Doctor, Thomas H. - On Ascertaining The Stuff Of Dreams

ON ASCERTAINING THE STUFF OF DREAMS: NĀGĀRJUNA’S

MADHYAMAKA AND TAKTSANG LOTSAWA’S INTERPRETATION

Thomas H. Doctor

Rangjung Yeshe Institute, Kathmandu University

thomas.doctor@ryi.org

Introduction

As a Madhyamaka philosopher, Taktsang Lotsawa Sherab Rinchen (stag

tshang lo tsA ba shes rab rin chen) (1405–1477) 1 is perhaps most widely

known for his claim to have identified eighteen major contradictions in the

thought of Tsongkhapa Losang Drakpa (tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa)

(1357–1419), a polemic discussion that appears in the Madhyamaka chapter

of his encyclopedic Freedom from Extremes through Comprehensive

Knowledge of Philosophy. 2 In this article we will not pursue this critique,

both renowned and infamous, but instead focus on Taktsang Lotsawa’s own

pragmatic hermeneutics of emptiness in context. Taktsang Lotsawa argues

that *Svātantrika (rang rgyud pa) 3 Mādhyamikas, in their drive to furnish the

two truths of appearance and emptiness with proper epistemic warrants,

inadvertently end up committed to a contradictory doctrine of “real

illusions,” entities that are false and yet facts. To avoid such blinding

metaphysics, Taktsang Lotsawa aligns himself with Candrakīrti (fl. seventh

century C.E.), whose *Prāsaṅgika (thal ‘gyur ba) he associates with epistemological

pragmatism and a conception of the Madhyamaka program as

processual and context dependent. To make sense and be soteriologically

effective, Taktsang Lotsawa argues, Madhyamaka must be seen as a project

that is carried out across three distinct yet interdependent contexts: those of

no, slight, and thorough analysis.

On this understanding, just about all the “big questions” about both

nature and the spirit are embraced by the Mādhyamika as a member of the

world (‘jig rten, Skt. loka)—that is, as a member of an emerging, everchanging

epistemic community that transcends specific religious, philosophical,

or ideological affiliations. The two truths of appearance and emptiness

present themselves once this whole wide world is subjected to Madhyamaka

analysis, but the two can by no means serve as a metaphysical bottom line.

The process that their “discovery” sets in motion also reveals their purely

heuristic value. On Taktsang Lotsawa’s interpretation, the Madhyamaka path

is then open-ended, because it admits no incontestable conclusions.

Nonetheless, it is also concrete, for the Madhyamaka exercise of reason

invites practical application.

Philosophy East & West Volume 70, Number 2 April 2020 285–302 285

© 2020 by University of Hawai‘i Press

Dependent Origination and Emptiness

As we begin to take stock of Taktsang Lotsawa’s Madhyamaka project it is

helpful to recall just how challenging the task of the Madhyamaka exegete

is. This may prevent us from reaching premature and facile conclusions—

something that both Taktsang Lotsawa and his historic adversaries repeatedly

warn us of. Revisiting the fundamental issues will also help us acknowledge

the factors that motivate, on the one hand, the development of an extensive

ontological and epistemological edifice, and, on the other, the scrapping of

it all. Giving in to either one of such two impulses is deeply problematic for

a proponent of the Middle Way, because going off in either direction

typically ends in a spiraling, extremist fall.

In the opening verses of his most influential treatise, Fundamental Verses

on the Middle Way, 4 Nāgārjuna famously describes the unique insight of

awakening (byang chub; Skt. bodhi) as the realization of dependent

origination (rten cing ‘brel bar ‘byung ba; Skt. pratītyasamutpāda). Yet

Nāgārjuna’s understanding of dependent origination rings in the key of the

Perfection of Wisdom discourses (Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa’i mdo;

Skt. Prajñā-pāramitā-sūtra), because for him the way things occur in

dependence is such that they neither cease nor come into being, neither

come nor go, neither endure nor turn to nothing, and are neither different

nor the same. Given such qualifiers, does it make sense to speak of

“origination”? On the face of it, Nāgārjuna’s version of dependent origination

seems to admit no intelligible sense at all.

As a philosophical program that carries deep soteriological aspirations,

Madhyamaka in this way arguably emerges based on the tensions that

inhere in a simultaneous affirmation and denial of dependent origination,

and every Madhyamaka thinker must then find a way both to fully

accommodate and to exclude the way things appear. In terms of methodology,

a similar paradox is apparent, because the Mādhyamika must pursue a

course that can claim to be both eminently reasonable and non-discursive.

Again, the opening verses of Nāgārjuna’s foundational treatise of Madhyamaka

reasoning present this challenge by associating knowledge of

dependent origination with the pacification of “conceptual constructs” (Skt.

prapañca).

