UNHCR's ELIGIBILITY GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSING THE ...
UNHCR's ELIGIBILITY GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSING THE ...
UNHCR's ELIGIBILITY GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSING THE ...
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government offices, 441 and changing the demographics with the ultimate goal of<br />
incorporating Kirkuk and other mixed areas into the Region of Kurdistan. 442 The Centre for<br />
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) noted that the Kurdish parties “present the threat<br />
of soft ethnic cleansing in the area of Kirkuk.” 443<br />
It has been reported that KDP offices have been opened in all villages in the Ninewa Plain,<br />
Kurdish armed forces (Peshmerga) patrol the streets of Kirkuk and street signs in Kirkuk<br />
have been changed from Arabic to Kurdish. 444 The issue of return of persons displaced by<br />
the former Government, as foreseen in Article 58 of the TAL, has particularly sparked<br />
tensions and disputes over the ownership of homes and lands and is expected to further<br />
increase in view of the popular referendum. The Kurdish parties have been accused of<br />
being responsible for the return of hundreds of thousands of Kurds to Kirkuk and other<br />
disputed areas, including of persons that had never been expelled by the former regime. 445<br />
&ucat=2&; Christian and Shabak communities claim that in the 15 December 2005 elections, approximately<br />
500 non-resident Kurds entered the polling centre in Bartilla and over 200 had voted by the time MNF<br />
intervened and stopped the illegal voting; see AINA, Kurds Block Assyrians, Shabaks From Police Force in<br />
Northern Iraq *PIC*, 24 June 2006, http://www.betnahrain.org/bbs/index.pl/noframes/read/5520.<br />
441 The Washington Institute reported that persons loyal to the Kurdish parties occupy key civil service<br />
positions in Kirkuk and are paid with funds from the budgets of the KRG. Furthermore, ethnic Kurds control<br />
Kirkuk’s intelligence and security forces. In 2005, the Kurdish chief of Kirkuk’s police said that 40 percent of<br />
Kirkuk’s police force was loyal to the two Kurdish political parties; see: Cagaptay and Fink, see above<br />
footnote 44. Furthermore, Christian and Shabak communities claimed in 2006 that the local police forces in<br />
the districts of Hamdaniya and Tilkaif in the Ninewa Plain were dominated by Kurds loyal to the KDP while<br />
they were underrepresented. Orders by the Ministry of Interior to recruit additional policemen, including from<br />
Ninewa’s minority groups were reportedly delayed by the Kurdish-dominated Governorate Council and the<br />
Police Chief. The order was finally carried out June 2006, however, Christian and Shabak recruits were<br />
assigned to Mosul City instead of their hometowns, which remained under the control of the Kurdish militias;<br />
see AINA, Kurds Block Assyrians, Shabaks From Police Force in Northern Iraq *PIC*, 24 June 2006,<br />
http://www.betnahrain.org/bbs/index.pl/noframes/read/5520.<br />
442 See, for example, Iraqi Turkmen Human Rights Research Foundation (SOITM), Violation of Human<br />
Rights of the Turkmen in Iraq, Report to the Working Group on Minorities, 12 th Session, 30 July 2006,<br />
http://www.turkmen.nl/1A_soitm/OSt.49-G3006.doc; ibidem, Iraqi Turkoman: “US-made” Kerkuk City<br />
Council decides once again in favor of the Kurds, 11 January 2005, http://www.unpo.org/<br />
article.php?id=1718.<br />
443 Anthony H. Cordesman, Iraq’s Evolving Insurgency and the Risk of Civil War, CSIS, Arleigh A. Burke<br />
Chair in Strategy, Working Draft, revised 26 April 2006, p. xii, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060424_<br />
iraqinsurgrpt.pdf.<br />
444 Cagaptay and Fink, see above footnote 44. See also: UNAMI HRO, August 2006 Human Rights Report,<br />
p. 13, see above footnote 26; Al-Qaddo, see above footnote 209.<br />
445 Numbers of Kurdish returnees vary, some sources speak of some 120,000 Kurdish families, see ITF, Iraqi<br />
Turkmen: Results Notification of the Consultation Meeting, 5 September 2006, http://www.unpo.org/<br />
article.php?id=5330; SOITM, Iraqi Turkoman, see above footnote 442. Rashad Mandan Omer, the former<br />
Iraqi minister for Science and Technology, in his report to UNAMI stated that “more than 250000 Kurds”<br />
came to Kirkuk after the fall of the former regime; see: Rashad Mandan Omer, The Turkmen Issue of Kerkuk,<br />
report submitted to UNAMI in 2006, published on the website of the SOITM at<br />
http://www.turkmen.nl/1A_soitm/ROM.doc. Ali Mehdi Sadek, a Turkoman member of the Kirkuk<br />
Governorate Council claims that the population increase in Kirkuk Governorate, from 850,000 in 2003 to<br />
1,150,000 in 2006, could only partially be justified by the return of formerly expelled Kurds, saying that an<br />
additional 40,000 Kurdish families had come to Kirkuk; see: ICG, Iraq and the Kurds: The Brewing Battle<br />
over Kirkuk, Middle East Report No. 56, 18 July 2006, p. 12, http://www.crisisgroup. org/library/documents/<br />
middle_east___north_africa/iraq_iran_gulf/56_iraq_and_the_kurds___the_brewing_battle_over_kirkuk.pdf.<br />
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