PROFILE OF INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT : KENYA - UNHCR

PROFILE OF INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT :
KENYA
Compilation of the information available in the Global IDP
Database of the Norwegian Refugee Council
(as of 30 November, 2004)
Also available at http://www.idpproject.org
Users of this document are welcome to credit the Global IDP Database for the collection of information.
The opinions expressed here are those of the sources and are not necessarily shared by the Global IDP
Project or NRC
Norwegian Refugee Council/Global IDP Project
Chemin Moïse Duboule, 59
1209 Geneva - Switzerland
Tel: + 41 22 799 07 00
Fax: + 41 22 799 07 01
E-mail : idpsurvey@nrc.ch

CONTENTS
CONTENTS 1
PROFILE SUMMARY 6
SUMMARY 6
KENYA: TENSIONS RISE AS GOVERNMENT FAILS TO ADDRESS INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT 6
CAUSES AND BACKGROUND 9
BACKGROUND 9
PATTERN OF STATE-INSTIGATED VIOLENCE 9
PROMINENT PARTY POLITICIANS OF THE FORMER GOVERNMENT HAVE FUELED INCIDENTS ALONG
ETHNIC CLASHES IN KENYA SINCE 1991 12
DEVASTATING COMBINATION OF ORCHESTRATED VIOLENCE AS A POLITICAL TOOL AND EASY
ACCESS TO SMALL ARMS 13
TO CALL THE VIOLENCE "TRIBAL" CONCEALS THE ATTEMPT TO ALTER THE POLITICAL
DEMOGRAPHY OF THE REGION IN THE GOVERNMENT'S FAVOUR(1997) 15
DEMOCRATIZATION HAS RESULTED IN REAFFIRMATION OF ETHNIC IDENTITIES, 1963-2000 15
INTERNATIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE BORDERS HAVE DIVIDED COMMUNITIES AND RENDERED
THE CONFLICTS MORE COMPLEX (2004) 17
MAASAI LAND CLAIMS REJECTED BY THE GOVERNMENT (AUGUST 2004) 18
PERPETRATORS ON HIRE, 1991-2001 19
COMMERCIALISATION OF LAND OCCUPIED BY THE COLONIALISTS IMPORTANT FACTOR BEHIND
THE VIOLENCE DURING THE 1990S 20
MOI GOVERNMENT CAPITALIZED ON UNADDRESSED LAND OWNERSHIP AND TENURE ISSUES
CREATED DURING THE COLONIAL PERIOD, 1960-2001 21
ETHNIC CLEANSING DISGUISED AS WHAT THE KANU GOVERNMENT CALLED "MAJIMBOISM" 23
COLONIAL HERITAGE EXPLAINS CONTEMPORARY INTER-TRIBAL DIVISIONS IN THE RIFT VALLEY,
1918-2003 24
COALITION GOVERNMENT ELECTED ENDS 40 YEARS OF KENYA AFRICAN NATIONAL UNION
(KANU) RULE (DEC 2002) 25
CAUSES OF DISPLACEMENT 27
MAIN CAUSES OF DISPLACEMENT IN THE RIFT VALLEY, 1992-2002 27
MAIN CAUSES OF DISPLACEMENT IN NYANZA AND WESTERN REGIONS, 1992-2001 29
LAND DISPUTE CAUSES DEATHS AND DISPLACEMENTS IN MARAKWET DISTRICT (SEPTEMBER
2004) 31
COMPETION OVER SCARCE RESOURCES AND ADMINISTRATIVE BOUNDARIES CAUSE
DISPLACEMENTS AMONG PASTORALISTS (SEPTEMBER 2004) 32
SEVERAL THOUSANDS DISPLACED AS TENSION BETWEEN RESIDENT FARMERS AND PASTORALIST
COMMUNITIES IN THE TANA RIVER DISTRICT BROKE INTO ARMED CONFLICT (2001-2002) 35

DISPLACEMENT DURING LATE 1990S INCREASINGLY CAUSED BY CLASHES WITHIN THE SAME
ETHNIC GROUPS, 1997-2004 36
A PATTERN OF ATTACKS- AND REVENGE ATTACKS BETWEEN DIFFERENT COMMUNITIES HAS
CONTINUED ( 2000-2002) 38
RENEWED VIOLENCE IN THE RIFT VALLEY DURING 1998 CAUSED DISPLACEMENT SIMILAR TO
THE EARLY 1990S 40
DISPLACEMENT CAUSED BY FIGHTING IN MOMBASSA REGION/COAST PROVINCE (1997) 42
POLITICALLY MOTIVATED CLASHES RELATED TO THE 1992 ELECTION DISPLACED MORE THAN
300,000 IN THE RIFT VALLEY 43
PEACE EFFORTS 44
PEACE EFFORTS IN THE RIFT VALLEY 44
PEACE EFFORTS IN THE NYANZA AND WESTERN REGIONS, 2001 45
PEACE EFFORTS IN THE NORTH EASTERN PROVINCE, 1992-2003 46
POPULATION FIGURES AND PROFILE 48
GLOBAL FIGURES 48
360,000 IDPS REPORTED IN KENYA (MAY 2004) 48
JRS REPORT DIVIDES THE IDPS INTO SEVEN CATEGORIES (2001) 53
ESTIMATED THAT 230,000 REMAINED INTERNALLY DISPLACED BY END, 2002 55
REPORTED THAT 210,000 REMAINED DISPLACED BY EARLY 1998 56
ESTIMATED BY HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH THAT SOME 300,000 WERE DISPLACED BY 1993 57
DISPLACEMENT NUMBERS UNCERTAIN DURING THE 1990S BECAUSE OF ABSENCE OF SYSTEMATIC
REGISTRATION 59
PATTERNS OF DISPLACEMENT 60
GENERAL 60
SEMI-NOMADIC COMMUNITIES IN THE NORTHERN FRONTIER DISTRICT ALSO AFFECTED BY
DISPLACEMENTS(DEC 2002) 60
IDPS SEEK REFUGEE IN URBAN AREAS INSTEAD OF BEING RESETTLED (1997-2000) 61
PHYSICAL SECURITY & FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT 62
PROTECTION CONCERNS DURING DISPLACEMENT 62
CHILDREN DISPLACED DURING THE EARLY 1990S END UP AS STREET CHILDREN IN NAIROBI
(1997) 62
OUTSIDERS UNABLE TO MONITOR SECURITY SITUATION AS CONFLICT AREAS IN THE RIFT VALLEY
BECAME CLOSED SECURITY ZONES DURING 1993-1995 62
IDPS NOT PROVIDED ADEQUATE PROTECTION OR THE MEANS NECESSARY FOR REINTEGRATION
AFTER AUTHORITIES DISPERSED THEIR TEMPORARY SETTLEMENTS (1993-1996) 62
CLAIMED IN SEVERAL REPORTS THAT SECURITY FORCES HAVE LACKED IMPARTIALITY (1992-
1997) 64
SUBSISTENCE NEEDS (HEALTH NUTRITION AND SHELTER) 65
GENERAL 65
2

IDPS REDUCED TO BEGGERS (SEPTEMBER 2004) 65
SUMMARY OF HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OF THE CONFLICT AFFECTED POPULATION IN TANA RIVER
AREA (NOVEMBER 2001) 67
IDPS SEEKING SHELTER IN TOWNS LIVE IN SLUM CONDITIONS, 1997-2001 68
DIFFICULT LIVING CONDITIONS FOR IDPS REMAINING IN MAELA CAMP (1996-2000) 69
HEALTH 70
SPREAD OF HIV-AIDS IS PARTICULARLY HIGH AMONG THE URBAN DISPLACED (2002) 70
CHILDREN AND WOMEN DISPLACED DURING THE EARLY 1990S PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE 71
SHELTER 71
IDPS FORCED TO LEAVE KYENI FOREST LIVING IN MAKESHIFT SHELTERS (AUGUST 2001) 72
POOR SHELTER CONDITIONS FOR IDPS DURING THE 1990S 72
ACCESS TO EDUCATION 73
GENERAL 73
CHILDREN'S EDUCATION DISRUPTED BY DISPLACEMENT (1993-2002) 73
ISSUES OF SELF-RELIANCE AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 74
GENERAL 74
INCOME-GENERATING ACTIVITIES WITHIN IDP CAMPS ARE NON-EXISTENT 74
IDPS FEEL THAT SOMEONE TOOK THE LAND THAT BELONGED TO THEM (2002) 75
THE VIOLENCE HAS CONDEMNED A FORMERLY SELF-SUFFICIENT AND PRODUCTIVE SECTOR OF
THE ECONOMY TO PERMANENT DISPOSSESSION AND POVERTY (SEPTEMBER 2004) 75
DOCUMENTATION NEEDS AND CITIZENSHIP 78
GENERAL 78
DISPLACED WOMEN NOT REGISTERED AS VOTERS (2002) 78
PEOPLE DISPLACED IN THE COAST AREA COULD NOT VOTE IN 1997 ELECTIONS BECAUSE OF LOSS,
DESTRUCTION OR DENIAL OF IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENTS 79
ISSUES OF FAMILY UNITY, IDENTITY AND CULTURE 80
GENERAL 80
LACK OF EMPLOYMENT DURING DISPLACEMENT ALTERS PATTERN OF SEX ROLES 80
AS MANY AS FOURTEEN CHILDREN PER MOTHER IN SOME HOUSEHOLDS 80
DISRUPTION OF LIVES COMPELLED FAMILIES TO MINIMIZE COSTS BY SHARING HOUSES, KITCHENS,
FOOD, AND WORK 81
BREAKDOWN OF SOCIAL SUPPORT SYSTEMS (2000) 82
PROPERTY ISSUES 83
GENERAL 83
BOTH VICTIMS AND PERPETRATORS OF DISPLACEMENTS SEEK COMPENSATION FROM THE
GOVERNMENT(2004) 83
3

COMMISSION URGES THE GOVERNMENT TO ISSUE LAND TITLE DOCUMENTS 85
INDIVIDUALIZING PUBLIC LAND HAS GENERATED NEW TYPES OF DISPUTES (2000) 87
PRIVATISATION OF LAND AND CONCENTRATION OF POWER OVER LAND IN THE PRESIDENCY
PROMPTED VIOLENCE AND DISPLACEMENTS 88
VAST AREAS OF LAND IN THE RIFT VALLEY AND THE COAST PROVINCE CONCENTRATED IN THE
HANDS OF A FEW POWERFUL FAMILIES (OCTOBER 2004) 89
IDPS SEEKING LEGAL CLAIM TO THEIR FARMS HAVE LITTLE SUCCESS (2001) 91
THE CONFLICTS AND THE DISPLACEMENT HAVE CAUSED A LASTING ALTERATION OF LAND
OCCUPANCY AND OWNERSHIP PATTERNS (1997-2000) 92
RESETTLEMENT DIFFICULT BECAUSE OF DESTROYED HOMES AND PROPERTY (1992) 93
PATTERNS OF RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT 95
GENERAL 95
FEAR AND UNCERTAINTY MAIN REASONS FOR NOT RETURNING (2002) 95
THE NEW "RAINBOW" GOVERNMENT CRITICISED FOR NOT RESETTLING IDPS (AUGUST 2004) 96
3,000 IDPS WHO HAD TEMPORARILY RESETTLED IN KYENI FOREST IN THIKA DISTRICT FORCED
TO FURTHER MOVE IN 2001 97
PEOPLE DISPLACED IN THE COAST REGION RETURNED AFTER CALM WAS RESTORED (1997-1998)
98
POLITICIANS AND SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS RELUCTANT TO LET IDPS RETURN TO THEIR
FORMER HOMES (1994-2000) 98
IDPS NOT RETURNING TO THEIR HOMES DUE TO FEAR OF RENEWED VIOLENCE OR BECAUSE THEY
HAVE LOST THEIR LAND (1999) 99
PEOPLE DISPLACED FROM CLASHES IN THE POKOT AND MARAKWET AREAS IN 1999 STARTED TO
RETURN (OCTOBER 2000) 100
CHURCH ORGANISATIONS ASSIST MORE THAN 1,000 FAMILIES RESETTLE AND 800 FAMILIES TO
RELOCATE (1999) 101
CLAIMS THAT UNDP PROGRAMME HAD RESETTLED 180,000 BY 1995 QUESTIONED BY LOCAL
OBSERVERS 102
HUMANITARIAN ACCESS 104
OPPORTUNITIES FOR OUTSIDERS TO MONITOR AND ASSIST THE IDPS 104
LIMITED ACCESS FOR OUTSIDERS TO MONITOR THE DISPLACEMENT SITUATION (1997) 104
GOVERNMENT RESTRICTED ACCESS TO MAELA CAMP AFTER MANY IDPS WERE MOVED FROM THE
CAMP IN 1994 104
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES 106
COORDINATION 106
NATIONAL IDP NETWORK 106
NATIONAL RESPONSE 108
CONTROVERSIAL REPORT ON IRREGULAR LAND ALLOCATIONS WITHELD BY THE GOVERNMENT
(OCTOBER 2004) 108
THE GOVERNMENT IS NOT MOVING FAST ENOUGH TO RESETTLE IDPS (SEPTEMBER 2004) 110
IDPS IN THE SPOTLIGHT AS PRIEST’S DEATH IS COMMEMORATED (AUGUST 2004) 112
4

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON ETHNIC CLASHES FORMED IN 1998, REPORT RELEASED IN OCT
2002 113
THE PSYCHO-SOCIAL NEEDS OF DISPLACED AND DISPOSSESSED WOMEN AND THEIR ACCESS TO
JUSTICE SYSTEMS HAVE NOT BEEN ADDRESSED FOR THE LAST SIX OR SO YEARS (2002) 114
POLICE RESERVIST DISARMED AS AN EFFORT TO IMPROVE SECURITY IN TANA RIVER DISTRICT
(DECEMBER 2001) 114
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALLY ENCOURAGING RETURN BUT NEW REFUGEE BILL DOES NOT ADDRESS
THE PROBLEM OF IDPS (1999-2001) 116
OFFICIAL NON-RECOGNITION OF IDPS BELONGS TO THE PAST (DEC 2002) 116
GOVERNMENT SECURITY INITIATIVE BETWEEN 1993-1995 STABILISED THE ETHNIC VIOLENCE IN
THE RIFT VALLEY 117
NATIONAL ACTORS REASSERTED THEIR ROLE AND ENGAGEMENT FOLLOWING WITHDRAWAL OF
INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES IN 1991 1992 118
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES OF KENYA (NCCK) AND ACTION AID HAVE ASSISTED
RESETTLEMENT AND PEACE BUILDING IN THE RIFT VALLEY (1997-1999) 118
PEACE BUILDING INITIATIVES BLOCKED AS NGOS HAD TO AVOID ACTIVITIES WITH A "POLITICAL
CHARACTER" (1991-1995) 119
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 120
THE KANU GOVERNMENT CONSIDERED IT IN THE INTEREST OF STATE SECURITY TO DENY LOCAL
AND INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION ON IDPS 120
UNDP HAS NOT BEEN INVOLVED IN FOLLOW-UP ACTIVITIES ON THE SITUATION OF THE
DISPLACED SINCE 1995 (2002) 121
LIMITED INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION GIVEN TO THE CONFLICTS WITHIN KENYA (2000) 121
UNDP'S RECONCILIATION AND REINTEGRATION PROGRAMME (1993-1995) 122
REFERENCES TO THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT 124
NO MOVES TO USE THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR POLICY ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT BY THE
FORMER GOVERNMENT (DEC 2002) 124
LIST OF SOURCES USED 125
5

