not done earliest it would either burst the headworks and/ or flood the

villages in the border area causing great losses citing numerous technical

reasons for the same. Accordingly, an operation was planned under the

command of Lt Col V K Dandekar( CO 3 GUARDS, our sister battalion)

with covering fire and engineer personnel. As can be expected, this ended

in a disaster; the enemy sitting on the far bank of Hussainiwala bridge

was very effectively dominating the length and breadth of the bridge. (

Oldies might remember that Col Dandekar was a test cricketer and was

the 12th man in one test match.) The net result of this operation: one

sapper officer killed, Col Dandekar wounded in the leg and evacuated.

Sluice gates could not be opened and there was no flooding or any other

calamity as feared, till the end of the war.

Capture of Anuke and Kassoke.

Since the anticipated attack did not come, we were asked to abandon

our defensive positions and capture these two positions in concert with

7 Inf Div offensive operations in the Sejhra Bulge. It needs to be recalled

that the command and control of Hussainiwala sector was no more with

this formation—in fact it was with no one as it had been captured by

Pak troops. Pressure had to be built so that the enemy did not become

more adventurous. These two positions were captured by our unit on

6th/7th Dec and were a cakewalk. There was practically no resistance

as the enemy had got embroiled in the advance of 7 Inf Div.

After the capture of Anuke and Kassoke, we were again pulled out

and it was only then that Mamdot started figuring in our discussions

and we were asked to capture and clear the bulge. We were given just

two days preparation time to commence our attack, which included

movement time from South of Sehjra in Pakistan to Rangewala in the

Mamdot Bulge. Just one more day of additional recce would have saved

us from a number of casualties and heavens would not have fallen.



The reader needs to appreciate that in the space of a two week

war, the battalion first occupied defences on the Dulchike bund, cleared

Anuke and Kassoke and then cleared the Mamdot enclave.

As I think of rounding up and concluding this writeup, the major

issue that stands out is relegating the primary role, viz, defence of Ferozepur

and the various approaches to it in favour of making limited gains

50 years later, very few people remember Mamdot or Sejhra( except the

units or formations who took part in the operations) but the loss of Hussainiwala

still rankles our minds. The enemy had removed the statues

of the three shaheeds and paraded them as war trophies in the cities of

Kasur and Lahore, as also other places. The present statues located in the

enclave were remade by our artisans and placed after Pak had to withdraw

from the area post the Shimla peace accord. Another major issue

that springs to mind is the reactive nature of operations the formations

were asked to perform. And the hub of all this was the attack at Hussainiwala

headworks. To my mind, had Hussainiwala not happened, the

Ferozepur sector would not even have figured in the war. Contingency

planning consequent to its loss would have cleared many cobwebs in

the military planners minds. Since no military commander( even in their

sub- conscious mind) ever thought that the enemy would capture it, very

little thought or planning was done on this aspect. At best, even if it came

up it must have been glossed over. Today, the formations and units who

were major participants in the Ferozepur sector (including my own unit)

may pull out their war diaries and try and rationalize their decisions and

actions, but soldiers know that in war the first casualty that occurs is

truth. Embellishments are added and the kinks smoothened to present

the positives and paper over the negatives. The area was visited by the

Chief, Gen Sam Maneckshaw within days of the ceasefire. After shaking

hands with some of us in the irrigation dept complex on the home side,

the Chief moved aside with a mug of tea and started staring towards the

far end of the Headworks where the enemy had entrenched himself. The

GOC, Gen Kalkat came alongside and stated that he was ready to take on

the recapture of Hussainiwala, if given a chance. Please remember that



both shared the same regiment—8 Gorkha Rifles and Gen Kalkat was

handpicked by the Chief to lead and coordinate the operations of Mukti

Bahini in East Pakistan. The Chief shot back at him, “Don’t be silly; the

whole world knows about it.” Most of us within earshot distance picked

it up. While narrating this, my intention is not to decry the GOC. Most

of us will probably do the same with our seniors—who dosen’t like to

score brownie points. The intention here is only to highlight that the

mention of the loss of Hussainiwala touched a raw nerve right up the

chain of command.

Conclusion

Let me end on a positive note. The nation was in a celebratory mood.

We had won a decisive victory and created a new nation. Never since

World War II had so much been achieved in such a swift and short war.

The two nation theory had fallen flat. The icing on the cake was the

93,000 prisoners we had captured after the abject surrender of the Pak

army in Eastern Pakistan. The whole world was paying us accolades

for freeing millions of people long oppressed by Yahya Khan and his

military regime. The political and military leadership of the country were

on a high never seen before. All our shortcomings got drowned in the

celebrations that took place in India and Bangla Desh. Sheikh Mujibur

Rehman had been released by Pakistan to become the first Prime Minister

of Bangla Desh. To summarize, everyone was rejoicing and for very good

reason. The most significant takeaway of the two week 1971 war for us

young officers who were in our early or mid twenties was that we had

been transformed from rookies into war veterans.



Figure 93: Sketch: Mamdot Bulge, 15 Dogra.1971

Figure 94: At Amrudwali on the evening of capture.



Figure 95: At Jaloke Dhuan. Day after ceasefire.

Figure 96: COAS at Hussainiwala Headworks soon after ceasefire


Chapter 29: 1971 War As I Saw It by PJS Sandhu

29. 1971 War As I Saw It by PJS Sandhu

1

Iwas posted as Staff Captain ‘Q’ with HQ 16 (Independent) Armoured

Brigade (16 (I) AB) which was raised at Faizabad in

1969 and had moved to Patiala in 1970 and taken over the regiments

of 1 Armoured Brigade; namely: 16 th Light Cavalry (16 CAV), 4 Horse

(4H) and 17 Poona Horse (17H). All these regiments were equipped with

Centurion Mark VII tanks. Brigadier (later COAS) Arun Vaidya was the

brigade commander in 1971.

Move to the Operational Area and Deployment

It was sometime in end Aug 1971 that I was suddenly asked to take the

Brigade Advance and harbour parties to Pathankot and marry up with

the advance elements of HQ 1 Corps who were also moving in at the

same time. Beginning Sep, regimental trains started arriving at Madhopur.

By the end of Oct, the Brigade had moved into its Concentration Area

which happened to be Kharka Nala, northeast of Sambha. Just before the

war, 16 CAV was detached from the brigade and 18 RAJ RIF (TOPAZ

APCs) was allotted to the brigade.

1

Maj Gen PJS Sandhu (Retd)

295


Relief Joins and the War Starts

Sometime in Oct the posting order of my relief had been received and

he was to reach Pathankot on 03 Dec 71. I received him at Pathankot

railway station and we reached our brigade location at about 1900 hours.

On reaching we learnt that the war had started.

That evening at dinner in the brigade field mess, the conversation

turned on shortage of first line transport with the units. Brigadier Vaidya

suggested that the officers messes could be off loaded in the Concentration

Area itself and these vehicles could be used for carrying ammunition

and fuel. Orders were issued immediately that the officers mess vehicles,

including the brigade HQ, would be off loaded and used for carrying

ammunition and fuel for the tanks. This was to be Brigadier Vaidya’s

approach throughout the war.

Further, he had his essential personal kit packed in a kit bag and a

haversack which were to accompany him in the tank. It is to his credit

that he operated from the Track Group (command and control tanks)

throughout the war. He never came back to his HQ and it was always the

brigade main HQ which moved up to the location of the Track Group as

and when the operational situation allowed. This was the main reason

for success of operations by 16 (I) AB.

Next day, I took my relief around to all the logistics units of the

Brigade and also completed whatever handing/taking over was to be

done. By the afternoon of 04 Dec, we were able to report to my boss

that the handing/taking over was complete and if I could leave for my

Regiment, 8 th Light Cavalry (8CAV). I was ushered before the Brigade

Commander. After listening to me he said,” the war has started. Your

relief will be of little use to us and you will be of little use to your regiment.

So, you better stay on”. A signal was sent to the Army HQ immediately

that the officer was being retained as an additional officer till further

orders. Naturally, I was feeling quite dejected at being denied a lifetime

of an opportunity to fight a war from a tank.

During the night of 04 Dec 71, the Brigade moved from the Concen-



tration Area to the Forward Assembly Area, a few km North of the International

Border and remained in dispersal during the day. The Brigade

‘A’ vehicles numbering about 150 had to be routed through Sambha

which was a big bottle neck as a lot of convoys were moving on the

Pathankot Jammu highway that night. My successor and self with the

help of the Brigade Provost Unit managed to do that without any hold

up. The Brigade was grouped with 54

Infantry Division of 1 Corps and was launched into the Shakargarh

Bulge along Axis Darman - Zafarwal on the Night of 04/05 Dec 1971.

On our left flank was 2 (I) AB which was equipped with T-55 tanks.

Foray into the Night

My relief and myself constituted the Brigade Rear HQ. Our main job was

to control and coordinate the move of Brigade Essential Vehicles (EVCs)

which had to move every night after last night to replenish the units and

be back by the first light. After 2-3 days, my relief had got a grip on the

things and was able to handle all the responsibilities quite effectively.

Thus, I was left free to roam around the battle field and enjoyed doing

that very much.

It was around 08 Dec that I was called by the BM late in the evening

and tasked to go and locate 91 (I) Recce Squadron (equipped with AMX-

13 tanks) which had now been placed under command 16 (I) AB. As

there was no communication with the squadron it was to be physically

contacted and guided to the Brigade Area of operations. The area indicated

to me was about 20 km to our East and 6-8 km into the enemy

territory.

So, feeling quite excited for having got a task, I set out immediately

in my jeep into the night with a driver and a radio set. After about 10

Km, while crossing a nullah the jeep stalled and would not start. After

trying a few times, I got out of the jeep and decided to walk to reach

the squadron. I must have walked hardly a km that the jeep caught



up with me and we drove on into the darkness. At one place in the

enemy territory we crossed some tank tracks. In torch light I was able

to identify these as AMX-13 tank tracks as I myself was from an AMX-

13 regiment. We followed these tracks without lights. Suddenly, out of

the darkness, a voice shouted,” Thum, kaun ata hai”. On the spur of

the moment, I recognized the voice to be that of Naib Risaldar Sarup

Singh with whom I had served in 8 CAV. He was now posted with the

91 (I) Recce Squadron, the sub-unit that I was looking for. It was just

providence and some invisible hand had guided me!

Naib Risaldar Sarup Singh guided me to his Squadron HQ which was

located just about 2-3 km from there. It was around 0500 hours that I met

up with the Squadron Commander and conveyed to him his orders. The

squadron had during the night taken part in an attack on Chak Masrur

Bara Bhai which had just been captured. The Squadron Commander

explained that 4-5 of his tanks had developed leaks in their fuel tanks

after firing armour piercing discarding sabot (APDS) ammunition and

these needed to be replaced. As this was a recurring problem with AMX-

13 tanks, adequate number of spare fuel tanks were being carried in ‘B’

vehicles which had fetched up and were in the process of being changed.

As that was to take about 2-3 hours, I decided to go round the village of

Chak Masrur Bara Bhai which had just been captured. After explaining

the mission to the Squadron Commander, I set course for my Brigade

HQ and by about 1100 hours was able to report to the BM as mission

accomplished. The squadron also fetched up later in the afternoon.

A Visit to the Regiment

By now I was getting a little frustrated for sitting out the war. So, on 11

Dec, I decided to drive up to my Regiment (8 CAV) which was about

two hours drive from our location. I met the Commanding Officer and

told him that my relief had been there for a week now and I wanted to

return to the Regiment immediately. He straight away sent a signal to



the Army HQ saying that the officer was being retained as an additional

officer and his services were urgently required in the Regiment. Having

done my bit, I returned to the

Brigade HQ but did not share this information with anyone. Sure

enough, two days later there was a signal from Army HQ to relieve me

forthwith. It was decided that I could leave on 15 Dec (AN).

Farewell

On 15 Dec, I paid a visit to the RHQs of 17 H and 4 H who were in

their operational locations as there was a lull in the battle and said good

bye to my friends. The Brigade HQ wanted to lunch me out from the

operational location which was a great honour. While we were at it, I

noticed that Brigadier Vaidya and the commanding officers were sitting

on the ground a little distance away with their maps spread out. I later

learnt that final orders for the establishment of a bridge head across

Basantar river in the area of Jarpal - Barapind which was to be carried

out that night were in progress. After a frugal but most affectionate lunch

I left for my regiment on the afternoon of 15 Dec and was thus to miss

out on being part of the famous tank battle of Basantar which took place

the following morning.