These rather daunting requirements that traditional Madhyamaka scholarship

must face are also reflected in the work of Madhyamaka interpreters

in the contemporary academy, who have explored ways of making logically

coherent sense of Madhyamaka discourse, 5 just as they have highlighted the

requirement for thought transcendence in Madhyamaka thought. 6 At times,

their work has taken the form of spirited disputes between parties who either

focus on Madhyamaka as a circumscribable, analytically developed point of

view or, alternatively, as a path to the relinquishment of views and

286 Philosophy East & West

positions. 7 With the reflections above in mind, perhaps we can conclude

that such disputes are inextricable from, and so also integral to, proper

Madhyamaka thought. Debates regarding the value of rational thought and

the relevance of philosophical positions in the Madhyamaka context clearly

cannot be settled in simple pro and contra terms, because no Mādhyamika

can afford to champion either side wholly at the expense of the other.

Rather than simply steps toward identifying the true character of Madhyamaka

thought, disputes such as those that we have recently witnessed in the

academy can then arguably also be regarded as themselves its genuine

expressions. Indeed, arguments along such lines have written the history of

Madhyamaka thought—Taktsang Lotsawa and his impact in Tibet being a

compelling case in point. The latter formulates his own proposals for how to

understand and do Madhyamaka based on critiquing a venerable counterposition

to which we shall next turn.

The Svātantrika “Solution”

According to Taktsang Lotsawa, the Svātantrika response to the emptiness/

dependent origination dilemma is to carefully distinguish the two truths and

establish them by means of a corresponding set of reliable epistemic

instruments (tshad ma, Skt. pramāṇa). This is the approach upheld by Indian

masters such as Sāntarakṣita (ca. 725–ca. 788) and Kamalasīla (ca. 740–

ca. 795), whose imprints on Indian and Tibetan Buddhism can hardly be

overestimated. 8 Taktsang Lotsawa acknowledges this. He also recognizes the

fact that the vast majority of Mādhyamika thinkers up to his own time have

been representatives of precisely that approach, which aims to pay both

dependent origination and emptiness their proper due with the help of a

robust and sophisticated epistemological apparatus.

There are many reasons that one may find such a program compelling.

The force of Nāgārjunian reason is considerable, as well as hard to

accommodate, for it questions the validity of the entire framework of thinking.

As Sāntarakṣita concludes, “The ultimate evades the entire net of constructs—

entity and non-entity, origination and absence of origination, empty and not

empty.” 9 For Sāntarakṣita, Svātantrika philosopher par excellence, this allconsuming

negation resides, so to speak, in a relative reality of dependent

origination that both can and must be accurately acknowledged on its own

terms. While in the face of Nāgārjunian analysis the appearance of dependent

origination, as well as its negation, do not obtain in any way at all, there is

thus, nevertheless, something to the pre-analytic manifestation of causes and

conditions that makes it much more than a flatus vocis:

The relative is not just verbal convention. Rather, the perceptible and

efficacious entities of dependent origination constitute the correct relative

(tathyāsaṃvṛti) .... 10 Entities that are incapable of resisting analysis but

Thomas H. Doctor 287

nonetheless efficacious are referred to as the “correct relative.” Those are not

just nominal, and they are hence unlike “the person,” and the like. 11

The precise causal character of these pre-analytic appearances can thus be

ascertained by means of epistemic instruments that do justice to their objects,

and being a Mādhyamika is then clearly very different from subscribing to a

blanket denial. Rather, the real, albeit merely relative, stuff of dependent

origination must be distinguished from imputations—such as the personal self

that Buddhism famously denies—and the complete Madhyamaka picture thus

arguably emerges by seeing the perceptible and causally efficacious entities of

the “correct relative” in the light of their ultimate non-establishment.

Nevertheless, according to Taktsang Lotsawa, Sāntarakṣita’s program is

clearly not subtle enough to be Great Madhyamaka:

On the basis of analysis, Svātantrikas insist on the simple claim that things such

as fire perform an objective function. Hence, all their talk about the “the

unexamined” and that which is “compelling only when not examined” 12 turns

out to be mere lip service. 13

Svātantrikas aim to draw up a correct inventory of the pre-analytic

conventional reality while at the same time acknowledging the ultimate

emptiness of apparent entities. Yet their careful, epistemology-based attempt

at paying both truths their proper due—and so avoid both realist bondage

and the nihilist pits—is in the end self-defeating. For Taktsang Lotsawa that

sort of endeavor cannot be maintained from a proper Mādhyamika

perspective:

Those assertions are, however, unreasonable because since this is the context of

rational analysis, they all end up resistant to analysis. There is no superior

analysis beyond the present analysis of the ultimate or objective nature of

arising. 14

The seemingly prudent, epistemological concession to both truths turns out

to be incoherent for it introduces, and inadvertently reifies, a mode of reality

that remains beyond the purview of Nāgārjunian critique. Thus, while

Taktsang Lotsawa ascribes great heuristic value to Svātantrika, in the end the

system rests on a contradiction.