PROFILE SUMMARY
summary
Kenya: tensions rise as government fails to address internal displacement
•
When the KANU (Kenya African National Union) government was voted out in December 2002 after
almost 40 years in power, around 350,000 remaining internally displaced people (IDPs) regained hopes of
returning to the land they had been forced to flee during the 1990s. However, the new government has not
lived up to expectations that it would resolve the causes of the displacement and resettle or compensate the
IDPs. More than half a million Kenyans fled violence along inter-ethnic lines largely instigated by the
KANU government in response to the introduction of multi-party democracy in the 1990s. Most of the
perpetrators belong to pastoral groups who had themselves been evicted from their land during the
colonial period. On the other hand, most of the internally displaced people belong to agricultural
communities who had been brought in by British settlers from neighbouring provinces to work on the land
of the evicted pastoralists. These land issues remain unresolved as of November 2004 and have the
potential to cause renewed displacements on a significant scale as the pastoral communities claim back
their ancestral land and the victims of the violence in the 1990s claim compensation from the government
and punishment for the perpetrators. Most of the IDPs are living in squalor in Kenya's urban slums,
surviving on petty trade, casual labour and commercial sex work. The lack of response by the new
government has prompted the IDPs to organise themselves to fight the impunity of the perpetrators and
increase the pressure to address the underlying causes of the displacements.
Unresolved land disputes from colonial era
Displacement in Kenya is closely linked to land tenure issues and forced displacements of the country's
colonial past. In the early 20th century, the British colonialists evicted indigenous nomadic pastoralists
(Kalenjin, Maasai, Samburu and Turkana) from the most fertile land in the Rift Valley in the west and
recruited non-indigenous agricultural labourers from the neighbouring provinces to work on their farms,
particularly Kikuyu from the Central Province. During the 1960s, in the aftermath of the colonialists'
departure from what is commonly labelled "the White Farmlands", the non-indigenous agricultural
labourers on the European farms took advantage of the land-buying schemes offered by President Jomo
Kenyatta and bought the land they had worked on for the white colonialists (CIDCM, Oct 1999, pp.1-4;
HRW, June 1997, pp. 37-38). The nomadic pastoralists who had been evicted by the colonialists were
thereby denied access to land they believed to be rightfully theirs. This situation was largely maintained
throughout the KANU period until 1992-1993 when the non-indigenous agriculturalists were ordered by
the government to leave the Rift Valley and return to their "homeland" in the Central Province.
This order and the consequent violent displacements coincided almost exactly with the amendment of the
Kenyan Constitution to permit multi-party politics in September 1991 (Article 19, Oct 1997, p. 24). Soon
afterwards, parties were formed along tribal lines, with KANU officials paying landless youth to harass and
force mainly Kikuyu people out of their homes and constituencies. The major periods of violence and
displacement centred around the 1992 and 1997 elections and the main perpetrators of the violence in both
these elections were predominantly dispossessed Kalenjin and Maasai supporters of the KANU government
against members of opposition groups. By 1993 about 300,000 people had fled their homes (HRW, June
1997, p.36).
6

In addition to the upheaval in the Rift Valley, there was a major outbreak of violence in the Mombasa
region/Coast province in August and early September 1997. This violence caused the displacement of up to
120,000 people and left at least 100 dead. The victims again belonged largely to groups perceived to be
associated with the political opposition, while the perpetrators were mainly disgruntled young men who
were paid to commit the atrocities (US DOS, 30 January 1998, sect 1a; Nowrojee 1998, p. 65; USCR
1998).
More recently, conflicts over access to water and pasture are a major cause of violence and displacement
among pastoralists in northern and western Kenya. The conflicts are exacerbated by prolonged drought and
the proliferation of small arms, which reportedly amounts to over 100,000 illegal guns in the districts of
Turkana, Samburu and West Pok alone (CISA, 26 October 2004). No comprehensive assessment of
numbers of IDPs among these pastoralists and their needs had been conducted as of May 2004 (EAS, 6
September 2004; OCHA, 31 May 2004; UN DPMCU Dec 2002, p.35).
Government downplays scope of internal displacement
The December 2002 electoral defeat of KANU, which had ruled the country since independence from
Britain in 1963, raised IDPs' hopes that they would be allowed to return to the lands they had left or obtain
some sort of compensation. However, the new government has not lived up to expectations that it would
resolve the causes of the displacement and resettle or compensate the IDPs (EAS, 12 September, Justice for
clash victims).
The government appears to downplay the scope and significance of internal displacement in Kenya.
Whereas UN OCHA estimates there are around 350,000 IDPs in Kenya, the minister in charge of land and
housing recently suggested there are no more than 10,000 “genuine” IDPs and that only those with title
deeds should be eligible for compensation (EAS, 12 September, Internally displaced opportunists; OCHA,
31 May 2004). This would leave all those who only leased land and others with informal land arrangements
outside the scope of a long-waited national response.
The growing frustration about the government’s failure to provide durable solutions has motivated the
displaced to organise themselves and create an IDP network, in close collaboration with the Kenya Human
Rights Commission and church organisations. The network, which has become an important channel for the
fight for durable solutions and against impunity for the perpetrators, argues that the IDPs’ plight should be
treated as a political matter requiring a political solution, opposing what it sees as government attempts to
convert their struggle into a matter of general poverty and landlessness (EAS,12 September 2004, Internally
displaced opportunists; KHRC, 31 July, 15 May 2004).
The issue of land ownership is highly controversial in a country where most of the arable land is in the
hands of a few families (EAS, 6 October 2004, Land crisis, 1 October 2004, Who owns Kenya?). A
report prepared by a presidential commission, parts of which have been leaked to the public, appears to
confirm that all post-independence administrations have been involved in irregular land allocations. There
are fears that the publication of the report could unleash pent-up anger over the unresolved land issues both
among the IDPs and the evicted pastoralists held responsible for the displacements in the 1990s, potentially
leading to a larger-scale crisis similar to the situation in Zimbabwe (EAS,1 October, Land report, 12
September, Internally displaced opportunists; OCHA, 11 August 2003). Some IDPs in Nakuru Region
have openly threatened to invade the farms of President Mwai Kibaki and the retired President Daniel Arap
Moi unless their claims for compensation are met (KHRC, 15 May 2004).
Continued human rights violations
Although the violence that caused the displacements of the 1990s has generally ebbed down, the conflict
left a legacy of tensions between the victims and perpetrators which occasionally leads to renewed
7

violence. There have been reports of rapes, arbitrary arrests and other human rights violations, often
exacerbated by prolonged drought, unresolved land disputes, pauperisation, lingering insecurity and
evictions. The latter is part of the new government’s policy of demolishing illegally-constructed houses
which affects IDPs, regular residents and urban migrants alike (EAS, 12 September 2004, Revenge
mission, Will peace deal hold; KHRC, 31 July, 15 May 2004; IRIN, 24 February 2004)
Dire living conditions
The majority of IDPs in Kenya continue to live in dire conditions in urban areas, often in makeshift
settlements, abandoned buildings or church compounds. Many of them lack access to clean water, food and
sanitation. Over 70 per cent of the heads of household are single mothers. Women are often exposed to
physical and sexual violence. Coping mechanisms among IDPs include petty trade, casual labour, charcoal
burning and commercial sex work. The new government has made schooling free of charge and thereby
removed a major obstacle for displaced and destitute children to attend classes, but statistics on displaced
children attending classes are unavailable (EAS, Tough life, 12 September 2004; OCHA, 31 March 2003;
UN DPMCU, Dec 2002, pp.36-39).
International response
The new government’s election pledges to resettle the IDPs and bring the perpetrators to justice have not
been accompanied by any visible international support or pressure. A UNDP resettlement programme,
closed down in 1995, was the last time the UN was directly involved in addressing internal displacement.
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which suspended their support to the KANU
government in 2001 following accusations of wide-spread mismanagement and corruption, have resumed
cooperation with the new government.
Unresolved land disputes, tensions among the affected communities and the humanitarian needs of the
IDPs are, almost two years after the installment of the new government, still pending issues. International
humanitarian agencies should therefore renew support to the ongoing local initiatives and urge the
government to handle this potentially major crisis adequately. (Updated November 2004)
8

CAUSES AND BACKGROUND
Background
Pattern of state-instigated violence
• Causes for displacements summarised in the following manner:
• Election-related violence
• Border and land Disputes
• Cattle Rustling and Banditry
• Urban Disturbances
• Proliferation of small arms and light weapons
• Official Eviction from Forestland and Water Catchments
“The causes and issues surrounding internal population displacement in Kenya illustrate a consistent
pattern of state-instigated and/or tolerated violence, and systematic human rights abuses against particular
sections of the population by agents of or known to the state. Various human rights observers, researchers
and politicians have recognized the role of the KANU Kenya African Nationa Uniongovernment in the
cycle of clashes and armed hostilities that have persisted in the country since the advent of pluralist party
politics in 1991 [...]
Main Causes of Population Displacement in Kenya
As noted above, the main causes of forced migration within Kenya are chiefly man-made, and political in
nature. In some places, flooding of rivers and drought compel people to leave their homes. The main causes
include:
Election-related violence
This was witnessed in the run-up to, during and shortly after the multi-party elections in 1992 and 1997.
Political analysts contend that the KANU government used violence to intimidate supporters of the then
political opposition, which posed a challenge to its legitimacy. Others maintained that violence was a tool
to retain political monopoly in geographical zones designated as ‘exclusive’ to particular ethnic
communities and political parties. By creating insecurity, it made it difficult for other political parties to
penetrate or sustain support in these zones.
In 1992 and 1997, ‘land’ or ‘ethnic’ clashes, as the violence came to be known, spread in multi-ethnic
regions of Western, Rift Valley and Coast provinces, resulting in death of an unknown number of persons
and displacement of thousands of others. While the media and politicians across the board characterised
the armed hostilities as ‘ethnic’, ‘traditional’ or ‘communal’, Human Rights observers and conflict analysts
argued that existing communal conflicts over land claims and cattle raiding were manipulated so that
communities appeared to be fighting over ‘traditional’ issues. Confessions made to Human Rights Watch
researchers by perpetrators also revealed that while attackers were allegedly dressed in traditional garb,
sometimes they were brought from outside the conflict area to assail the local people.
Forced population displacement or eviction of certain communities from some geographical regions served
to change the electoral demography, in order to predetermine election results. It also enabled powerful
people to fraudulently acquire land belonging to those associated with the political opposition. The said
9

land was later used to reward political clients. Part of the forestlands and Agricultural Development
Corporation (ADC) farms degazetted for the purposes of relocating displaced persons in Naivasha,
Elburgon and Keringet were allocated to senior government officials and KANU supporters.
Ethnic relations in some regions affected by clashes have healed and life returned to ‘normal’, but others
are characterised by deep-seated suspicion. In areas such as Molo and Rare in the Rift Valley, sporadic
arson, cattle rustling and revenge attacks between Kikuyu and Kalenjin groups have persisted over the
years. Real or perceived ethnic hostility and violence, as will be discussed below, is one of the reasons for
non-return of IDPs in parts of TransNzoia, West Pokot, Nakuru, Nandi and Mt Elgon districts. [...]
2002 General Elections
Due to past experience of violence during elections, many Kenyans and sections of the international
community expected the 2002 General Elections to be marred by bloodshed. Expectation of violence was
heightened by the emergence of ‘armies’ and vigilante groups (jeshis), known to cause mayhem in urban
areas or to unleash or threaten violence on supporters of political opponents. Jeshis are supported or
sponsored by influential individuals or political parties. During the campaign period, however, only a few
isolated cases of violence were reported. These incidents were often between supporters of different
candidates, sometimes even within the same party; they did not reflect underlying ethnic tensions.
The absence of violence in 2002 could be attributed to various factors: firstly, the unification of thirteen
political parties into one coalition meant that communities that were hitherto conflicting drew closer on the
same side. Secondly, with the weakening of KANU and subsequent defections, politicians’ loyalties were
divided, especially because they were uncertain how the incoming government would treat the issue of
impunity for electoral violence. Besides, those who had instigated the ethnic clashes were afraid of being
exposed by those who had defected from the party widely associated with the conflict. Thirdly, the
electorate shunned violence and militant politicians due to painful memories of the clashes and remorse, in
addition to the negative effect bloodshed had had on their livelihoods. Therefore aspirants were unable to
influence people to engage in violence, in spite of existing differences that could easily have been
manipulated. The youth and other idle persons who had been used to perpetrate violence in 1992 are said to
have ‘refused to be used’ because the promises made to them then (especially of employment) had not been
honoured.
Fourthly, in parts of the Rift Valley and Western, eviction or displacement of communities associated
particular parties had been successfully accomplished during the KANU era; hence local support for the
said parties could only be tolerated.
Fifth, the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK), the civil society, and the media engaged a rigorous and
aggressive civic education campaign, which went a long way in promoting political maturity amongst
Kenyans. The electorate this time round was tolerant of people who differed with their political views.
Furthermore, the political culture of voting for candidates who gave tokens was countered by the desire for
change, which seemed to be sweeping across Kenya after the formation of the umbrella opposition party,
the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC)
Border and land Disputes
This is a serious conflict issue affecting regions along administrative boundaries in Busia/Teso,
Migori/Kuria Gucha/TransMara, TransMara/Migori, Meru North/Isiolo, Meru North/Tharaka,
Turkana/West Pokot and Marakwet/East Baringo. In the affected areas, an artificial no-man’s land has
come into existence as people from either district are pushed further away from regions along the disputed
border. The problem in areas such as Meru North/Tharaka began after the creation of new administrative
districts and constituency boundaries. The new boundaries describe ethnic boundaries; hence a minority
population of either ethnic group is inevitably found in the ‘wrong’ district. Regardless of legal ownership
of the land that such minority groups occupy, the majority ethnic group intermittently moves to ‘evict’
them. Border conflicts often turn into massacres, particularly because of retaliation and revenge attacks. ...
10