Back in the Regiment

I reached 8 CAV Regimental HQ near Ranbirsinghpura just as it was

getting dark. The Regiment was equipped with AMX-13 tanks when

I had left the Regiment in Nov 1969; now they had been converted to

Vijayanta tanks. Since I had not done any conversion, I spent better

part of 16 Dec getting familiar with the new tank. Dacca fell on 16 Dec

and Mrs Indira Gandhi offered ceasefire to Pakistan, effective from 2000



hours on 17 Dec. In the evening of 16 Dec we listened to General Yahya

Khan on the Pak radio, spewing venom and promising a thousand years

war! Next morning on 17 Dec, I was told to report to Alfa Squadron and

take over as the Squadron Second-in-Command (2IC).

The Short Lived Thrill and the Ceasefire

I was feeling quite thrilled to be back with the squadron where I had

served as a tank troop leader on commissioning and made haste to reach

and report to the Squadron commander. The squadron was deployed

just about 1-2 km from the IB and it was a wonderful feeling to be

back in the turret of a tank. We could see Pakistani tanks behind an

earthen bandh deployed at a distance of 2- 3 km. In the afternoon, a tank

duel developed and we kept engaging the tanks at long ranges. We did

see some flashes but can’t really say if we destroyed any tanks but we

suffered no tank casualty. The firing stopped at last light and the guns

fell silent at 2000 hours. Apparently, the ceasefire had been accepted by

Pakistan. Rest is history.


Chapter 30: SIGINT During the 1971 War by Chandra Nath

30. SIGINT During the 1971 War by Chandra

Nath

1

“Relative to all other intelligence disciplines, many

intelligence ‘insiders’ consider SIGINT to be one of the

most cost effective means of gathering intelligence” 2

We the signal officers commissioned in our course were on the

degree engineering course of three-year duration at CME, Pune/MCTE,

Mhow when the course was terminated midway and we were posted

out to the units on the verge of the war with Pakistan in 1971.

Peace Posting

I had my knee operation some months back at MH, Kirkee, Pune, and I

was downgraded for a long time in the medical category and when the

Army Hq decided to terminate all courses, they could not post me to a

field unit and hence I got my posting to a SIGINT unit “somewhere in

the Western sector”!

I knew nothing about the SIGINT 3 then, so I started with a totally

blank slate! Tabula rasa ( “blank slate”) is the theory that individuals are

born without built-in mental content, and therefore all knowledge comes

1

Capt CPC Nath served in a SIGINT unit “somewhere in the Western Sector”

during 1971 War

2

https://tinyurl.com/rvyx3f2d

3

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Signals_intelligence

301


from experience or perception. In Locke’s philosophy, tabula rasa was

the theory that at birth the (human) mind is a “blank slate” without rules

for processing data, and that data is added and rules for processing are

formed solely by one’s sensory experiences.

Initiation into SIGINT

Considering the contributions of the WEU (Wireless Experimental Unit)

towards the war SIGINT effort could be substantial, suddenly landing

in a WEU towards the declaration of the war without even a general

introduction to the SIGINT effort forget about training for preparation

in SIGINT was neither good for the unit nor for me personally. I guess

it must have been the case for many of us. That is the way training for

preparation for war is practically conducted in many cases in the units!

SIGINT: What is it?

“SIGINT is a broad discipline, and can include

intelligence collection from various means including

communications intelligence (COMMINT), electronic

intelligence (ELINT) Radar and electronic warfare.”

Signals intelligence (SIGINT) is intelligence-gathering by interception

of signals, whether communications between people (communications

intelligence — abbreviated to COMINT) or from electronic signals not

directly used in communication (electronic intelligence — abbreviated

to ELINT). Signals intelligence is a subset of intelligence collection management.

“SIGINT can involve the collection of communications data such as

call logs, text messages, and geographical location data. Access to SIGINT

information provides intelligence analysts the ability to determine who a



target is talking to, when, and where and assess the nature of relationships

and their activities. All without being detected.” 4

SIGINT: History

“Wireless interceptors have tuned their radio receivers

all over the world for nearly a hundred years, often

subject to all the risks of war, often in appalling

conditions, often for impossibly long shifts, often without

relief for weeks, striving for perfect copy of enemy traffic.

After the First War wireless signals were rarely sent in

plain language so the intercept operators could almost

never understand the traffic they took down- Code

Breaking and Wireless Intercepts.” 5

Radio spies[6] and Codebreakers[4], Piercing the fog [5] are some

important books on SIGINT. Wiki on Cryptography 6 is also very informative

resource in pubic domain.

Soviet SIGINT

The Soviet Union maintains the most extensive and most comprehensive

signals establishment (SIGINT) capabilities in the world.[1]

Soviet SIGINT in India in 1971 War

From international reports, we learn that: “In early 1971, the Soviet Union

established two SIGINT stations in Punjab. One stationary operated by

4

Signals Intelligence; What is SIGINT & How Does It Work? BY BEN

STARK ON NOVEMBER 12, 2016 http://www.intelligence101.com/

signals-intelligence-what-is-sigint-how-does-it-work/

5

http://marconiheritage.org/ww1-intel.html

6

https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Cryptography



some 300 Soviet Air Force personnel, is at Ludhiana; and the other, with

some 200 personnel, is at Bhatinda. These stations are well-placed to

provide SIGINT coverage of northern Pakistan and southwest China.”

Page 15 of [2].

Paranoia Is Our Profession

Because of absolute secrecy followed in the profession (Paranoia Is Our

Profession, P251 of [3]), there is no confirmation/denial of this claim of

the author!

“Using signals intelligence tactically was always a

calculated risk, but at least there were potential benefits

that could be weighed against the risk of arousing enemy

suspicions. The real nightmare for the code breakers was

that simple carelessness, or gossip, or bragging might put

all of their work in jeopardy for no gain at all. Or, worst

of all, that someone in the know might fall into enemy

hands and, under interrogation or torture, reveal the

state of Allied success against enemy codes. Bletchley

Park solved that problem by simply refusing to let

anyone leave once they showed up”-Paranoia Is Our

Profession P-251[3]

SIGINT in India



SIGINT Work during the 1971 War

Radio Telephony

We were essentially intercepting the minute-to-minute developments

over RT and RTT on the HF link between Dacca and Rawalpindi/Islamabad.

On RT they were using a secrecy device somewhat like our ITI manufactured

the Ultaphone which works somewhat like an inversion of

the audible frequency spectrum. The secrecy provided is minimal in the

sense that a trained operator could make sense of the communication

whereas an untrained person like me could not make sense out of the

communication! I just had to trust my trained and seasoned operators

who have been intercepting this radio link for months together!

Radioteletype (RTTy)

Fortunately, most of the information that was passed is sure to follow in

the RTTy 7 and we used more as a confirmation of the Radio Telephony

message already intercepted on the RT link.

Interesting Intercepts

Some of the interesting messages passed over to higher HQ by our intercepting

unit were

1. Brig Khan was in charge of arresting Bangabandhu Mujib code

named ‘Big Bird’ on the night of March 25 account of the arrest

of the Big Bird’ and events leading to the arrest.

2. “Six months before the start of the war, SIGINT alerted the Indian

authorities to the imminent crackdown’ against the top leaders

of the Awami League by Pakistani forces; the The intercept of

transmission from East to West Pakistan that night to the effect

7

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radioteletype



that ’... the bird has been caged’ informed them that Sheik Muijibur

Rehman, leader of the Awami League and later the first President

of Bangladesh, had been caught by the Pakistanis.” 8 9

3. In early December, ’radio intercepts that the Pakistanis were pulling

out’ formed the basis of the Indian move to capture the town of

Sylhet on 7-14 December.

4. “Information obtained through radio intercepts’ provided order-ofbattle

intelligence on Pakistani forces deploying along the border,

although there was little depth to this intelligence” 10

5. The fall of Dacca was followed minute by minute from the Pak

army perspective as they were continuously reporting to their

Western Headquarters the advance of the Indian Army and the

decision to surrender!

6. Speaking on the radio even as the army began its crackdown,

Mujib declared Bangladesh’s independence at midnight on March

26, 1971.

All We Knew

All we knew was some of our interceptions were extremely important

in some cases to construct the larger picture (but we did not actually

know how this larger picture was constructed or what came of it. So,

all we concentrated on was, as soon as anything was intercepted, our

responsibility was to ensure that it was conveyed to Delhi SIGINT Headquarters,

and once conveyed, our responsibilities are over! How that was

8

Asoka Raina, Inside RAW: The Story of India’s Secret Service (Vikas Publishing

House, New Delhi, 1981), p.54.

9

The arrest took place well before I arrived at the unit and it was all hearsay

for me. All I heard was the story of the bird had been caged message.

10

General K.V. Krishna Rao, Prepare or Perish: A Study of National Security,

Lancer Publishers, New Delhi, 1991, p.248.



used, how significant it turned to be were all outside our horizon. Neither

were we given the feedback on the importance of our contribution by

the higher headquarters. In the absence of this feedback, it is difficult to

keep our men motivated.

How We Kept our Men Motivated

We used to narrate the anecdotal evidence of the effect of an interception

of the radio net of Pakistan formation Headquarters that resulted in the

killing of the Pakistani commanders who assembled for a meeting of the

Divisional commander in the 1945 war with Pakistan. In the absence

of any formal system of passing down the chain of command of the

successes of the SIGINT, everything remained just folklore and anecdotal

evidence.

Much later, I had read about this in the book on SIGINT that came

out of the Australian National University[2]:

“During this first India- Pakistan war (October

l947-December 1948, the Indian Army conducted

extensive tactical COMINT operations. For example, on

8 January 1948, on the basis of the information gleaned

from the intercepts that the Divisional GOC was at

milestone 35 on the Bhikhiwind road, Indian armoured

troops successfully ambushed the Pakistani force, all of

whom (including the GOC) were killed. On 11

September, during the battle at Phillorah, intercepts

informed the Indian commanders of Pakistani losses,

and it quickly became evident to them that they had

achieved a decisive victory and set a major

turning-point in the war.” 11

11

Cited in Major K.C Praval, Indian Army after Independence (Lancer International,

New Delhi, 1990), p.283. See also Lt Col (Retd) Bhupinder Singh,1.965

War: Role of Tank in India-Pakistan War (B.C Publishers, Patiala, Punjab,

1982), pp.13G7.



It is a tragedy that we had to fall back on such anecdotal evidence

to motivate our men to do a better job of whatever they are engaged

in because there was no formal system of conveying the successes of

SIGINT to those who toiled day and night in such SIGINT activities.

It is difficult to motivate these “radio spies” without credible stories of

successes of SIGINT activities, somewhat like:

“If a tree falls in a forest and no one is around to hear it,

does it make a sound?” is a philosophical thought

experiment that raises questions regarding observation

and perception.

Post Military Service

After leaving the Army on premature retirement in 1987, my work on

software using AES-256 encryption with BouncyCastle that I used in

the software product I conceived and designed using 256-bit key length

(import then into India of any equipment/software with AES key length

greater than 64 bit was criminally punishable export of munitions by

the US Government) 12 This exposure enabled me to get a position as

12

“The US Government had long regarded crypto software as a munition, and

thus subject to arms trafficking export controls! At that time, the boundary

between permitted (“low-strength”) cryptography and impermissible (“highstrength”)

cryptography placed PGP well on the too-strong-to-export side

(this boundary has since been relaxed). The Arms Export Control Act of 1976

(Title II of Pub.L. 94–329, 90 Stat. 729, enacted June 30, 1976, codified at 22

U.S.C. ch. 39: See Link: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/

22/chapter-39) gives the President of the United States the authority to

control the import and export of defense articles and defense services. The

H.R. 13680 legislation was passed by the 94th Congressional session and

enacted into law by the 38th President of the United States Gerald R. Ford

on June 30, 1976: See Link: https://www.secret-bases.co.uk/wiki/

Arms_Export_Control_Act



a Software Security Architect in a leading financial services software

company in the USA where I worked till I retired and returned to India.

As an aside, I want to narrate this story as an anecdote for the “cryptic

humor” in it: I did take the AES-256 encryption software with publicprivate

key pair to RAW 13 and Army Headquarters and the Major General

Signal Staff at Army Headquarters expressed his apprehension that

he was unwilling/concerned to accept the risk of using a public key for encryption/decryption

software because of the paranoia we in the Corps of

Signals always had for anything that is “public” in signals/communication

matters. I chuckled with glee in my mischievous eyes that he could, alternatively,

keep the public key secret from “the public” too!

