UNHCR's ELIGIBILITY GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSING THE ...

Sunnis willing to denounce violence and releasing those detainees found innocent, 485 the
ISF continues to be accused of carrying out indiscriminate arrest campaigns against Sunni
Arabs. There have been consistent reports about the systematic use of torture, and its
prevalence has been “widely acknowledged as a major problem by Iraqi officials”. 486 In
fact, the situation is worse for detainees held by the Iraqi authorities, in unofficial detention
centres of the Ministry of Interior. The vast majority of these are Sunni Arabs, mostly
accused of “terrorism”. 487
2. Members and Associates of the Ba’ath Party and the Former Regime
Under the former Government’s rule, the State, the armed forces and the security and
intelligence apparatus were dominated by the Ba’ath Party, which served as the President’s
political instrument to control the country. No special qualifications were required to
become a member of the Party, and the regime consistently and systematically expanded
membership. Members perceived by the Government to have been particularly loyal
received preferential treatment in key aspects of life.
Thousands of former Ba’ath Party members in governmental establishments, universities
and schools (including the RCC, National Assembly, members of the former judicial and
prosecutorial system organs, the military, paramilitary, and security and intelligence
services) lost their jobs as a result of the de-Ba’athification process. This happened, even
though many of those who joined the Party had done so out of necessity and not ideological
conviction. Thousands of Iraqis, however, were deeply involved in the Ba’ath Party’s
crimes as they rose to positions of authority. While any Iraqi could join the Ba’ath Party, it
was largely dominated by Arab Sunnis, in particular its higher ranks. Although the total
number is unknown, it is estimated that between one and 2.5 million Iraqis were members
of the Ba’ath Party. 488
On 16 May 2003, the CPA’s Order No. 1 outlawed the Ba’ath Party. 489 Members of the
four senior Ba’ath Party ranks 490 and anyone in the top three levels of management in the
485 See, for example, Jurist, Holly Manges Jones, Iraq reconciliation plan offers amnesty, bans rights
violations and torture, 25 June 2006, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2006/06/iraq-reconciliation-planoffers.php;
Lionel Beehner, The Debate Over Granting Amnesty to Iraqi Insurgents, CFR, 22 June 2006,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/10965/debate_over_granting_amnesty_to_iraqi_insurgents.html.
486 UNAMI HRO, August 2006 Human Rights Report, p. 15-18, in particular para. 64, see above footnote 26.
487 UNAMI HRO, December 2006 Human Rights Report, p. 18, see above footnote 10. See also: Ellen
Knickmeyer, U.S. Envoy Calls Torture Severe And Extensive at 2 Iraqi Prisons, The Washington Post,
14 December 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/13/AR20051213004
29.html.
488 Doug Struck, “My Hands Are Not Stained With Blood”, The Washington Post, 3 February 2005,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A59279-2005Feb3.html.
489 CPA Order No. 1, see above footnote 82. Article 7 (I) of the Constitution of Iraq bans the “Saddamist
Ba’ath in Iraq”; however, the Ba’ath Party de facto was never dissolved and was later reorganized with a new
structure. After the execution of former President Saddam Hussein on 30 December 2006, the Ba’ath Party
announced that it had appointed Izzat Al-Douri, its Deputy Secretary-General, to succeed Saddam Hussein as
the Party’s Secretary-General. See: Al Jazeera, Iraq’s Baath party names new leader, 1 January 2007,
http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/4878159A-9C63-4F91-AB54-5915374D5149.htm; see also: Anthony
H. Cordesman, The Iraqi Insurgency and the Risk of Civil War: Who Are the Players?, CSIS, Working Draft,
revised 1 March 2006, p. 48, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060301_iraginsurgplayers.pdf.
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