Respondent's Brief - Washington State Courts
Respondent's Brief - Washington State Courts
Respondent's Brief - Washington State Courts
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
Therefore, communicating to the jury that a particular child seems to be<br />
able to distinguish between the truth and a lie and seems to know that it is<br />
preferable to tell the truth, is not the same as communicating to the jury<br />
that this child is actually telling the truth. Indeed, Thomas never testified<br />
that C.D. was telling the truth or that Thomas believed that she was. See<br />
RP 565-91.<br />
Therefore, Thomas did not offer testimony in the form of an<br />
opinion regarding the veracity of the victim, See Demery, 144 Wn.2d at<br />
759-65. Rather, she simply described her interview protocol, and thus,<br />
provided the necessary context for the jury to assess for itself the<br />
reasonableness of the victim's responses,<br />
In Kirkman, a case consolidated with Candia for review, our<br />
Supreme Court found that such testimony does not directly address<br />
credibility, and thus rejected an argument virtually identical to that<br />
advanced by Defendant here. Kirkman, 159 Wn.2d 918, 927, 155 P.3d<br />
125 (2007). Compare <strong>Brief</strong> of Appellant, p. 11-17.<br />
In the Kirkman case, Detective Kerr testified "about the<br />
competency protocol that he gave to [the victim], relating to her ability to<br />
tell the truth." Id. at 930. When asked why he administered such a<br />
protocol, he responded, "[b]ecause I'm —I'm interested in —in this person<br />
being able to distinguish between truth and lies," Id. Kerr went on to<br />
testify that the victim "was able to distinguish between the truth and a lie<br />
18- optest-prosmiscsptrialmedaniel,doc
Change language