SIGINT Today

“The global Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) market is

expected to grow from USD 12.8 billion in 2018 to USD

15.6 billion by 2023, at a Compound Annual Growth

Rate (CAGR) of 4.1% during the forecast period. The

major market growth factors include increasing

terrorism, the growing defense budget of major countries

across the globe, and the modernization or replacement

of an aging defense system. However, the high cost

involved in the SIGINT system deployment could

restrain the market growth.” 14

13

Thanks to my erstwhile colleagues and friends, Maj General VK Singh and

Brig Ujjal Dasgupta, both of Corps of Signals serving in RAW that time.

14

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Market by Type (Electronic Intelligence

(Elint) and Communications Intelligence (Comint)), Application (Airborne,

Naval, Ground (Vehicle-Mounted, Soldiers, & Base Station), Space, & Cyber),

and Region - Global Forecast to 2023 See this link: https://www.sdki.

jp/reports/signals-intelligence-sigint-market/106540, last

visited 4 March 2021




Chapter 31: 1971 NAVAL OPERATIONS: ACTION IN THE ARABIAN SEA BY

WESTERN FLEET by SS Sethi

31. 1971 NAVAL OPERATIONS: ACTION

IN THE ARABIAN SEA BY WESTERN

FLEET by SS Sethi

1

Never since antiquity, in the history of mankind, a new nation

was born resulting from a war between two nations. The jointmanship

of the three brave Armed Forces of India together with Mukti-

Bahini had written a Chapter of Glory and Valour, to be remembered in

footprints of time for the future generations. The attack on Karachi (OP

Trident and Python) on the Western Seaboard, the attack on Dacca, Chittagong,

Khulna, Cox Bazar, and Mongla by the Seahawks from Vikrant,

the stealth attack by the daredevils of Mukti-bahini trained for Operation

X by Indian Navy in Plassey, the joint attack by the valiant Indian Air

Force’s precision bombing and the charged up Army advancing through

the Padma and Meghna fronts and the Bangladesh terrain, closing in

from all directions into Dhaka. . . resulted in the surrender of the 95,000

Pakistani armed force personnel, 49 years ago. . . resulted in the birth of a

new Nation. . . “B-A-N-G-L-A-D-E-S-H”. A great day for the tri-services

of India

1

Captain S S Sethi is an alumnus of the National Defence Academy (28th

course) and a postgraduate in military studies from Defence Services Staff

College, Wellington. He has had a remarkable career in the Indian Navy,

most of which was spent at sea on various warships—he has commanded

INS Prabal and INS Ranjit and was the commissioning captain of C G S

Vijaya. He has also commanded Navigation and Direction School in Kochi.

After retirement, he has held senior positions in various shipping and offshore

companies.

311



Figure 97: The Chandigarh Tribune Monday, 06 Dec 1971

Even as the two Nations rejoice the Golden Jubilee of the momentous

grand event of 1971, the alumnus of NDA – 28th Course have come

together to reset together the pieces of the jigsaw, fragmented by Time,

to bring back the events that were the substantial contributor to the

War’s outcome. I also, having been a member of the prestigious Western

Fleet of the Navy, have put together the memoirs, to reconstruct the

actions in the Arabian Sea by the Western Fleet.

In retrospect, the Western Fleet had demonstrated total dominance

in the Arabian Sea in Sea Control and Sea Denial. The Western Fleet

had ensured total sea control for the Indian Navy and total Sea Denial

to the Pakistan Navy.

The Western Fleet had accomplished its stated directives;

1. Seek and Destroy. The Pakistan ships patrolling off the Karachi

harbour were engaged and sunk.

2. Attack and Cripple Karachi Port. The Karachi port was attacked

and port operations got suspended to a large extent. The fire in the oil

farms in Karachi kept burning for days.

3. Total Blockade. The operations by Western Fleet ensured total

blockade of tankers from the Gulf and any other ships entering Pakistan

ports.




NAVAL SCENARIO BEFORE 1971 AND FORMATION OF EAST-

ERN FLEET

Indian Navy had only one Fleet till 1971. All operational frontline

ships were part of the Indian Fleet, under the command of Flag Officer

Indian Fleet with its headquarters in Mumbai. In May 1971, the Fleet was

divided into the Western Fleet based in Mumbai and the new Eastern

Fleet based at Visakhapatnam.

In June 1971, the Aircraft Carrier of the Indian Navy, INS Vikrant

along with two escorts INS Brahmaputra and INS Beas were transferred

to the Eastern Fleet for deployment in the Bay of Bengal.

This was a good move as Vikrant played a pivotal role in the operations

in East Pakistan.

The Eastern Fleet with Vikrant was able to enforce a total blockade

in the ports of East Pakistan and thwart the escape of Pakistan forces

from the sea. Also, the aircraft from Vikrant inflicted heavy damage

to Chittagong and various ports in East Pakistan and ensured an early

surrender of Pakistan’s forces.

MY PERSONAL EXPERIENCE AS PART OF THE

WESTERN FLEET DURING THE WAR

I was the Navigating Officer of INS Betwa, part of the Western Fleet,

Navigating the Front-line Ship. I was fortunate to have been posted on

Betwa at the appropriate time.

I was undergoing the Long Navigation and Direction Specialisation

course in Cochin in 1971. The course was abruptly terminated in mid-

October and I was posted as the ND officer of INS Betwa.




Departure of Western Fleet from Mumbai

The Western Fleet sailed out from Mumbai on Thursday, 02 Dec. I am

emphasizing the day as Thursday, since my engagement was fixed for

Sunday, the 05 Dec. This is a separate story and will be related later.

However, the engagement ceremony was solemnized on 05 Dec, in my

absentia.

When we sailed out from Mumbai, we were 13 Ships with INS

Mysore, the Cruiser, as the Flag Ship under the Command of Capt RKS

Gandhi and with the Fleet Commander, Rear Admiral EC Kuruvilla embarked

with his staff on board. My Commanding Officer INS Betwa was

Cdr RK Choudhry, from the 1st course NDA.

The other twelve Ships were;

1. INS Trishul and Talwar of the 15th Frigate Squadron

2. INS Betwa of the 16th Frigate Squadron

3. INS Khukri, Kuthar, and Kirpan from the 14th Frigate Squadron

4. INS Ranjit from 11th Destroyer Squadron

5. INS Kadmatt from Petya Squadron

6.INS Deepak, the Auxiliary Tanker

7. INS Sagardeep, the Auxiliary Supply Vessel

8. INS Vinash and Vijeta, the two Missile Boats undertow

The Second Group The second group of 6 ships, consisting of two

Petya class ships INS Kiltan and Katchal along with four missile boats

had sailed out to the Kathiawar coast and positioned off Okha. The ships

from this formation, took part in Operation Trident, the first attack on

Karachi on the night of 04/05 Dec. This will be discussed in detail under

Operation Trident.

Arabian Sea Experience

The entire Scenario of the happenings in the Arabian Sea have been

scripted in the under-mentioned headings:

1. Incidents on 03 Dec.

2. Operation Trident - Attack on Karachi.




3. Operation Python - Second Attack on Karachi.

4. Attack on Makran Coast.

5. Sinking of INS Khukri.

6. Fleet Manoeuvers from 09 -16 Dec.

7. Two personal experiences.

Incidents On 03 December

AM 03 December

The Fleet on sailing out from Mumbai on 02 Dec had set the course

straight for Karachi. During the forenoon of 03 Dec, a submarine contact

was obtained. The Fleet took an evasive turn and our ship Betwa along

with INS Trishul was told to investigate the contact with our Sonars.

Trishul and Betwa formed the Anti-Submarine Warfare formation and

the contact on the sonar was established intermittently. After about two

hours, both ships were signaled to disengage and rejoin the Fleet. I

believed that this was a confirmed Pakistan submarine.

PM 03 December Our Ship Betwa was designated as Air Picket

Ship, to search and report all air contacts. The Ship was fitted with

LR-960 Search Radar, with proven aircraft detection capability. In the

late afternoon, Betwa picked up an aircraft on LR-960. After tracking, it

was estimated to be a Pakistani reconnaissance aircraft, shadowing the

fleet, but at the same time remained outside our gun range. The Fleet

Commander was informed accordingly.

Splitting of Fleet in Groups

At dusk on 03 Dec, we received the signal of hostilities breaking out with

Pakistan. The Fleet Cdr appreciated that the shadowing Pakistan aircraft

would compromise our position. A very smart manoeuver was executed

by splitting the fleet and altering course Southwards. At this time, we

were 200 miles south of Karachi. This confused the tracking aircraft, and

after some time we lost it on our Radar screen.

Tactical Advantage




The smart manoeuver by the Fleet Cdr to split the force and alter

course southwards helped the fleet tremendously in the rest of the operation,

as the air reconnaissance effort by Pakistan failed to detect the

Western Fleet thereafter. This was a huge tactical gain by the Western

Fleet. However, the only disadvantage accrued was that the Fleet had

moved too far South of Karachi to launch the attack on the Naval base

on the very night of breaking out of hostilities with Pakistan.

Fleet Operations on 04 December

The Fleet regrouped on 04 Dec after evading the Pakistan reconnaissance

aircraft. It was important to keep the ships topped up with

Fuel and the tanker INS Deepak kept fueling the ships one after another.

All this while, the Fleet was moving at high speed to avoid any lurking

submarines.

During the afternoon of 04 Dec, INS Kuthar had a major fire in its

Engine room, incapacitating the ship. The Fleet Commander decided to

detach the three Anti-Submarine Squadron Ships - Khukri, Kirpan, and

Kuthar back to Mumbai. Also, Missile boat Vijeta, which had developed

machinery defects was sent back escorted by the Auxiliary Supply Ship

‘Sagar Deep’.

The Anti-Submarine Squadron having departed, the remaining Six

Gun-ships, Mysore, Trishul, Talwar, Betwa, Ranjit, and Kadmatt along

with Missile boat Vinash and the tanker Deepak became a formidable

surface Strike Force capable of engaging Pakistani Naval Ships and shore

bombardment and inflicting heavy damage to the enemy.

OPERATION TRIDENT - Attack on Karachi 04/05 Dec

The First strike group on Karachi, for the Operation code-named ‘Trident’,

assembled and rendezvoused off Okha in Gujarat on the afternoon

of 04 December. The group consisted of two Petya class ships, Kiltan

and Katchal as escorts, with three OSA-M Missile boats Nirghat, Nipat

and Veer loaded with four Styx missiles each.

As shown on the chart, the force set course towards Karachi on PM

04 Dec, and at 1800 hrs was at a distance of 150 miles from Karachi.




Around 2200 hrs, when the task force was about 70 miles from

Karachi, they detected two targets on their Radars. The Missile Boats

closed in and took up positions to engage the targets. The result of this

daring attack on Karachi was as follows;

1. Pakistan Navy destroyer, PNS Khyber was patrolling outside Karachi

harbour. The Missile fired by INS Nirghat hit the main engine room of

Khyber, and the ship got engulfed in fire. The next Missile fired by INS

Nirghat was again a direct hit, and within minutes the ship sank, with

more than 200 crew on board. The Captain and the staff failed to appreciate,

what had happened. They had earlier radioed that they were

under air attack, mistaking the Missile attack as an Air attack.

2. The Missile fired by INS Veer, hit the Pakistan Navy Ship, PNS

Muhafiz. This was a Minesweeper and she sank immediately.

3. INS Nipat engaged a ship underway close to the Karachi port.

The first Missile hit the ship resulting in a big explosion. The second

Missile hit resulted in the ship breaking in two and sinking. This was

MV Venus Challenger, a merchant ship carrying a full load of American

ammunition for the Pakistan Navy and Air Force.

4. INS Nipat fired a missile at the Shore establishments in Karachi.

5. The Force R/V ’ed after the attack and departed for Mumbai. This

Taskforce was able to return to Mumbai after sinking three ships outside

the Karachi harbour, without suffering any casualties. This attack had a

substantial effect on the overall outcome of the war.

Jubilation in the Western Fleet (05 Dec)

The news of the attack on Karachi by the Missile Group reached

us on the night of 04/05 Dec after operation Trident was executed. We

on Betwa were enthralled on getting the news and the spirits on board

went skyrocketing, with the determination to fight the war boldly and

with resolute.

Tactical Picture In The Ops Room Of Betwa

In INS Betwa, the Operations Room and the Communication room

are next to each other. The teams in the communication room were

decrypting all the messages, concerning the operations in the Arabian




Sea, and forwarding a copy to the Ops Room. In the operations room,

we had the General Operations Plot, where the movements of all the

units in the Arabian Sea were getting plotted and updated. Thus, our

ship had an up-to-date real-time operational tactical picture at all times.

