UNHCR's ELIGIBILITY GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSING THE ...

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politicians accusing each other of stirring sectarian tensions. 163 In addition to the insurgency, the lack of rule of law, the election of a sectarian-based government and its inability to promote reconciliation, the empowerment of militias and human rights abuses by Shi’ite-dominated ISF against Sunnis, have all contributed to further sectarianism. After the bombing of the revered Shi’ite Al-Askari Shrine in the predominantly Sunni city of Samarra on 22 February 2006, allegedly by Sunni extremists, sectarian violence has escalated and “has become one of the most significant forms of human rights violation.” 164 The attack spawned days of reprisals and set off a cycle of sectarian violence across Iraq, including violent clashes between Sunnis and Shi’ites, targeted kidnappings and assassinations as well as attacks on mosques. 165 Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani urged his followers not to retaliate against Sunnis, but revenge killings have now become a daily occurrence. The moderating influence of Al-Sistani appears to be waning. 166 Since the Samarra bombing, more Iraqis have died in execution-style sectarian killings than in terrorist attacks carried out by insurgents, which had previously been the major threat to security in Iraq. 167 iii) Current Situation Sunni armed groups are held responsible for (suicide) attacks targeting Shi’ite-dominated ISF bases and recruitment centres, Shi’ite religious sites and gatherings (e.g. during the festivities of Ashura), as well as religious leaders and Shi’ite civilians at large. For example, on 3 February 2007, a suicide bombing hit a crowded market in Al-Sadriya, a predominantly Shi’ite district in Baghdad, leaving at least 130 Iraqis dead. 168 A series of car bombs and mortar attacks in Sadr City, home to more than two million Shi’ites, on 23 November 2006 caused the death of over 200 persons and injured many more. 169 163 See, for example, Parker and Hamdani, see above footnote 104. See also: UNHCR, 2005 Country of Origin Information Iraq, p. 15-16, see above footnote 53. 164 UNAMI HRO, April 2006 Human Rights Report, p. 1, see above footnote 74. 165 See, for example, UNAMI HRO, Human Rights Report, 1 January – 28 February 2006, p. 1-2, http://www.uniraq.org/documents/HR%20Report%20Jan%20Feb%2006%20EN.PDF (further: “UNAMI HRO, February 2006 Human Rights Report”). 166 See, for example, Iraq Study Group Report, p. 16, see above footnote 35. 167 The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq, written by the US National Intelligence Council, parts of which became public in early February 2007, emphasized that Iraqi-on-Iraqi violence has become the primary source of conflict. See: Karen DeYoung and Walter Pincus, Iraq at Risk of Further Strife, Intelligence Report Warns, The Washington Post, 2 February 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/02/01/AR2007020101152.html. The US Department of Defense assessed that “(i)t is likely that Shi’a militants were responsible for more civilian casualties than those associated with terrorist organizations”; see: US Department of Defense, p. 17, see above footnote 73; Farah Stockman and Bryan Bender, Iraq militias’ wave of death, The Boston Globe, 2 April 2006, http://www.boston.com/news/ world/articles/2006/04/02/iraq_militias_wave_of_death/. 168 BBC News, Baghdad market bomb “kills 130”, 3 February 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/ 6327057.stm. 169 Sudarsan Raghavan and Nancy Trejos, Assault on Iraqi Civilians Is Deadliest Since 2003, The Washington Post, 24 November 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/ 11/23/AR2006112300399.html. 50
