UNHCR's ELIGIBILITY GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSING THE ...

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“Sunni triangle”. Around half of them live in urban areas, mainly in Baghdad and Mosul, while the Shi’ites dominate the areas south of Baghdad as well as a large portion of Baghdad, in particular Sadr City. 149 The contemporary divide between Shi’ites and Sunnis in Iraq, however, includes more than the above-described schism. In fact, there has been considerable intermarriage between the two groups among the urban middle class and some Iraqi tribes have both Sunni and Shi’ite branches. 150 In reality, the schism is also a result of the politics of the former regimes, exacerbated by post-2003 emphasis on religious and ethnic identities. 151 Despite the fact that, since its formation in 1921, Iraq has been largely secular, Sunni Arabs by-and-large dominated the country’s government, military and economy. The Ba’athist Government of Saddam Hussein targeted the Shi’a clergy and the Shi’ite population at large. According to Global Security, “Forces from the Intelligence Service (Mukhabarat), General Security (Amn al-Amm), the Military Bureau, Saddam’s Commandos (Fedayeen Saddam), and the Ba’ath Party […] killed senior Shi’a clerics, desecrated Shi’a mosques and holy sites (particularly in the aftermath of the 1991 civil uprising), arrested tens of thousands of Shi’a, interfered with Shi’a religious education, prevented Shi’a adherents from performing their religious rites, and fired upon or arrested Shi’a who sought to take part in their religious processions. Security agents reportedly are stationed at all the major Shi’a mosques and shrines, and search, harass, and arbitrarily arrest worshipers.” 152 Furthermore, the regime of Saddam Hussein was responsible for military campaigns against Shi’ite civilians, extra-judicial killings, the confiscation of land and the drainage of the Southern marsh areas and forcible relocation of its original inhabitants, the Marsh Arabs. The unequal distribution of the country’s resources led to the under-development of the mainly Shi’ite South of Iraq. 153 ii) The Emergence of the Current Sectarian Violence The Sunni-driven insurgency initially targeted US troops. Soon, with the involvement of Al-Qa’eda in Iraq, parts of the insurgency deliberately attacked Shi’a targets. Igniting sectarian violence is central to Al-Qa’eda’s strategy in Iraq. In a 15 June 2004 letter purportedly authored by Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, Al-Qa’eda’s former leader, and addressed 149 Global Security, Sunni Islam in Iraq, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/religionsunni.htm [last updated 22 June 2005]. 150 CFR, Iraq: The Sunnis, see above footnote 148. 151 According to the ICG, Iraq’s electoral law, drafted in 2004, had also furthered “communalism” and “deepened ethnic and sectarian identities (…)”; see ICG, After Baker-Hamilton, p. 19, see above footnote 111. The USIP assessed that “(i)n order to gain power in a political vacuum, among an electorate with few institutions and little experience, leaders appealed to ethnic and sectarian identity with great success, mobilizing these sentiments and organizing coalitions on this basis, and thus furthering the division of Iraq largely along ethnic and sectarian lines”; Phebe Marr, Iraq’s New Political Map, USIP, Special Report, January 2007, p. 7, http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr179.pdf. 152 Global Security, Sunni Islam in Iraq, see above footnote 149. However, the Ba’athist regime of former President Saddam Hussein exploited religion to mobilize his people, in particular during the Iraq-Iran War in the 1980s. See: Global Security, Shia-Baath Relations, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/ religion-shia-baath.htm [last updated 22 June 2005]. 153 Global Security, Shia-Baath Relations, see above footnote 152. 48