OPERATION PYTHON - Second Attack on Karachi on 08/09 Night

The Fleet was manoeuvered on 06 and 07 December and kept fully

fuelled up and ready to attack the Pakistan coast, when suitable.

The opportunity came on 08/09 night. The Fleet was split into three

groups on the forenoon of 08 December. At this time, the Fleet was about

250 miles South West of Karachi and 200 miles South of the Makran

Coast. The plan was to carry out a two-pronged attack on Karachi and

Makran coast around midnight by splitting the Force, and thereafter

again rendezvous in a position 350 miles South West of Karachi by PM

09 December (as indicated on the chart).

The Three Groups

The three groups were formed as follows;

1. INS Trishul and Talwar along with Missile boat INS Vinash, took

departure for the attack on Karachi.

2. The Flag Ship INS Mysore along with Ranjit and our Ship Betwa,

took departure for the Makran Coast to attack Gwadar and Jiwani.

3. The Tanker, INS Deepak along with consort ship INS Kadmatt,

sailed towards the African coast with orders to return to Rendezvous the

Fleet PM the next day, 09 December.

Attack on Karachi

The attack task force consisting of INS Trishul, Talwar, and Vinash set

course for Karachi, to be in the firing position before midnight. Around

2300 hrs, the task force arrived off Karachi and detected a group of ships

outside the harbour.

The Missile boat, INS Vinash, took up position off Karachi and fired

all the four missiles, which scored the following hits; 1. The first Missile




struck the oil tanks on the shoreline of Karachi and started a huge fire.

2. The second Missile hit a ship in harbour. This was later identified

as the British merchant ship MV Hamilton.

3.The third Missile hit another Ship in the harbour and it sank in a

few minutes. This was later identified as Panama Vessel, MV Gulf Star.

4. The fourth Missile hit the Pakistan Navy Tanker, PNS Dacca. This

ship got severely damaged.

The task force thereafter reassembled and headed back to rendezvous

the Fleet in the predetermined position the next day. A few minutes after

this attack, the Indian Air Force attacked the Karachi Airfield and the

Port installations. The blazing Oil tanks were easy to home on, and the

additional bombing by the IAF aircraft, kept the fires burning in Karachi

for many days.

ATTACK ON MAKRAN COAST

When the Trishul group headed for Karachi, the second group consisting

of INS Mysore, Betwa, and Ranjit proceeded towards the Pakistan

Makran coast. INS Betwa was ordered to bombard Gwadar, whereas

INS Mysore and Ranjit proceeded towards Jiwani.

When the task force was about 70 miles from the target, a merchant

ship was sighted. This was identified as the Pakistani merchant ship MV

Madhumati. A little later, a Radio transmission by Madhumati to Karachi

was intercepted by us.

The Fleet Cdr felt that the position of the task force had been compromised,

and aborted the attack on the Makran coast. The boarding

party from our Ship was sent on Madhumati and the ship was captured.

This task group, thereafter withdrew with the prize catch of Pakistani

Ship Madhumati, to rejoin the INS Trishul group returning after the

successful OPERATION PYTHON.

There was total jubilation in the Indian Navy after operation Python -

the second attack on Karachi on the night of 08/09 December. However, it

is learned that the situation in the Pakistan Navy was extremely different.

The Warships were not only asked to take shelter in the inner Karachi




Port but also de-ammunition the Ships, to avoid catastrophic damage in

case of subsequent Missile attacks by the Indian Navy.

Fleet Operations on 09 and 10 Dec.

The INS Trishul group after attacking Karachi, the INS Mysore group

after capturing Pakistani ship Madhumati from the Makran coast, and

the third INS Deepak tanker group, regrouped on the evening of 09 Dec.

There was overall jubilation in all the Ships for completing the missions

successfully.

Since all the missiles had been expended, the Fleet Cdr felt prudent

for the ships to return to Mumbai, carry out emergency machinery repairs,

pick up loaded Missiles boats, and redeploy for operations thereafter.

Thus a Southwesterly course towards Bombay was ordered.

SINKING OF INS KHUKRI - 09/10 NIGHT

The Anti-Submarine squadron consisting of INS Khukri, Kuthar, and

Kirpan had sailed with us on 02 December. At sea on 04 Dec, INS

Kuthar had a boiler explosion. The ship was required to be towed back

to Mumbai harbour. The Fleet Commander decided to send the Anti-

Submarine Squadron back to Bombay. These three ships returned to

Port on 06 December.

The Electronic Warfare intercepts had reported a submarine off the

Gujarat coast, near Diu Head. The FOC-in-C West decided to sail out

INS Khukri and Kirpan to neutralise this submarine threat.

These two ships sailed out on 08 December and set up an antisubmarine

patrol off the Diu head in Gujarat. At about 2049 hrs on

09 Dec, while on the anti-submarine patrol, INS Khukri was hit by a

torpedo. We first intercepted an Emergency signal from INS Kirpan

about an explosion on Khukri. A few minutes later, a Flash signal was

received from Kirpan, stating that the radar contact of Khukri was lost.

After being hit by the torpedoes, Khukri sank in a few minutes, taking

down with her 18 Officers and 175 men, including the Commanding




Officer, Capt MN Mulla. It has been reported that Capt Mulla, could

have saved himself, but decided to go down with the ship, following true

naval traditions.

FLEET MANOEUVERS - 09 TO 16 Dec

During the return passage to Mumbai, the following facts were evident,

and counter-measures catered for;

Surface Threat:

There was a minimal threat from the Pakistan Fleet. Their deployment

in the Arabian Sea away from the coastline was unlikely.

Air Threat:

Though the Air threat was still feasible, the non-detection of our

Fleet, by the Pakistani reconnaissance aircraft, had gone entirely in our

favour. Also, the Fleet was now transiting more than 300 miles from

Karachi. The likelihood of Pakistan Air Force aircraft, venturing out at

sea was extremely remote.

Submarine Threat:

The biggest threat to the returning Fleet was from the Pakistani

submarines. They would certainly be deployed off the approaches to

Mumbai harbour. On receiving the acoustic warning, they could position

themselves to attack the returning fleet.

Given the above assessment, the Fleet Commander decided to continue

to proceed in the South Easterly direction. In the forenoon of 11

Dec, we had reached 250 miles west of Goa. At this time, the course was

altered eastwards, towards the Indian Coast. The overall speed of the

Fleet had reduced due to the slow speed of the captured Pakistani ship,

Madhumati.

On PM 12 Dec, the course of the Fleet was altered in a North Easterly

direction to make a landfall at Jaigarh. The shallow water continental

shelf from Mumbai, extends for nearly 140 miles to the south, till Jaigarh.

Thereafter the depths drop quite steeply.

It was appreciated by the Fleet Commander, that once the Fleet

starts transiting through shallow waters, it would not be possible for the




Pakistan submarines to close in to attack the returning fleet. We made

landfall at Jaigarh around midnight on 12 Dec and thereafter proceeded

in line astern formation, hugging the coastline. These waters were too

shallow for the submarine to operate. Also, we had used the surprise

element to make landfall well to the south of Mumbai. This ruse by

the Fleet Commander paid off and all the ships, including the captured

Pakistani ship Madhumati, entered the Bombay harbour safely on 13

December.

The Pakistan Army in the East surrendered on 16 December and the

hostilities were terminated with the ceasefire being announced. Thereafter,

we entered the Bombay Naval Dockyard, to a rousing reception

by the Headquarters Western Naval command. I continued to serve

onboard INS Betwa, till my specialisation course was resumed in Jan

1972.

PARTY ONBOARD

On the day of the ceasefire, my department sailors organised a small

tea party. There was overall jubilation on board and on being invited,

I readily agreed to join the tea party. However, I was totally surprised

when my Navigator Yeoman read out my total sleep in 12 days from

02 December to 13 December. He was recording all the winks taken by

me on the Camp cot in the Ops room, my sleeping and resting place.

The total sleep recorded in 12 days averaged less than 3 hours per day.

It was indeed a very touching gesture from my men and nostalgic till to

date.




Engagement Ceremony in Bombay on 05 December

I desired to get married to my fiancée only on completion of my specialisation

course and had conveyed this decision to my family accordingly.

However, since the course had been interrupted and both the families

were in Bombay, they insisted we should go ahead with the engagement

and ring ceremony. Thus the date was fixed on Sunday, 05 Dec.

Before the Ship sailing on 02 December, I called up my father and

informed him regarding our sailing orders. He was instructed to keep

this information confidential and cancel the ceremony, if I do not return

on 04 Dec. When the hostilities broke out on Friday 03 Dec, my father

realised that I would not be returning for some time. He, therefore, broke

the news of my ships sailing to my Father in law. My father-in-law was

not at all perturbed and felt that the ceremony should be solemnised and

not get canceled. A large number of guests had been invited from both

sides.

It was extremely gutsy on the part of both the families, to go ahead

with the ceremonies, celebrations, and entertainment of guests. A small

formal engagement took place at end of December, for both of us to

exchange engagement rings.




Figure 98: WESTERN FLEET TRACK CHART




Figure 99: OPERATION TRIDENT




Figure 100: OPERATION TRIDENT




Figure 101: OPERATION PYTHON TRACK CHART







IV. Epilogue

329

Chapter 32: Capt RN Gupta,Vr.C by Mohinder Nath Mahajan

32. Capt RN Gupta,Vr.C by Mohinder Nath

Mahajan

1

Capt Ravinder Nath Gupta was born in Varanasi on 20 Dec 1945.

He did Senior Cambridge from Oak Groves School Mussoorie in

1960, where his mother was the Principal. He did his Inter Science

from Ewing Christian College Allahabad in 1962 and soon thereafter

joined 28th NDA Course, Fox Squadron at National Defence Academy

Khadakvasla in July 1962, where I had also joined a few days earlier. His

Father (Late) Shri JW Gupta was an Officer with Indian Railways. He

had two younger brothers, Virender who joined Indian Navy (through

NDA) is settled in USA and the youngest joined IMA (Indian Military

Academy Dehradun) but unfortunately died in a swimming accident.

RN (as he was affectionately called) was very good both in Academics

and Sports, had a dashing personality and used to stand out among

Cadets. It was only after our stay together for about two years, we learnt

that he was Christian as the name and conduct gave no such indication.

Also in those days, we never gave a thought to caste or religion.

Capt RN Gupta was commissioned into the Madras Sappers on 15

June 1966. During his formative years, after the YOs (Young Officers)

Course at CME

1

Brig Mohinder Nath Mahajan, Veteran, (IC16825) mailto:mnmahajan@

yahoo.com

331


Figure 102: Citation Capt RN Gupta VrC



Figure 103: RN at 27-C DEGREE, CME PUNE



27-C Degree at College of Military Engineering (CME), Pune

CME (College Of Military Engineering) Pune, he served with 9 Engineer

Regiment in NEFA (now Arunachal Pradesh) as a Platoon Commander

(Second Lieutenant), did his Degree Engineering Course from CME and

joined 9 Engineer Regiment again as Captain at Lucknow in January

1971. I was also commissioned into Madras Sappers and so we were

together during the YOs and Degree Engineering Course. I joined 201

Engineer Regiment at Allahabad in Jan 1971 and both “The Nine” and

“Two Not One” Engr Regts were part of the same Formation ie 416

Engineer Brigade located in Lucknow.

While 9 Engr Regt moved for operations from Lucknow and was

allotted to 54 Infantry Division, I as part of 201 Engr Regt moved from

Allahabad and continued to be part of 416 Engr Bde. I met RN last in

Oct 1971 in Meerut during Road Move from our respective locations to

Punjab.

During Indo- Pak War 1971, Capt RN Gupta was one of the Subtask

Force Commanders for breaching of a minefield in the Basantar

Area, part of Western Sector. The success of operation depended upon

the completion of Vehicle Safe Lanes through enemy minefield so that

an Armoured Regiment could be inducted in the area before enemy

launched a Counter attack. The area was continuously under enemy

Artillery and Mortar fire and information regarding the depth of the

enemy minefield was not available. Considering the shortage of time,

Cap RN Gupta volunteered to lead a small party on foot on a wide

outflanking move to ascertain the far edge of the minefield. With this

move, the party was able to get the final information within an hour.

Subsequently, when enemy attacked, Capt RN Gupta personally guided

our Tanks through the cleared minefield with complete disregard to his

safety. Later while engaged in maintenance of the Safe Lane, he was hit

by an enemy artillery shell resulting in his death on 17 Dec 1971.