Cattle Rustling and Banditry
Among pastoralist communities, the traditional practice of cattle raiding was done seasonally as a rite of
passage into adulthood, and to obtain cattle for bride price. Raiding was also a means of restocking after
calamities such as prolonged drought. Cattle were a status symbol, and raids part of the communities’
history. Given their purpose, raids were predictable, infrequent and controlled not to cause death or
harmfully affect the lives or livelihoods of the society. The Pokot, Turkana, Marakwet, Tugen and Keiyo
raided each other, but lived harmoniously until the onset of multi-party politics in the 1990s, when the raids
eventually acquired belligerent and criminal tendencies. As the practice gained political character, raiders
disregarded the seasonal aspect of cattle theft. Whereas communities would organize missions to retrieve
stolen animals, the introduction of small arms has changed the nature of such custom and undermined
traditional conflict management arrangements. Increasingly, communities are amassing weapons for their
own security, and to carry out raids and retaliation missions. Any number of armed young raiders can now
go on raiding missions, with or without the blessing of the traditional elders who traditionally sanctioned
raids ...
Urban Disturbances
These are sporadic violent incidents in Nairobi and other urban centres, usually in response to unpopular
government actions such as house demolitions, eviction orders, or skirmishes between two or more interest
groups. They last only a few days, but leave in their wake several deaths, injuries, substantial loss of
property and forced exodus from affected residential estates. For example, violence broke out in November
2001 between landlords and tenants in Kibera slums after former President Daniel Arap Moi and area
Member of Parliament directed that tenants pay ‘reasonable’ rent. Tenants immediately refused to disburse
any rent, demanding that the initial amount be halved. Most of the owners of the informal shelters depend
on the rent for their livelihoods, and inevitably resisted the directive. Some brought in henchmen to force
the tenants to pay the rent, while the tenants ganged up to repulse them. Many issues emerged from the
incident: the matter of land ownership in Kibera, the question of citizenship for the Nubians, as well as the
relationship between poverty and security, and poverty and politics. Many people moved out of Kibera to
more secure but affordable estates such a Kangemi and Kawangware. The number of those who relocated is
not known [...]
Proliferation of small arms and light weapons
The presence and abuse of guns has led to militarization of the communities, fuelled general insecurity and
criminalized the traditional practice of raiding. It has also led to political manipulation of disputes, thereby
intensifying conflicts and blurring the line between long-standing ethnic feuds (e.g. cattle raids) and
political violence. Crime rate has soared, as guns are now used to carry out acts of banditry and cattle raids.
Interview with Mr. Oduol, OCPD West Pokot. See also Osogo Opolot, ‘Rising Armed Crime Linked to SPLA Guns’ the
East African Weekly, Sept 13-20, 1999; ‘Police Unearth Arms Syndicate’ Daily Nation March 26, 2000. Sometimes
the police posted in the area do not follow up reported cases of banditry or rustling due to ineptitude or
because the raiders have superior weapons. Armed youth have become confident and aggressive, and often
overrule or disregard elders. Given the impunity that exists in this region as no offenders are arrested or
prosecuted, coupled with the absence of explicit gun control mechanisms, raids are commonly conducted
for criminal purposes. Consequently, unarmed men, women and children form the bulk of the victims,
contrary to former rules of war (killing of such people was traditionally taboo). This trend has jeopardized
conflict management efforts, making identification and resolution of the sources of conflict much more
complex. Violence as a direct consequence of proliferation of small arms and cattle rustling has caused
population displacement in Marakwet, East Baringo, West Pokot, Southern Turkana, TransNzoia, Isiolo,
Tana River and Mt. Elgon districts.
Official Eviction from Forestland and Water Catchments
During the 1992 clashes, illegal occupation of forestland was cited as justification to evict non-Maasai
from parts of Narok. Those from Olenguruone were asked to surrender their title deeds in exchange for
five-acre parcels of land at Kapsita in Elburgon, Baraget and Molo. Those from Enoosupukia were given
11

two-acre plots at Moi Ndabi in Naivasha. The Maasai community remained in the so-called ‘forestland’,
with some taking over the land formerly owned by IDPs. Later attempts by the government to evict them
from the water catchments have failed."( UN DPMCU, Dec 2002, pp. 12-21).
Prominent party politicians of the former government have fueled incidents along
ethnic clashes in Kenya since 1991
• Ethnic tensions developed especially around access to economic opportunities and redistribution
of land
• Hundreds of thousands of Kikuyu moved into large farms in the Rift Valley abandoned by the
white farmers following decolonisation
• Most of the land in question had historically belonged to the Kalenjin and the Maasai
• Politicians instigated violence by the Kalenjin and Maasai against the Kikuyu to retain power
following introduction of multy-party democracy in 1992
“Violence has displaced up to 400,000 people in eastern, western, and northern Kenya during the past
decade. In most cases, political discontent, simmering land disputes, and ethnic tensions were at the root of
Kenya’s domestic conflicts.
The Kenyan government’s Presidential Commission on the Ethnic Clashes concluded nearly a year of
hearings into the country’s violent population displacement in 1999 and submitted a report to then
President Daniel arap Moi. After years of delay, the Kenyan government finally released the report publicly
in October 2002. The report confirmed that “prominent ruling party politicians have fueled multiple
incidents of so-called ethnic clashes in Kenya since 1991” by inciting mobs to seize land from perceived
political opponents. The government failed to announce any formal action on the report’s findings."(US
CR, 1 June 2003)
"The problem of ethnicity, having emerged during the colonial period, has been progressively accentuated
since independence with the emergence of ethnicity as a factor in national politics. Ethnicity in Kenya
became a national concern as early as during the colonial period but was accentuated in the postindependence
period during the implementation of the policy
of Africanization. Ethnic tensions developed especially around the structure of access to economic
opportunities and redistribution of some of the land formerly owned by the white settlers. Most of the land
in question was in the Rift Valley province and was historically settled by the Kalenjin and the Maasai. The
other area that was affected by colonial settlement
was the Central province. But the crisis was aggravated during the mid-1950s when forced land
consolidation took place during the emergency period, which benefited mainly the progovernment group
that had not joined the Mau Mau revolt. And when the state of emergency was lifted at the end of the
1950s, most of the detainees returned home to find that they had lost their land to the loyalists. As some
moved to the urban centres in search of wage and self employment, a large wave of this group moved to the
Rift Valley in anticipation of what was expected to be land redistribution after independence. A number of
them joined relatives and kinsmen who had moved to the Rift Valley many decades earlier and were
staying in some of
the settler owned land as squatters. Therefore, when the redistribution of some of the land formerly owned
by the white settlers began, it is these squatters that became the instant beneficiaries of the allocations.
But the policy that gave rise to large scale land acquisition by "outsiders" in Rift Valley was the policy of
`willing buyer willing seller' that the government assumed for land transfers after the initial political
settlement on about one million acres. Using the economic and political leverage available to them during
the Kenyatta regime, the Kikuyu, Meru and Embu groups,
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ut especially the Kikuyu, took advantage of the situation and formed many land-buying companies. These
companies would, throughout the 1960s and 70s, facilitate the settlement of hundreds of thousands of
Kikuyu in the Rift Valley, especially in the districts with arable land notably Nakuru, Uasin Gishu, Nandi,
Trans Nzoia and Narok. The land in the said districts historically belonged to the Kalenjin, Maasai and
kindred groups such as the Samburu. But the Kikuyu, Embu and Meru were not the only ones to acquire
land in the Rift Valley after independence. The new entrants in the post independence period included the
Kisii, Luo and Luhya, who moved into and bought land that bordered these districts. This new settlement
continued in spite of opposition by the indigenous ethnic groups of the Rift Valley. In fact the Nandi, in
particular protested in a more dramatic manner when in 1969
at a meeting in Nandi Hills, what became known as the "Nandi Declaration" was made after a gathering of
radical political leaders in Nandi met to protest what they regarded as an invasion of their ancestral land by
outsiders. Aware of these protests even before the "Nandi Declaration" the Kenyatta regime relied on the
senior Kalenjin in the government to neutralize the political opposition to the settlers. And none other than
the then Vice-President
(a Kalenjin) would play a leading role in this strategy. But as fate would have it, it was this same Vice-
President, finding himself as the country's President, who would have to deal with the most exclusive ethnic
conflict arising from a policy that he had personally contributed to implementing.
However, during the first decade of his rule, Moi by and large managed to contain the situation helped
largely by the politico-administrative culture that had been fostered during the one party era. But he at the
same time put in place a mechanism that weakened the capacity of the Kikuyu to continue acquiring more
land in the Rift Valley province. It is in the above context that the problem in Rift Valley province that is
the subject of analysis here is to
be seen. The ethnic conflict in the Rift Valley took place against a background of an impending general
election. This was to be the first time since independence when a truly multi-party election was to be held
in post-independent Kenya. This is because this time round, the ruling party was seriously threatened with
the probability of being removed from power by the combined political opposition, which had in the first
place mobilized public opinion that ultimately forced the government to change the constitution to allow
the operation of multipartyism. Playing a major role in the emergent opposition movement were the Kikuyu
and the Luo communities." (Walter O. Oyugi, 2002)
Devastating combination of orchestrated violence as a political tool and easy access
to small arms
• Likely opposition voters were forced to flee their homes
• Disgruntled local young men hostile toward non-indigenous residents of the region
• The ruling party instigated the disgruntled local young to commit atrocities that served their
political aspirations
• The weapons circulating in Kenya originate from China and the United States among other
countries
• The line between long-standing tribal competition-traditionally manifested in cattle theft or
rustling-and political violence is blurred by the proliferation of small arms
“This report examines in detail the outbreak of political violence on the Kenyan coast in mid-1997 as a case
study of both the orchestration of violence as a political tool and the devastating impact of small arms on
human rights. At that time, thecountry was gearing up for elections and calls for constitutional reform were
increasing, putting the ruling party on the defensive. Against this political backdrop, well-organized and
well-armed irregular paramilitary forces-known as "raiders"-carried out a series of brash and deadly attacks
on non-indigenous residents around Mombasa, Coast Province. ...
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The Coast1 raiders targeted members of ethnic communities that had voted disproportionately against the
ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU) party in the 1992 election, causing KANU to lose two of
four parliamentary seats in one district that year. As a result of the 1997 attacks these likely opposition
voters were forced to flee their homes and, in spite of an unexpected backlash against the government over
police abuses, KANU won three of the parliamentary seats in elections later that year, with a fourth seat
(the one in the area where the violence was sparked) being won by a KANU ally registered under a new
party. In a neighboring district that was also at the center of the violence, KANU won all three
parliamentary seats, as it had in 1992. President Daniel arap Moi, who needed to win at least 25 percent of
the presidential vote in Coast Province to ensure his reelection, carried the province easily, and his vote
tally rose considerably in violence-affected areas that previously had been opposition strongholds.
The perpetrators of the Coast attacks were largely disgruntled local young men whose hostility toward nonindigenous
residents of the region led them to support a divisive ethnic agenda that also served the ruling
party's political aspirations. Many strongly felt that long-term migrants from other parts of Kenya, as well
as other ethnic minority communities settled there, were to blame for the poor conditions faced by their
indigenous ethnic group, the Digo. They were motivated by anger over the economic marginalization of the
local population, which contrasted sharply with the wealth generated by the area's tourism economy. Their
goal was to drive away members of the ethnic groups originating from inland Kenya-the "up-country"
population-in order to gain access to jobs, land, and educational opportunities. They used brutal tactics to
terrorize their targets for weeks on end....
“Small arms proliferation across the globe leads to the more rapid spread of violence and magnifies the
devastating effects of violence, contributing significantly in areas of armed conflict to human rights abuses
and violations of international humanitarian law. In countries emerging from war, the widespread
availability of guns contributes to high levels of crime and makes more difficult the transition to a lasting
peace. In Kenya and other countries not at war, the ready availability of these weapons undermines security
(including with relation to crime), erodes prospects for development, contributes to social disintegration,
and makes the resort to violence more likely-and more deadly.
Kenya is vulnerable to weapons trafficking because of its geographic location in a conflict-ridden region.
The weapons circulating in Kenya originate from places as far away as China and the United States, but
most of them passed through war zones in neighboring countries before making their way to Kenya's illegal
gun markets. For years Kenya's territory has been a conduit for weapons shipments destined to nearby areas
of violent conflict, but more recently the spread of weapons has spilled back into Kenya itself.
For the time being, guns in Kenya are circulating on a small scale when compared to its war-torn neighbors.
They are smuggled into the country a few at a time in a steady flow and sold by traders in secret markets,
with some larger-scale illegal arms trafficking also reportedly taking place. The impact of even relatively
modest quantities of such weapons, however, is already being felt.
The increasing availability of weapons in Kenya has helped fuel rising insecurity and, in some areas, the
growing militarization of society. Much media attention has focused on the prevalent use of sophisticated
weapons in urban crime, particularly in Nairobi. Often, refugees living in Kenya are scapegoated as the
source of these weapons. The proliferation of small arms is most serious along Kenya's northern and
western borders, where pastoralist communities have ready access to AK-47s and other automatic rifles
obtained from neighboring countries. The introduction and spread of such sophisticated weapons among
these communities has intensified conflict and blurred the line between long-standing ethnic competitiontraditionally
manifested in cattle theft or rustling-and political violence. Guns are now widely used to carry
out acts of banditry and cattle rustling in Kenya, and have been responsible for growing numbers of human
casualties, including during armed confrontations that pit ethnic groups against each other. This grave
insecurity, as rightly noted by a Kenyan civic leader, derives both from "the influx of small arms" and
"careless utterances and incitement" by politicians.” (HRW, 31 May 2003, pp. 1-2)
14

To call the violence "tribal" conceals the attempt to alter the political demography of
the region in the government's favour(1997)
• The violence is ostensibly caused by land disputes between agricultural and pastoralist
communities.
• To call the violence "clashes" conceals the fact that the predominant pattern has been attacks by
Kalenjin and Maasai warriors on unarmed communities
• The onset of the violence, in September 1991, coincided almost precisely with the amendment of
the Kenyan Constitution
"Political violence in the Rift Valley and other areas of western Kenya has cost at least 1,500 lives since
1991 and has caused massive displacement among the local population. At one point the number displaced
may have been as high as 300,000.
The violence is ostensibly caused by land disputes between the settled agricultural communities of Kikuyu,
Luo and Luhya people and the pastoralist Kalenjin and Maasai. This is often described as "tribal clashes"
and there is no doubt that allegiances in the conflict generally follow ethnic lines. However, it is not
coincidental that many Kikuyus, Luhyas and Luos are supporters of the opposition parties, while President
Moi is a Kalenjin and Vice-President Saitoti a Maasai, as are many of their immediate circle. To call the
violence "tribal" conceals the fact that one of its principal effects has been to alter the political demography
of the region in the government's favour. To call it "clashes" conceals the fact that the predominant pattern
of the violence has been attacks by Kalenjin and Maasai warriors on unarmed communities.
The onset of the violence, in September 1991, coincided almost precisely with the amendment of the
Kenyan Constitution to permit multi-party politics. President Moi, who had made this change only under
concerted foreign and internal pressure, presented the "tribal clashes" as evidence that multi-party
democracy was divisive and that Kenyans were unready or unsuited to it. However, the initial violence was
the result of explicit incitement by leaders of the ruling Kenyan African National Union (KANU)
determined not to cede their political monopoly in the Rift Valley. At a political rally in September 1991 a
group of Rift Valley KANU politicians announced that they were "banning" members of the opposition
from entering the area and threatened Kikuyus, Luos and Luhyas living there. In the year leading to multiparty
elections in December 1992, KANU leaders continued to issue threats and ultimatums. For example,
in June 1992 a government minister threatened that non-Maasai in the traditional Maasai area of Narok
would not be allowed to vote there unless they owned land or property. The next week Maasai warriors
attacked Kikuyus at a voting registration centre in Narok, killing three and injuring four." (Article 19, Oct
1997)
Democratization has resulted in reaffirmation of ethnic identities, 1963-2000
• Since independence in 1963, Kenya has been shaped primarily by the Kenya African National
Union (KANU)
• International actors imposed multy-partyism in 1992
• The government put a ban on political rallies after more than 2000 people were killed in the
period leading up to the presidential and parliamentary elections in 1992
"In Political Parties the republic of Kenya was described in early 1979 as "a one-party state that is not
15