to Osama Bin Laden, the Shi’ites are described as “a sect of treachery and betrayal through the ages.” 154 Ansar Al-Islam issued a statement in January 2007, calling on Sunnis to wage a war against the Shi’ites, saying Furthermore: “Come to jihad...those (Shi’ites) do not respond to condemnations or threats, only fire and steel bring good in dealing with them.” 155 “Organise yourself in groups of four, each of which should cleanse their area from every spy, agent, traitor who stalks the mujahideen and all employees of the interior and defence ministries. Most of those are hateful rejectionists (Shi’ites).” 156 Suicide car bombs and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) became the main weapons to target Shi’ite civilians in mosques as well as Shi’ite-dominated police stations and recruiting centres. Sunni militants forced Shi’ites out of religiously mixed neighbourhoods and systematically killed bakers, 157 barbers 158 and trash collectors, 159 who are often Shi’ites. 160 To a large extent, the Shi’ites, including the various militias, did not answer with serious retribution. Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani repeatedly issued statements and fatwas speaking out against violence. 161 However, since May 2005, Sunni and Shi’ite victims of execution-style killings have routinely been discovered around the country. 162 The growing violence has also been reflected on the political level, with Sunni and Shi’ite 154 Abdel Bari Atwan, Al Qaeda’s hand in tipping Iraq toward civil war, The Christian Science Monitor, 20 March 2006, http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0320/p09s01-coop. html?s=widep. 155 According to Reuters, the authenticity of the statement could not be verified; see: Reuters Alertnet, Iraq Sunni militant group urges war on Shi’ites, 17 January 2007, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/ L17862862.htm. 156 Ibid. 157 See, for example, BBC News, Iraq ministry hostages “tortured”, 16 November 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6153316.stm; Sabrina Tavernise, Sects’ Strife Takes a Toll on Baghdad’s Daily Bread, The New York Times, 21 July 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/21/ world/middleeast/21bakers.html?pagewanted=2&ei=5088&en=0182007d054b4df7&ex=1311134400&partne r=rssnyt&emc=rss; Agence France-Presse (AFP), Ten Iraqi bakers kidnapped, 18 June 2006, http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200606/s1665781.htm; ABC News, Iraq Violence Sweeps Up Unlikely Group – Bakers, 15 April 2006, http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/IraqCoverage/story?id= 1846519&CMP=OTC-RSSFeeds0312&WNT=true; NPR, Bakeries Get Caught in Iraq’s Sectarian Crossfire, 4 April 2006, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5321698; Agencies, 23 die in Iraq attacks on bakery, mosque, 12 February 2005, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-02/12/ content_416202.htm. 158 See “Persons Accused of “Un-Islamic” Behaviour”. 159 Michael Luo, The danger in the trash of Baghdad, The New York Times, 11 October 2006, http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/10/11/news/trash.php; Sabrina Tavernise, As death toll mounts, middle class flees Iraq, The New York Times, 19 May 2006, http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/05/19/news/exodus.php. 160 Sabrina Tavernise, District by District, Shiites Make Baghdad Their Own, The New York Times, 22 December 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/23/world/middleeast/23shiites.html?ex=1324530000 &en=127a0eb6a78cc578&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss. 161 AP, Top Iraqi Shiite: Sectarian bloodshed aids agitators, 3 February 2007, http://www.cnn.com/ 2007/WORLD/meast/02/03/iraq.cleric.ap/index.html. For earlier statements and fatwas, see: Ashraf Al- Khalidi and Victor Tanner, Sectarian Violence: Radical Groups Drive Internal Displacement in Iraq, The Brookings Institution/University of Bern Project on Internal Displacement, October 2006, p. 15, http://www.brookings.edu/fp/projects/idp/20061018_DisplacementinIraq_Khalidi-Tanner.pdf. 162 Al-Khalidi and Tanner, p. 7, see above footnote 161. See also: UNHCR, 2005 Country of Origin Information Iraq, p. 15 and Annex I, see above footnote 53. 49
Page 1 and 2: UNHCR’s ELIGIBILITY GUIDELINES FO
Page 3 and 4: iii) Current Situation ............
Page 5 and 6: a) Overall Situation ..............