In this action, Capt RN Gupta (IC 16871) displayed courage, devotion

to duty beyond words, gallantry, determination and leadership of a high

order and was awarded ‘Vir Chakra’ (Posthumous).



As per the then prevalent system, he was buried at Christian Cemetery

in Jammu with full military honours. Passing away of a course-mate

was sad for all of us but the consolation was that he died defending the

borders of our country. I have had discussions with Lt Gen BT Pandit,

PVSM, Vr C (who retired as Adjutant General of Indian Army) the then

CO of Capt RN Gupta, who described RN as a dashing knowledgeable

Sapper officer, a ‘Leader of Men’ who was always willing to take on

challenges.

Col Vivek Mundkur, our Course-mate and Madras Sapper was posted

in Jammu in 1988. He visited the Garrison Cemetery Jammu and found

that the grave was in a state of dis-repair and in a bad shape. He got

the grave renovated with the help of Brig Sukhdev Singh who was commanding

an Engr Regt in Nagrota.

Planning for the Golden Jubilee Celebrations (GJC) of commissioning

of Course in June 2016 commenced around March 2016. I hit upon the

idea of renovating the grave of Capt RN Gupta through his Regt. I decided

that I will announce the execution of work carried out as a surprise to

the Course during the GJC.

I requested Maj Gen Surinder Sharma, Veteran, ex CO 9 Engr Regt

who had served with me in 201 Engr Regt and was later my student in

DSSC Wellington. He got the things moving but 9 Engr Regt was located

thousands of Kilometres away. Finally the Grave was nicely done up in

March 2017 and I informed my course mates (28 NDA, 37 IMA and 21

Tech) accordingly which was a pleasant surprise for all of them. Regular

contact was also maintained with Mr Virender Gupta, younger brother of

RN, the only living family member, who is settled in USA. He informed

me that Citation and Vir Chakra of Capt RN Gupta were presented to

Madras Engineer Group and Centre Bangalore.



Citation of Capt R N Gupta VrC

On the night of Dec 17, Capt

Ravinder Nath Gupta volunteered

for the task of conducting a recce along

the wide frontage of the enemy

minefield across river Basantar.

Despite the grave risk involved and

very intense enemy fire he and his

party brought back vital data which

enabled 17 Horse to be inducted into the

bridgehead well in time to take on the

enemy’s counter attacks and eventually

led to the destruction of his armoured

formation west of river Basantar.

Determinedly working on improving

the crossing, Capt Gupta was among

those killed on Dec 17, by enemy fire.

For his exemplary courage, he was

posthumously decorated with the Vir

Chakra.



Figure 104: Gazette Notification OP catus Lilly

I am grateful to 9 Engr Regt for the excellent renovation work executed

very well both technically in granite and aesthetically. Photographs

of Capt RN Gupta and the Grave are attached.

9 Engr Regt celebrates ”Basantar Day” as Regiment Day on 15 Dec

every year. One regimental Officer with a small team ensures cleanliness

of the Grave area and pays homage on that day. Mr Virender Gupta and

all of us feel satisfied and happy that memory of our course-mate, Capt

RN Gupta is kept alive.



Figure 105: Capt RN Gupta VrC Posthumous



Figure 106: Mr JW Gupta (RN’s Father) at Regimental Ceremony - 9

Engr Regt



Figure 107: Lt Gen BT Pandit at the War Memorial saluting the plaque

of IC 16871 Capt R N Gupta, VrC, 9 Engr Regt



Figure 108: Maj Reen (9-ER) Lays Wreath - 15 Dec 2020



Figure 109: Renovated Grave: Capt RN Gupta VrC (Posthumous)


Chapter 33: Capt GGK Panicker by Pradeep Sharma

33. Capt GGK Panicker by Pradeep Sharma

1

History and recording it is absolutely vital. Especially during a

war

The validity of the above precept could not be better proven than by

recounting the story of our Course Mate Capt. GGK Panicker, a Bengal

Sapper. Panicker joined 37 IMA in June 1965, after completing his pre-

IMA qualification as part of the 7 OTU course. Panicker, as he was

usually called, and I, did the 38 YOs course at CME Poona in 1967-68.

We reported back to CME for the Degree course and were part of 27-C

Engineer Officers Degree Course between 3 Jan 68 and 2 Jan 71. For

several months during the course, we were also roommates at CME.

Panicker got married to Padmini in 1969 while undergoing the Degree

Course. Their son Prasanth was born on 16 July 1970. The family

was last together in July 1971 in Alleppey (now Alappuzha) Kerala, when

Panicker went on leave from 74 Independent Field Company where he

had been posted after the Degree Course. It was only early in January

1972 that we got the very tragic and sad news of Panicker having become

a War Casualty on 17 Dec 1971 in Kargil . His wife, with a 18 month

old son, was unable to even be present for the last rites.

There is absolutely nothing available as history of or in 74 Fd Coy

or in Bengal Sappers HQ & Centre Roorkee to record how this brave

officer passed.

Prasanth (his son) later joined NDA (Golf Sqn) and was commissioned

into the Indian Navy in 1991. While leading a mountain biking

expedition of the Navy, Prasanth managed to locate a memorial to Pan-

1

Author thumb sketch here

343


icker and two other Sappers who were martyred in a minefield clearing

operation. The memorial was located within ASC Battalion (B Coy) supporting

121 Infantry Brigade, at the time .

Pieced together with excruciating delay, and tinged with both pride

and grief, the apparent sequence of events – in Prasanth’s words is:

“On 17 December 1971 during demining operations after the ceasefire

(according to the accounts that I heard from various persons including

family members and my mother), my Father undertook to rescue two

Jawans trapped in a minefield. In the absence of the officer designated

for this task, he volunteered to do this urgent rescue. During this action,

one of the trapped Sappers stepped on a mine which exploded . My

father suffered grievous shrapnel injuries. He refused evacuation until

after the two soldiers who were part of the mine clearing team were first

evacuated for treatment. He died shortly thereafter, and an eyewitness

reported to my Mum that he went down gallantly with a smile on his

face. The watch he was wearing on his wrist got punctured with holes

and debris and stopped at 1530 hrs (time of the explosion) is with us in

Thrissur.

We had limited and occasional contact from Bengal Sappers following

his valiant death for the next couple of years before things went silent.

Contact was maintained with us by a couple of his friends/ coursemates

through visits and letters all this while. Sometime in the late 90s, late

Col. Ramachandran (Signals) who was my Dad’s good friend managed

to find his memorial in Kargil travelling at great personal risk of getting

shelled by the Pakistani Army, and sent us some photographs. Thus we

knew that there was a small monument dedicated in my Dad’s name.

Col. Ramachandran maintained constant contact with us till his untimely

death in 2007. In June 2008, I managed to locate the same memorial

(which also named 2 other Jawans of his unit) in the unit lines of B Coy

in the ASC Battalion supporting 121 Inf Bde in Kargil. I offered to pay

for maintenance of his memorial to the Brigade Commander. The latter

was kind enough to tell me not to worry and that that he will ensure it

from his end.”



It is indeed tragic and sad that a son managed to locate some detail

of his father who died a martyr to the nation after some 37 years. All

because we do not bother to record history as it happens. There is no

effort to post history as known to some on the internet for posterity. The

media (mainly the print media in the previous millennium) was never

present or embedded with units in the field.

Lessons are seldom or never learned and those who gave their lives

for the nation go unsung, unrecorded and unremembered.

We are fortunately now in an age of ever present and proliferating

smart phones where photographs are instantly taken and can be electronically

sent in minutes. Hopefully, this lack of history and an authentic

and useful record will become a thing of the past

May your soul rest in eternal peace, dear Panicker.

An article titled “Memories of my Father” written specially and

poignantly by Prasanth for this chapter is below. Thanks Prasanth for

putting this together for Panicker’s course mates from IMA, CME and

the Bengal Sappers.

Memories of my Father

The most impactful memories of my father obviously are related to the

childhood conversations I used to have with my mother and my grandma

(father’s mum) in the 1970s. My mother, Padmini and my grandmother,

Gauri, though addressed as Amma and Ammooma, were two affectionate

and nurturing ladies. But both were definitely very strong women in

their own right. Naturally, the nature of conversations were remarkably

different, both in context and content. My mother felt that I was not a

patch on her husband’s, my father’s, remarkable personality. I understand

that comparisons are inevitable when you have deep boots to step into

which further adds to the enigma that my Dad is for me. My grandmother

shared more mellowed versions of an ideal son whom she sadly lost at

a tragically young age. Lovingly remembered and missed, yet deeply



grieved for in her own private vulnerable moments.

Human feelings have a humbling characteristic to them. Even more

so when directly related to someone whose towering personality loomed

far beyond that of an average person. My acknowledgement increases

multifold when meeting people who had personally known and were

close to Capt GGK Panicker, my Dad. These persons considered him not

just a great friend but also retain those special fond and unforgettable

memories of good times they shared in person with Dad. These are

ordinary folks and brilliant people alike, ranging from his childhood

friends and villagers in the remote backwaters of Alappuzha to highly

accomplished individuals whom he came across in the latter part of his

life, tragically cut short by the 1971 war.

I will attempt to narrate the factors that helped me shape my views

of a father I have not met or seen for almost five decades. Through

meeting and hearing about him from people (besides from my mother

and grandma), I gained an insight into a remarkable human being whom

I would have called my Dad, who I never saw except as a one year

old. My childhood is filled with anecdotes from his younger brother,

Ashok with whom he shared a very close bond. My uncle never really

recovered from the shock of the death of his closest brother and best

friend. Also, my aunt (though not by relation), Late Dr. Vimala Aravind

(ex AFMC) carried very fond memories of my Dad as being an elder

brother never born to her parents. Very demonstrative in her affections

to me as her ‘only’ nephew or sometimes ‘son’, she and her late husband,

Col Aravindakshan (EME) always made it a point to make me stay with

her for holidays in all the stations that she and Aravind Uncle were posted

to. Blessed be they who have now crossed over the ‘Moksha Dwar’ to

merge with the infinite divinity!

Gopi, as my Dad was known to his family and childhood friends

was born as the second son to Shri. Parameshwaran Namboodiri and

Smt. Gauri Kutty Kunjamma on 16 June 1946. As is common within

matriarchal Nair families of Kerala, his identity follows from his mother’s

side, the illustrious Mathoor family renowned for their military valour



and commandership of the three main kingdoms of Kerala and smaller

royal families. The men born to this family were given the title ‘Panicker’

and the women bore the title ‘Kunjamma’. It may therefore be a surprise

to many that ‘Panicker’ was my father’s ‘royal military title’ than his

surname. Hence, chivalry and valour were ingrained in to him as a

young child while growing up amongst the enchanting backwaters and

luscious paddy fields of pristine and naturally resplendent Kuttanad in

Alappuzha district.

After schooling in his village, Gopi was keen to join the Army keeping

up with family traditions. However, his young age (due to attaining a

double promotion in school) precluded him from applying for the NDA

and he then joined the famous University College in Thiruvananthapuram

studying for his BSc degree. His college mates (one of them who

later became my English Teacher in Sainik School) remember him as a

very keen Hockey player and also the brightest NCC cadet in the college.

A very active sportsperson, my Dad was a State player for Kerala in both

Hockey and Football teams. During these days, strong bonds and camaraderie

were forged amongst his friends over endless cups of addictive

steaming coffee from the famous Indian Coffee House near the college

campus; a trait which later became his hallmark during his CME days

as well, in the Pune Camp area.

Dad was selected to lead the Kerala Men’s contingent in the Republic

Parade in Delhi when he serendipitously first met my mother Padmini,

who was leading the Kerala Women’s contingent. Later, Dad was successful

in getting selected to train as an Army officer through the OTU.

After a brief stint with his unit and the YOs course, he was transferred

to undergo his degree course in CME. Mum was at that time studying

in Mumbai while undergoing selection to Air India. Events took its natural

course in due time and my parents who were corresponding long

distance till then decided to get married in 1969.

I was born on 16 July 1970 when my parents were in CME and was

happily surprised to see our ‘quarters’ when Mum and I visited CME in

1996. My mother recollects very happy times in CME, hosting endless



parties and going on frequent rides on their Jawa 250 CC motorcycle

(MHU 866), which I continue to own (as KLH 2701). I rode this motorbike

with pride till 2007 after which I decided to retire the old warhorse and

preserve it in our home at Thrissur. Brig. Kiran Krishan would certainly

recall seeing this bike when he visited and stayed with us on three

occasions of which I have extremely fond memories as a child and

later as a young naval officer. I was also fortunate to visit them later

at Chandimandir in 1996 for his daughter Sameer’s wedding, proudly

standing in as one of her ‘brothers’. It’s quite possible that Col. CPC Nath

may also recollect seeing the gleaming Jawa when he visited us when I

was a small boy.

