API RP 581 - 3rd Ed.2016 - Add.2-2020 - Risk-Based Inspection Methodology

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5-64 API RECOMMENDED PRACTICE 581Damage State of the Protected EquipmentA direct link to the current condition, or damage state, of the protected equipment is critical to the evaluationof the consequence of PRD failure. Damage for each protected vessel is measured by a DF, D f , which iscalculated considering each of the damage mechanisms (corrosion, cracking, creep, etc.) that are applicableto the protected equipment. The higher the overall DF of the protected equipment, the more likely theequipment is to experience undesirable consequences as a result of a PRD that is in a failed state (stuck)upon demand. Part 2 of this document provides details on calculation of the DF and the probability of loss ofcontainment from fixed equipment.Where damage assessment has not been completed in conjunction with an RBI analysis of the PRD, thenassumptions of the damage state of the protected equipment must be made as described in Section 6.2.5 b).Overpressure Potential for Overpressure Demand CasesFor API 581 to provide a relative ranking of risk between PRDs, the analysis must include an assessment ofthe overpressure demand cases (overpressure scenarios) that are applicable to each PRD. In other words,what process upsets are the device protecting against and how critical would the effect on the protectedequipment be if the device were to fail to open upon demand.The PRD methodology makes a clear distinction between criticality of the overpressure demand cases thatthe device is protecting against, i.e. why the device is there. For example, a PRD that protects equipmentand piping for the blocked discharge demand case downstream of a pump is considered to be less criticalthan a device that is protecting a reactor from a runaway chemical reaction since the amount of overpressureexpected as a result of a PRD failure to open upon demand would be much less. Likewise, a device that isonly protecting piping against thermal relief is much less critical than a device that is protecting low-pressureequipment from gas breakthrough from a high-pressure source due to control valve failure.For most of the overpressure demand cases, the potential overpressure that results when a PRD fails toopen upon demand from an overpressure event may be calculated. The logic for determining the potentialoverpressure for each of the overpressure demand cases is provided in Table 6.3. In many situations, thepotential overpressure will approach the burst pressure (estimated to be design margin times the MAWP ) ofthe protected equipment since the overpressure demand case is not self-limiting. In other overpressurescenarios, such as a blocked discharge downstream of a centrifugal pump, the potential overpressure willlimit itself to the deadhead pressure of the pump, which is typically 1.3 times the normal discharge pressureof the pump.This part of the analysis requires a thorough review of the unit pressure-relief study and piping andinstrumentation diagrams (P&IDs) and should be performed by personnel qualified and experienced in thedesign and installation of pressure-relief systems.In general, the determination of the potential overpressure, P o , as a result of PRD failure to open upondemand is a function of the following.a) Type of Upstream Overpressure Source—For example, centrifugal pumps, steam supply headers,upstream pressure vessels, etc.b) Upstream Source Pressures—These include the steam supply pressure, control valve upstreampressure, pressure from the high-pressure side of a heat exchanger, and deadhead pressure forcentrifugal rotating equipment. Additionally, credit for PRDs on upstream equipment can be assumed tobe available to limit overpressure.c) Heat Sources, Types, and Temperatures—In cases of blocking-in equipment, the heat source supplyingenergy to the system has a significant impact on the potential overpressure. For example, solarheat/energy supplied in a thermal relief scenario will typically result in flange leaks and the overpressureends up nominally being the normal operating pressure of the system. On the other hand, if the heatsource is a fired heater, the overpressure can build until a rupture occurs (i.e. overpressure exceeding

