UNHCR's ELIGIBILITY GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSING THE ...

III. MAIN GROUPS PRACTICING VIOLENCE
A. General
While non-state actors were identified as the main groups violating human rights and
international humanitarian law, when UNHCR’s issued its Guidelines Relating to the
Eligibility of Iraqi Asylum-seekers 69 in October 2005, increasingly state actors have come
to the forefront, including members of the ISF. Furthermore, with the escalation of
sectarian violence since 2006, armed militias have not only filled the security vacuum in
the country, but have also become responsible for targeted attacks and displacement.
Militias are linked to major Shi’ite political parties and personalities such as the Supreme
Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and Muqtada Al-Sadr, 70 and have
infiltrated the Shi’ite-dominated law enforcement agencies or closely collaborate with
them. In addition, criminal groups have also become involved in human rights violations
targeting individuals of specific profile.
In many cases, it will prove difficult, if not impossible, for victims to identify who harmed
them or why they were targeted. Perpetrators of violence often remain unidentified for
a number of reasons, such as the failure or inability of the State to undertake criminal
investigation or the sheer number of actors actively engaged in violent activities in today’s
Iraq. Although they have diverse agendas, these actors often share common targets, e.g.
members of religious minorities or certain professions.
B. Lack of National Protection
Pervasive violence, institutional weaknesses, and a general lack of rule of law seriously
impede the ability of Iraqi authorities to provide protection to its citizens. The ISF is itself
a major target of the insurgency 71 and has been infiltrated by, or has collaborated with,
armed groups practicing violence. The ISF also reportedly lacks leadership, training,
equipment and personnel and continues to be highly dependent on the support of the
MNF. 72
69
See above footnote 8.
70
For an overview of these Shi’ite militias, see: UNHCR, UNHCR, 2005 Country of Origin Information
Iraq, p. 59 and further, see above footnote 53.
71
On 24 December 2006, Jawad Al-Bolani, the Iraqi Minister of Interior, indicated that 12,000 police
officers had been killed since 2003, an average of ten police officers every day. See: BBC News, Iraqi police
deaths “hit 12,000”, 24 December 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6208331.stm.
72
UNAMI HRO assessed that “(L)aw enforcement agencies are insufficient, inadequately equipped and in
need of further training”; see UNAMI HRO, August 2006 Human Rights Report, p. 1, see above footnote 26.
According to the CRS, “President Bush tacitly acknowledged the lack of capability of the ISF by announcing
that “we will increase the embedding of American advisers in Iraqi Army units and partner a Coalition
brigade with every Iraqi Army division””; see: The Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, The
Iraqi Security Forces: The Challenge of Sectarian and Ethnic Influences, CRS Report for Congress,
18 January 2007, p. 3, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/79272.pdf. See also Iraq Study Group
Report, p. 12-14, see above footnote 35.
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