Coming back, I understand that my Dad lost a term in CME and had

to pass out with the 28th course rather than with his original batchmates

in the 27th course. Subsequently, he was posted to Ambala with a field

tenure looming as war clouds gathered. Hence, the family decided to

relocate to his home in Alappuzha. The last time we were all together

was in Alappuzha in July 1971. My Dad left to join his unit a week after

my first birthday. He went to Ambala and thereafter the unit moved to

Kargil in the western front.

The Indo Pak war of 1971 proved to be a turning point in our lives

when we received a telegram informing about his valorous demise in

action followed by the arrival of his ashes in an urn and personal belongings

in a trunk delivered to his ancestral house by two Jawans. Though

devastated, my Mum was brave enough to confront the new reality and

move on to ahead to an uncertain future. She received great support from

both sides of the family and my Grandma was a pillar of exceptional

strength and support. Mum went to Thiruvananthapuram and enrolled

in a BEd. Degree course to pursue a vocation as a government teacher.

However, the central government came up with a rehabilitation proposal

of running either a Petrol Pump or Gas Agency, the latter which was

accepted by her with encouragement from family. We then relocated to

Thrissur, the cultural capital of Kerala which was easily accessible by

both families, Mum’s at Palakkad and Dad’s at Alappuzha.



My mother, bless her noble heart, always tried to give me the best

possible parental support and guidance. I could sense, that deep within

her, she carried a terrible weight of sadness following the tragedy that

befell her when she was barely 25 years of age. Her brother Karunakaran

left his lucrative job as an officer in the Merchant Navy to help her establish

the Gas Agency and help us settle in Thrissur. Sadly, we lost him

a few years later to an unfortunate accident which was a great tragedy

for our close knit family. My mother masked all her sadness at least

publicly, by taking on the enormous societal and work pressures she

faced as a fledgling businesswoman trying to set up and run a Gas Dealership

in communist, patriarchal Kerala of the late 70s and the decade of

the 1980s. Besides, she was fully involved in various spiritual activities

involving the Chinmaya Mission, RamaKrishna Mission and Narayana

Tapovanashram and other charitable causes. After an eventful career of

41 years, she has now retired and has fully dedicated herself to spiritual

pursuits.

I was keen to pursue various career options of joining the Army, being

a Diplomat or nurturing my passion for Ashok Leyland trucks by studying

for Automobile Engineering. I joined the Sainik School at Kazhakootam

in 1981 and got selected to the NDA in 1987. In deference to my Mum’s

wishes of joining the Navy for reason’s obvious, I opted for this service

in the beginning. I was assigned to the Golf Squadron and passed out

with the 78th course on 30 June 1990. Subsequently, I joined INS Tir as

a naval cadet and was assigned to the Engineering Branch while passing

out in 1991. After few years at the Naval College of Engineering in INS

Shivaji, Lonavla and a couple of operational assignments onboard ships

and establishments, I was selected to undergo my Post Graduation at

BARC, Mumbai in 1998 and joined the Navy’s ATV programme where

I served off and on in some very interesting assignments of national

importance. I took premature retirement from the Navy in early 2012

after completing 20 years of service since I was keen to pursue a career

in International Relations and Public Policy. Coincidentally, my wife

Lakshmi who is a Doctor was offered a job in the UK and we relocated



there in December 2012. Presently, I am working for a college managing

the Engineering and Management disciplines for the industry and also

writes Policy Papers on Public Governance for a leading think-tank in

my free time. We have two daughters studying in college and secondary

school.

As a young child, I was unconsciously aware of someone I once

called ‘Papa’, who died in the war with Pakistan in 1971. However,

the undeniable grim reality of a partial parent profile dawned, initially

when I went to school where happy children came for events flanked

by their beaming parents and later, whenever a father’s counsel would

help assuage doubts of a teenager. Or the mentorship of a Father who

would always guide a son who was constantly learning the ropes of

life. Time has passed as is wont to time, and the healing process slowly

took over the lives of the people closest to me. However, a void did still

remain within, more so while growing up and especially as a precarious

teenager. The absence of his counsel was also keenly felt later during my

years as a cadet in NDA and subsequently in the Navy, while choosing

the harder right over the easier wrong!

Some of my father’s closest friends (in CME and other vocations) continued

to keep in touch and I could feel my father’s presence through my

interactions with them. It was such a pleasure to hear from Capt. Pradeep

Sharma in 2011 when he managed to track down my whereabouts and

continues to be in constant touch and guidance to this very day. It is just

a humble, yet the strongest testimony to my father’s nature and character

that strong friendships in his life are still recalled and talked about - and

within the Army in particular. Through them, even 50 years later, I feel

strengthened and reassured of Dad’s benevolent presence in my life and

that of my family. Being a student of our Vedic heritage and culture as

well as the science of modern physics, I understand that the reality of

an illusionary existence can be very comforting in circumstances such

as mine having to cope up with growing without the physical presence

of my much beloved Dad.

To him and the eternal soldier within, I dedicate the initial lines of



this evergreen and powerful verse written by TB Macaulay:

To every man upon this earth, death cometh soon or

late; And how can man die better than facing fearful

odds, For the ashes of his fathers, and the temples of his

Gods. . .

To my Dad, I stand proud of what you are and what you have done!




Chapter 34: Capt Daljinder Singh, Deccan Horse by Gautam Tandon

34. Capt Daljinder Singh, Deccan Horse

by Gautam Tandon

1

Daljinder known to most of his close friends as Dallu was a

strapping six foot two inch two hundred pounder who lived

life king size .He did his schooling at Lawrence School Sanawar and at

RIMC, Dehra Dun. He joined NDA like all of us in July 1962, however

somewhere down the line he earned a one star, if I am not mistaken for

passing a PT test for some one else and subsequently passed out with

the 29th course.

Daljinder and Surinder Kaushik ( Kalakar ) both ex 28th course were

commissioned into Deccan Horse in Dec 1966 and joined the regiment

at Firozepore. Thus there were three of us from the same course as

budding young troop leaders, self having joined the Regiment in June

66 in Babina where the regiment was converting to T54 tanks having

shed their WW2 vintage Sherman tanks. The same make of tanks that

had served the regiment in its advance to Rangoon in WW2 and in the

Khem Karan Sector in Sept 1965.

In 1970 both Daljinder and I were posted to ACC&S where there

was large contingent of Captains from 27, 28 and 29th courses were

posted as instructors. A major part of our leisure hours were either spent

on the golf course or at the Annexe Bar. Amongst our group Jiti Mann

and Dallu were really good golfers and Dallu could by his sheer size

could out drive us by at least thirty yards.Since Vijay Krishnan (16 Cav)

and I were were the only course mates who had made the early plunge

1

Brig Gautam Tandon

353


into matrimony we were constantly being raided by the likes of Dallu,

Kutbab Hai, SAG Gulati etc. Particularly Dallu being a great foody never

found the mess Bill of Faire upto his standard in terms of quality and

more so in quantity. In the latter part of the sixties when the Regiment

was in Ambala, the officers mess ran a piggery. In those days we had a

veteran waiter called Gopal who one day in good humour announced

two things troubling in the mess one were the Yorkshire pigs and the

other was Daljiner Singh sahib, both had enormous appetites. Those

were the days when he was on a weight reduction diet of boiled food.

After grudgingly eating his boiled food he would order Gopal to serve

what was on the platter for the others. Daljinder is best remembered as

a fun loving person who loved having his leg pulled.It was difficult for

him to be serious about anything , it was just not part of his nature.

In March 1970 Deccan replaced 8 Cav as the Div Regt AC of 10 Inf

Div which was operationally responsible for the Akhnoor Sector. The

Regiment less B sqn was Located at Pahun Da Chak (PDC), while B sqn

moved to Pathankot where 10 Inf Div less 191 Inf Bde was located.In

those day as per the 1950 Karachi Agreement only one inf Bde and a

sqn of tanks could be located in Chhamb-Jaurian. The odd time the UN

rep visited, the RHQ and C sqn would disappear into the nearby khud.

With the situation rapidly deteriorating in the erstwhile East Pakistan

and the large influx of refugees by early October conflict with Pakistan

was appearing more than likely. Towards the end of October or early

November B sqn joined up with the regiment and the balance of the

division moved into the sector.

With courses almost coming to a standstill, a number of officers

including Dallu were posted back to their respective regiments. Its was

some time in the third or fourth week of Oct71 that Simran and I bid

farewell to Daljinder at Nagar railway station . Dallu was affectionately

referred to as the 46th tank of the regiment and no Pak tank shell could

penetrate, how prophetically wrong we were. Dallu on his return was

appointed as 2IC B Sqn where he had earlier served both as troop leader

and 2IC. I was to move a little later to rejoin the regiment.



Prior to the out break of hostilities 191 Inf Bde and A sqn were

deployed West of the Munawar Tawi in the Chhamb salient while the

rest of the division was located to the East of the Tawi. The overall

plan being for 191 Inf Bde to provide a firm base for a limited offensive

through the Chamb salient towards Jhelum/ Gujrat. On 30th Nov Lt Col

JS Bal met with a serious jeep accident and had to be evacuated, Maj

HN Hoon took over as the offg Comdt and was promoted to command

on 8th Dec during the war.

On the night of 3/4 Dec as we were in the process of moving into

the forward posture for a subsequent offensive there was intense Pak

arty shelling all along the front and the depth areas followed by multiple

attacks on the FDLs of 191 Bde by enemy inf supported by armour.

The initial deployment of the bde was better suited for providing secure

launch pads rather than a sustained defensive battle. It was a repeat of

1965, Pak had launched an offensive with an Inf Div and an armoured

bde. The offensive came as surprise in view of the prevailing intelligence.

In light of the prevailing situation in the early hours of 4th Dec

Bravo sqn was inducted across the Munawar Tawi to augment Alpha

sqn. Around 0700 hours Bsqn came under tank and heavy arty shelling .

In the ensuing skirmish Dallu’s tank sustained a direct hit by an arty shell

and he suffered fatal shrapnel wounds . Daljinder was one of the first

casualties that the regiment suffered that first day of the 1971 war.On

the morning of 4th December we lost two brave hearts Capt Daljinder

Singh and 2Lt SS Gill troop leader A sqn . Within a matter of hours of

the start of the 1971 conflict Daljinder had made the supreme sacrifice

for the nation and the regiment. Alas the regiment lost a brave soldier

and for me I lost a dear friend and a comrade in arms . It is difficult

to believe that in another few months it will be fifty years since Dallu

left us, it only seems like yesterday that Daljinder, Kalakar Kaushik and I

were sitting on the saddles in Drunken Horse bar sipping our whiskies.

I salute you my my friend.



Figure 110: Capt Daljinder Singh



Figure 111: Daljinder with his parents and sister

Figure 112: Deccan Horse officers killed in action in1965 & 1971



Figure 113: Destroyed tanks of C & B Sqns during the failed Pak attempt

to establish BrHs across the Munawar Tawi on 10/11 Dec 1971

Figure 114: Destroyed tanks of C & B Sqns



Figure 115: Destroyed tanks of C & B Sqns

Figure 116: Destroyed Pak tank



Figure 117: Deccan Horse War Memorial at Pahun Da Chak ( Jaurian)



Figure 118: Deccan Horse War Memorial at Pahun Da Chak ( Jaurian)




Chapter 35: Honours, Awards & Achievements by Arvind Sharma

35. Honours, Awards & Achievements by

Arvind Sharma

1

On 15 June 1966, one of the largest courses, comprising 416 Gentleman

Cadets of the 37 th Regular and 21 Technical Graduates

course, were commissioned as officers of the Indian Army from Indian

Military Academy, Dehradun. Their contemporaries at the National Defence

Academy, Khadakwasla were commissioned as officers, 21 in the

Indian Navy on 01 Jan 1967 and 79 in the Indian Air Force on 04 June

1967.

28 th Course had joined the National Defence Academy, Khadakwasla

in the second week of July 1962 and were under training there,

when the 1962 Indo – China war took place. The 1965 Indo -Pak war

passed by us as we were still under training at the Indian Military

Academy and the respective Naval and Air Force academy(s). During

the 1971 war, we all were in the 4-5 years of service bracket and in the

ranks of Captain in the Army, Lieutenant in the Navy and Flying Officers

in the Air Force. A fairly large number of officers of our batch were in

schools of Instructions attending specialist courses of long duration and

by the time they rejoined their units, the war was almost over.