To better understand the sense of contradiction that Taktsang Lotsawa

associates with Svātantrika, it is helpful to note that on his exegesis

Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika are identical with “Illusionism” (sgyu ma rigs

grub pa), and “Non-Foundationalism” (rab tu mi gnas par smra ba). 15

Employing recurrent examples from the sūtras, all Mādhyamikas indeed

argue that apparent entities are just like illusions, mirages, or the moon’s

reflection in water. It is also possible, however, to turn the idea of illusion

into a reasoned position regarding the metaphysical status of appearances.

Making that move yields Illusionist Madhyamaka, a position according to

which illusion is the correct conclusion to be drawn from the Nāgārjunian


analysis of manifest phenomena. On this position, causes and effects

undeniably appear, but they can all be logically proven to be merely

apparent and not real in the way they seem—hence, they are all in fact

illusory. At first glance this might seem like a promising way to get a handle

on the illusory Madhyamaka middle and avoid the perilous extremes of

reification and nihilist denial. Yet the appearance of closure is itself just an

appearance; and Taktsang Lotsawa shows this while citing the Indian master

Sūra (ca. fourth century):

Those fooled by thinking of mere illusion

Will fail to see the ineffable

Mañjusrī beyond all constructs.

Illusion is not mere illusion . . . .

Therefore, when something is of illusory nature

It cannot be determined as such. 16

The example of illusion obviously cannot provide any rock-bottom Madhyamaka

ontology, because it undermines itself. What could it possibly mean

for these appearances to be “real as illusions?” The very idea of illusion

demonstrates their lack of reality. We might argue that the reflection of my

face in the mirror is unreal only insofar as it is not my actual face, but that,

on the other hand, the reflection is not altogether unreal, because it indeed

appears, and because its appearing is a real event. But what exactly is it that

here makes us hesitate to dismiss the reality of apparent phenomena

completely?

Sāntarakṣita employs the example of illusion in the key argument of his

Ornament of the Middle Way 17 and it is helpful to notice here how this

great Svātantrika himself elaborates on the precise character of the example.

We may think of the experience of illusion as an actual mental event, or we

may conceive of physical factors that combine to produce the real event of

an illusory phenomenon. Yet the physical and mental factors that we thus

bring to mind to explain the illusory appearance as a real event of illusion

are themselves simply real and hence not illusory in any meaningful sense

at all. Neither category of the existent thus captures the force of the

example. That which is illusory, as Sāntarakṣita explains, is therefore not the

physical, mental, temporal, or spatial factors that contribute to the arising

and endurance of illusion. The illusory phenomenon is precisely that which

seems to be there and yet isn’t—the seemingly perfectly real face that

appears in the mirror but does not possess even a particle of an actual face.

Sāntarakṣita’s own analysis then appears to acknowledge that the illusory

is wholly unreal. Hence, even by the Svātantrika’s own lights, Illusionism

ought to be seen as an insupportable position. On Taktsang Lotsawa’s analysis,

a Mādhyamika must hence conclude that when the sūtras declare all

phenomena to be like illusions and dreams they in fact mean to say just that.

In other words, the horse that may kick me today is ontologically no different


from the horses and elephants conjured by a magician, or the horse that I

dreamt of riding last night. Yet on Taktsang Lotsawa’s reading, Svātantrikas are

unable to accept such a complete lack of foundations and instead resort to a

fundamentally incoherent ontology of real illusions. They fail to take the point

of their own example, and so fail to see Mañjusrī.

The Madhyamaka Context

Now where is Taktsang Lotsawa going with all this? If, on his interpretation,

aPrāsaṅgika cannot accept any substantial difference between dream horses

and those horses we otherwise, for a number of in-our-face reasons, readily

call real horses, then what could we possibly learn from such a seemingly

self-defeating global fictionalist? Tsongkhapa’s Geluk defenders are quick to

dismiss Taktsang Lotsawa as absurd, 18 and contemporary scholars have also

been concerned that a Taktsang-style reading of Candrakīrti would result in

his becoming bogged down in a dismal slough of senseless relativism. 19 And

indeed, how could the upshot of Nāgārjuna’s critique of dependent

origination be that everything is at the same level of irreality, and that any

statement therefore seemingly turns out just as true or false as any other?

Whether we are looking for coherent philosophy or a path of liberation, it

seems that this would be an ultimate dead end. On the other hand, taking

the road of epistemological realism in the Madhyamaka context appeared to

deliver a doctrine of illusion that in the end simply does not withstand

analysis. It seems we are stuck with two unacceptable alternatives, and no

real space to occupy in between.

