UNHCR's ELIGIBILITY GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSING THE ...

also aim to foment civil war, including by targeting Shi’ite civilians. The Islamic State of
Iraq in an internet statement in December 2006, called for a war on Iraq’s Shi’ites, saying
Furthermore:
“Stand like one man ... and cut their (Shi’ites’) throats, spill their blood, burn the ground
underneath them, and rain bombs on them.” 90
“They (Shi’ites) have done more than the crusaders (U.S.-led forces) have been doing. They
killed men, rendering women widows and children orphans, burned houses of God and tore
his book.” 91
They and others also aim for the establishment of an Islamic State based on Shari’a law.
However, there are major divisions among some of the groups, in particular among foreign
and indigenous groups, for example over the legitimacy of targeting civilians, 92 the goal of
establishing an Islamic state 93 and their willingness to consider an amnesty and join the
political process under certain conditions. 94
The insurgency against the MNF and the present Government is mainly active in the “Sunni
triangle”, 95 in which Arab Sunnis make up the majority as well as in mixed areas in the
Governorates of Diyala, Babel and Kirkuk. 96
Insurgency groups continue to target persons affiliated with or supporting the MNF/ISF 97
as well as the Iraqi Government. 98 Furthermore, they are considered responsible for attacks
on members of the Shi’ite community 99 as well as religious minorities 100 in an aim to create
a situation of civil war and bring Iraq’s institutions to collapse. Most high-profile attacks
causing large numbers of civilian casualties are attributed to Al-Qa’eda in Iraq and Ansar
90
According to Reuters, the authenticity of the posted recording could not be verified; see: Reuters Alertnet,
Iraq Qaeda-linked group calls for war on Shi’ites, 17 December 2006, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/
newsdesk/L17355726.htm.
91
Ibid.
92
See, for example, Khalid Al-Ansary and Ali Adeeb, Most Tribes in Anbar Agree to Unite Against
Insurgents, The New York Times, 18 September 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/18/world/
middleeast/18iraq.html.
93
See, for example, Rick Jervis, General sees rift in Iraq enemy, USA Today, 25 January 2006,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2006-01-25-insurgency-rift_x.htm.
94
Sabrina Tavernise and Dexter Filkins, Evidence increases of an Iraqi-Qaeda split, The New York Times,
12 January 2006, http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/01/12/news/rebels.php; Sabrina Tavernise, “Enemy on
enemy” fire signals split among insurgents in Iraq, The New York Times, 22 June 2005,
http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/06/21/news/rebels.php.
95
The “Sunni triangle” comprises parts of the Governorates of Al-Anbar, Salah Al-Din, Ninewa and
Baghdad.
96
Military Review, Jeffrey White, Assessing Iraq’s Sunni Arab insurgency (political activities of Saddam
Hussein), May-June 2006, http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G1-147346137.html. For an overview on the
insurgency in Iraq, see UNHCR, 2005 Country of Origin Information Iraq, p. 64-73, see above footnote 53.
97
See “Actual or Perceived Sympathizers of the US-Led Invasion and/or the Multi-National Force in Iraq”
and “Employees of the Former CPA, MNF or Iraqis Employed by Foreign Embassies or Foreign Companies”.
98
See “Government Officials and Other Persons Associated With the Current Iraqi Government,
Administration and Institutions”.
99
See “Shi’ites and Sunnis Civilians”.
100
See “Non-Muslim Religious Groups”.
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