In the 1971 war, some of our colleagues laid down their lives in

defence of the motherland; some were given gallantry awards and some

recognized for having rendered distinguished service. Besides, a number

of our course mates were given due recognition in a similar manner,

for their performance in Counter Insurgency operations, Aid to Civil

1

Lt Gen Arvind Sharma

363


Authority and other operations. The Kargil operations in 1999, were

conducted under the dynamic and charismatic leadership of one of our

colleagues – Mohinder Puri. Besides, a few of our colleagues have gained

recognition at the National level in other fields of excellence.

During the 1971 war, some of us fought on the Western front and

some in erstwhile East Pakistan, where the Pakistani Air Force was

knocked out of the skies in the first three days of the war. In 1968, when

a battle was fought with the Chinese at Nathu La, Sikkim, one of us, then

2 nd Lieutenant (later Colonel) NC Gupta of Signals, performed creditably

and was awarded the Sena Medal for Gallantry. During Operation

BLUESTAR in June 1984, one of our colleagues, Major HK Palta of Kumaon

Regiment, led his company from the front and made the supreme

sacrifice; for his act of bravery, he was awarded the Kirti Chakra. Yet

another colleague, Major GS Khanuja of EME, during the Bhopal Gas

Tragedy in December 1984, did meritorious work for which he was

awarded the Vishisth Seva Medal; unfortunately, he suffered total loss

of vision due to the disaster.

Martyrs

The following officers of our batch made the supreme sacrifice in the

1971 war and in Counter Insurgency (CI) operation(s):-

Capt Ravindra Nath Gupta, Engineers, 1971 war.

Capt Daljinder Singh, Armoured Corps, 1971 war.

Capt Manjit Singh, Artillery, 1971 war.

Capt GGK Panicker, Engineers, 1971 war.

Maj Gurdeep Singh Badalia, MAHAR, CI Operations Nagaland, 1970

Maj HK Palta, KUMAON, Punjab, Operation BLUE STAR, 1984.

Brig V Sridhar, GUARDS, J & K, CI Operations, 1994.



Gallantry Awards

Uttam Yudh Seva Medal

Lt Gen Mohinder Singh, PUNJAB, CI Operations Assam, 2003.

Maj Gen (later Lt Gen) Mohinder Puri, 3 GR, Operation VIJAY, 1999.

Kirti Chakra

Maj HK Palta, KUMAON (Posthumous) Operation BLUE STAR, 1984.

Vir Chakra

Capt Ravindra Nath Gupta, Engineers (Posthumous), 1971 war.

Capt Manjit Singh, Artillery (Posthumous), 1971 war.

Flg Offr(later Air Cmde) KC Kuruvilla, Indian Air Force, 1971 war.

Flg Offr(later Wg Cdr) S Balasubramaniam, Indian Air Force, 1971

war.

Flg Offr Sudhir Tyagi, Indian Air Force (Posthumous), 1971 war.

Yudh Seva Medal

Col (later Lt Gen) TPS Brar, MARATHA LIGHT INFANTRY, Operation

Pawan, 1987.

Col (later Lt Gen) TS Pathak, PARA, Operation Pawan, 1987.

Col (later Maj Gen) Basant Singh,1 GR, Operation Pawan, 1987.

Col (later Brig) PS Gurung, 4 GR, Operation Meghdoot, 1987.

Air Cmde RV Kumar, Indian Air Force.

Sena Medal(Gallantry)

Maj (later Brig) ABS Kundra, DOGRA, CI Operations Manipur, 1969.

Capt(later Brig) NR Naidu, RAJPUT, HAWS, J& K, 1971.



Lt (later Col) RK Ganapathy, GUARDS, CI Operations, Nagaland

1970.

2nd Lt (later Col) NC Gupta, Signals, Sikkim, 1968.

Distinguished Service Awards

Param Vishishtha Seva Medal

Lt Gen Arvind Sharma, 4 GR, 2006.

Lt Gen PPS Bhandari, Armoured Corps, 2005.

Lt Gen Mohinder Singh, PUNJAB, 2005.

Lt Gen Mohinder Puri, 3 GR, 2005.

Lt Gen TPS Brar, MARATHA LIGHT INFANTRY, 2005.

Lt Gen RSK Kapur, Engineers, 2005.

Ati Vishishth Seva Medal

Lt Gen Arvind Sharma, 4 GR.

Lt Gen PPS Bhandari, Armoured Corps.

Lt Gen Mohinder Singh, PUNJAB.

Lt Gen TS Pathak, PARA.

Lt Gen Rajinder Singh, Artillery.

Lt Gen RSK Kapur, Engineers.

Maj Gen VS Budhwar, KUMAON.

Maj Gen Basant Singh, 1 GR.

Maj Gen Rajendra Singh, EME.

Maj Gen RS Batra, EME.

R Adm MS Bedi, Indian Navy.

AVM JS Grewal, Indian Air Force.

AVM HS Sidhu, Indian Air Force.



Brig T Mukherjee, RAJPUTANA RIFLES.

Cmde AA Chacko, Indian Navy.

Cmde A Sachdeva, Indian Navy.

Air Cmde AD Karandikar, Indian Air Force.

Sena Medal (Distinguished Service)


Maj Gen Satbir Singh, Artillery.

Col Kiran Krishan, Engineers.

Nao Sena Medal

Cdr AS Lazaro, Indian Navy.

Sena Medal (Distinguished Service)

Air Cmde AD Karandikar, Indian Air Force.

Air Cmde PC Chopra, Indian Air Force.

Wg Cdr VM Bhatia, Indian Air Force.

Wg Cdr V Pashupati, Indian Air Force.

Vishishth Seva Medal

Lt Gen Arvind Sharma, 4 GR.

Lt Gen Rajinder Singh, Artillery.


Maj Gen VS Budhwar, KUMAON.

Maj Gen Basant Singh, 1 GR.

Maj Gen RN Suryavanshi, 11 GR.

Maj Gen KB Kapoor, Engineers.

Maj Gen DK Bewtra, Signals.

Maj Gen Subhash Chander, Signals.

Maj Gen Lalit Chopra, Signals.

Maj Gen Rajendra Singh, EME.

Maj Gen RS Batra, EME.



Maj Gen Subhash Bindra, AOC.

Maj Gen Amrik Singh, Engineers (MOGSGS).

R Adm MS Bedi, Indian Navy.

AVM HS Sidhu, Indian Air Force.

Brig V Sridhar, GUARDS(Posthumous).

Brig MS Ruhil, Grenadiers.

Brig M Dutta, 9 GR.

Brig Parvez Cawasji, Artillery.

Brig RD Singh, Engineers.

Brig BM Bakshi, Engineers.

Brig Pradip Mehta, Engineers.

Brig SM Joshi, EME.

Brig VP Singh, Military Farms.

Air Cmde AD Karandikar, IAF.

Col PS Bhandari, BIHAR.

Gp Capt Om Kumar, IAF.

Lt Col GS Khanuja, EME.

Mention in Despatches(1971 war)

Capt(later Lt Gen) Mohinder Singh, PUNJAB.

Capt(later Brig) BS Mehta, Armoured Corps.

Capt(later Lt Col) V Malhotra, Armoured Corps.



National Awards/ Achievements

Col KS Garcha

He was conferred the ’Rajasthan Shree’ in 1986 and the ‘Arjuna

Award’ in 1987 for excelling in Polo. He Captained the Indian Polo

Team for the World Cup in 1995 and has played the game in about 30

countries across the world.

Col Vivek Mundkur

He achieved national recognition for his pioneering efforts to introduce

“Hang Gliding” in India. His innovations in power generation by

designing and fabricating ‘Windmills’ with local resources, have been

adopted by some states in interior areas. His innovation of a Portable

Solar Power Pump won the World Innovation Challenge organized by

Greenpeace in December 2013. This pump will provide water to small

marginal farmers who do not have electricity and cannot afford diesel

pumps.

Air Cmde AD Karandikar,VM,VSM

On being commissioned as a Pilot in the Transport stream on 04

June 1967, he was awarded the Chief of Air Staff Trophy and the Flying

Trophy, for being the Best Cadet.

In 1972 he was given a Commendation by the CAS for safely landing

a fully loaded Dakota, following an engine fire after ‘take off’ from

Lilabari, Assam, on an air maintenance sortie. He was one of the first

three pilots cleared for VIP operations on the Boeing 737-200 aircraft on

its induction in the Air Force.

In 1995, his outstanding performance of recording 12990 hours of

military flying, accident and incident free, was recognized by an entry

recorded in the Limca Book of Records. After taking voluntary retirement

from the IAF in June 1997, he was appointed the Chief Pilot Eastern

Region, in Alliance Air, flying B737-200s. On 26 Dec 2004, when the

earthquake and Tsunami struck Port Blair, he was the first one to land

on the runway, which was reduced to half its length by the calamity.



Thereafter he led the relief efforts, flying multiple sorties from dawn to

dusk. He also holds the distinction of being the first to land at Thoise,

Ladakh on Boeing 737-200, for commercial operations.

Subsequently, he flew B737-700,800,900NG aircraft with Sahara and

JetLite/Jet Airways. When he finally hung up his flying overalls, he had

logged in a total of 24680 hours of flying sans a mishap, a record indeed!


Bibliography

Bibliography

[1] Desmond Ball et al. Soviet signals intelligence (SIGINT). Canberra:

Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School

of Pacific . . . , 1989. https://openresearch-repository.

anu.edu.au/bitstream/1885/216501/1/047_soviet_

signals_intelligence_sigint_canberra_papers_on_

strategy_and_defence_desmond.pdf.

[2] Desmond Ball et al. Signals intelligence (SIGINT) in

south Asia: India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka. Canberra: Strategic

and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific . . . ,

1996. https://openresearch-repository.anu.edu.au/

bitstream/1885/216567/1/117_Signals_Intelligence_

(SIGINT)_in_South_Asia_India_Pakistan_Srilanka_

(Ceylon)_Desmond_Ball_P134.pdf.

[3] Stephen Budiansky. Battle of wits: the complete story of

codebreaking in World War II. Simon and Schuster, 2000.

https://www.google.co.in/books/edition/Battle_

of_Wits/uccLlgJDk4gC?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=u.s.+ARMY+

SIGNALS+INTELLIGENCE+IN+WORLD+WAR+II&pg=PP13&

printsec=frontcover.

[4] David Kahn. The Codebreakers: The comprehensive history of

secret communication from ancient times to the internet. Simon

and Schuster, 1996. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_

Codebreakers.

[5] John F Kreis, Robert F Futrell, Alexander S Cochran Jr, Robert C

Ehrhart, Williamson Murray, and Thomas A Fabyanic. Piercing the

371

Bibliography

Fog: Intelligence and Army Air Forces Operations in World War

II. Department of the Air Force, 1996. https://www.google.co.

in/books/edition/Piercing_the_Fog/vZFEAAAAIAAJ?

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IN+WORLD+WAR+II&pg=PR3&printsec=frontcover.

[6] Bartholomew Lee. Radio spies–episodes in the ether

wars. Antique Wireless Association Review, 2002. https:

//www.californiahistoricalradio.com/wp-content/

uploads/2011/11/spies9eR2006.pdf.


Index

Index

Bletchley Park, 304

intercepting, 305

WEU, 302

Wireless interceptors, 303

373

Index


Chapter 36: About the Authors

36. About the Authors

S Balasubramanian

Figure 119: Wg Cdr S Balasubramanian

VrC

involved in humanitarian activities.

Wg Cdr S Balasubramanian VrC,

commissioned in Jun ‘67, remained

associated with aviation

for over 50 years. Besides serving

in fighter squadrons he has

been a flying instructor in India,

abroad and in the Flight Instructor’s

School, Tambaram.

While in Air India he been

an instructor and examiner on the

Airbus and a simulator instructor

on the B 787. He is a trustee with

Indian Development Foundation,

NGO recognized by the UN and

375


PPS Bhandari

Lt Gen PPS Bhandari was commissioned

into Hodson’s Horse.

Later joined 72 Armoured Regiment

on its Raising and commanded

it. A graduate of DSSC,

HC Course and an alumnus of

RCDS, UK and Galilee College, Israel.

He was a DS in ACC&S,

IMA, DSSC and Commander Senior

Comd and Higher Comd

wings. He commanded an Armoured

Brigade, an Armoured Di-

Figure 120: Lt Gen PPS Bhandari

vision and a Strike Corps besides

being the Additional MS in Army HQ. He retired as DCOAS (P&S) in

2006.