This perception of dire straits and seemingly no passage is in a sense

part and parcel of the Madhyamaka analytical context because, as we noted

in the beginning of this discussion, all intelligible versions of dependent

origination wither under Nāgārjunian analysis, and yet pure denial of

dependent origination is but another ominous extreme. On Taktsang

Lotsawa’s account, this strange and potentially paralyzing sense that there is

no viable alternative has in fact its proper context, and if it becomes

paralyzing it is only because of our failure to see that natural contextuality.

The analytic dead end and the specter of lifeless relativism appears due to a

misconstrual of the Madhyamaka enterprise. Despite any amount of

Svātantrika efforts to the contrary, Madhyamaka is not a metaphysical

position, and as Candrakīrti’s critique of the Svātantrika project reveals, all

attempts at delivering a final, unassailable ontology of the Middle Way are

therefore bound to go up in flames. As shown by Nāgārjuna’s foundational

critique of dependent origination in the light of the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras,

reality simply does not support such ultimate fixtures of metaphysics.

Mādhyamikas know this, and their “position” is therefore not static but

engaged—a concrete and analytically informed approach to the experience

of dependent origination that is discernible in terms of three contexts:


Since few know how to explain this, there are few who accept it. Nevertheless,

I have understood that in general all teachings of the Victor—and in particular

the scriptures of Nāgārjuna and his heirs—can be put into practice with great

ease if one relates their statements to three contexts: (1) that of no examination

and analysis; (2) that of slight analysis on the basis of rational cognition; and (3)

that of thorough analysis on the basis of the inexpressible. 20

More than anything, Madhyamaka is a practice, a way of engaging with the

apparent causes and conditions that we keep identifying within the

emergence of ourselves, each other, and the world. In that world of

conventions, identity is constructed by assuming that factors that can

otherwise be shown to be separate are in fact one and the same. This is,

Taktsang Lotsawa specifies, what we should understand by the Prāsaṅgika

notion of “world” (‘jig rten; Skt. loka): the context of things as they appear

from the innate perspective that uncritically assumes and endorses personal

self. 21 That world of construction is convincing only as long as it is not

subjected to Madhyamaka reasoning. In the face of such analysis, its falsity

is effectively exposed and the constructs fall apart.

On the basis of this rational mode of cognition that is specific to

Madhyamaka, the idea of an ultimate truth of emptiness emerges as the

falsity of conventions is realized and subsequently juxtaposed with the

ultimate transcendence of error. The error of the Svātantrika metaphysician

is to stop here, after only slight analysis and at an uneasy point of no lasting

value. Since the duality between appearances and their true nature itself

does not stand up to reason, that duality, too, must in the end fall to

Madhyamaka analysis. The sustained process of Madhyamaka enquiry must,

in other words, be taken through to the relinquishment of even the notion of

two truths. On Takstang Lotsawa’s analysis, all of the classical declarations

of Madhyamaka philosophy are in this way made in consideration of these

three contexts: at times they express the unexamined perspective of the

world, at others they consider the two truths of appearance and emptiness

as they emerge by subjecting the world to analytic critique, and at still

others they acknowledge the inexpressible and inconceivable character of

the Madhyamaka enterprise as it emerges by leaving nothing—emptiness

included—outside the purview of critique.

According to Taktsang Lotsawa, the Madhyamaka version of conventional

and ultimate truth thus becomes relevant in a specific, practical context of

enquiry, and a reification of the two truths beyond this passing, contextual

relevance is for him antithetical to Candrakīrtian insight. Such a metaphysical

construction would, on Taktsang Lotsawa’s analysis, bar us from

acknowledging truth and knowledge where those principles otherwise

belong and are readily available—that is, in the pre-analytical world of

practical engagements. Taktsang Lotsawa’s rejection of conventional epistemic

warrant is, obviously but importantly, in terms of the Madhyamaka


systematic approach eo ipso. That is, such a denial applies to the second

and third contexts only and does not constitute a dismissal of truth and

falsity, right and wrong, up and down, et cetera within the world at large. 22

And on Taktsang Lotsawa’s reading of Candrakīrti, the world is very wide

indeed, for it includes both the secular and the realm of religion:

The Svātantrikas and everyone below them each have their own particular

understanding, and hence their explicit teachings must be conveyed in terms of

their own particular philosophical frameworks. Nonetheless, the Victor’s

teachings of the second turning in general—and in particular the scriptures of

the masters of this lineage of the Great Madhyamaka—apply the ground

(aggregates, elements, and sense sources) as well the path (conduct and means)

and the fruition (such as embodiments and activities) in the conventional

framework of no examination or analysis. 23

Just about all “the big questions” about both nature and the spirit are, in

other words, embraced by the Mādhyamika as a member of “the world”—

that is, as a member of an emerging, ever-changing epistemic community

that transcends specific religious, philosophical, or ideological affiliations.