without threats to its stability". (Janda, 1980: 992) For a long time this held true, but there has been some
significant changes, especially since the early 1990s. Kenya has been, since its independence from the
United Kingdom, a country with a capitalist oriented economy, a stable political system and in general
been viewed as a friend of the West. Increasingly this view of Kenya has changed. Its economy is in
shambles, the political system is repressive, and Kenya has been, and continues to be, criticized by its
former Western friends. In general, Kenya has not performed economically nor politically as predicted
when she gained her independence some 33 years ago.
Since Kenya gained its independence on December 12 1963, it has been shaped primarily by the Kenya
African National Union (KANU) and the de facto one-party system in place (which became a de jure oneparty
state in 1982). The one-party system was a trend that could be seen all over the African continent
during the 1960s, and by the early 1970s, all but a few countries in Africa were one-party states. Of course,
this did not mean that the one-party states mirrored each other, rather, there were important differences
between the different countries. (Tordoff, 1997: 4) Furthermore, a trend that was obvious across the
continent was one of personalizing power in the hands of the party leader, who also became state president.
In the case of Kenya this power landed first in the hands of Jomo Kenyatta (1964-1978), and later with
Daniel arap Moi, who is still in power today. (Tordoff, 1997: 4) Furthermore, there was a general move
away from federal and quasi-federal systems of government to unitary systems, as in Kenya were federal
elements of the constitution were removed in 1964. (Tordoff, 1997: 10) All of these trends point to
centralization of power, personalized by the president. Very often this meant that power was diverted from
party organs to the bureaucratic machine instead, as evidenced in Kenya. The main argument for retaining
a one-party system was always for the sake of political stability. [...]
During the first half of 1992, around 2000 people were killed in tribal clashes in Western Kenya.
Consequently, the government put a ban on political rallies, a ban that was later lifted after protests
organized by FORD. In December 1992 both presidential and parliamentary elections were held, but
because of the oppositions' lack of cohesiveness and inability to form an alliance against KANU, Moi and
KANU were able to remain in control. (Tordoff, 1997: 16) However, it is contested how free and fair these
elections really were, and to what extent Moi and his political machine used their incumbent status to
control the results. (KHRC, 1998) Moi was elected to a fourth term as president with 36.3% of the vote
ahead of Kenneth Matiba (26.0%), Mwai Kibaki (19.5%) and Oginga Odinga (17.5%). Of the 188 seats in
the National Assembly, KANU won 100, FORD- Asili and FORD-Kenya gained 31 seats each and DP got
23 seats. (Europa Publications Limited, 1999: 2037)
After the 1992 elections tribal clashes continued. In May 1995 a new political party, SAFINA, was formed
by opposition activists who claimed that the party intended to fight for human rights and against
corruption. The chairman at the time was Mutari Kigano, a prominent human rights lawyer, and as
secretary general SAFINA appointed Dr Richard Leakey, a prominent white Kenyan. Today SAFINA is
led by Farah Maalim (chairman) and Mghanga Mwandawiro (secretary general). Again, even though
SAFINA represents an important element in Kenyan politics, it did not meet the requirements to qualify
for study.
The Kenya of today is marked by increased tension between ethnic groups. Tension that goes back to the
days when Jomo Kenyatta was president (1964-1978) and the Kikuyu dominated Kenyan politics. The
extent of Kikuyu domination came to alienate the Luo and other ethnic groups within the country.
(Tordoff, 1997: 86-7) The Kikuyu is the largest ethnic group in Kenya, followed in size by Luhya, Luo,
Kamba, Kalenjin and a host of other smaller ethnic groups. (KHRC, 1998: 11) Daniel arap Moi belongs to
the Kalenjin group. (Tordoff, 1997: 166) In Kenya, "Democratization has resulted in reaffirmation of
ethnic identities, with political parties emerging along ethnoregional criteria rather than ideological ones."
(Bratton and van de Walle, 1997: 239)
The 1992 multi-party election did not change who was in power, and neither the level of corruption within
the government. As before, the international community used its weight to put pressure on Kenya to take
action against official corruption. However, this time pressure came from the IMF who suspended
16

payments in August 1997 pending action on Kenya's part. Kenya promptly inaugurated an anti-corruption
body. However, in late August serious strife erupted in and around Mombasa, essentially along ethnic
lines."(Christina Nystrom, August 2000)
International and administrative borders have divided communities and rendered the
conflicts more complex (2004)
• Causes of conflict include limited access to water and pasture resources, loss of traditional grazing
land, cattle raiding, lack of alternative sources of livelihood from pastoralism
• Obstacles to peace efforts include diminishing role of traditional institutions in conflict
management, political incitement, non-responsive governments policy and inter-tribal animosity
"Nomadic pastoralism is the main economic activity and the main source of livelihood in the arid and semi
arid northern Kenya. Apart from environmental vagaries conflicts are many and centre mainly, on the
exploitation of the limited resources. Conflict over natural resources such as land, water, and forests is
ubiquitous. People everywhere have competed for the natural resources they need or want to ensure or
enhance their livelihoods.
However, the dimensions, level, and intensity of conflict vary greatly. Conflicts over natural resources can
take place at a variety of levels, from within the household to local, regional, societal, and global scales.
Furthermore,conflict may cut across these levels through multiplepoints of contact. The intensity of conflict
may also vary enormously — from confusion and frustration among members of a community over poorly
communicated development policies to violent clashes between groups over resource ownership rights and
responsibilities. With reduced government power in many regions, the resource users, who include
pastoralists, marginal farmers and agro-pastoralists, increasingly influence natural resource management
decisions.
However, the causes of conflict are diverse, and include: limited access to water and pasture resources, loss
of traditional grazing land, cattle raiding, lack of alternative sources of livelihood from pastoralism,
diminishing role
of traditional institutions in conflict management, political incitement, non-responsive governments policy
and intertribal animosity. The complexity of the conflicts is heightened by the presence of international and
regional
boundaries that have affected nomadic pastoralism through creation of administrative units, which split
communities that once lived together. This is true for example, between the Pokot and the Turkana who
occupy parts of Kenya and Uganda. These boundaries have interfered with seasonal movements
(nomadism) that were occasioned by resource dynamics. Proliferation of small arms and light weapons
(SALW) from war torn
countries in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes Region (Rwanda, Burundi and DRC) have amplified
the problem. The failed Somalia state coupled with the ongoing civil war in Southern Sudan has resulted in
proliferation of thousands of dangerous arms into the hands of tribal chiefs, warlords and ordinary
tribesmen. Due to remoteness, rugged terrain, underdeveloped
infrastructure and pastoralists’ migratory nature, the formal security system is inaccessible and/or
inappropriate to manage the nature and the magnitude
of the current conflicts. This is why despite the presence of formal security personnel in Kenya, Uganda
and Sudan, conflicts executed in the form of cattle rustling has continued to claim human lives, loss of
property and
destruction of biodiversity."(ITDG, 31 January 2004)
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Maasai land claims rejected by the government (August 2004)
• One million hectares of Maasai land was leased for 99 years to British settlers in 1894
• The government does not recognise the lease
• The one million hectare area shared among white farmers and black Kenyans, who practice
small-scale farming
• The Maasai want the white farmers to be evicted
"The Kenyan government has rejected demands by ethnic Maasai protesters for the return of land leased to
British settlers 100 years ago.
Lands Minister Amos Kimunya said the government did not recognise the colonial-era treaties.
The original lease expired this weekend on one million hectares of land, traditionally used by the Maasai
and then occupied by white farmers.
On Friday, more than 100 Maasai tribesman demonstrated in Nairobi.
Dressed in traditional regalia, the Maasai handed a petition to the Kenyan lands and justice ministries and
demanded compensation from the UK.
The one million hectare area is now subdivided among some white farmers, who own ranches, and black
Kenyans, who practice small-scale farming.
The Maasai want the white farmers to be evicted and compensation from the British for the land occupied
by the black farmers.
The Maasai Civil Society Group, which represents members of the community scattered in eight districts
throughout Kenya, says if the demands are not met, it will consider legal action." (BBC, 16 August 2004)
"Kenyan riot police have used tear gas to disperse more than 100 Maasai protesters in traditional outfits in
the capital, Nairobi.
The Kenyan police said they used force because the protest was illegal.
The Maasai are demanding the return of farmland leased to British settlers 100 years ago.
The original lease expired last weekend on one million hectares of land but the government says it does not
recognise the colonial era agreement.
"We have arrested quite a number of ringleaders and recovered knives from them because this meeting was
illegal," Nairobi police chief Julius Ndegwa told AFP news agency.
Maasai leaders say up to 10 people were wounded in running battles.
A Maasai statement said their lawyers would take their fight to the Kenyan High Court and the
International Court of Justice.
Protests
Over the weekend, Kenyan police shot dead a 70-year-old Maasai tribesman who was trying to graze his
cattle on a white-owned farm.
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Four other herdsman were injured in the shooting which took place 40 km north of Nanyuki township in
central Kenya. Police said 71 people, all believed to be Maasai land protesters, were arrested.
Last week the Maasai held demonstrations across Kenya.
The 99-year lease expired on 15 August.
The one million hectare area, mainly in the Rift Valley, is now subdivided among some white farmers, who
own ranches, and black Kenyans, who practice small-scale farming.
The Maasai want the white farmers that remain to be evicted and are seeking compensation from the
British.
The Kenyan government rejected their appeals.
Lands and Housing Minister Amos Kimunya said at the weekend that the government would not condone
the occupation of private farms and ranches by any groups.
"It should be clear that those inciting the youth will face the full force of the law," he said."(BBC, 24
August 2004)
Perpetrators on hire, 1991-2001
• The government blamed the violence on tensions caused by 'land-hungry' tribes and the country's
multi-party political system
• The use of surrogate agents to cause chaos, disrupt rallies, beat up, intimidate opponents or
otherwise defeat a political cause has been referred to as ‘informal repression
"Political violence in the Rift Valley and other areas of western Kenya has cost at least 1,500 lives since
1991 and has caused massive displacement among the local population. At one point the number displaced
may have been as high as 300,000. " (Article 19 October 1997, sect. 2.3)
"The victims were mostly non-Kalenjins, particularly the Kikuyu, Luo, Kisii and Luhya. Yet, the
government blamed the violence on tensions caused by 'land-hungry' tribes and the country's multi-party
political system. The Moi regime's response to the violence was grossly inappropriate. Little was done to
protect or aid the victims while the government obstructed organizations and the press which had sought to
monitor the violence or help the victims. Although some Kalenjin attackers have been convicted, there have
been a disproportionate number of convictions of non-Kalenjins who had obtained weapons to defend
themselves after being attacked.
[...]
Predictions of pre-election violence came to pass in August 1997 when ethnic clashes again took place in
Kenya. The violence along the coast near Mombasa, and in the Rift Valley, have resulted in at least 60
deaths and thousands of displacements. Again, the opposition and government blamed each other for
orchestrating the violent clashes. Kikuyu, Luo and Kisii seemed to be the groups most often targeted by the
violence." (CIDCM October 1999)
"In areas where violence occurred, evidence indicated that the perpetrators were on hire. According to the
interviews conducted by KHRC on the violence at the coast, gangs of young people were recruited, oathed
19

into taking part in causing chaos, and taken into the forests where they received military training. They
were paid about Ksh.500. The raiders were clad in informal uniform or traditional attire symbolically
associated with the local people. Many of the recruits were outsiders brought into Likoni and other affected
areas and familiarised with the region. It is alleged that some were Swahili-speaking Hutu refugees from
Rwanda and some Ugandans who served as trainers. With regard to armaments, former recruits claimed
that they used crude traditional weapons like machetes, bows, arrows and spears, although later some
Somalis said to have escaped from the Utange refugee camp and operating gun-running businesses
delivered guns.
Other groups of people were involved in election violence. They include ethnic militias like the morans and
‘warriors’, hired thugs, secret armies, ‘hit squads’, vigilante groups, personal armies like the jeshi la mzee
and the baghdad boys, and party youth wingers. The use of such surrogate agents to cause chaos, disrupt
rallies, beat up, intimidate opponents or otherwise defeat a political cause has been referred to as ‘informal
repression’. There is no hard and fast evidence to hold anybody directly responsible. Use of surrogate
agents is on the rise in Kenya. They are rowdy groups of young people able to carry out their terror as the
police officers sent into an area ‘to provide security’ watch indifferently. Because they are not formally
organised or recognised, it is difficult to address the problems they cause. Rather, blame for the violence is
placed on the organisers of the disrupted rallies or functions. The government easily denies involvement in
the hooligans activities, condemns the violence and calls for the perpetrators to be arrested.
[...]
Recent developments indicate that simmering ethnic tensions have led to revenge or retaliatory violence.
Multi-ethnic South Rift is most affected as incidents at Baraget and Rare indicate. In these two cases,
skirmishes involving Kalenjin and Kikuyu in 1997-9 led to the displacement of Kalenjin families. In 2000,
retaliatory attacks at the Kaptagat Saw Mill resulted in the demolition or burning of houses belonging
mainly to Kikuyu. Such ‘new’ cases of revenge and population displacement receive little if any national
and international attention because they are small-scale and not related to obvious political incitement."
(JRS March 2001, pp.7-8, 17)
Commercialisation of land occupied by the colonialists important factor behind the
violence during the 1990s
• Relationship between so-called ethnicity and territory is rooted in colonial policies
• The principle of 'willing seller, willing buyer' determined who could own land
• The most violent inter-ethnic clashes were within the former 'white' highlands
• Conflicting rights of the pastoralists and the squatter communities not addressed after
independence
"With the return to pluralism, violence refered to as ‘ethnic cleansing’ or ‘land clashes’ erupted in many
parts of the country, including multi-ethnic regions in the Rift Valley, Coast and Western provinces.
Tensions that often resulted in violence were also prevalent in areas of common borders like Gucha, Trans
Mara, Migori, Tigania and Tharaka Nithi, among others. This violence caused the displacement of
thousands of people and undermined their civic and political rights, especially their right to vote. The
bloody confrontations between supporters of different parties, and the indifference of the government to the
violence drew international attention to the elections, which were described by monitors and observers as
massively flawed.
[...]
Research into the violence indicates that the affected communities were mainly supporters of opposition
parties. The Kenya government got into pluralism involuntarily due to internal and international pressure,
and it is alleged that KANU leaders were firmly resolved on either reverting the country to one party status
or keeping genuine democracy at bay.
[...]
20

The land issue is a problem along district boundaries in other parts of the country as well. It became more
prevalent with the creation of new constituencies and districts because they are viewed as describing tribal
boundaries. In multi-ethnic areas, the creation of a new district has led to the victimization and expulsion of
the ethnic minority. It has affected border areas such as Busia/Teso, Migori/Kuria, Gucha/Kuria,
Gucha/Transmara and constituency boundaries in Meru. Such tension causes displacement of the minority
group. Affected people usually do not move into camp-like settlements, but go to live with relatives or rent
rooms and shanties in towns." (JRS March 2001, pp.5, 6, 11)
"The nexus between ethnicity and geographical space gave the 1990s clashes their unique character. The
campaign against multiparty politics would have had a less violent impact, were it not for this association
[...]. These clashes were attempts to drive away populations seen as 'alien' (non-indigenous) in a bid to
create ethnic homogeneity, presumed to operate as bloc that could offer political support. As 'enemy'
communities were expunged, KANU strongmen urged vigilantes to create and protect KANU zones. For
example, in early 1991, the controversial majimbo rallies promulgated the theory that the Rift Valley was
an exclusive Kalenjin KANU zone. Opposition party leaders were warned not to enter the Rift Valley.
Meanwhile, their presumed supporters were being driven out of the Rift Valley[...].
[...]
Ironically, the relationship between ethnicity and territory is rooted in colonial policies that created the
enviable 'white' highlands. During this period, Kenyans were evicted to create space for settler agriculture.
With independence, the principle of 'willing seller, willing buyer' determined who could own these lands.
People of different ethnic backgrounds, with the ability to purchase these farms, either individually or as
members of co-operatives, became neighbours. Meanwhile, large numbers of people who had been evicted
earlier, but did not have money after independence, remained squatters. The areas that witnessed the most
violent of inter-ethnic clashes were within the former 'white' highlands. The principal areas of conflict
include (1) the Rift Valley districts of Nakuru, Molo, Kericho, Nandi, Uasin Gishu, Trans-Mara, and
Marakwet; (2) the districts that flank Mt. Elgon, namely, Trans-Nzoia, Bungoma and Mt. Elgon, and (3)
Mombasa located in the Coast Province." (Kathina Juma, May 2000)
"Access and rights to land are a key issue of contention in Kenya, particularly in the Rift Valley Province.
The customary rights of the nomadic pastoral communities, including the Kalenjin, to land in the province
were usurped during the colonial period by white settlers, who expropriated much of the best land. The
settlers recruited agricultural labour from neighbouring provinces, particularly the Kikuyu from Central
Province, who became squatters on European farms. After Independence the conflicting rights of the
pastoralists and the squatter communities were not addressed. Many Kikuyu took advantage of land-buying
schemes and settled permanently in the Rift Valley. The area in the Nakuru district affected by the violence
had been settled in the late 1970s by both the Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities. Since 1996 2,000 to 3,000
Kalenjin families have been settled by the government in the forest areas neighbouring the Njoro to Molo
road [ Pressure on land has resulted in forest areas being settled. However, this policy has caused
controversy and many settlement schemes have been challenged, often on the grounds that they ignored
customary rights to the land. This settlement was challenged by the Ndorobo, one of the Kalenjin ethnic
groups.]. These families were from the Bomet and Kericho areas. Prior to the elections the two
communities lived peacefully together." (AI 10 June 1998, sect.2)
Moi government capitalized on unaddressed land ownership and tenure issues
created during the colonial period, 1960-2001
• Kikuyus moved into the Rift Valley Province during the colonial period and after independence
• Large number of Kikuyus bought land in areas inhabited by among others Maasai and Kalenjin
people, in the Rift Valley in the 1960s and 1970s
• Proponents of "Majimboism" have called for the expulsion of certain ethnic groups from the Rift
Valley
21