Page 7 and 8: IOM International Organization for
Page 9 and 10: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY A. Current Situat
Page 11 and 12: and gatherings, Shi’ite religious
Page 13 and 14: Government Officials and Other Pers
Page 15 and 16: Iraqi Asylum-Seekers From Central a
Page 17 and 18: considered to be well-founded. To t
Page 19: affiliated with criminal groups. In
Page 22 and 23: expand on the legal and policy guid
Page 24 and 25: The general chaos following the inv
Page 26 and 27: countries. While a good part of the
Page 28 and 29: evenues. 41 An understanding of var
Page 30 and 31: Article 140 of the Constitution cal
Page 32 and 33: the Middle East in terms of women
Page 34 and 35: epealed the CPA’s decision to sus
Page 36 and 37: The Iraqi judiciary continues to be
Page 38 and 39: Several groups, including the Mujah
Page 40 and 41: Al-Sunna. In addition, members of t
Page 42 and 43: dominated Special Police Commando u
Page 44 and 45: military commander in Iraq, General
Page 47: IV. PARTICULAR GROUPS AT RISK A. Re
Page 51 and 52: Shi’ite militias on the other han
Page 53 and 54: underscored how explosive the confl
Page 55 and 56: of the latest security crack-down i
Page 57 and 58: Ninewa Plains in particular have be
Page 59 and 60: The overall climate results in non-
Page 61 and 62: efuge in the three Northern Governo
Page 63 and 64: an international court. 261 Several
Page 65 and 66: The alleged main perpetrators of at
Page 67 and 68: In the current climate of religious
Page 69 and 70: prohibition to kill, lie, commit ad
Page 71 and 72: Mandaeans as belonging to the “Pe
Page 73 and 74: have found refuge with the Sabaean-
Page 75 and 76: distributed to homes in Baghdad gav
Page 77 and 78: Estimates of the number of Yazidis
Page 79 and 80: Yazidis are furthermore organized i
Page 81 and 82: AP reported in October 2006 that
Page 83 and 84: apostasy and a threat to public ord
Page 85 and 86: KRG. Mr. Falak Al-Deen Kakai, senio
Page 87 and 88: “those Iraqis who had lost their
Page 89 and 90: government offices, 441 and changin
Page 91 and 92: security, of transferring hundreds
Page 93 and 94: 2. Roma (Kawliyah) 461 a) Introduct
Page 95 and 96: Ghraib and was known for its strong
Page 97 and 98: Sunnis willing to denounce violence
Page 99 and 100:
CPA began to allow some vetted ex-B
Page 101 and 102:
It has been documented that attacks
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een killed in Iraq and another 491
Page 105 and 106:
Acts committed against employees or
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E. Government Officials and Other P
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3. Persons Opposing the Ruling Part
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3,250 professors had fled Iraq sinc
Page 113 and 114:
There are a number of possible moti
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inside the media compound, refrain
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3. Artists Iraqi artists, actors an
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groups for not giving priority to t
Page 121 and 122:
population at large and bring the c
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after their release. 660 UNAMI HRO
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International Covenant on Civil and
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evidence that over forty people had
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Both sexes have become victims of s
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V. ELIGIBILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL PR
Page 133 and 134:
those countries, even only on a tem
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violence on a daily basis. Ordinary
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cause. 733 More than one Convention
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C. Exclusion From International Ref
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a) Before the Fall of the Former Re
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) War Crimes War crimes are serious
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in mind when assessing crimes commi
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groups (pre-2003) or insurgency or
Page 149 and 150:
A plausible explanation regarding t
Page 151 and 152:
D. Internal Flight or Relocation Al
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Travel by Road Road travel in Iraq,
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with armed conflict between the MNF
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egulations regarding entry and resi
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It has been reported that new IDPs,
Page 161 and 162:
Interior and Finance. While the Min
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and generally describe the three No
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In order to access the three Northe
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Governorate of Sulaymaniyah Persons
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v. Risk of Persecution or Other Ser
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In addition, non-Kurdish persons, p
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Conclusion Availability of an inter
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to flee Iraq have done so illegally
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explosives blew up. Two people were
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• On 2 July 2003, an armed assaul
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• 18 September 2006: Gunmen kille
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• 17 December 2003: An angry mob
Page 185 and 186:
Annex IV: Attacks on Government Off
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• 2 May 2006: A suicide car bombe
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• 5 December 2006: Dr. Mohammed H
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Annex VI: Attacks on Doctors and Ot
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• 1 July - 31 August 2006: Accord
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Annex VIII: Attacks on Athletes and
Page 197 and 198:
Annex IX: Attacks on Palestinian Re
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Palestinian family fled the hospita
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Annex X: Selected Bibliography Note
Page 203 and 204:
IWPR, Baghdad Gays Fear for Their L
Page 205 and 206:
Senanayake, Sumedha, Iraq: Ethnic T
Page 207 and 208:
W Wilson, Scott, Iraqis Killing For
Page 209:
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