With this pre-analytic identification of the world, we arguably arrive at the

“real world” as we know it, a world that matters and will not be ignored.

Who would dream of retreating into a hardened metaphysical position when

the fabric of this world so clearly defies it? And who can, for that matter,

doze off in fictionalist, relativist slumber? The world itself will awaken us

and make its demands.

In this Candrakīrtian conception of the world—the whole body of

things and phenomena observed or postulated—we may find a startlingly

modern—and, yes, enlightened (in the Age of Reason sense of the word)—

approach to the human condition and the prospects of knowledge. As we

noted, the great body of the holy Dharma (its entire ground, path, and

fruition) is in fact here entirely included in the pre-analytic context of the

world. It goes without saying that such a conception of the universe lends

itself well to objectification and the notion of scientific study. We may note

that, on Taktsang Lotsawa’s reading, the Prāsaṅgika account of the world

clearly discourages dismal attempts at epistemic retreat.

Nevertheless, once that mundane framework of knower and known is

subjected to Madhyamaka analysis, the framework itself disappears from the

purview of enquiry. That disappearance under analysis may make it seem as

if there were only one truth: ultimate emptiness. Yet that, too, is mere

appearance. This becomes clear by taking Madhyamaka enquiry beyond

Taktsang Lotsawa’s second context of mere partial analysis (chung zad

dpyad pa) and into the third. According to Taktsang Lotsawa, the two truths

of appearance and emptiness thus emerge as observed reality by stepping

onto the Madhyamaka path, but that path does not end in metaphysics.

Recognizing that there are really three contexts—those of no, slight, and


thorough analysis—is for Taktsang Lotsawa the key to understanding the

nature of the Madhyamaka beast:

Knowing how all frameworks relate to these three contexts will make one a

representative of the Great Madhyamaka, but without such knowledge contradictions

are compounded. 24

We need not demand that the acknowledgment of things and events—or

what Buddhist philosophy terms dependent origination—be combined with

a declaration of universal voidness, so as thereby to form an indivisible

claim to an essentially unitary metaphysical truth. As we saw, such an

endeavor is bound to fail, because the doctrine of illusion that ensues by

ascribing two distinct aspects—appearance and emptiness—to a single

substratum is in the end incoherent. If the image of illusion is meant to show

that the pillar in front of me is unreal only in a certain sense, then there

must obviously be something about it that is not just merely apparent. Yet

whatever that something might be, if consequently we hold the pillar to be

real in a way that is more than just seeming it would also be the case that

we thereby have abandoned the Madhyamaka position.

And perhaps such contradictions are quite avoidable. Philosophical

positions need not, and ultimately cannot, be reduced to truth claims only.

The complex “clusters of attitudes” (to use van Fraassen’s phrase) 25 that

carry larger philosophical programs resist such an analysis, and if our

philosophical orientation is motivated by pragmatic considerations and a

focus on what is empirically accessible, rather than metaphysical categories,

the quest for a single, context-independent truth formula would seem

particularly futile. As our experience with science may tell us, rigorous

enquiry can be meaningfully and successfully conducted without any predeclared

belief in the achievability, or even desirability, of explanatory

models that lay claim to an incontrovertible universal truth. Taktsang

Lotsawa’s account of Madhyamaka as a practice that emerges in context—a

path of reasoning that can be applied to the whole world but does not entail

any preconceived conclusion—appears highly compatible with an analysis

of philosophy as stance. If rather than anticipating a claim to metaphysical

truth we instead look for elements in a lived stance—a practical program

informed by discrete observations along the lines of emptiness and

dependent origination—much of the conceptual strangeness dissolves, and

Madhyamaka arguably emerges as both an intelligible and a feasible

project. 26

Conceived as a cognitive program, Madhyamaka can be seen to emerge

in an atmosphere of general distrust of, and discontentment with, metaphysical

explanation. As a stance that thus is developed by attending to manifest

appearances in the light of rational analysis, Madhyamaka becomes

intelligible as a philosophical orientation and a practical approach to the

contents of experience. Such thought can be tried and evaluated on


pragmatic grounds—tested for applicability and usefulness—and the Nāgārjunian

critique of causation, motion, et cetera can in this way also be

understood as a way of honing our perception of manifest phenomena. The

Madhyamaka point of view thus emerges as an actual perspective—

philosophical and/or perceptual. At the same time, such a Madhyamaka

point of view clearly cannot be construed as a dogmatic position, because it

does not occupy or lay claim to any fixed section of our conceptual or

linguistic landscape.