Shi’ite militias on the other hand are mainly operating in the form of death squads, but have also launched a series of mortar attacks on (homogenous) Sunni neighbourhoods. 170 For example, after the devastating attack in Sadr City on 23 November 2006, Shi’ites responded almost immediately with reprisals, firing ten mortar rounds at the Sunni Abu Hanifa mosque in Adhamiya, the holiest Sunni shrine in Baghdad, killing one person and wounding seven. The morning of 24 November 2006, AP reported that Shi’ite militiamen retaliated for the previous day’s attacks, dousing six Sunni Arabs in kerosene and burning them alive. The Iraqi Army could not confirm the reports of Sunnis being burned alive, and found only one mosque that had suffered fire damage. However, the AP stood by its story after reconfirming its details with their sources. 171 Both Sunni and Shi’ite armed groups are held responsible for running death squads that conduct kidnappings and execution-style killings in Baghdad and other parts of the country. Bodies are routinely found dumped in the streets, rivers and mass graves. Most bear signs of torture, including bound hands and feet and beheadings. 172 It has also been reported that armed groups and militias try individuals in extra-judicial courts before executing them. 173 The Observer reported that rape is being used to exact revenge and humiliate the other community. 174 Kidnappings and extra-judicial killings reportedly often take place on the basis of the victim’s name. As a result, Iraqis are resorting to changing their names, holding forged ID cards and learning religious history and customs in order to avoid being identified as belonging to either community. 175 Even selling or reading the “wrong” newspaper could 170 According to the ICG, “(t)erritorial polarization also makes possible a transformation in the nature of warfare: from individual killings to mortar attacks, labour-intensive operations, and other highly indiscriminate forms of violence”; see: ICG, After Baker-Hamilton, p. 8, see above footnote 111. 171 AP, AP Defies Military, Bloggers on Story of 6 Iraqis Set on Fire, 29 November 2006, http://www.editorandpublisher.com/eandp/news/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1003439706; AP, Iraqi militias take fiery revenge for slaughter, 25 November 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15873863/; AP, Shi’ites burn six Sunni worshippers alive, 25 November 2006, http://www.kansas.com/mld/kansas/news/ world/16089847.htm; Robin Wright, U.S. Says Violence Is Meant To Topple Iraqi Government, The Washington Post, 25 November 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/24/ AR2006112400203.html; Multinational Force – Iraq, One Mosque Burned in Hurriya, 25 November 2006, http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=7540&Itemid=21. 172 UNAMI HRO, December 2006 Human Rights Report, p. 8, see above footnote 10. See also: US Department of Defense, p. 19, see above footnote 73. 173 UNAMI HRO, April 2006 Human Rights Report, p. 5, see above footnote 74. See also “Sexual Orientation”. 174 Peter Beaumont, Hidden victims of a brutal conflict: Iraq’s women, The Observer, 8 October 2006, http://observer.guardian.co.uk/world/story/0,,1890260,00.html. 175 Times Online, Inside Iraq – The invisible man, 11 December 2006, http://timesonline.typepad.com/ inside_iraq_weblog/2006/12/the_invisible_m.html; Ahmad Ali, Oliver Poole, Sunnis learn Shia customs to bluff Baghdad death squads, The Telegraph, 10 October 2006, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/10/09/wiraq109.xml; Al-Khalidi and Tanner, p. 14, see above footnote 161; James Hider and Ali al-Hamdani, Faking faith to fool death squads, The Times, 15 August 2006, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/iraq/article609188.ece; Patrick Cockburn, Dozens Die as Sectarian Attacks Escalate in Iraq, The Independent, 10 July 2006, http://www.truthout.org/cgibin/artman/exec/view.cgi/62/21024; Nancy A. Youssef, Iraqis faking their IDs to hide religious affiliations, Knight Ridder Newspaper, 26 April 2006, http://www.wwrn.org/article.php?idd=21315&sec=46&con=34; Sabrina Tavernise, Sectarian Hatred Pulls Apart Iraq’s Mixed Towns, The New York Times, 20 November 51
Page 1 and 2: UNHCR’s ELIGIBILITY GUIDELINES FO
Page 3 and 4: iii) Current Situation ............
Page 5 and 6: a) Overall Situation ..............
