UNHCR's ELIGIBILITY GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSING THE ...

Al-Sunna. In addition, members of the educated elite such as journalists, doctors,
academics and teachers, have been frequent targets. 101
There are reports that insurgents have infiltrated parts of the ISF. 102 For example, several
brigades of the Ministry of Defence in charge of protecting oil pipelines have been accused
of running death squads killing (Shi’ite) Government officials and appear to have links to
insurgency groups. 103
Iraqi Government officials blame the Sunni parties for supporting “terrorism”, in particular
the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP), the largest Sunni Muslim bloc in the Council of
Representatives, and the Association of Muslim Scholars (AMS), the most influential Sunni
organization in Iraq. 104 However, it is unclear how closely these parties are involved in
directing or funding the insurgency.
2. Iraqi Security Forces and Shi’ite militias
Shi’ite-dominated ISF and militias, often wearing police or Special Forces uniforms, 105
regularly target members of the Sunni population. 106 Those targeted include also Sunni
Arab refugees such as Palestinians and those from Syria and Iran, 107 as well as former
members of the Ba’ath Party and security services, 108 who are considered supporters of the
former regime and the ongoing insurgency. The fact that Shi’ite militias have infiltrated or
collaborate with the ISF 109 blurs the line between state and non-state actors. 110
101
See “Certain Professions”.
102
UNAMI HRO, December 2006 Human Rights Report, p. 8, see above footnote 10.
103
Dexter Filkins, Armed groups propel Iraq toward chaos, The New York Times, 24 May 2006,
http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/05/24/africa/web.0525police.php.
104
See, for example, Ned Parker and Ali Hamdani, How violence is forging a brutal divide in Baghdad, The
Times, 14 December 2006, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/iraq/article753899.ece. See also:
UNHCR, 2005 Country of Origin Information Iraq, p. 15, see above footnote 53.
105
Damien Cave, In Iraq, It’s Hard to Trust Anyone in Uniform, The New York Times, 3 August 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/03/world/middleeast/03uniforms.html.
106
See “Shi’ites and Sunnis Civilians” and “Sunni Arabs”.
107
See “VI. EFFECTIVE PROTECTION OF REFUGEES OF ARAB ORIGIN IN IRAQ”.
108
See “Members and Associates of the Ba’ath Party and the Former Regime”.
109
According to the US Department of Defense, “(m)ilitia influence exists in the Iraqi Police”. However,
“there is currently no screening process specifically designed to ascertain militia allegiance. Recruits take an
oath of office denouncing militia influence and pledging allegiance to Iraq’s constitution”; see US
Department of Defense, p. 34, see above footnote 73. See also: Robert Perito, Reforming the Iraqi Interior
Ministry, Police, and Facilities Protection Service, USIP, USIPeace Briefing, February 2007,
http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2007/0207_iraqi_interior_ministry.html; The Library of
Congress, see above footnote 72; HRW, Iraq: End Interior Ministry Death Squads, 29 October 2006,
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/10/29/iraq14473.htm.
110
See, for example, Filkins, see above footnote 103.
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