Notably, understanding Madhyamaka to be a programmatic commitment

of this type does not entail that the truth declared in Madhyamaka

philosophy thereby becomes “merely contextual.” Rather, what such an

understanding of Madhyamaka does entail is that truth, as such, emerges in

concrete contexts—and that this is how truth can in fact manifest as the

dispeller of falsity. Madhyamaka words and Madhyamaka thoughts can in

this way be dealt with, reckoned with, and paid attention to as concrete and

potentially efficacious factors in the world that is at hand. As inconceivable

as it appears when construed as a metaphysical position, so Madhyamaka

becomes just as tangible when understood as a stance.

At the same time, when moving along a Path of the Middle in that way,

relying on available tools of analysis and experience as accurately as we

can, we might come to a point of agreement, conceding to Sāntarakṣita that

“the ultimate evades the entire net of constructs—entity and nonentity,

arising and no arising, empty and not empty.” 27 But rather than calling for

metaphysical closure, we are then reporting our “findings,” simply but

sincerely holding them up for assessment and critique, and letting conventions

do what they do best.

A Conclusion—Nonetheless

How can the appearance of causes and conditions be reconciled with our

failure to find any under analysis? The quest for a satisfying solution to this

apparent existential paradox is to a large extent integral to the task of the

Madhyamaka commentator. But with his hermeneutics of three contexts,

Taktsang Lotsawa also exposes the longing for closure as treacherous.

Whichever way we may propose our attempt at resolution—in strings of

argument, inspired song, or through so-called noble silence—the very act

can always be seen as evidence of the very problem that the Madhyamaka

analysis originally drew our attention to. Taktsang Lotsawa’s own proposal

for how to do Madhyamaka might then be formulated as follows:

Mādhyamikas learn with the world as members of it, and this sense of

genuine participation must not be trivialized and cannot be explained away

(the lesson of context 1). Although apparent foundations are legion, analysis

nevertheless reveals that there is no way of getting to the bottom of

experience and engagement (the lesson of context 2). No matter how


skillfully or emphatically we may express the former statement, this does not

detract from the fact that also caves in on itself under analytic pressure, and

so it cannot support any constitutional conclusions (the lesson of context 3).

In Taktsang Lotsawa’s hermeneutics, any conclusion or insight that we may

take with us from our Madhyamaka experiment with reason is in this way

mundane, taking us back to the pre-analytic world of engagement and

experience. The path is tangibly concrete but does not afford any privileged

positioning vis-à-vis the natural world.

We began by reminding ourselves not to be overly hasty in drawing

conclusions, and it may be equally prudent to end on a similar note. If

indeed Madhyamaka is a practice more than a metaphysics, it seems we

will have to stay on our toes to avoid slipping off into vain construction. The

irony would be complete if we were to let our engaged Madhyamaka stance

freeze into a metaphysics of no metaphysics. Yet that risk seems to stay with

us, by the very nature of the enterprise. For as long as there is perception,

experience, and a world to live in, it seems we cannot really let down our

guard or declare our Madhyamaka project completed in any ultimately

meaningful way. Such prospects might possibly seem dissatisfying to

philosophers used to armchair comforts and the dissociated pursuit of ideas,

but probably less so to philosophers who take the findings of science to be

of some consequence for their work. Once we go along with science, any

illusions about the achievability of an ultimate bottom line seem unlikely.

The upside, then, is that by going about things in this way we can, and

should, expect an impact from our efforts that is not the least confined to

the armchair.

Notes

The thoughts expressed in this article have developed in a collaborative

effort that began a few years ago. I thank José Cabezón, Ryan Conlon,

Douglas Duckworth, Jed Forman, Jay Garfield, John Powers, Sonam

Takchoe, Tashi Tsering, and Yeshe Thabke for their continuous input and

critique. The translations included here are my own but have likewise

benefited from the group’s attention.

1 – For biographical details, see Kodani 2017.

2 – Grub mtha’ kun shes nas mtha’ bral sgrub pa. InTaktsang Lotsawa 1976.

3 – Tibetan doxography tends to divide Indian Mādhyamikas in terms of

‘thal ‘gyur ba versus rang rgyud pa, terms that have served as the basis

for the current Sanskrit constructions, Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika.

Exemplified by masters such as Bhāviveka (490/500–570 C.E.) and

Sāntarakṣita (ca. 725–ca. 788 C.E.), the latter approach characteristically

employs the framework of epistemic instruments and warrants (Skt.


pramāṇa) that is associated with Dignāga (ca. 480–ca. 540 C.E.) and

Dharmakīrti (seventh century) as integral elements in the interpretation

of Nāgārjuna. (For an introduction to Indian Buddhist pramāṇa theory,

see Dreyfus 1997, pp. 15–21; Tillemans 1999, pp. 1–18; and Dunne

2004, pp. 15–52). Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka, on the other hand, is

primarily associated with Candrakīrti and the latter’s critique of the

logico-epistemological enterprise. While references to ‘thal ‘gyur ba

and rang rgyud pa are quite ubiquitous in Tibetan Madhyamaka

literature, their definitions vary widely from author to author, and a

rich literature on the so-called “Prāsaṅgika/Svātantrika distinction”

has thus developed. On the origins, character, and developments of

this twofold interpretational model, see Ruegg 1981, Dreyfus and

McClintock 2003, Doctor 2014, and Duckworth 2019.

