The 12th International Conference on Environmental ... - Events

Abstracts Session 41
mined in an ancient salt bed more than 2,000 feet underground. This paper provides a brief history of WIPP with an overview of
both the technical and political hurdles that had to be overcome before the idea of a permanent disposal facility became reality. <strong>The</strong>
paper focuses primarily on the safe uneventful transportation program that has move 100,000-plus containers of TRU waste from
various US Department of Energy generator and/or storage sites across the United States to southeastern New Mexico.
4) RESEARCH REACTOR SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL SHIPMENT FROM THE CZECH REPUBLIC
TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION - 16195
Frantisek Svitak, Karel Svoboda, Josef Podlaha, Nuclear Research Institute Rez plc. (Czech Republic)
In May 2004, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative agreement was signed by the governments of the United States and the
Russian Federation. <strong>The</strong> goal of this initiative is to minimize, in cooperation with the <strong>International</strong> Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
in Vienna, the existing threat of misuse of nuclear and radioactive materials for terrorist purposes, particularly highly enriched uranium
(HEU), fresh and spent nuclear fuel (SNF), and plutonium, which have been stored in a number of countries. Within the
framework of the initiative, HEU materials and SNF from research reactors of Russian origin will be transported back to the Russian
Federation for reprocessing/liquidation.
<strong>The</strong> program is designated as the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return (RRRFR) Program and is similar to the U.S. Foreign
Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Acceptance Program, which is underway for nuclear materials of United States origin. <strong>The</strong>se
RRRFR activities are carried out under the responsibilities of the respective ministries (i.e., U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and
Russian Federation Rosatom).
<strong>The</strong> Czech Republic and the Nuclear Research Institute Rez, plc (NRI) joined Global Threat Reduction Initiative in 2004. During
NRIs more than 50 years of existence, radioactive and nuclear materials had accumulated and had been safely stored on its
grounds. In 1995, the Czech regulatory body, State Office for Nuclear Safety (SONS), instructed NRI that all ecological burdens
from its past activities must be addressed and that the SNF from the research reactor LVR-15 had to be transported for reprocessing.
At the end of November 2007, all these activities culminated with the unique shipment to the Russian Federation of 527 fuel
assemblies of SNF type EK-10 (enrichment 10% U235) and IRT-M (enrichment 36% and 80% U235) and 657 irradiated fuel rods
of EK-10 fuel, which were used in LVR-15 reactor.
5) THERMAL SAFETY ANALYSIS OF A DRY STORAGE CASK FOR THE
KOREAN STANDARD SPENT FUEL - 16159
Jeong-Hun Cha, B. S. Youn, S. N. Kim, Kyunghee University (Korea);
K. W. Choi, Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (Korea)
A conceptual dry storage facility, which is based on a commercial dry storage facility, was designed for the Korea standard
spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and preliminary thermal safety analysis was performed in this study. To perform the preliminary thermal
analysis, a thermal analysis method was proposed. <strong>The</strong> thermal analysis method consists of 2 parts. By using the method, the surface
temperature of the storage canister corresponding to the SNF clad temperature was calculated and the adequate air duct area
was decided using the calculation result. <strong>The</strong> initial temperature of the facility was calculated and the fire condition and half air
duct blockage were analyzed.
6) CONTINGENCY OPTIONS FOR THE DRYING, CONDITIONING AND PACKAGING
OF MAGNOX SPENT FUEL IN THE UK - 16331
Jenny E. Morris, Phil Richardson, Stephen Wickham, Galson Sciences Ltd. (UK);
Colin Rhodes, NDA (UK); Mike Newland, UKAEA (UK)
<strong>The</strong> UK Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) is responsible for safe and secure management of spent nuclear fuel.
Magnox spent fuel is held at some Magnox reactor sites and at Sellafield where it is reprocessed using a number of facilities. It is
intended that all Magnox fuel will be reprocessed, as described in the published Magnox Operating Plan (MOP). In the event, however,
that a failure occurs within the reprocessing plant, the NDA has initiated a programme of activities to explore alternative contingency
options for the management of wetted Magnox spent fuel.
Magnox fuel comprises metallic uranium bar clad in a magnesium alloy, both of which corrode if exposed to oxygen or water.
Consequently, contingency options are required to consider how best to manage the issues associated with the reactivity of the metals.
Questions of whether Magnox spent fuel needs to be dried, how it might be conditioned, how it might be packaged, and held
in temporary storage until a disposal facility becomes available, all require attention. A review of potential contingency options for
Magnox fuel was conducted by Galson Sciences Ltd, UKAEA and the NDA.
During storage in the presence of water, the corrosion of Magnox fuel produces hydrogen (H2) gas, which requires careful
management. When uranium reacts with hydrogen in a reducing environment, the formation of uranium hydride (UH3) may occur,
which under some circumstances can be pyrophoric, and might create hazards which may affect subsequent retrieval and/or repackaging
(e.g. for disposal). Other factors that may affect the choice of a viable contingency option include criticality safety, environmental
impacts, security and Safeguards and economic considerations.
7) NUCLEAR SAFETY AT THE HEART OF THE DESIGN OF THE NEW SELLAFIELD
PRODUCT AND RESIDUE STORE - 16077
Alec Glover, Sellafield Limited (UK)
A new facility for the storage of multi tonne quantities of fissile material has been constructed in the UK on the NDA owned
Sellafield Site: <strong>The</strong> Sellafield Product & Residue Store(SPRS) will cost £260M to construct and enter active operations in early
2011. <strong>The</strong> asset will serve to provide safe, secure storage facilities over a design life of at least fifty years.
<strong>The</strong> author will present a technical presentation which describes the following:
• <strong>The</strong> context of the SPRS facility in UK Government strategy for the longer term management and storage of product and
residues.
• <strong>The</strong> hazards and key stakeholder constraints impacting upon the facility.
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