Respondent's Brief - Washington State Courts
Respondent's Brief - Washington State Courts Respondent's Brief - Washington State Courts
was of consequence in the context of the other facts and the applicable substantive law. Because, flo "[ be relevant, evidence must" both (1) have " a tendency to prove or disprove a fact" (2) that is "of consequence in the context of the other facts and the applicable substantive law (materiality)," Rice, 48 Wn. App, 7, 12, 737 P.2d 726 (1987), and the proposed evidence met neither of these requirements, the court properly found that such evidence was not relevant. Therefore, the court properly denied the defendant's motion to admit evidence that McCutcheon was employed as an "exotic dancer", and evidence of CPS involvement and should be affirmed. Although the defendant faults the trial court for comparing her analysis of the admissibility of the disputed evidence to the rape shield statute, Brief of Appellant, p. 24-25, the defendant seems to mistake the court's analogy for its substantive analysis. The trial court spent no more than two sentences on this rape-shield analogy before giving a detailed ruling based solely on relevance. RP 288-89. Because its ruling was not based on the rape-shield statute, its analogy is not relevant. Moreover, even had the trial court's decision regarding the admissibility of the disputed evidence been based on the rape-shield statute, it can be affirmed on any ground the record adequately supports even if the trial court did not consider that ground. Costich, 152 Wn.2d at 477. Therefore, the court's 29 - optest-prosmiscsptrialmrdaniel.doc
mention of the rape-shield statute is simply not relevant to appellate review of its decision. Although the defendant argues that the disputed evidence "bore directly upon the credibility to C.D.' s allegations and McCutcheon's bias," Brief of Appellant, p, 27, the record demonstrates otherwise. Indeed, evidence of McCutcheon's drug use or addiction, her employment, and the CPS investigation, has nothing to do with C.D.' s credibility, and the defendant has failed to show otherwise. While the defendant argues that the evidence of "McCutcheon's drug addiction, the finding that she was negligent in parenting C.D., and her 15-month involvement with CPS" gave McCutcheon an incentive to offer testimony favorable to the State's case," Brief of Appellant, p. 25- 26, he does not explain why this is true. In fact, the opposite conclusion seems warranted. Assuming that CPS had found McCutcheon negligent in parenting C.D., it would seem that McCutcheon would have an incentive to provide testimony favorable to the defendant. Indeed, if the defendant had been acquitted, then McCutcheon could demonstrate to CPS that C.D. had not been exposed to child molestation while in her care. This would undercut any finding of negligence on her part and vindicate McCutcheon. Although the defendant cites the fact that McCutcheon told C.D. that she was going to "take Dennis to jail" as evidence of McCutcheon's bias, 30 - optest-pros m iscsp trial-m cdan iel. doc
- Page 1 and 2: 930 Tacoma Avenue South Room 946 Ta
- Page 3 and 4: 2. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED
- Page 5 and 6: State v. Gregory, 158 Wn.2d 759, 84
- Page 7 and 8: Rules and Regulations CrR3. 3 .....
- Page 9 and 10: The court originally set Defendant'
- Page 11 and 12: State made a similar motion, RP 74-
- Page 13 and 14: 522-43, Elizabeth Wendell, RP 543-6
- Page 15 and 16: RP 339, 341. She testified that she
- Page 17 and 18: touching to S.D. RP 428-29. She tol
- Page 19 and 20: witnesses and arranged for a forens
- Page 21 and 22: C. ARGUMENT. 1. THE TRIAL COURT PRO
- Page 23 and 24: expansive view of claims that testi
- Page 25 and 26: Therefore, communicating to the jur
- Page 27 and 28: held that testimony describing "[t]
- Page 29 and 30: 2. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED
- Page 31 and 32: To be relevant, evidence must meet
- Page 33 and 34: RP 257. See RP 254-58, 261-62, 283-
- Page 35: ecollection of that molestation, an
- Page 39 and 40: 3. THE DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO MEET
- Page 41 and 42: the issues in the case, the evidenc
- Page 43 and 44: indicator for child sexual abuse."
- Page 45 and 46: emphasis added). T]he decision to g
- Page 47 and 48: and judges." Kenyon, 167 Wn.2d at 1
- Page 49 and 50: untenable reasons, "' State v. Flin
- Page 51 and 52: obtained via in camera review." CP
- Page 53 and 54: At that July 19, 2010 motion, the d
- Page 55 and 56: and judges at the time of that cont
- Page 57 and 58: Certificate of Service: The undersi
- Page 59 and 60: 1111111111111111111111 0 33454459 O
- Page 61 and 62: 09- 1 33587523 ORCTD 01- 19-10 SUPE
- Page 63: JUN 1 R " SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHING
- Page 66 and 67: APPENDIX E
- Page 68 and 69: APPENDIX F
- Page 70 and 71: APPENDIX G
- Page 72 and 73: APPENDIX H
- Page 74 and 75: APPENDIX I
- Page 76 and 77: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE
- Page 78 and 79: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE
- Page 80 and 81: STATE OF WASHINGTON, DENNIS MCDANIE
- Page 82 and 83: STATE OF WASHINGTON, DENNIS MCDANIE
was of consequence in the context of the other facts and the applicable<br />
substantive law.<br />
Because, flo "[ be relevant, evidence must" both (1) have " a<br />
tendency to prove or disprove a fact" (2) that is "of consequence in the<br />
context of the other facts and the applicable substantive law (materiality),"<br />
Rice, 48 Wn. App, 7, 12, 737 P.2d 726 (1987), and the proposed evidence<br />
met neither of these requirements, the court properly found that such<br />
evidence was not relevant. Therefore, the court properly denied the<br />
defendant's motion to admit evidence that McCutcheon was employed as<br />
an "exotic dancer", and evidence of CPS involvement and should be<br />
affirmed.<br />
Although the defendant faults the trial court for comparing her<br />
analysis of the admissibility of the disputed evidence to the rape shield<br />
statute, <strong>Brief</strong> of Appellant, p. 24-25, the defendant seems to mistake the<br />
court's analogy for its substantive analysis. The trial court spent no more<br />
than two sentences on this rape-shield analogy before giving a detailed<br />
ruling based solely on relevance. RP 288-89. Because its ruling was not<br />
based on the rape-shield statute, its analogy is not relevant. Moreover,<br />
even had the trial court's decision regarding the admissibility of the<br />
disputed evidence been based on the rape-shield statute, it can be affirmed<br />
on any ground the record adequately supports even if the trial court did not<br />
consider that ground. Costich, 152 Wn.2d at 477. Therefore, the court's<br />
29 - optest-prosmiscsptrialmrdaniel.doc
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