UNHCR's ELIGIBILITY GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSING THE ...
UNHCR's ELIGIBILITY GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSING THE ...
UNHCR's ELIGIBILITY GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSING THE ...
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Al-Sunna. In addition, members of the educated elite such as journalists, doctors,<br />
academics and teachers, have been frequent targets. 101<br />
There are reports that insurgents have infiltrated parts of the ISF. 102 For example, several<br />
brigades of the Ministry of Defence in charge of protecting oil pipelines have been accused<br />
of running death squads killing (Shi’ite) Government officials and appear to have links to<br />
insurgency groups. 103<br />
Iraqi Government officials blame the Sunni parties for supporting “terrorism”, in particular<br />
the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP), the largest Sunni Muslim bloc in the Council of<br />
Representatives, and the Association of Muslim Scholars (AMS), the most influential Sunni<br />
organization in Iraq. 104 However, it is unclear how closely these parties are involved in<br />
directing or funding the insurgency.<br />
2. Iraqi Security Forces and Shi’ite militias<br />
Shi’ite-dominated ISF and militias, often wearing police or Special Forces uniforms, 105<br />
regularly target members of the Sunni population. 106 Those targeted include also Sunni<br />
Arab refugees such as Palestinians and those from Syria and Iran, 107 as well as former<br />
members of the Ba’ath Party and security services, 108 who are considered supporters of the<br />
former regime and the ongoing insurgency. The fact that Shi’ite militias have infiltrated or<br />
collaborate with the ISF 109 blurs the line between state and non-state actors. 110<br />
101<br />
See “Certain Professions”.<br />
102<br />
UNAMI HRO, December 2006 Human Rights Report, p. 8, see above footnote 10.<br />
103<br />
Dexter Filkins, Armed groups propel Iraq toward chaos, The New York Times, 24 May 2006,<br />
http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/05/24/africa/web.0525police.php.<br />
104<br />
See, for example, Ned Parker and Ali Hamdani, How violence is forging a brutal divide in Baghdad, The<br />
Times, 14 December 2006, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/iraq/article753899.ece. See also:<br />
UNHCR, 2005 Country of Origin Information Iraq, p. 15, see above footnote 53.<br />
105<br />
Damien Cave, In Iraq, It’s Hard to Trust Anyone in Uniform, The New York Times, 3 August 2006,<br />
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/03/world/middleeast/03uniforms.html.<br />
106<br />
See “Shi’ites and Sunnis Civilians” and “Sunni Arabs”.<br />
107<br />
See “VI. EFFECTIVE PROTECTION OF REFUGEES OF ARAB ORIGIN IN IRAQ”.<br />
108<br />
See “Members and Associates of the Ba’ath Party and the Former Regime”.<br />
109<br />
According to the US Department of Defense, “(m)ilitia influence exists in the Iraqi Police”. However,<br />
“there is currently no screening process specifically designed to ascertain militia allegiance. Recruits take an<br />
oath of office denouncing militia influence and pledging allegiance to Iraq’s constitution”; see US<br />
Department of Defense, p. 34, see above footnote 73. See also: Robert Perito, Reforming the Iraqi Interior<br />
Ministry, Police, and Facilities Protection Service, USIP, USIPeace Briefing, February 2007,<br />
http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2007/0207_iraqi_interior_ministry.html; The Library of<br />
Congress, see above footnote 72; HRW, Iraq: End Interior Ministry Death Squads, 29 October 2006,<br />
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/10/29/iraq14473.htm.<br />
110<br />
See, for example, Filkins, see above footnote 103.<br />
40