RISK-BASED INSPECTION METHODOLOGY, PART 5—SPECIAL EQUIPMENT 5-65the burst pressure of the protected equipment). Other heat sources include steam reboilers to towersand the hot side of heat exchangers.d) Fluid Bubble Point Pressure—In many overpressure scenarios, the pressure buildup is limited to thebubble point pressure of the contained fluid at the temperature of the heat/energy source being suppliedto the process.Multiple Relief Device InstallationsWhen the relief requirements for the process are such that multiple PRDs are needed to handle the requiredrelief capacity, there is a reduction of risk since the probability that all of the PRDs are in a failed state upondemand will be reduced. The protected equipment will have a higher probability that some of the PRDcapacity is available on demand to minimize the amount of overpressure during an overpressure demandcase.When a piece of equipment is protected by multiple PRDs, the calculated POFOD for any one specific PRDin the multiple device installation will remain the same. However, an adjustment is made to the potentialoverpressure as a result of the PRD failing to open on demand. This multiple device installation adjustment,F a , takes into consideration common cause failures and also considers the likelihood that other PRDs of themultiple device installation will be available to minimize the potential overpressure.FprdAa = (5.114)prdAtotalThis multiple device installation factor reduces the potential overpressure that is likely to occur by assumingthat some of the installed PRD relief area will be available if the PRD under consideration fails to open upondemand. The multiple device installation adjustment factor has a minimum reduction value of 0.25. Thepresence of the square root takes into consideration that the PRDs in a multiple device installation may havecommon failure modes. The reduction in overpressure as a result of multiple PRDs is in accordance withEquation (5.115):Po,j = Fa ⋅ Po,j(5.115)The multiple installation adjustment factor, F a , is a ratio of the area of a single PRD (being analyzed) to theoverall areas of all PRDs in the multiple setup.This reduced overpressure should be implemented when determining the protected equipment failurefrequency. However, it should not be considered when determining the overpressure factor, F op , which isused to determine the POFOD in Section 6.2.4 i.Calculation of COF to OpenConsequence calculations are performed for each overpressure demand case that is applicable to the PRD.These consequence calculations are described in Part 3 of this document for each piece of equipment that isprotected by the PRD being evaluated and are performed at higher potential overpressures as described inSection 6.4.1.The overpressure for each demand case that may result from a failure of a PRD to open upon demand hastwo effects. The probability of loss of containment from the protected equipment can go up significantly asdiscussed in Section 6.2.5. Secondly, the COF as a result of the higher overpressures also increases. Themagnitude of the release increases in proportion to the overpressure, thus increasing the consequence ofevents such as jet fires, pool fires, and VCEs. Additionally, the amount of explosive energy released as aresult of a vessel rupture increases in proportion to the amount of overpressure. Part 3 provides detail for theconsequences associated with loss of containment from equipment components.

RISK-BASED INSPECTION METHODOLOGY, PART 5—SPECIAL EQUIPMENT 5-65

the burst pressure of the protected equipment). Other heat sources include steam reboilers to towers

and the hot side of heat exchangers.

d) Fluid Bubble Point Pressure—In many overpressure scenarios, the pressure buildup is limited to the

bubble point pressure of the contained fluid at the temperature of the heat/energy source being supplied

to the process.

Multiple Relief Device Installations

When the relief requirements for the process are such that multiple PRDs are needed to handle the required

relief capacity, there is a reduction of risk since the probability that all of the PRDs are in a failed state upon

demand will be reduced. The protected equipment will have a higher probability that some of the PRD

capacity is available on demand to minimize the amount of overpressure during an overpressure demand

case.

When a piece of equipment is protected by multiple PRDs, the calculated POFOD for any one specific PRD

in the multiple device installation will remain the same. However, an adjustment is made to the potential

overpressure as a result of the PRD failing to open on demand. This multiple device installation adjustment,

F a , takes into consideration common cause failures and also considers the likelihood that other PRDs of the

multiple device installation will be available to minimize the potential overpressure.

F

prd

A

a = (5.114)

prd

Atotal

This multiple device installation factor reduces the potential overpressure that is likely to occur by assuming

that some of the installed PRD relief area will be available if the PRD under consideration fails to open upon

demand. The multiple device installation adjustment factor has a minimum reduction value of 0.25. The

presence of the square root takes into consideration that the PRDs in a multiple device installation may have

common failure modes. The reduction in overpressure as a result of multiple PRDs is in accordance with

Equation (5.115):

Po,j = Fa ⋅ Po,j

(5.115)

The multiple installation adjustment factor, F a , is a ratio of the area of a single PRD (being analyzed) to the

overall areas of all PRDs in the multiple setup.

This reduced overpressure should be implemented when determining the protected equipment failure

frequency. However, it should not be considered when determining the overpressure factor, F op , which is

used to determine the POFOD in Section 6.2.4 i.

Calculation of COF to Open

Consequence calculations are performed for each overpressure demand case that is applicable to the PRD.

These consequence calculations are described in Part 3 of this document for each piece of equipment that is

protected by the PRD being evaluated and are performed at higher potential overpressures as described in

Section 6.4.1.

The overpressure for each demand case that may result from a failure of a PRD to open upon demand has

two effects. The probability of loss of containment from the protected equipment can go up significantly as

discussed in Section 6.2.5. Secondly, the COF as a result of the higher overpressures also increases. The

magnitude of the release increases in proportion to the overpressure, thus increasing the consequence of

events such as jet fires, pool fires, and VCEs. Additionally, the amount of explosive energy released as a

result of a vessel rupture increases in proportion to the amount of overpressure. Part 3 provides detail for the

consequences associated with loss of containment from equipment components.

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