23.12.2012 Views

Safety Considerations Guide for Trident v2 Systems - TUV ...

Safety Considerations Guide for Trident v2 Systems - TUV ...

Safety Considerations Guide for Trident v2 Systems - TUV ...

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

30 Chapter 2 Application <strong>Guide</strong>lines<br />

• Use of the maintenance override capability should be documented in a DCS or<br />

TriStation 1131 log. The documentation should include:<br />

— Begin- and end-time stamps of the maintenance override.<br />

— Identification of the maintenance engineer or operator who activates a maintenance<br />

override. If the in<strong>for</strong>mation cannot be printed, it should be entered in a workpermit<br />

or maintenance log.<br />

— Tag name of the signal being overridden.<br />

— Communication packages that are different from a type-approved Modbus should<br />

include CRC, address check, and check of the communication time frame.<br />

— Loss of communication should lead to a warning to the operator and maintenance<br />

engineer. After loss of communication, a time-delayed removal of the override<br />

should occur after a warning to the operator.<br />

• For more in<strong>for</strong>mation about maintenance override operation, please see the TÜV web<br />

site at http://www.tuv-fs.com/m_o202.pdf.<br />

<strong>Safety</strong> Controller Boundary<br />

The boundary of the safety controller includes the External Termination Panels (ETPs) and<br />

interconnecting cables. Triconex safety controllers must be used with approved ETPs and cables<br />

only. The use of unapproved, unauthorized cables and/or ETPs compromises the TÜV safety<br />

certification and potentially the ability of the logic solver to respond to safety demands. False<br />

trips resulting from the use of unapproved components can cause end-user economic loss.<br />

CAUTION<br />

Background<br />

IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 define a programmable electronic <strong>Safety</strong> Instrumented System (SIS) as<br />

consisting of sensors, logic solvers, and final control elements, as shown in this figure.<br />

Sensors<br />

Figure 7 Simplified SIS<br />

Together, these elements implement <strong>Safety</strong> Instrumented Functions (SIF) of the target <strong>Safety</strong><br />

Integrity Level (SIL). In order to implement a safety-certified SIF, the system designer must<br />

choose safety-certified loop elements, including sensors, final elements, logic solvers, and other<br />

interconnecting components.<br />

<strong>Safety</strong> <strong>Considerations</strong> <strong>Guide</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>Trident</strong> <strong>v2</strong> <strong>Systems</strong><br />

When using fanned-out interface cables or third-party ETPs—such as<br />

those from P&F or MTL—please consult the Invensys Global Customer<br />

Support (GCS) Center <strong>for</strong> the safety-boundary impact of using such<br />

cables or ETPs.<br />

Logic<br />

Solver<br />

Final<br />

Elements

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!