4 – Numerous translations exist. See, e.g., Siderits and Katsura 2013. For a

critical edition of the Sanskrit, see, e.g., de Jong 1977.

5 – See, e.g., the essays included in Cowherds 2010.

6 – See, e.g., Huntington 2003, Ferraro 2013, Shulman 2014, and Stepien

2015.

7 – Cf., e.g., Huntington 2007, Garfield 2008, Garfield and Siderits 2013,

and Ferraro 2014.

8 – Both Sāntarakṣita and his disciple, Kamalasīla, were instrumental in the

propagation and establishment of Buddhism in Tibet during the eighth

century. For discussions of their pramāṇa-theoretic Madhayamaka

projects, see, e.g., Ruegg 1981, pp. 98–100; McClintock 2003 and

2010; Tillemans 2003; Keira 2004; Blumenthal 2004 and 2009;

Mipham 2004; Coseru 2012 and 2017; and Arnold 2017.

9 – Commentary on the Ornament of the Middle Way, 73a:

The ultimate evades the entire net of constructs—entity and non-entity, arising

and no arising, empty and not empty, et cetera.

don dam pa ni dngos po dang dngos po med pa dang / skye ba dang mi skye

ba dang / stong pa dang mi stong pa la sogs pa spros pa’i dra ba mtha dag

spangs pa’o // (Critical edition in Ichigō 1985).

For studies and translations of the Ornament of the Middle Way, see

ibid., Blumenthal 2004, Mipham 2004, and Shantarakshita 2005.

10 – Ibid., 70b–71a:

kun rdzob ni sgra’i tha snyad tsam gyi bdag nyid ma yin gyi / mthong ba

dang ‘dod pa’i dngos po rten cing ‘brel bar ‘byung ba rnams ni brtag mi bzod

pas yang dag pa’i kun rdzob ste /.

lso ibid., 71a–b.


11 – Ibid., 71b:

brtag mi bzod la don byed nus pa’i dngos po nyid ni yang dag pa’i kun rdzob

ces bya ste / gang zag la sogs pa ltar gra tsam ni ma yin no zhes bya ba’o //.

12 – Cf. ibid., 64a.

13 – Freedom from Extremes (Taktsang Lotsawa 1976, 267):

rang rgyud pas me sogs kyi yul la rang ngos nas bya ba byed pa ‘di tsam rig

pas dpyad nas nan gyis smras te / brtags pa ma byas ma brtags gcig pu nyams

dga’ ba nyid du zhes yang yang smras pa tshig tsam du lus shing.

14 – Ibid., 291:

de lta na yang ‘thad pa min te / ‘di ltar dpyod pa’i rig ngo ‘dir dpyad bzod du

grub sogs phyir te / dngos po la don dam mam yul ngos nas grub pa’i skye

tshul dpyod pa la di sogs pas so /.

The sogs that appear twice in the former citation allude to the

following verses from the root text (ibid., 30):

tha snyad tsam du ma dpyad ‘dod na yang // ‘di las lhag pa’i dpyod tshul

gzhan med pas // ‘dir grub bden grub nyid du ‘gyur ba’i phyir // kun kyang

tha snyad tsam du ‘ang ‘dir mi ‘dod //.

15 – Ibid., 202–206. On the origins and nature of this classification, see

Almogi 2010.

16 – Ibid., 203–204:

sgyu ma tsam du brtags pas bslus // ‘dis kyang tshig tu brjod spangs pa’i // spros

bral ‘jam dbyangs mthong ba min // sgyu ma sgyu ma tsam min te // . . . // de

phyir sgyu ma’i rang bzhin ni // sgyu bzhin ‘di zhes brjod du med //.

Note that the sequence of the verses in Taktsang Lotsawa’s citation

differs somewhat from the way they appear in Tōh 3912 (17b–18a).

On the latter text, attributed to Sūra/Asvagoṣa, see Almogi 2010.

17 – 8b–9a.

18 – See Losang Chökyi Gyaltsen 1973, Phurpuchok 1973, and Jamyang

Shaype Dorje 1999 (translation in Hopkins 2003).

19 – Cf. references to Taktsang Lotsawa in Cowherds 2010, pp. 40, 157.

