UNHCR's ELIGIBILITY GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSING THE ...

underscored how explosive the conflict between Iraq’s Sunni and Shi’ite communities has
become and how little the ISF is able to do in preventing the violence, if they are not
themselves involved. 184
Both Sunni and Shi’ite armed groups use violence to drive the other community from their
areas. Systematic forced displacement serves as a tool to increase territorial influence and
political leverage. 185 According to the Brookings Institution, “(t)he displacements clearly
help further the political agenda of these extremist groups.” 186
UNAMI reported that
“(T)his forced displacement has been achieved by means of large scale attacks targeting
civilians, kidnappings, extra-judicial killings, dropping of threatening leaflets, destruction
of properties, and intimidation.” 187
Both Sunni and Shi’ite armed groups are held responsible for widespread human rights
violations directed against members of the other community or their own members if
considered as “traitors”. Both sides operate largely with impunity. On the one hand, the
MNF/ISF are largely unable to quell Sunni insurgent violence against civilians. On the
other hand, consistent reports suggest that the Shi’ite-dominated ISF are infiltrated by
militias, which collude with death squads in targeting Sunnis, e.g. through the facilitation of
movement despite curfews and provision of advance warnings of upcoming security
operations. 188
Criminal gangs often work hand-in-hand with armed groups and militias, bolstering the
latters’ sectarian agenda. 189
iv) Affected Areas
Particularly affected by the ongoing violence and sectarian cleansing are areas with
(formerly) mixed populations such as the cities of Baghdad, Mosul and Basrah, the
Governorates of Salah Al-Din and Diyala 190 (in particular Samarra, Tikrit, Balad, Dujail
and Baqouba and Miqdadiyah) as well as Yusufiyah, Latifiyah and Mahmoudiyah in the socalled
“Triangle of Death” south of Baghdad in the Governorate of Babel. 191 Sectarian
184
Nancy A. Youssef, U.S. forces move to quell sectarian violence in Balad, McClatchy Newspapers,
17 October 2006, http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/15782387.htm.
185
See, for example, Parker and Hamdani, see above footnote 104.
186
Al-Khalidi and Tanner, p. 1, see above footnote 161. See also: ICG, After Baker-Hamilton, p. 9, see
above footnote 111, which states that “among Iraqis, the feeling is widespread that the violence is more a
function of expedient calculations by politicians obsessed with their short-term survival than a deep-seated
and long-term animosity between Sunnis and Shi’ites.”
187
UNAMI HRO, December 2006 Human Rights Report, p. 8, see above footnote 10.
188
US Department of Defense, p. 18, see above footnote 73; Al-Khalidi and Tanner, p. 7-8, see above
footnote 161.
189
See “Criminal Groups”.
190
On the situation in the Governorate of Diyala, and in particular the town of Baqouba, see: Oppel Jr., see
above footnote 123.
191
Al-Khalidi and Tanner, p. 16, see above footnote 161.
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