• Moi's Kalenjin group and the Maasai instigated the violence against other groups in the Rift
Valley
"The Rift Valley is home of people of many ethnic backgrounds. Some communities are pastoralists and
others small-scale farmers. Prior to the multi-party era, these people lived harmoniously together,
intermarried and engaged in trade. In 1992/3, most of the agriculturalists, mainly from Central and Western
provinces, were ordered to return to their ancestral lands, and failure to do so resulted in their being killed
and their property looted or destroyed. Ethnic sentiment and suspicion is deep in South Rift, where there is
a mixture of Kikuyu, Kalenjin and Maasai tribes. Memories of 1992 are still fresh as people remain
displaced. Small differences between individuals rapidly escalate into tribal skirmishes as one tribe is seen
to be attacking the other. The researcher was told of an incident in August 2000 at Baraget where a quarrel
over a wrist watch between two young people from different ethnic groups led to a tribal war that saw to
the death of six. It could have got worse had elders from both tribes not met to find out the root of the
problem. In this part of the Rift Valley, issues are judged according to the ethnicity of the person raising
them, rather than by their merit. See a version of this kind of ethnic animosity in Museveni, Y., Sowing the
Mustard Seed (Kampala: Macmillan, 1998) pp.10-21. Nepotism and favouritism has made matters worse as
people from a particular community have benefited more or at the expense of others. Fear of economic and
political domination by certain communities is evident by the appointment of individuals from particular
tribes to key or strategic government positions." (JRS, March 2001)
"The Moi government capitalized on unaddressed land ownership and tenure issues, dating back to the
colonial period. During colonial rule, pastoral ethnic groups on the land in the Rift Valley area were ousted
to provide land to British settlers. Following independence in 1963, much of this same land was used to
settle squatter laborers who had been previously used as cheap agricultural labor on the settler farms.
After independence, Kenya became a de facto one-party state led by KANU, following the voluntary
dissolution of the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) which had advocated ethnic regionalism and
another party, the African People's Party. KANU rule under president Jomo Kenyatta was characterized by
strong Kikuyu nationalist sentiments. Moreover, the land issue was never fully addressed. British settler
interests were safeguarded, while no effort was made to deal with the competing claims of those pastoral
ethnic groups who originally were ousted from the Rift Valley area by the British and the squatter laborers
who subsequently settled on the land. Consequently, large tracts of some of the best farmland in Kenya
remain owned by British settlers. For those settlers who wanted to sell their land, land settlement schemes
were set up with the newly independent government to assist the former squatter labor to buy land either
individually or through collective schemes.
Among the Kikuyu, unlike communal pastoral groups, such as the Maasai and Kalenjin, farming was an
established practice. Accordingly, many Kikuyus were eager to take advantage of the opportunity to
purchase land. Encouraged and assisted by President Kenyatta, a Kikuyu, large number of Kikuyus bought
land in the Rift Valley in the 1960s and 1970s and moved from the overcrowded Central Province. These
farms were at the center of the 'ethnic' violence of the 1990s. The instigators drew on the competing land
claims in order to inflame violence among certain ethnic groups." (HRW June 1997, pp. 37-38)
"No ethnic group in Kenya, except a few of the smallest ones, is culturally and linguistically homogeneous.
The Kikuyu are found in the Central Province and the capital city Nairobi. During British colonial rule, the
Kikuyu, an agricultural people, lost their land to white settlers and took work as laborers on European
farms. In order to relieve their land shortage and demographic stress, they moved into the Rift Valley
Province during the colonial period and after independence. During the rule of Kikuyu President Kenyatta
(1963-1978), they enjoyed political and economic advantages. They are still advantaged economically. The
Kikuyu are strongly in opposition to Moi, but their loyalty is split between the FORD-Asili (Forum for the
Restoration of Democracy), FORD-Kenya and Democratic Parties (DP). FORD was founded in 1991, but
split in 1992. FORD-Asili draws its support mainly from the Kikuyu and Luhya, FORD-Kenya from the
22

Luo and the DP from the Kikuyu. During President Moi's rule, the Kikuyu have been the primary targets of
ethnic violence.
The Luo inhabit the southwestern Nyanza Province. While Oginga Odinga, a Luo and leader of KANU at
independence, held the office of Vice President, the Luo were politically advantaged. But the Luo lost their
political advantage when Odinga defected from KANU and formed the Kenya People's Union (KPU) in
1966. He has continued to be a leading opposition figure and the Luo were targeted for violence between
1991-94.
The term Luhya was first introduced during the colonial period. It is a large linguistic group which consists
of sixteen smaller groups: Bukusu, Dakho, Kabras, Khayo, Kisa, Marachi, Maragoli, Marama, Nyala,
Nyole, Samia, Tachoni, Tiriki, Tsotso, and Wanga. Luhya are concentrated in the Western Province and
adjacent areas of the Rift Valley Province. They were also targeted by the ethnic clashes that erupted in
1991.
The Kisii live primarily in the southwest corner of Kenya in Nyanza Province. In 1964, the Kisii and
Maasai were involved in border disputes that Moi mediated successfully. Between 1991-94, Kisii were also
targeted by the Kalenjin and Maasai. Of the four groups, the Kikuyu and Luo are most united in opposition
to the Moi regime, the Luhya are the least uniformly anti-KANU and anti-Moi, and the politics of the Kisii
are the least known.
Upon Kenyan independence from Britain in 1963, President Kenyatta began to give preferential treatment
to his own Kikuyu group. The Kikuyu obtained much of the fertile land in the process of the Africanization
of the White Highlands. Since Daniel arap Moi (a Kalenjin) came to power in 1978, however, Kalenjin and
Maasai politicians have demanded the introduction of Majimboism (a federal system based on ethnicity)
which would mandate that only members of the original inhabitants (i.e., the Kalenjin and Maasai) would
have political and economic rights in the Rift Valley areas.
President Moi has been repeatedly criticized for the harsh repression of opposition to his government and
for other human rights abuses. Between the end of 1991 and 1994, the country was torn apart by ethnic
violence which pitted Moi's Kalenjin group with the Maasai against the Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya and Kisii.
[...]
Since Moi came to power, Kalenjin and Maasai politicians in KANU have advocated the introduction of
the Majimbo (federalism) system (which was proposed at independence but abandoned by then-President
Kenyatta, a Kikuyu), claiming that the Rift Valley was originally the land of the Kalenjin and other pastoral
groups, including the Maasai, Turkana, and Samburu. These Majimboism proponents have called for the
expulsion of all other ethnic groups from the Rift Valley. If implemented, Majimboism would expel
millions of people (predominantly members from the Kikuyu, Luhya, and Luo) who have settled there
since the 1920s and who had legally bought land since independence. The Rift Valley area is not only the
country's most fertile farmland but also accounts for the largest number of seats in Parliament. Not
surprisingly, ethnic groups that Majimboism proponents proposed to expel from the Rift Valley are those
perceived to support the political opposition." (CIDCM October 1999)
See also:
Displacement during late 1990s increasingly caused by clashes within the same ethnic groups
Ethnic cleansing disguised as what the KANU government called "Majimboism"
• According to the government, majimboism is a form of Kenyan regionalism
• According to its opponents it is nothing less than a form of ethnic cleansing
23

"When, after the end of the Cold War, Moi was confronted with the demand for multi-partyism, his answer
was majimboism. According to the government, majimboism is a form of Kenyan regionalism. According
to its opponents it is nothing less than a form of ethnic cleansing which has encouraged discrimination
against Kikuyu in the Rift Valley province. So the Kikuyu - and the Luo - have been excluded from the
President's cabinet, while numerous smaller peoples have cabinet representation. The state has explicitly
called for the expulsion of all non-Kalenjin, non-Maasai, non-Samburu, and non-Turkana from land in the
Rift Valley. Many observers agree that majimboism has played a pivotal role in inciting the ethnic violence
which has prevailed in the Rift Valley since 1992 and as a result of which hundreds of Kikuyu have been
killed while 250,000 others have been forced to leave their villages. Interviews with the victims of these
clashes and other evidence suggest that groups aligned with Moi assisted the Maasai and Kalenjin KANU
militants by providing training, transport, and sometimes payment. Underlying these conflicts is a life and
death struggle for natural resources, especially land. Since president Moi and his KANU party held onto
power in the 1997 National Assembly elections - albeit with a smaller majority than in 1992 - the situation
has further deteriorated (EPCT, 11 Nov 2000).
Colonial heritage explains contemporary inter-tribal divisions in the Rift Valley, 1918-
2003
• Maasai and Kalenjin were ousted to make way for British settlers who in turn employed farmer
communities from other Provinces
• No effort was made to deal with the competing claims of those pastoral groups originally forced
from the Rift Valley
• The colonial alienation of land robbed the Maasi of grazing land
“Until they were evicted, the ethnic Luo community had inhabited land in the Rift Valley since 1918, when
they were employed as labourers on European-owned sisal plantations, according to Oduor.
In 1971, eight years after Kenya gained its independence, the 'Thessalia people' who were at that time
squatting, came together and purchased the land for some 81,000 Kenya Shillings (about US $1,080 today).
However, their legal claim to ownership of the land is far from certain. Although they still have receipts
showing their purchase, no official deed was ever received, and despite having occupied the area
continuously for over 70 years, the community has no officially recognized proof of land purchase.
According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), land ownership issues in the Rift Valley have remained
unresolved since colonial times, when pastoral groups such as the Maasai and Kalenjin were ousted to
make way for British settlers, who in turn employed labourers, some of whose descendants now live at
Thessalia.
Following independence the land issue was not fully addressed, and no effort was made to deal with the
competing claims of those pastoral groups originally forced from the Rift Valley and the squatter-labourers
who subsequently settled on the land, HRW said in 1997 report.
Some 1500 families in Kenya are currently displaced because there is a dispute of some kind regarding
ownership of their land, and there are places where two or more title deeds exist for the same tract of land,
according to the JRS report.
No recourse to the law
IDPs attempting to seek redress through the courts are faced with prohibitively high legal costs, and a
"culture of silence" in government on the issue, JRS claims.
24

Those who have attempted to seek legal claim to their farms are making little headway because of "the
feeling among lawyers, politicians and the general public that talking of clashes and reparations can only
open old wounds and lead to fresh bitterness and conflict," JRS says (IRIN 14 Nov 2002).
"Colonial land alienation processes fractured pre-colonial economies and inter-ethnic relations. In Kenya,
the Bantu speaking Luhya and Kisii and the Nilotic speaker who had mixed economies, pursed trading
strategies which linked them to the Maasai in a regional system, with the ethnic relations that were
mutually beneficial and helped to neutralize potential rivalry and conflict. Colonial policies created a
common politico- administrative centre, which had the effect of bringing together all “tribes” under one
authority but saw the division of the state into ethnic administrative enclaves, and the confinement of the
“natives” to their reserves. The colonial alienation of land in Nakuru, Laikipia, Nyandarua, Uasin Gishu
and Trans- Nozia in what was traditionally Maasiland robbed the Maasi of grazing land thereby
constraining their economic activities. Large scale land alienation in Kikuyuland engendered squatter
farming among the Kikuyu, especially in white settled areas in the Rift Valley. By 1918, 10% of the
Kikuyu had become squatters. The Anti-Kikuyu crusade between the Kalenjin and the Maasai in
contemporary Kenya has to be explained largely by this colonial heritage." (UNDP, 12 March 2003, p. 11)
Coalition government elected ends 40 years of Kenya African National Union (KANU)
rule (Dec 2002)
• The National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) won a majority of seats in Parliament and close to 60
per cent of the presidential votes
• Voters were able to cast their votes freely and for the candidates of their choice
• Primary education will be free and compulsory
“Kenyans ushered in the new year with a new government after 40 years of Kenya African National Union
(KANU) rule. The National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) won a majority of seats in Parliament and close to
60 per cent of the presidential votes, relegating the former ruling party to the opposition benches. The new
President, former official leader of the Opposition, Mr Emilio Mwai Kibaki, was sworn in on December 30
at a ceremony reminiscent of celebrations in 1964 when the country attained independence.
The swearing in ceremony was witnessed by Levy Mwanawasa of Zambia, Uganda's Yoweri Museveni and
Tanzania's Benjamin Mkapa, as well as South Africa's first lady, Zanele Mbeki, all of whom hailed the
peaceful transition.
NARC's victory hinged on an ambitious list of promises aimed at revitalising the economy and tackling
poverty. In its election campaign, NARC promised to create more than 500,000 jobs every year for the next
five years. On being sworn in, NARC reiterated the promise to tackle corruption by adopting a 'zero
tolerance' approach and privatising all non performing public companies. In addition, primary education
will be free and compulsory as stipulated in the recently enacted Children's Act.
The ruling party said it would spur economic growth by revitalising the investment sector. This would be
done by increasing trade and investment opportunities. In addition, the government pledged to reduce
corporate tax from 30 per cent to 25 per cent, which is hoped to produce rapid business growth.
Improvement of the economy's management and setting aside funds for investment in labour-intensive
public works such as road construction and the building of dams and bridges was also included in NARC's
promises to the electorate. Investment in farming and agriculture would be given priority and loans made
available to farmers. The economic prosperity is expected to provide greater health care. The government
will pay attention to tourism, security throughout the country and restoration of authority to the parliament
and the judiciary.
Former President Daniel arap Moi - who ruled the country since 1978 - retired after completing two fiveyear
terms, the maximum allowed by the constitutional changes made in 1992. The outgoing president has
25