Virender Budhwar

Figure 121: Maj Gen Virender Budhwar

AVSM,VSM.

Virender Budhwar was commissioned

into 16 Kumaon

and commanded the same

battalion in Sri Lanka

during IPKF operations.

He attended the Canadian

Forces Staff College, was

Deputy Military Advisor in

the Indian High Commission

in London, UK. He

served in various sectors

in India and held quite

a few staff and instructional

appointments. He

commanded a division in Ladakh, was Chief of Staff of a corps in the

desert, and was Director-General Resettlement before superannuating.



E Jai Chacko

Figure 122: Cdr E Jai Chacko IN (Rtd)

Kerala, looking after the family farm.

An alumnus of the Lawrence

School Lovedale and National

Defence Academy.

Commissioned into the Indian

Navy in1967, served

on IN ships, Tir, Kuthar,

Delhi, Godavari, Gaj, Sandhayak

and Darshak. Did

Engineering from INS Shivaji,

came back as Instructor

and Commander Naval

College of Engineering.

Retired from Naval Dockyard

Vishakapatnam in

1988. Now settled in Mankotta,



Ram Chandra Chhetri

Figure 123: Lt Col Ram Chandra

Chhetri(Retd)

Lt Col Ram Chandra Chhetri

(Retd.) was commissioned

in the Army Ordnance

Corps on 15 June 1966.

During his service of three

decades plus, he has served

in the North East, Control

Officer Central Ordnance

Depot Jabalpur, Officer

Incharge Tech Stores

Sec 810 Corps Tps Wksp

EME, Adm Officer 7 Inf

Div OFP, Bde Ord Offr 164

Mtn Bde, OC OFP 12 Inf

Div, OC 40 Mobile Amn

Rep Sec, I Armd Div, Trg Officer AOC Centre Secunderabad, 2IC CAOC,

HQ 1 Corps, 2IC CAOC, 39 Inf Div, OC 10 Mobile Amn Rep Sec HQ

Delhi Area and Adm Officer Depot Bharatpur.



Ujjal Dasgupta

Brig Ujjal Dasgupta was

commissioned into the Corps

of Signals. In his career of

36 years, he has served in

J&K, Sikkim and the Western

Sector. He was BM

of an Infantry brigade and

has held grade 1 general

staff and signals staff appointments

at Army HQ

and Command HQ. He

has served as an instructor

Figure 124: Brig Ujjal Dasgupta

at Defence Services Staff

College and Miliary College

of Telecom Engineering.

He commanded an Inf Div Signal Regt as a Lt Col and Tropo Group

as Brigadier, both in the Western Sector.



Mahendra Joon

Mahendra Joon was commissioned

in 3 Grenadiers. A Commando

Dagger holder, he served

as Instructor in Commando Wing,

Weapon leg of YO Wing, GSO2

( I ) XV Corps, took part in Ops

in Eastern Sector, Commanded A

Coy 3 Grenadiers alongside Major

Hoshiar Singh ( PVC, who

commanded C Coy ) in Battle

of Jarpal / Basantar and Commanded

3 Grenadiers, in Field and

Figure 125: Col Mahendra Joon

Peace, both as Lt. Col and on in

situ promotion as Colonel.

After he lost his younger brother, he took premature retirement on

27 Aug 1990 before his Board for Brigadier. After retirement, he developed

Commercial / Residential projects in Bahadurgarh, Jodhpur and

Bhubneshwar.



Tarlochan Singh Kalra

Figure 126: Col Tarlochan Singh

Kalra

1994 to 1997.

Col Tarlochan Singh Kalra psc , an

ex NDA was commissioned on 15

Jun 1966. He had the privilege of

being Adjutant of 2 SIKH during

1971. He is in full knowledge of

unit’s day to day happenings and

has penned down all essential details

pertaining to Pulkanjri battle.

He commanded same Battalion i.e.

2 SIKH from 1985 to 1988 and

superannuated after doing tenure

as Comdt Sikh Regt Centre from



Shimi Kanbargimath

Figure 127: Brig Shimi Kanbargimath

Commissioned into the Dogra

Regiment in 1966, Brig

Kanbargimath joined his

battalion in Nagaland. He

later served as Instructor

Commando Wing, Belgaum

and took part in the

1971 Bangladesh war. After

a stint in IMA, Dehra

Dun, he commanded 2

Dogra, a battalion commanded

by his father. Thereafter

he served in JL Wing,

Belgaum, and later commanded 112 Mtn Brigade in N.Sikkim. He retired

from the College of Combat JC Wing and is happily settled in Bangalore.



Rana SK Kapur

Figure 128: Lt Gen Rana SK Kapur, PVSM,

AVSM, SM, VSM, Veteran

Commissioned in the Corps

of Engineers in Jun 1966,

Gen Kapur is one of the

most decorated officers of

the Corps of Engineers and

a veteran of two wars –

Liberation of Bangladesh

1971 and the Kargil War in

1999. He has excelled himself

since childhood having

been the School Captain

in his School, Best

Army Cadet at the NDA

and First in the order of

Merit amongst Sappers Officers

at the Indian Military

Academy where he also received

the Chief of the Army Staff’s Banner. Academically, he is a graduate

in civil engineering from CME, Masters in Defense Studies from

the Defense Services Staff College, Wellington and in Computer Science

from University of Alabama, USA and has also attended the prestigious

Higher Command and NDC Courses. A very fine sportsman he has

represented the NDA, IMA and CME in Football, Hockey and Cricket

and has been awarded the Colours in Football at IMA and CME.



Satish Kumar Kukreja

Figure 129: Brig Satish Kumar Kukreja

Brig Satish Kumar Kukreja

was commissioned in 17

JAT on its raising. Commanded

15 JAT, 10 Sector

/DIG B Range(AR) in Manipur

at the height of the

insurgency and JAT Regimental

Centre. Had served

in CI Areas both in East

and J&K, Was JPS (Army)

in the erstwhile Cabinet

Sectt (Mil Wg). Retired in

Nov 2000 as DDG Canteen

Services.



Mohinder Nath Mahajan

Figure 130: Brig Mohinder Nath Mahajan

(Retd)

Brig Mohinder Nath Mahajan

was commissioned

into Madras Sappers on

15 June 1966. During

his Service, he served in

Ladakh, J&K and Thar

Desert of Rajasthan. He

Commanded an Engineer

Regiment Bridge (PMS).

He introduced Computerisation

in BRO, has been Instructor

at DSSC, Wellington

and has been Chief Engineer

of a Corps. Prior to

Superannuation, he served in Quarter Master General Branch in Army

Headquarters.



NR Naidu

Brig NR Naidu After training

at NDA and IMA, he

was commissioned into 3

Rajput. He commanded 2

Rajput in Mizoram and

Arunachal Pradesh and commanded

a Brigade in Manipur.

He served as an instructor

in High Altitude

Warfare School (HAWS)

for 5 years. He was also

an instructor at the Defence

Services Staff Col-

Figure 131: Brig NR Naidu (Retd)

lege, Wellington. At HAWS,

he conducted a daring mission to rescue an American Mountaineer from

the Kolohoi mountain, for which he was awarded the Sena Medal for

gallantry. During the 1971 war with Pakistan, he was part of the Ski

Troops employed on the Gulmarg Front. He opted for early retirement

in 1997.



Chandra Nath

Chandra served in Corps

of Signals before he took

retirement from the military

in 1987.

He completed his graduate

study in Computer

Science at University of

California in 1983.

He taught Computer

Science at MCTE, Mhow

and Jawaharlal Nehru University.

He last served as

a Security Architect in the

software industry in Los Figure 132: Lt Col CPC Nath (Retd)

Angeles, California, USA.

He dabbles in philosophy, critical thinking, technology, privacy, and

law just for the fun of it. He enjoyed typesetting this book in L A TEX



Vijay Rai

Commissioned in 15 DO-

GRA, which he later commanded

in mid eighties

in CI Ops. During 1971

operations he was a rifle

company commander

and was awarded Mention

in Despatches. During his

service, served on instructional

assignments in Defence

Services Staff College,

IMTRAT ( Bhutan),

Figure 133: Brig V K Rai,VSM (Retd)

and Counter Insurgency

School. Commanded a brigade as part of Strike Corps. Has done operations

Staff assignments in North East and served in J&K.



PJS Sandhu

Major General PJS Sandhu

was commissioned into

8th Light Cavalry on 15

June 1966 and later commanded

47 Armoured Regiment.

During his service

he commanded an Independent

Armoured Bde, an

Armoured Division and retired

as the Chief of Staff

of a Strike Corps on 31

July 2003. As a Captain, he

Figure 134: Major General PJS Sandhu

participated in the 1971 India

- Pakistan War in the

Shakargarh Sector.

Post retirement, he worked as the Deputy Director & Editor of the

United Service Institution of India from 2007 - 2016.



Surinder Singh Sethi

Captain Surinder Singh

Sethi is an alumnus of

St. Edwards School Shimla

and the National Defence

Academy, Kharakvasla (28th

Course). He is also a postgraduate

from the prestigious

Defence Services

Staff College, Wellington.

He has had a remarkable

career in the Indian Navy,

Figure 135: Capt Surinder Singh Sethi

mainly on various Warships

and also the Fleet

Navigating Officer of the Western Fleet. He Commanded the Missile

boat INS Prabal and the Missile Destroyer INS Ranjit and the commissioning

Captain of CGS Vijaya. He also Commanded the Navigation and

Direction School in Kochi. He was the Indian Naval Commander during

the IPKF operations in Sri Lanka . After retirement, he has held senior

positions including Director of various Shipping Companies in India and

abroad. He is now leading a retired life and settled in Mumbai.



Arvind Sharma

Lt Gen Arvind Sharma

was commissioned in 2/4

GR. During his service

of four decades plus, he

has served in J & K,

Ladakh, Sikkim and the

North East. He was an instructor

at the NDA and

the DSSC, Wellington; he

was the Defence Attache

at Kathmandu, Nepal. He

has served in Counter Insurgency

operations in Nagaland,

Manipur, J & K and

Figure 136: Lt Gen Arvind Sharma Punjab. He commanded

the Division in Manipur, a

Corps in Ladakh and was the Army Commander, Eastern Command

prior to superannuation.


Colophon

Colophon

The following will be replaced with the actual colophon once it is ready:

“In early printed books the colophon, when present, was a brief

description of the printing and publication of the book, giving some or

all of the following data: the date of publication, the place of publication

or printing (sometimes including the address as well as the city name), the

name(s) of the printer(s), and the name(s) of the publisher(s), if different.

Sometimes additional information, such as the name of a proofreader or

editor, or other more-or-less relevant details, might be added. A colophon

might also be emblematic or pictorial rather than in words.[4] The normal

position for a colophon was after the explicit (the end of the text, often

after any index or register). After around 1500 these data were often

transferred to the title page, which sometimes existed in parallel with a

colophon.

Colophons sometimes contained book curses, as this was the one

place in a medieval manuscript where a scribe was free to write what

he wished. Such curses tend to be unique to each book.[12]

In Great Britain colophons grew generally less common in the 16th

century. The statements of printing which appeared (under the terms of

the Unlawful Societies Act 1799)[13] on the verso of the title-leaf and final

page of each book printed in Britain in the 19th century are not, strictly

speaking, colophons, and are better referred to as ”printers’ imprints” or

”printer statements”.

393

Colophon

In some parts of the world, colophons helped fledgling printers and

printing companies gain social recognition. For example, in early modern

Armenia printers used colophons as a way to gain ”prestige power” by

getting their name out into the social sphere.[14] The use of colophons

in early modern Armenian print culture is significant as well because it

signalled the rate of decline in manuscript production and scriptoria use,

and conversely the rise and perpetuation of printing for Armenians.

With the development of the private press movement from around

1890, colophons became conventional in private press books, and often

included a good deal of additional information on the book, including

statements of limitation, data on paper, ink, type and binding, and other

technical details. Some such books include a separate ”Note about the

type”, which will identify the names of the primary typefaces used, provide

a brief description of the type’s history and a brief statement about

its most identifiable physical characteristics.

Some commercial publishers took up the use of colophons, and began

to include similar details in their books, either at the end of the text (the

traditional position) or on the verso of the title-leaf. Such colophons might

identify the book’s designer, the software used, the printing method, the

printing company, the typeface(s) used in the page design and the kind

of ink, paper and its cotton content.[15] Book publishers Alfred A. Knopf,

the Folio Society and O’Reilly Media are notable for their substantial

colophons.”

Course Google Group & Website

• Course Google group and how to join

• Course website details


War Dispatches 1971

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