Thinking Democratically: A Comprehensive Approach to Countering and Preventing Shrinking Space

Ambiguous role
While ruling parties may have incentives to change the rules of the game to retain their position, one
would assume opposition parties actively defend democratic space. After all, it is only through
democratic checks and balances that they can compete fairly in the political arena and stand a
chance at challenging the incumbent. This seems to be true for smaller political parties, who
defended constitutionalism and fought for a level playing field in different case studies. In Kenya,
for instance, small parties have used dialogue mechanisms to lower the compliance threshold for
competing in elections and qualifying for state funding. At the same time, the ruling party may also
use the legitimacy of smaller political parties to create the illusion of contestation and inclusiveness,
as was the case in Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwean ruling party set up its own platform for interparty
dialogue, which lacks the participation of the main opposition party, thereby making it largely
irrelevant as a platform of contestation.
In other cases, a cross-party alliance of both the governing party and the main opposition parties
joined forces to safeguard the level playing field. In Honduras, for instance, an alliance of political
parties passed a much-needed political party regulation that would restrict their own campaign
spending and require higher levels of transparency, as all parties acknowledged electoral violence
was to be expected under another election with the same rules. However, in several case studies,
large opposition parties have also actively restricted democratic space whenever they have spied an
opportunity to gain political capital or perceive a direct threat to their interest. This happens
sometimes in coordination with a governing party, showing that there is an elite party system, based
on established parties that want to keep newcomers out.
Commercialisation & polarisation
The case studies highlight the importance of patronage and clientelist networks, which contribute to
the “commercialisation of political parties” who “act and function like they are corporations”. 62 A
number of case studies stressed that politicians appreciate democracy not for its intrinsic value but
as an instrument for accessing political office and the concomitant economic benefits. Through
practices of patronage and clientelism, further fueled by private funding in election campaigns,
democratic contestation is reduced to a set of transactions.
As parties lose their ideological orientation and the commitment to the intrinsic value of democracy,
the option to close democratic space becomes attractive as a way to limit the competition for power
and resources. Zero-sum elections then further incentivise the pro-active shrinking of space for
contestation and limit the capacity of opposition parties to push back on such restrictive measures
and generate compromise. This was particularly obvious and harmful in the case of El Salvador and
62
See Indonesia case study summary, Annex 6.3
32