een criticised for failing to clamp down on high-level corruption, which has contributed to the collapse of
the country's economy. The country is also experiencing high levels of unemployment and poor production.
The IMF and the World Bank suspended aid to Kenya in late 2000 because of the government's failure to
fulfil its promises of tackling corruption and privatising key sectors of the economy. In the same year,
Kenya experienced its worst recession since independence in 1963, and last year Gross Domestic Product
actually shrank by 0.3 percent.
Moi's supporters, however, credit him with successfully steering a relatively peaceful country in the
particularly turbulent East African region. However, his decision to declare his own successor within
KANU this year caused a rift within the party, with some prominent party members decamping to the
opposition.
Mr Kibaki's win was not all that much of a surprise seeing that since early December opinion polls by
various local and international institutions had indicated that he was going to win about 68 percent of the
total votes cast. Uhuru Kenyatta, the candidate of the ruling Kenya African National Union and Moi's
preferred successor, was forecast to achieve 21 percent.
Most election monitors gave the elections a clean bill of health saying the outcome was a true reflection of
the will of Kenyans. A European Union 160-member observer team was of the same opinion and described
the election as an important step in the development of democracy. The mission said voters were able to
cast their votes freely and for the candidates of their choice.
A commonwealth observer mission gave a similar glowing tribute to the way the elections were conducted.
The Director General of the United Nations Office at Nairobi said the peaceful and calm conduct of the
elections was a victory for democracy and the integrity of the Kenyan people.
The UN Development Programme supported the elections in its Good Governance for Poverty Eradication
Programme, and in partnership with the Institute for Education in Democracy (IED) and the Electoral
Commission of Kenya (ECK).
UNDP carried out voter education, media campaigns, training of ECK officials, and recruiting, training and
deploying of 177 National United Nations Volunteer (UNV) long term election observers nationwide. The
UNVs were deployed for a period of three months in order to observe the period leading to the elections,
polling as well as the post election period. UNDP also supported the Kenya Domestic Observation
Programme (K-DOP), which deployed around 19,000 national poll observers covering all polling stations
in Kenya.
Thirty seven political parties took part in the elections in which a new president, new parliament and new
civic representatives were elected. Polling went on quietly in many polling stations around the country
without any major incidences of violence. In some centres, the long morning queues had vanished by
midday.
The print and electronic media were praised for offering extensive and diverse coverage of the campaigns.
A directive stopping the state owned Kenya Broadcasting Corporation from airing NARC campaign
messages was revised instantly after the Government realised that it was going against the people's wishes.
Hitches observed during the elections included political violence aimed at both voters and candidates,
omission of voters from voters registers which political parties said was "too large" and could be a
"deliberate" effort to rig elections, open bribery of voters and buying of voters cards.
On Christmas Day, relatives of the KANU presidential aspirant distributed small amounts of money to
women in Mbeere's Gachoka constituency. The relative explained that the money was being given out so
that people attending their rally could enjoy 'tea'. In Vihiga District, four people were arrested on voter-card
buying charges. A total of 213 cards were found on one of the arrested suspects.
The ruling party says it will challenge election results in a number of constituencies in which KANU won
on grounds of rigging. Among those already identified are four constituencies recaptured by KANU's
former cabinet ministers.
They are Keiyo South won by former powerful minister Nicholas Biwot, Nambale taken by former minister
Mr Chris Okemo and Mwatate which was recaptured by Mr Marsden Madoka. The fourth was taken by
KANU's Mr Abdul Barre Ali's in Isiolo South. NARC claimed to have been denied victory through
"massive rigging and election mal-practices."
The ECK had attempted to address the issue of missing names on the voters roll by saying that they would
allow people who had registered in the previous elections to vote but the political parties blocked the move
26

saying it would create room for rigging. The problem was widespread throughout the country and ECK said
they were looking into the matter.
In Wajir, top NARC officials claimed that pre-marked ballot papers were confiscated when a number of
individuals were arrested. The ballot-papers were said to have been marked in favour of a KANU
candidate.
Counting of votes at the polling stations was praised because it improved the openness and transparency of
the democratic process. In the past votes were transported to a central counting hall which created a
loophole for rigging.
The observers praised the ECK saying it was well-equipped and prepared for the task. The team also
commended the commission for acting on breaches on the electoral code and for conducting a widespread
voter education programme.
Preparations for guarding against election rigging started early. At the end of November a group of some
10-15 organizations working toward peaceful elections formed an ad hoc coordination body. One of its
activities was hosting a policy forum workshop entitled, "Addressing Elections Offences." The half-day
workshop was attended by members of the Kenyan civil society, government, the media, and international
organizations to discuss the elections with a specific focus on examining past instances of vote-rigging and
election offences (UN DPMCU, 31 Dec 2002).
Causes of displacement
Main causes of displacement in the Rift Valley, 1992-2002
• The Rift Valley is characterized by violence and organized crime
• Almost every household has a firearm
• The Turkana, the Marakwet and the Pokot communities raiding and counter raiding one another
• Residents are dissatisfied with the exisiting land tenure policies
• Livestock theft has been the major issue of conflict in the region
"An area that was worst hit by the ethnic/Land clashes of 1991/2, with a re-emergence of a more
catastrophic scenario in 1997 taking into consideration the number of people killed in a very short time and
the more sophisticated firearms used, the great Rift Valley is characterized by violence and organized
crime.
The Rift valley communities have endeavored to outpace each other in organized raid practices causing
major insecurity to the whole pastoralist communities. There has been continued and persistent influx of
firearms with almost every household owning one. Firearms trade in cash and in kind tend to be a new
development. Commercialization of cattle rustling poses a great threat to security in the region.
Intermittent attacks, warlike activities, ruthless killings, rape and destruction of property continues to rise at
an alarming rate. The Turkana, the Marakwet and the Pokot continue raiding and counter raiding one
another, a trend that has become habitual. Culturally rooted cattle rustling has led to deep hatred among
these communities.
Resource based conflicts; grazing fields, water resources, land and district borders continue to be witnessed
as pastoralism is the only economic and social livelihood.
27

The attacks have assumed well-organized military tactics: killing, destroying property and burning houses.
Animals are raided in large numbers, even up to over 1,000 in a single raid.
Political motivation into violent conflicts is a frequent phenomenon in this region as is characterized by
political outbursts in the recent past.
The presence of government security forces has very little to contribute to the insecurity in the area as their
systems seem non-complacent.
NCCK, an institution that has worked in and has wide experience of the situation in this area says there is
need to seriously address the looming armed civil strife/massacre in this region.
Communities have been reported to be using such heavy artilleries as hand grenades, bazookas and rocket
launchers as part of raiding gear and community arming against potential attacks.
Conflict causes in the rift
An expansive region covering Trans-mara, Narok, Kajiado, Usin Gishu and Elgeyo Marakwet,
Pokot,TransaNzoia, Laikipia and Nakuru North Rift has distinctive violent causes including:
Land
Residents are dissatisfied by the exisiting land tenure policies and the general legal regime resposible for
land, which do not clearly address land rights and land leases.
At another level, there is evidence of rampant crop theft and crop destruction instigated and executed by
rival communities.
Political manipulations
Politicians have taken advantage of the poverty/ ignorance of the electorate to influence them to fight
against each other.
They are "made" to perceive others as enemies. Hatred and frequent conflicts thus persist within the
region.
Cattle Rustling
Livestock theft has been the major issue of conflict in the region.
A particular cause for concern in the region is the Government's demonstrated laxity in addressing matters
of importance that are sensitive like cross boarder conflicts, cattle rustling, land issues, ethnic tensions and
arms proliferation.
Other conflict causesInclude:
- Grabbing/Sale of communal land and favouritism in it's allocation
- Partisan security agents
- Squatting in communal land
28

- Commercialization of cattle rustling and competition over natural resources namely: land, pasture, water
and livestock.
- Cultural Practices, human and wildlife conflicts
- Political intimidation and illegal firearms" (PDN, 31 December 2002)
Main causes of displacement in Nyanza and Western regions, 1992-2001
• Gangs of disenfranchised youths used by politicians to attack opponents
• Auctioneers, land grabbers and landlords who have problems with their tenants hire these groups
to evict tenants
• Causes of conflict include control of fish landing bays and pricing
• Administrative boundaries have been created according to ethnic criterias
• Poor policies on land demarcation and ownership
Nyanza region
Nyanza is currently one of the most politically violent province in Kenya since the advent of multi-party
politics in 1990.
Hired gangs take charge here, killing, maiming, wounding and destroying valuable property with impunity.
The police and the provincial administration have in most cases been reported to have never taken any
action to apprehend members of these organized gangs and protect civilians continually terrorized by the
same.
No arrests have been made despite the knowledge of some of the leaders of this group. Media serialization
of the groups' activities and their leadership has never influenced any official action.
Kisumu town is now the largest reservoir of these political gangs and the home to the dreaded "Baghdad
and Kondele Boys".
These young people are out for hire to commit dangerous political crimes. They break up political
meetings, kidnap rivals and organize attacks on opponents.
Auctioneers, land grabbers and even landlords who have problems with their tenants hire these groups to
evict tenants.
During the last two mayoral elections at the Kisumu town hall, they violently broke in to force the election
of particular individuals as mayors. During the last mayoral elections in Kisumu for example, one of their
leaders who led them to jam the public gallery dared any of the councillors to oppose Mayor Shabir as he
29

said. "This is not a secret ballot, the voting shall be done by a show of hands. We are ready to slash any arm
raised in the opposition to Mr. Shabir".
In the January, 2001 by-elections in Kenya, Nyanza saw the worst form of political intolerance in South
Mugirango Constituency where a threatening level of participation of the vigilante group Chinkororo was
used and about four people reportedly killed. The M.P. elect had to be hospitalized following the injuries
sustained in the campaign violence.
Violence along the Gucha/Trans Mara border area pitting the Kisii against the Maasai seems unending.
Well over twenty people have been reported dead and scores injured in the last resurgence alone (See
peacenet report on Trans-Mara -Gucha conflict).
Other potential violent conflict issues in Nyanza include control of fish landing bays and pricing and
disfranchised farmers in the sugar belts
Western Region
Cross border conflicts have been widely experienced along the borders of Bungoma, Mt. Elgon, Busia and
Teso districts.
These are large because of: Ethnicization and politicization of land as seen in the creation of administrative
boundaries especially in the Busia, Teso and Bungoma Districts.
Moreover the local people are dissatisfied with the office of the President, as it has refused to honour ethnic
boundaries. They also attribute it to the imbalances in allocationd for development projects.
Conflicts continue to arise as citizens angrily react to mismanagement of local resources, poor distribution
of development aid and capital flight from the region as seen in the exploitation of the Elgon Teak from
Mount Elgon and fish from Lake Victoria.
Cattle rustling has been a recent phenomenon and violence continue to be seen as clans fight in attempt to
retrieve lost property through raiding.
To a larger extent, raiding is instigated on political grounds (rivalry) where politicians incite their electorate
in order to be seen in control/power.
Major conflict sources in these regions include:
Ethnicity/ethnic clashes
Instigated by land grabbing through political maneuvers and administrative rewards. This has fatally stalled
all structures of development.
Political interference
Politicians have capitalized on the ignorance of the electorate to incite them against each [other]. This they
have perfected by misinterpretation of government policies to suit party interests.
30

Land
The value attached to land in the region has perpetuated the recurrent conflicts within the communities.
Other land related conflicts in the region have been attributed to poor policies on land demarcation and
ownership as well as allocation of public land to non-residents as prevalent in in Nyanza province.This has
affected the co-existence of the communities; Luo, Kuria and Suba.
In Western Region, the problems associated with land are as a result of inheritance and multi-ethnicity.
There is no clear policy on land inheritance.
Other issues include the fact that during the establishment of Mumias sugar company 50 thousand locals
refereered to as "abahuyi" were left landless. These are the most dissatisfied lot as they have never
benefited from the establishment of the company.
Further, 70% of sugar cane in Mumias does not belong to the local community while more than 36% of
land is leased to outsiders." (PDN, 31 December 2002)
Land dispute causes deaths and displacements in Marakwet District (September 2004)
• 10 people killed in daylight in Marakwet District
• Villagers have fled the area
• The killings were ignited by a long standing land dispute
"Tension remained high in Tirap division of Marakwet District following killings of 10 people in the area,
as local leaders commenced plans for a mass burial tomorrow.
Villagers continued fleeing from Kapkao village to safer areas in fear of another attack.
The most affected are school children whose education has seriously been interrupted by the clashes.
Security in the area has been beefed up to check on any re-groupings of villagers bent on avenging the
deaths. Some of the villagers are said to be armed with assault rifles.
Last Friday’s killings, which were ignited by a long standing land dispute, were quickly blamed on alleged
laxity of the District Security Committee.
Marakwet West MP David Sudi said the security committe erred by withdrawing police officers from the
area after an earlier incident where a school boy was shot and seriously injured in a dispute over land.
"It is strange the raid took place in broad daylight without the knowledge of the security network," said
Sudi.
Sudi said the government should compensate the victims of the attack because it is its duty to protect the
lives and property of its people.
31

Speaking separately, former area MP John Marimoi said the elders had resolved that the mass burial would
be preceeded by an inter-denominational service at the Chesoi Catholic Church.
Marimoi said the elders had alo resolved that the victims would be buried at the same spot where they were
shot at Tuturung village in Tirap division.
The dead included three women. They were killed when members of Karel clan from Kerio Valley attacked
the Kapkao clan.
The elders were attending a peace meeting that had been called to look into ways of returning animals that
had been earlier stolen by members of the Karel clan.
An elderly woman and two men who were also injured during the attack were admitted to the Kapsowar
Mission Hospital.
The area MP and Minister in the Office of the Vice President, Mrs Linah Kilimo, was among the first
government officials to condemn the killings.
Kilimo who toured the area called for restraint among local residents. She promised that those behind the
killings would be made to face the full force of the law." (The East African Standard, 16 August 2004)
Competion over scarce resources and administrative boundaries cause
displacements among pastoralists (September 2004)
• Cattle raids and conflicts over water and pasture are the major causes of violence among
pastoralist communities
• There are over 100 000 illegal guns in the districts of Turkana, Samburu and West Pok
• The tensions between the communities intensifies whenever there is a prolonged drought
• Clashed erupted in early July 2004
• Shores of the lake was deserted throughout three days of fighting
"The Government's failure to control the large number of illegal guns in northern Kenya has made it
impossible to end insecurity and inter-ethnic hostility in the region, Church and community leaders said.
There are over 100 000 illegal guns in just three districts (Turkana, Samburu and West Pokot), the
chairman of the Samburu Distirict Peace Committee, Moses Lenairoshi, told a reconciliation Mass
celebrated by the Catholic Bishop of Maralal, Rt Rev Virgilio Pante.
The Eucharist was held on Sunday, October 24, 2004 at Malaso, near the place where suspected Pokot
herdsmen shot dead four Samburu men in June.
Bishop Pante prayed for peace among the Turkana, Samburu and Pokot communities. "We like pointing an
accusing finger at the other. But we are all guilty and should seek God's forgiveness," he said.
Cattle raids and conflicts over water and pasture are the major causes of violence among the three
pastoralist communities.
32

