Thinking Democratically: A Comprehensive Approach to Countering and Preventing Shrinking Space

The case studies show that the attacks on civic space cannot be seen as separate from the way space
for political contestation is being restricted. First of all, the three strategies are inherently
interlinked. The extent of success of attacks on the rule of law conditions the ability of civil society
to counter restrictive legislation, as well as the ability of political parties to challenge electoral
reform. A closed down civic space likewise renders democratic elections meaningless and thereby
contributes to an uneven political playing field.
Secondly, it is often the same actors who are closing civic space that are also undermining democratic
institutions and changing the rules of the game in their favour. While the ruling party is often the
main perpetrator of such autocratisation, the case studies illustrate the powerful role of criminal
networks, business interests and even major opposition parties in breaking down democratic space.
This is explored in further detail below.
Shrinking civic space cannot therefore be seen as separate from the wider trend of autocratisation
occurring at a global and national level. Civic space, space for political contestation and the rule of
law must be seen as different strategies to the same end: gradually silencing dissent and
concentrating power in the hands of a few. The phenomenon of shrinking civic space is deeply
embedded in a wider trend of regressing democratic space and authoritarian resurgence and must be
responded to accordingly. A case can be made that in some circumstances it would be wise to frame
the response as solely focused on civil space – however, this should be about framing as it would be
exceedingly difficult to actually succeed in the response without considering the wider political
sphere of broader contestation.
2. Shrinking space is non-linear, gradual and global
A. Multifaceted non-linear phenomenon
The case studies exemplify how different strategies are employed in varying combinations at
different points in time. In Kenya, the main attack on democratic space is directed at civic freedoms,
despite increasing efforts to create an uneven political playing field. In contrast, in Georgia civic
space is relatively unrestricted while the main battle is over the constitution, with ruling parties
trying to change the rules of the game in their favour. Relative improvements have been made in
Indonesia when it comes to civic space, and yet a restrictive NGO-law was passed and efforts to tilt
the political arena in favour of the incumbent continue. In El Salvador and Honduras, the failure to
uphold the rule of law and the complete impunity greatly restricts civic space, while illicit financial
flows and high entry barriers set the scene for an unrepresentative and exclusive space for
contestation. In Guatemala, the political elite upholds the rules of the game so that contestation
occurs outside the public realm and business elites dictate the government’s agenda, while also
attacking civil society. While the Zimbabwean judiciary still enjoys pockets of independence,
Zimbabwean civil society have been under severe attacks through legislative, administrative and
political means, and space for contestation is skewed in favour of the ruling party through extreme
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