UNHCR's ELIGIBILITY GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSING THE ...

politicians accusing each other of stirring sectarian tensions. 163 In addition to the
insurgency, the lack of rule of law, the election of a sectarian-based government and its
inability to promote reconciliation, the empowerment of militias and human rights abuses
by Shi’ite-dominated ISF against Sunnis, have all contributed to further sectarianism.
After the bombing of the revered Shi’ite Al-Askari Shrine in the predominantly Sunni city
of Samarra on 22 February 2006, allegedly by Sunni extremists, sectarian violence has
escalated and “has become one of the most significant forms of human rights violation.” 164
The attack spawned days of reprisals and set off a cycle of sectarian violence across Iraq,
including violent clashes between Sunnis and Shi’ites, targeted kidnappings and
assassinations as well as attacks on mosques. 165 Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani urged his
followers not to retaliate against Sunnis, but revenge killings have now become a daily
occurrence. The moderating influence of Al-Sistani appears to be waning. 166 Since the
Samarra bombing, more Iraqis have died in execution-style sectarian killings than in
terrorist attacks carried out by insurgents, which had previously been the major threat to
security in Iraq. 167
iii) Current Situation
Sunni armed groups are held responsible for (suicide) attacks targeting Shi’ite-dominated
ISF bases and recruitment centres, Shi’ite religious sites and gatherings (e.g. during the
festivities of Ashura), as well as religious leaders and Shi’ite civilians at large. For
example, on 3 February 2007, a suicide bombing hit a crowded market in Al-Sadriya,
a predominantly Shi’ite district in Baghdad, leaving at least 130 Iraqis dead. 168 A series of
car bombs and mortar attacks in Sadr City, home to more than two million Shi’ites, on
23 November 2006 caused the death of over 200 persons and injured many more. 169
163
See, for example, Parker and Hamdani, see above footnote 104. See also: UNHCR, 2005 Country of
Origin Information Iraq, p. 15-16, see above footnote 53.
164
UNAMI HRO, April 2006 Human Rights Report, p. 1, see above footnote 74.
165
See, for example, UNAMI HRO, Human Rights Report, 1 January – 28 February 2006, p. 1-2,
http://www.uniraq.org/documents/HR%20Report%20Jan%20Feb%2006%20EN.PDF (further: “UNAMI
HRO, February 2006 Human Rights Report”).
166
See, for example, Iraq Study Group Report, p. 16, see above footnote 35.
167
The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq, written by the US National Intelligence Council, parts
of which became public in early February 2007, emphasized that Iraqi-on-Iraqi violence has become the
primary source of conflict. See: Karen DeYoung and Walter Pincus, Iraq at Risk of Further Strife,
Intelligence Report Warns, The Washington Post, 2 February 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/02/01/AR2007020101152.html.
The US Department of Defense assessed that “(i)t is
likely that Shi’a militants were responsible for more civilian casualties than those associated with terrorist
organizations”; see: US Department of Defense, p. 17, see above footnote 73; Farah Stockman and Bryan
Bender, Iraq militias’ wave of death, The Boston Globe, 2 April 2006, http://www.boston.com/news/
world/articles/2006/04/02/iraq_militias_wave_of_death/.
168
BBC News, Baghdad market bomb “kills 130”, 3 February 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/
6327057.stm.
169
Sudarsan Raghavan and Nancy Trejos, Assault on Iraqi Civilians Is Deadliest Since 2003, The
Washington Post, 24 November 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/
11/23/AR2006112300399.html.
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