The Mass was the conclusion of an intensive peace campaign, dubbed Safari ya Amani (The Journey of
Peace), which was conducted throughout the Diocese, starting in August. Bishop Pante had declared 2004
the Year of Peace in his Diocese.
"What brings all the problems is the gun. If the gun were returned to where it came from, peace would also
return here," said Senior Chief Joseph Nareng' of Barsaloi. "The arm of the law is a long one. But how
come the armed criminals are never arrested? Do they disappear into the sky or down into the earth?" he
wondered."(CISA, 26 October 2004)
"There is little hope of a quick solution to the long-running clashes between members of the Tugen and
Njemps communities over boundary and pasture.
The two communities clashed again last weekend, bringing to the fore the differences that have dogged the
pastoralists.
A shaky peace deal brokered by Baringo District Commissioner John Abduba on Tuesday will come under
sharp focus as a committee of elders meet this morning to review it.
At the centre of the clashes is the lush Ilmania grazing fields located in Salabani Location. Both
communities claim it.
Marigat District Officer Michael Kibet held a six-hour meeting with 20 elders, 10 from each community to
try and resolve the matter — but it did not bear fruits.
He is scheduled to hold another one today seeking to allow the Tugen to graze their cattle in the disputed
area before the final meeting of elders and elected leaders on September 13.
The fight for access to the fields, also known as Ng’arua by the Tugen, intensifies whenever there is a
prolonged drought, as is the case at the moment.
The boundary dispute is interlinked with the same pastures and access to the waters of Lake Baringo,
making an easy resolution difficult.
The Njemps (Ilchamus) are a minority community in Baringo and earliest records indicate they were living
in Ngambo Location at Sindan by 1800.
They are cousins of the Maa speaking communities of Samburu, Narok, Laikipia and Kajiado and today
number about 40,000.
They are found in Salabani, Ng’ambo, Muktani, Eldume Kiserian sub-locations in Marigat and inhabit the
Kokwa area on the Lake Baringo islands.
The community is basically involved in cattle rearing, subsistence farming and fishing in the lake where
they have eked out a living for generations.
An uneasy calm between the two communities when they first clashed in early July was shattered when the
Tugen were denied access to Ilmania by the Njemps last week.
Although the two have lived side by side at Salabani (Njemps) and Bartum (Tugen) for generations, the
hostilities exhibited is proof of the deep passion evoked by the issue of pasture.
33

Their common centre, Kambi Samaki, on the shores of the lake was deserted throughout the three days the
combatants faced off across the Lake Baringo Club Airstrip.
The Tugen from Baringo North accuse the Njemps of encroaching on administrative areas in their division
and denying them access to natural resources.
According to Bartum councillor Richard Kampala, the Njemps have unfairly caused the adjudication of the
Salabani boundary across river Nomolrijo.
As a result, he argues, Sibilo, Loyamorok and Korosi sub-locations have been annexed into Salabani where
the lush pastures and Lake Baringo are located.
Kampala says Korosi and Loyamarok are in Chemalingot in Baringo East, while Sipilo is in Kabaratonjo
division in Baringo North.
Another elder, 50-year-old Joshua Chepsergon says the alterations have resulted in Kambi Samaki being
placed under the Salababani chief and Marigat DO.
"Our argument is that Kambi Samaki and all areas surrounding it are under the Kabaratonjo DO and
Bartum chief," he said.
It is due to the differences that assistant chiefs, Patrick Kiror of Akoren Sub-Location in Bartum, and
William Lempakanyi of Misori in Salabani, were suspended.
The provincial administration believes that the two incited their people in the hope that the busy centre will
fall under their jurisdiction.
Kambi Samaki is boat-landing centre for tourists and a fishing resort for locals, apart from providing access
to the lake.
The leader claims that the boundaries that placed the three sub-locations under Marigat Division were
secretly done IN 1985 by the pervious government to please the Njemps and expand Baringo Central.
However, the Njemps deny the accusations of encroaching on Tugen land, saying the boundary was located
beyond the cliffs in Loruk.
This creates a massive area under their claim and pushes the Tugen on to the rocky, bare and barren land
which they are unwilling to live in.
A Njemps elder and spokesman, Lesiaman Lenongonop, says the land under question, including the entire
grazing land and the lake traditionally belonged to his community.
"We have not locked anyone from the pastures or the lake. Modalities have to be worked out on how to
access through consensus by the elders," he says.
According to Salabani ward councillor Dickson Lenasiolo, the administrative boundaries have never been
tampered with and the two communities know that they are in Marigat Division.
He said the administrative set-up favoured Marigat as the divisional headquarters due to its prolixity and
availability of services.
The civic leader and the spokesman said the recent flare up was caused by the killing of a community
member Nuur Letiren at Kambi Samaki.
34

"We asked our neighbours to keep off the gazing fields until the matter is resolved by they drove in their
animals by force and our morans retaliated," said Lenongonop.
The two communities appear to have set the stage for trouble in 1983 and 1985 when they attempted to
form group ranches to secure land and pastures.
The Tugen came together under the Bartum Group Ranch in 1983 and demarcated their land up to river
Nomolrijo, almost 10 kilometres from Kambi Samaki.
Although their claim was recorded by the District Land Adjudication office, the actual possession of the
land did not take place.
The Njemps, in 1985, formed the Salabani Group Ranch and its boundary was the tarmac road from
Marigat to Loruk and then branches towards Kambi Samaki along the road to Lake Baringo Club.
This in effect created an overlap between the two group ranches and the government has never pursued the
demarcation and registration of the two.
The two groups are unanimous that there appear to be little political will to have a lasting solution, and
efforts are now geared towards bringing on board area MPs Gideon Moi and William Boit.
Little will, however, be achieved, as the Tugen, according to Kampala and Chepsergon, want the colonial
administration maps to resolve the issue once and for all.
On the other hand, the Njemps, according to Lenongonop and Lenasiolo, want the administrative
boundaries as currently drawn out to stay.
They want an arbitration panel of elders constituted from the Chumo and Sawe age groups from the two
communities to resolve the dispute of access to water and pasture.
"The grass and lake are a natural resource but their usage must be on agreement and mutual respect," says
Lenongonop.
According to Abduba, the September 13 meeting will bring together all the elected leaders so that they can
look at the contentious maps.
However, he was categorical that there has never been electoral boundary alterations, but is non-committal
on the fate of administrative boundaries."
Several thousands displaced as tension between resident farmers and pastoralist
communities in the Tana River district broke into armed conflict (2001-2002)
• Continued drought has increased the tensions between the resident farming communities
(Pokomo) and the pastoralist communities (Orma)
• Clashes in November 2001 displaced 3,400 persons
• Renewed violent clashes on 12 January 2002 between the Orma and Pokomo communities
35

"The conflict was initially triggered in December 2000 by a controversial land adjudication programme,
which could have given the Pokomo title deeds to the land they cultivate. The programme was opposed by
the Orma as it could have restricted their access to vital grazing lands, according to regional analysts. 'Land
adjudication is one of the main factors which ignited the clashes,' Murithi [Assistant Development
Coordinator for the international NGO Caritas]said." (IRIN, 18 December 2001)
"Over the last few months [before November 2001], Tana River district has experienced conflicts ranging
from domestic quarrels, to armed conflict between the predominantly Orma and Pokomo communities. A
catalyst for this state of conflict has been the prevalence of natural disasters, like the current drought, plus
diversity in land use practises. Since March 2001, as the drought continued, the majority of the animals,
both wild and domestic moved in to the dry season grazing area around the River Tana Delta (Garsen
Division). This increased the tension between the resident farming communities (Pokomo) and the
pastoralist communities (Orma). The first recorded killings were reported in Ngao village, and it extended
to Mnazini location later on. This tension resulted in the opening of an armed conflict that has claimed, up
to now, more than 50 lives, 120 houses completely burnt down, and also as a direct consequence, a large
number of displaced people." (OCHA 30 September 2001)
"The recent clash in Tana River District occurred on the 18 th November [2001] at Tarasaa and Ngao
claiming 14 lives and displacing 3,400 persons.
The Pokomo and Orma, farmers and pastoralists respectively, inhabit the Tana River district area. Since
December 2000, the two communities have been at conflict over pasture, water and land resources
sometimes resulting in clashes during which property was destroyed, people displaced and lives lost. And
due to these communities insistence on the use of heavy fire arms, education systems and social
development have been disrupted consequently restricting movement and causing food insecurity at the
household level as people are unable to access their farms." (OCHA 30 November 2001)
"The security of some 3,000 people displaced by recent violent clashes in Tana River District, eastern
Kenya, has improved significantly over the last week, according to humanitarian sources.
'Up to yesterday, there have been no incidents for the last week,' Pius Murithi, Assistant Development
Coordinator for the international NGO Caritas, told IRIN on Tuesday. 'There is quietness now, because
people are weary of hitting one another,' he added.
Some families who had fled villages around the town of Hola had begun returning to their homes, the Daily
Nation newspaper on Monday quoted Tana River District Commissioner James Waweru as saying. 'I am
encouraged by the situation, as families are now coming back, although others are yet to return,' he said."
(IRIN, 18 December 2001)
"Five people were killed and two others seriously injured in renewed violent clashes on Saturday [12
January 2002] between the Orma and Pokomo communities in Tana River District, eastern Kenya,
according to humanitarian and news sources.
A group of about 20 Orma pastoralists attacked the Pokomo farming community at Bondeni village, Galole
Division, at 5am local time on Saturday, setting some 37 grass-thatched houses on fire, and stealing 300
goats and 100 head of cattle, Pius Murithi, Assistant Development Coordinator for the international
nongovernmental organisation Caritas told IRIN on Monday." (IRIN, 14 January 2002)
Displacement during late 1990s increasingly caused by clashes within the same
ethnic groups, 1997-2004
36

• Displacement related to intra-ethnic conflicts and cattle-rustling in the Pokot and Marakwet areas
in the Northern Rift Valley (1997-1999)
• Conflicts involves different Kalenjin groups
• People fleeing attacks and seek shelter in caves and other temporary shelters
• Access to modern automatic firearms has made clashes more violent
• Pastoralist communities have from time immemorial fought over water and pasture
"By 1994-1995, inter-ethnic clashes had receded in importance and intensity. Even in areas like Njoro,
which saw intense conflicts after the elections in 1992 and 1997, communities are currently concerned with
issues of return and reconciliation. Thus, sporadic acts, partially linked to resource competition, have
replaced the systematic patterns of attacks that characterised Kenya between 1991-1995 and part of 1997.
These residual attacks are confined to border areas between pastoralists and farmers in search of pastures
and other resources. Nonetheless, when they do occur, they can be violent. The Kenyan newspaper, Daily
Nation reports a macabre murder of at least 40 members of a Kikuyu community in Laikipia District (10
February 2000).
As inter-ethnic clashes decrease, intra-ethnic conflicts, particularly between pastoral groups increase. The
most intense of such conflicts are among the Kalenjin groups who live in the North Rift Valley. Here, the
emerging pattern pits the Pokot on the one hand and the other Kalenjin sub-tribes, particularly the
Marakwet who have suffered most from these conflicts, on the other. For instance, in one publicised
incident, which caused a major outcry, in October 1999, between eight hundred and one thousand raiders,
believed to be Pokot, attacked Tot Centre in Marakwet. Outbursts of staccato gunfire marked this daylight
attack. They killed eleven people, including seven children and three mothers returning from a polio
immunisation campaign at the Tot Health Centre. Locals interviewed said the attackers hailed from
Kolowa, some 40 kilometres from Tot and Tangulbei areas (both Pokot areas). Some Pokots explained the
attack as retaliation for 'persistent' attacks by the Marakwet (Daily Nation 29 December 1999). Following
this attack, the Marakwet-Pokot border has remained pregnant with tension and awash with suspicion. In
the words a feature article in the Kenyan Daily Nation, 'The Marakwet feel vengeful and vulnerable,
[while] the Pokot feel stigmatised and defamed'(12 November1999). Popular belief is that the Pokots
entered alliances with the Sebeiis of Uganda to carry out attacks on other pastoral communities." (Kathina
Juma May 2000, p.52)
"For the past eight months [following June 1997], the Pokot and Marakwet districts in Kenya's Rift Valley
have been rocked by violence between the two resident ethnic groups. Inter-tribal cattle-rustling has long
been a source of tension in the area, but the conflict has escalated in recent months. Thousands of people
from both sides have had to flee their homes and are now living in caves and other temporary shelters with
little or nothing to eat, having been forced to abandon their fields for fear of attacks. The displaced
population has also suffered greatly from diseases such as Rift Valley fever, malaria and pneumonia."
(ICRC 4 February 1998)
The same violence pattern continued during 1999:
"Attacks and revenge counterattacks, part of a longstanding pattern of cattle rustling, continued between
Pokots and Marakwets/Keiyos in Trans Nzoia in the northwest, Boranas and Somalis in North Eastern
province, Ormas and Somalis in Eastern Province, and Kuria and Luos in the west, resulting in scores of
deaths [...]. At least 40 persons were killed in a March 4 cattle raid by Pokots on Turkana in the Turkwell
Gorge area. At least 15 persons were killed in an October 24 cattle raid by Pokots on the Marakwet village
of Tot; raiders killed 10 women and children waiting for polio vaccinations at a health clinic. Also in
October in the Rift Valley members of the Njemps and Turkana ethnic groups fought each other and burned
each others' houses after some inebriated Turkana men reportedly killed an Njemps herdsman." (US DOS
25 February 2000, sect.5)
37

"Clashes between the Marakwet and Pokot communities quickly grew more violent when the fighters
stopped using traditional weapons, such as spears and arrows, in favour of modern automatic firearms.
Several people, including women and children, were killed and large numbers of people fled their villages.
In some cases they took their cattle with them, but the animals proved unable to adapt to the new
environment on the escarpment and many died." (ICRC 6 October 2000)
"Margaret Chemwei, 22, (not her real name) had dreams and ambitions like many young girls of her age
from the Marakwet community.
On September 1999, however, everything she held on to came tumbling down. Armed bandits stormed an
anti-polio vaccination clinic and opened fire on scores of innocent unsuspecting mothers and left 16 of
them dead.
She became bed ridden with bullet wounds that she sustained during the raid and lost the fight for her life in
March 2000 leaving behind a son, who survived the bloody massacre.
Margaret represents hundreds of other Pokots and Marakwets who fall prey to cattle rustlers every time and
again.
Cattle rustling has continued to eclipse the productivity of the two districts and residents have progressively
become more impoverished.
Mr Richard Kireng, who heads a non-governmental organisation that is trying to find a lasting solution to
the constant raids, blames the cross border conflicts on shortages of water and pasture.
The Pokot Environmental Conservation and Livestock Development Organisation (PECOLIDO) boss says
pastoralist communities have from time immemorial fought over water and pasture."
A pattern of attacks- and revenge attacks between different communities has
continued ( 2000-2002)
• Factors contributing to the conflicts include:
• proliferation of guns
• commercialization of traditional cattle rustling
• weakening of state authority
• emergence of local militia leaders
• development of a modern warrior/bandit culture distinct from the traditional culture
" Attacks and revenge counterattacks continued between ethnic groups throughout the country, resulting in
an average of 75 to 100 deaths per month[...]. Significant conflict occurred between ethnic Pokots and
Marakwets, between Pokots and Turkanas, between Turkanas and Samburus, between Luos and Kisiis,
between Boranas and Somalis, and among various Somali clans. Many factors contributed to these
conflicts, including the proliferation of guns, the commercialization of traditional cattle rustling, the
weakening of state authority, the emergence of local militia leaders, the development of a modern
warrior/bandit culture (distinct from the traditional culture), irresponsible local political leadership,
38

