UNHCR's ELIGIBILITY GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSING THE ...

The Iraqi judiciary continues to be understaffed and badly equipped 73 and generally lacks
the capacity to provide judicial redress or protection. The Human Rights Office of the
United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI HRO) stated that “(e)xisting
mechanisms for redressing violations are insufficient”, and expressed serious concern that
“(The) investigative capacity of the State remains limited because of security conditions as
well as for lack of adequate resources and the limited number of investigative judges.
Allegations made that some sectors of the security forces are colluding with armed militias
or other armed groups risk eroding support for the security forces and increase the
perception that the impunity gap in Iraq is growing.” 74
As a result of these institutional weaknesses, most human rights violations are committed
with impunity, 75 with protection generally unavailable from national law enforcement or
security bodies. 76 It is common that victims or their families do not report attacks to the
police, either because they do not expect the police to investigate the case for lack of
resources, inertia or sympathy with the perpetrators, or for fear of repercussions. 77 The
MNF is generally unable to fill this protection void. Like the ISF, the MNF is itself
a frequent target of armed groups, having suffered 3,410 troop fatalities by 25 February
2007, and also has a restictive mandate with regard to the overall protection of civilians. 78
73
According to UNAMI HRO, “(C)ourts require adequate facilities, more investigative judges,
computerized and integrated management systems and greater security for all judicial personnel”.
Furthermore, the capacity of the Iraqi judiciary is limited, “particularly in cases involving organized crime,
corruption, terrorism and militia-sponsored armed activities are due to the high level of intimidation and
threats, limited protection mechanisms for both witnesses and judiciary, as well as limited number of
investigative judges”. UNAMI HRO, December 2006 Human Rights Report, p. 1 and 5, see above footnote
10. See also US Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, Report to Congress in
accordance with the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007 (Section 9010, Public Law 109-289),
p. 8, November 2006, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/9010Quarterly-Report-20061216.pdf.
74
UNAMI HRO, Human Rights Report, 1 March – 30 April 2006, p. 5-6, http://www.uniraq.org/
documents/HR Report Mar Apr 06 EN.PDF (further: “UNAMI HRO, April 2006 Human Rights Report”).
75
See, for example, UNAMI HRO, December 2006 Human Rights Report, p. 2, 3 and 13, see above
footnote 10.
76
The mandate of the MNF in Iraq, as laid down in UNSC Resolution 1546 (2004) and the letters annexed
to it, is to “contribute to the maintenance of security in Iraq, including by preventing and deterring terrorism
and protecting the territory of Iraq. The goal of the MNF will be to help the Iraqi people to complete the
political transition and will permit the United Nations and the international community to work to facilitate
Iraq’s reconstruction”; see UNSC, Resolution 1546 (2004), 8 June 2004, available in UNHCR’s Refworld at:
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=411340244d. In November 2006, the UNSC
voted to extend the mandate of the MNF until 31 December 2007. The presence of the MNF is at the request
of the Iraqi Government, which says the troops were needed for another year while it continues to build up its
own security forces; see UNSC, Resolution 1723 (2006), 28 November 2006, http://www.un.org/News/
Press/docs/2006/sc8879.doc.htm. The MNF are a frequent target by various armed groups and, by
25 February 2007, have suffered 3,410 troop fatalities; see: The Brookings Institution, Iraq Index, see above
footnote 16.
77
For example, it was reported that Sabaean-Mandaeans “encounter intimidation by public and religious
officials”; see UNAMI HRO, December 2006 Human Rights Report, p. 13, see above footnote 10. The Iraq
Study Group assessed that the “Iraqi police cannot control crime, and they routinely engage in sectarian
violence, including the unnecessary detention, torture, and targeted execution of Sunni Arab civilians”; see
Iraq Study Group Report, p. 13, see above footnote 35.
78
The Brookings Institution, Iraq Index, see above footnote 16.
36