20 – Freedom from Extremes (Taktsang Lotsawa 1976, 247–248):

‘chad ma shes pas ‘dod mkhan nyung ba de’i phyir na spyir rgyal ba’i gsung

rab mtha’ dag dang khyad par ‘phags pa klu sgrub sogs rnams gnas sogs rtogs

te / ma rtags ma dpyad pa’i gnas skabs dang rigs shes kyis cung zad dpyad


pa’i gnas skabs dang / brjod bral gyis legs pa’i dpyad pa’i gnas skabs rnam la

sbyar na shin tu nyams su blang bde bas so /.

The sogs that appear twice in the former citation allude to the

following verses (ibid., 24–25):

de phyir klu sgrub yab sras sangs rgyas bskyangs // zla grags zhi ba lha yi

gzhung mchog kun // ma dpyad cung zad dpzad dang legs par dpyad // gnas

skabs gsum la sbyor bar kho bos rtogs //.

21 – Ibid., 226–227:

Thus, in this context, the term ‘mundane’ refers to cognition that, without any

inquiry or analysis, treats before and after as one due to the so-called innate

ego-grasping that has been active since beginningless time. Such a cognition

may perceive smoke above a hilltop and from such evidence infer that behind

the hill there is fire. It may treat trustworthy verbal testimony as significant

and it may understand that a cow has hooves based on hearing that a cow is

similar to a gayal. In such cases people may say, “I have warrant for this,”

and they may likewise use the words, “I have seen that ultimately this is how

it is.” Mundane epistemic warrant is like this, and when people use it they

also classify dream horses as unreal while deeming the horses they see when

awake to be real. Thus, they draw distinctions between the correct and the

incorrect. But according to Candrakīrti’s own system both kinds of horse are

definitely equally efficacious from the perspective of delusion and equally

non-existent from the perspective of reason. Therefore, it is not even remotely

possible to treat these two perspectives as the same.

thogs ma med pa nas zhugs pa’i ‘jig rten ngar ‘dzin lhan skyes zhes bya ba

ma brtags ma dpyad par snga phyi gcig tu’dzin pa’i blo’di la skabs’di’i ‘jig

rten zhes bya la / ‘dis la khar du ba mngon sum du mthong zhing de’i rtags

las la rgyab du me yod par rtogs pa dang / rang yid ches pa’i tshig don ldan

du nges pa dang / ba men dang ‘dra ba’i rgyu las ba glang yang rmig pa can

du ‘dzin pa sogs la kho bo tshad mas grub ces dang / don dam par mthong

ngo zhes sogs tha snyad byed pas / de dag ‘jig rten gyi tshad mar bzhag cing

/ de dag gis rmi lam gyi rta dang sad pa’i rta la bden rdzun du ‘byed pas yang

log gi dbye ba yang byas mod / de gnyis ‘khrul ngor don byed mnyam dang

rigs ngor med mnyam du nges pa ni zla grags rang lugs yin pas gcig tu ‘dzin

thabs cung zad kyang med do //.

22 – Ibid., 269:

Upon analysis such things are all mere deceptions of the childish and they

have no substance. Yet the framework that is acknowledged by the world and

whereby epistemic instruments are distinguished from what are not such

instruments—as well as correct from what is incorrect, or simply what is true

from what is false—is accepted just as it may be compelling from the innate

mundane perspective.


dpyad na byis pa ‘drid pa byed pa tsam du zad pas snying po med la grags pa’i

tshad ma dang tshad min gyi rnam gzhag dang / yang log gam bden rdzun

tsam zhig ‘jig rten gyi lhan skyes ngor nyams dga’ dga’ ltar khas len mod.

23 – Ibid., 248:

de yang rang rgyud pa man gyis rang rang gi rtogs pas sbyar ba sogs ni rang

rang gi dngos bstan rnams so so’i grub mtha’ dang sbyar nas bshad dgos

kyang / spyir rgyal ba’i bka’ bar pa dang sgos su dbu ma chen po pa yab

sras’di dag gi gzhung las / gzhi phung khams skye mched / lam spyod pa

thabs phyogs / ‘bras bu sku dang phrin las la sogs pa ni / ma brtags ma dpyad

pa tha snyad kyi rnam gzhag dang sbyar la /.

24 – Ibid., 266:

rnam gzhag thams cad gnas skabs gsum sbyor shes na dbu ma chen po pa

yin zhing / ma shes na’gal ba’du ba de’i phyir ....

25 – See, e.g., van Fraassen 2002, p. 59. In seeing Madhyamaka as a committed

stance that is assumed in the practical exercise of reason, I rely on van

Fraassen’s analysis of philosophical positions (see Doctor forthcoming).

26 – On Madhyamaka as an analytically developed, practical stance on the

observable, see Doctor forthcoming.

27 – See note 10.

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Doctor, Thomas H. - On Ascertaining The Stuff Of Dreams

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