Page 7 and 8: IOM International Organization for
Page 9 and 10: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY A. Current Situat
Page 11 and 12: and gatherings, Shi’ite religious
Page 13 and 14: Government Officials and Other Pers
Page 15 and 16: Iraqi Asylum-Seekers From Central a
Page 17 and 18: considered to be well-founded. To t
Page 19: affiliated with criminal groups. In
Page 22 and 23: expand on the legal and policy guid
Page 24 and 25: The general chaos following the inv
Page 26 and 27: countries. While a good part of the
Page 28 and 29: evenues. 41 An understanding of var
Page 30 and 31: Article 140 of the Constitution cal
Page 32 and 33: the Middle East in terms of women
Page 34 and 35: epealed the CPA’s decision to sus
Page 36 and 37: The Iraqi judiciary continues to be
Page 38 and 39: Several groups, including the Mujah
Page 40 and 41: Al-Sunna. In addition, members of t
Page 42 and 43: dominated Special Police Commando u
Page 44 and 45: military commander in Iraq, General
Page 47 and 48: IV. PARTICULAR GROUPS AT RISK A. Re
Page 49: to Osama Bin Laden, the Shi’ites
Page 53 and 54: underscored how explosive the confl
Page 55 and 56: of the latest security crack-down i
Page 57 and 58: Ninewa Plains in particular have be
Page 59 and 60: The overall climate results in non-
Page 61 and 62: efuge in the three Northern Governo
Page 63 and 64: an international court. 261 Several
Page 65 and 66: The alleged main perpetrators of at
Page 67 and 68: In the current climate of religious
Page 69 and 70: prohibition to kill, lie, commit ad
Page 71 and 72: Mandaeans as belonging to the “Pe
Page 73 and 74: have found refuge with the Sabaean-
Page 75 and 76: distributed to homes in Baghdad gav
Page 77 and 78: Estimates of the number of Yazidis
Page 79 and 80: Yazidis are furthermore organized i
Page 81 and 82: AP reported in October 2006 that
Page 83 and 84: apostasy and a threat to public ord
Page 85 and 86: KRG. Mr. Falak Al-Deen Kakai, senio
Page 87 and 88: “those Iraqis who had lost their
Page 89 and 90: government offices, 441 and changin
Page 91 and 92: security, of transferring hundreds
Page 93 and 94: 2. Roma (Kawliyah) 461 a) Introduct
Page 95 and 96: Ghraib and was known for its strong
Page 97 and 98: Sunnis willing to denounce violence
Page 99 and 100: CPA began to allow some vetted ex-B
Page 101 and 102:
It has been documented that attacks
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een killed in Iraq and another 491
Page 105 and 106:
Acts committed against employees or
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E. Government Officials and Other P
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3. Persons Opposing the Ruling Part
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3,250 professors had fled Iraq sinc
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There are a number of possible moti
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inside the media compound, refrain
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3. Artists Iraqi artists, actors an
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groups for not giving priority to t
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population at large and bring the c
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after their release. 660 UNAMI HRO
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International Covenant on Civil and
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evidence that over forty people had
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Both sexes have become victims of s
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V. ELIGIBILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL PR
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those countries, even only on a tem
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violence on a daily basis. Ordinary
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cause. 733 More than one Convention
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C. Exclusion From International Ref
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a) Before the Fall of the Former Re
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) War Crimes War crimes are serious
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in mind when assessing crimes commi
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groups (pre-2003) or insurgency or
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A plausible explanation regarding t
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D. Internal Flight or Relocation Al
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Travel by Road Road travel in Iraq,
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with armed conflict between the MNF
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egulations regarding entry and resi
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It has been reported that new IDPs,
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Interior and Finance. While the Min
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and generally describe the three No
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In order to access the three Northe
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Governorate of Sulaymaniyah Persons
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v. Risk of Persecution or Other Ser
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In addition, non-Kurdish persons, p
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Conclusion Availability of an inter
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to flee Iraq have done so illegally
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explosives blew up. Two people were
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• On 2 July 2003, an armed assaul
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• 18 September 2006: Gunmen kille
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• 17 December 2003: An angry mob
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Annex IV: Attacks on Government Off
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• 2 May 2006: A suicide car bombe
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• 5 December 2006: Dr. Mohammed H
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Annex VI: Attacks on Doctors and Ot
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• 1 July - 31 August 2006: Accord
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Annex VIII: Attacks on Athletes and
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Annex IX: Attacks on Palestinian Re
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Palestinian family fled the hospita
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Annex X: Selected Bibliography Note
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IWPR, Baghdad Gays Fear for Their L
Page 205 and 206:
Senanayake, Sumedha, Iraq: Ethnic T
Page 207 and 208:
W Wilson, Scott, Iraqis Killing For
Page 209:
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