shrinking economic prospects for affected groups, a regional drought, and the inability or unwillingness of
security forces to stem the violence" (US DOS February 2001, sect.5)
Summary of the various conflicts as of August 2001:
"The situation in Tana River remains tense although the killings have abated somewhat. This could change
should the Orma/Wardies be forced to return from the Garsen area where they moved, back to the conflict
area in search of water and pasture. The Pokomos are currently reliant of relief food due to the insecurity.
The WFP office in Tana River has been closed. For information on security and to arrange security escorts,
contact the WFP office in Garissa.
Rising prices have been reported in Mandera following the closure of the border with Somalia. The local
administration has re-closed the crossing point having earlier reopened it to pedestrians. Kenya Revenue
Authority Officials, monitoring illegal crossings were shot at by a group they were intercepting. Caution
should be exercised when traveling in the border area, along the main El Wak/Rhamu/Mandera road and in
Mandera town due to the recent threat of vehicle hijack, discontent due to the closure of the border and
disruption of the food relief to the Gedo region due to the border closure. A recent security assessment has
resulted in the opening up to UN/NGO personnel the areas of Takaba, Iresteno and Qofole. This applies to
escorted day visits (1000-1600hrs only). The threat of insecurity as a result of the scramble for depleted
water and pasture has been contained, according to SC (UK) due to ongoing negotiations
Movement across the Kenyan and Ethiopian border in Moyale is currently limited and tensions appear to be
growing.
Tensions between neighbouring clans in Wajir and Mandera are continuing as a result of competition for
water and pasture, particularly in the North and West.
The border between West Pokot and Turkana at the Turkwell Dam area is still tense and there have also
been 4 banditry attacks on the Lokichokkio/Kakuma road. Two unescorted LWF lorries were ambushed, 12
August, 7km outside Lokichokkio town. Armed cattle raiders from Sudan attacked a Turkana manyatta at
Olopei, 12 August, killing animals and overpowering the homeguard. A cattle raid in Lokori division, 13
August resulted in the reported deaths of seven people. The raid, apparently perpetrated by Pokot from East
Baringo, affected some 37 families. Ethiopian pastoralists, numbering approximately 1,000 crossed over
the border into the Tondenyang area of Turkana together with some 20,000 head of livestock but have since
returned to their grazing lands following interventions by local authorities.
Similarly tensions between the Turkana and Baringo Pokots are high in the Lokori area. The Kerio valley is
the site of fighting between Marakwet clans. The issue is thought to revolve around issues related to land
ownership, large scale logging and traditional irrigation.
The District Commissioners of West Pokot, Baringo and Marakwet ordered, 30 August, all police officers
to arrest individuals carrying traditional weapons to market places and people in possession of illegal arms
are to surrender them immediately." (OCHA 31 August 2001)
Raising violence accross Kenya reported in January 2002
"Inter-ethnic clashes and civic unrest in Kenya continued to plague many communities across Kenya
throughout 2001. From the capital, Nairobi, to Turkana in the far northwest of the country, rising tensions
frequently exploded into violent clashes between neighbouring communities, forcing families to flee their
homes, exacerbating food shortages and increasing reliance on emergency relief aid.
Among the clashes to occur in Kenya in 2001, two stood out as examples of the violence prevalent in both
rural and the urban areas of the country: conflict between pastoralists and farming communities over land
and water resources in Tana River District, eastern Kenya; and the sudden outburst of civic unrest in
Nairobi's sprawling Kibera slum.
39

Kenya was now witnessing a rising incidence of violence across the country, ahead of the presidential and
parliamentary elections due this year, just as happened during the country's multi-party elections in 1992
and 1997, according to regional analysts.
In that respect, and especially because of the potential humanitarian consequences, this year's elections
would be a key event on Kenya's social-political landscape, they added.
[...]
According to regional observers and analysts, we may now be seeing the emergence of conflict as a
political tool in the run-up to this year's elections, due to be held by the end of the year." (IRIN 11 January
2001).
Renewed violence in the Rift Valley during 1998 caused displacement similar to the
early 1990s
• Violence in Laikipia area in January 1998 made over 2500 flee the area
• Attacks and counter attacks between Kalenjins and Kikuyus in Njoro area led to the burning
down of 200 houses and 'hundreds of people' fleeing
• Attacks by Kalenjin raiders on unarmed Kikuyus in the Nakuru district during January 1998
• Reduced violence in Rift Valley Province since mid-1998
"In December 1997, Kenyans went to the polls to elect members of parliament and the country’s president.
The elections were conducted in the glare of international publicity, not least because the international
community was seriously concerned about whether the elections would be free and fair. Despite evidence
of electoral irregularities, political violence and a legal framework which favoured the incumbent
government, observers of the elections endorsed the resulting victory of President Moi and the Kenya
African National Union (KANU) as being an expression of the will of the people.
In the wake of the elections, there rapidly followed a waning of international interest in political
developments in Kenya. This was despite the fact that within a month of the elections, politically motivated
ethnic ‘clashes’ erupted in Rift Valley Province. The violence left hundreds of people dead or injured, and
thousands of others displaced from their homes and living in makeshift shelters. It was clear that this
violence was following a pattern similar to that encountered during previous outbreaks of conflict in Kenya
between 1991 and 1994 — prior to and after the country’s first multi-party elections in 1992 — in which
predominantly Kalenjin supporters of KANU attacked members of ostensibly ‘pro-opposition’ ethnic
groups. The important difference between then and now was that for the first time, members of a ‘proopposition’
ethnic group, the Kikuyus, were organizing and actively fighting back." (Article 19 December
1998, sect.1)
"11 January 1998: Violence in the Rift Valley Province began with an attack on a Pokot (sub-group of the
Kalenjin) homestead by unknown raiders. This attack led to revenge attacks beginning 17 January against
Kikuyu families living in Ol Moran, a village in Laikipia region." (CIDCM October 1999)
"On the night of 13 January 1998, some Pokot and Samburu men attacked Kikuyu communities in the
Magande, Survey, Motala, Milimani and Mirgwit areas of Ol Moran in Laikipia. It appears that the
attackers were armed not only with spears, bows and arrows, but also with guns. It was claimed that some
of the attackers were dressed in military-type clothing. It has been estimated that over 50 Kikuyus were
killed during these attacks and over 1000 others fled the area and sought refuge at the Roman Catholic
church at Kinamba, from where they were later relocated to temporary shelters at Sipili and Ol Moran.
40

On 21 January, about 70 unidentified people invaded three farms in Njoro including one belonging to the
newly elected DP Member of Parliament for Molo Constituency, Kihika Kimani. Three days later, groups
of what local residents described as Kalenjins attacked Kikuyus in parts of Njoro in the same constituency.
There were varying explanations given for these attacks. One version of events blamed them on the refusal
of local Kikuyu traders to supply goods and services to Kalenjins in response to the events in Laikipia.
Another suggested that this was simply an unprovoked attack on Kikuyus by local Kalenjin youths. The
attack on Kikuyus on 24 January provoked a counter-attack by a group of apparently well-organized
Kikuyus, who on 25 January attacked Kalenjin residents of Naishi/Lare in Njoro.
According to police reports, 34 Kikuyus and 48 Kalenjins were killed during these initial attacks and over
200 houses were burnt down. Hundreds of people from both communities were displaced by the fighting,
and many of them fled to temporary ‘camps’ at Kigonor, Sururu, Larmudiac mission and Mauche. During
its visit to Kenya the joint mission witnessed the very poor conditions in which displaced people in these
camps were living. Sporadic fighting continued during February and March 1998. By 11 March, police
reports were estimating that at least 127 people had been killed since the ‘clashes’ had begun in January."
(Article 19 December 1998, sect.3.2)
"By the end of January [1998] most of the killings in Laikipia district had stopped. Over 50 people had
been killed, almost all Kikuyu, over 2,500 people had been displaced and 78 Kikuyu houses and stores had
been burnt. There were five reported cases of rape during the attacks. In the previous seven years there had
only been eight reported cases of rape. The majority of those people killed were aged over 60, with the
exception of those Kikuyu killed on 17 January [...]. Not all of the bodies of those killed have been found.
In Nakuru district the violence began late at night on 24 January when Kalenjin raiders attacked unarmed
Kikuyu in their homes in Mauche at 9pm and later at Ndeffo Store Mbili (two stores). The Kikuyu in the
area fled to Naishi, a predominantly Kikuyu area, during that evening and the following day [ Naishi, a
Kalenjin name, is also known as Lare in Kikuyu.]. On 25 and 26 January the Kikuyu responded to the
attacks on their community in an organised manner and attacked unarmed Kalenjin in their homes at
Naishi. Over 35 Kalenjin were killed. Witnesses described being attacked by organised groups of Kikuyu
men carrying pangas and rungus." (AI 10 June 1998, sect.3)
"7 February 1998: Fifteen Kalenjin were killed in recent ethnic violence in the Njoro and Mau Narok
areas. At least 80 people (one report suggests at least 150) have been killed in the region since early
January. Pokot and Samburu, sub-groups of the Kalenjin, are thought to be the main perpetrators of the
violence, and Kikuyu the main victims. A curfew was imposed in the Rift Valley Province's provincial
capital of Nakuru on 5 February. Hundreds of families have fled their homes in Gishu District, and
thousands of others have reportedly been displaced.
[...]
Violence in the Rift Valley follows the pattern of 1991-1994. There is compelling evidence that initial
attacks were organized from outside the communities. Recent attacks occurred only in areas where the
Democratic Party won parliamentary seats. Violence began within days of KANU politicians visiting the
area and verbally threatening DP supporters." (CIDCM October 1999)
"Attacks continued until mid-February. By then over 70 people had been killed many others wounded,
1,500 displaced and over 132 Kikuyu houses and 106 Kalenjin houses had been burnt. The majority of
those killed were Kalenjin. Sporadic incidents continue - at the end of April five people were killed,
including a 20-year-old woman, Helen Njeri Mbuthia, who died as a result of horrific wounds from panga
cuts after her house was attacked by a group of Kalenjin men." (AI 10 June 1998, sect.3)
Since mid-1998 it appears that the violence abated:
"Over the last six months [second half of 1998], the levels of violence in Rift Valley Province have
markedly reduced. The Kenyan government has announced a commission of inquiry which is mandated to
investigate the reasons for the violence in Rift Valley Province since 1991. Furthermore, the bitter dispute
between the Kenyan government and civil society organizations about the shape and direction of the
41

constitutional reform process set in motion during the run-up to the December 1997 elections appears at last
to have been resolved. So do these hopeful developments mean that the root causes of the violence in Rift
Valley Province may finally be addressed? The answer to this question will be ‘no’ unless there is an end to
the culture of impunity and disregard for human rights, which has, prevailed for so long in Kenyan
government circles." (Article 19 December 1998, sect.1)
Displacement caused by fighting in Mombassa region/Coast Province (1997)
• Discontent toward upcountry settlers materialised into violent attacks especially aimed at people
with Kikuyu, Luos and Luhya background
• Gangs of 200-500 people armed with guns, clubs, machetes and bows and arrows attacking
villagers
• "Thousands" of people fleeing to safe havens in Mombasa or inland
"There was a major outbreak of ethnic-targeted violence along the coast in August and early September
[1997], resulting in at least 100 deaths and thousands of people fleeing to safe havens in Mombasa or
inland. Most of the victims were immigrants from upcountry Kenya who had settled along the coast, and
the attacks reflected indigenous ethnic animosity and economic discontent toward the upcountry settlers.
However, there were indications that the violence had political roots, with local KANU political leaders
reportedly involved in the planning. The efforts of security forces to contain the violence were slow and
piecemeal, allowing the violence and the exodus of refugees to continue for many weeks." (US DOS 30
January 1998, sect. 1a)
"Police have arrested 200 people so far [21 August 1997], including a leading KANU member in Mombasa
and the leader of the party's youth wing on the coast, in connection with the ethnic violence that has
surfaced in the Mombasa region. Some 2500 people have been displaced by the fighting and are camping at
Likoni Roman Catholic Church south of Mombasa. The Church is guarded by 40-50 police. The attacks
began in mid-August with gangs of 200-500 people armed with guns, clubs, machetes and bows and arrows
attacking villagers. Kikuyu, Luos and Luhya are the main targets of the attacks, just as they were in the Rift
Valley in 1992. At least 70 people have been killed in the violence.
[...]
Four people are dead in violence in Likoni, a suburb of Mombasa, in fighting between the Maasai and Kisii
communities. Over the past few days [early September 1997], up to 100,000 people have fled Likoni by
ferry. A recent raid on a police station in Likoni left ten police officers dead while the raiders got away with
a large arms supply from the station." (CIDCM October 1999)
"Thousands reportedly remained displaced at year's end [1997], fearful that security personnel were unable
or unwilling to protect them.
Kenya's coastal violence erupted four months before the country's presidential election and appeared to be
politically motivated, according to most neutral observers. Attackers primarily targeted Kenyans who had
migrated to the coastal Mombassa area from other regions of the country, many of them seeking
employment in the area's healthy tourism industry. Leaflets warned 'non-native' families to return to their
'ancestral homes,' and attackers destroyed their houses and businesses.
Uprooted families fled to churches, mosques, and hospitals, where some of them suffered further attacks."
(USCR 1998)
"In August 1997, a series of ethnically-driven attacks in the Coast province killed 40 people and displaced
more than 120,000, adding to the hundred of thousands already displaced in similar violence in the early
1990s. The Kenyan government did not provide adequate security or protection to these people, nor did it
42

take any steps to assist them to return to their homes. Armed gangs from coastal ethnic groups razed
businesses and homes belonging to people from inland tribes." (Nowrojee 1998, p.65)
Politically motivated clashes related to the 1992 election displaced more than 300,000
in the Rift valley
• The majority of the displaced came from the ethnic groups associated with the political opposition
(e.g. Luo, Luhya, and Kikuyu)
• Competing land claims were used to inflame violence among certain ethnic groups
• People displaced as armed "Kalenjin warriors" attacked Luo, Luhya, and Kikuyu farms
• Most attacks carried out by organised groups
"In August 1991, an internal democracy movement had demanded an end to the monopoly on power held
by KANU, which had led Kenya since independence in 1963. President Moi, however, claimed that the
return to multiparty rule would threaten the stability of the state by polarizing the country along ethnic
lines. By the time multiparty elections were held at the end of 1992, it appeared that his claim was accurate:
Kenya's political parties had divided largely along ethnic lines, and 'tribal clashes' in the rural areas of
western Kenya had left hundreds dead and tens of thousands displaced. The great majority of the victims
came from the ethnic groups associated with the political opposition. By 1993, Human Rights Watch/Africa
estimated that 1,500 people had died in the clashes and that some 300,000 were displaced. The clashes
pitted Moi's small Kalenjin tribe and the Maasai against the populous Kikuyu, Luhya, and Luo tribes. For a
while, Kenya, previously an example of relative stability in the region, teetered on the brink of a low-level
civil war.
[...]
As the campaign for multiparty democracy gained strength [during 1991] and then developed into a full
election campaign, violence broke out between different ethnic groups, particularly in the Rift Valley,
Western and Nyanza provinces, the heart of the 'white highlands' during colonial times. The 'tribal clashes,'
as they became known, first broke out in October 1991 on the border of the three provinces, and rapidly
spread to neighboring districts. By December 1991, when parliament repealed the section of the
constitution making Kenya a one-party state, large areas of western Kenya had been affected as tens of
thousands were displaced from their land.
Eyewitness reports of the attacks were remarkably similar. Bands of armed 'Kalenjin warriors' attacked
farms belonging to the Luo, Luhya, and Kikuyu, the groups from which FORD drew its main support,
destroying homes and driving the occupants away or killing those who resisted. The attackers were often
dressed in an informal uniform of red or black t-shirts, their faces marked with clay in the manner of
initiation candidates, and armed with traditional bows and arrows or pangas (machetes). The attacks by the
Kalenjin warriors had in almost all cases been carried out by organized groups. Local Kalenjin often
reported that outsiders had come to tell them that they had to fight and that the Kikuyu or others were
planning to attack them. They also reported that they were promised the land of those they attacked. By
contrast, where counter attacks had been mounted by Kikuyu, Luhya, or Luo, they were usually more
disorganized in character, and by no means as effective in driving people away from their land. The great
majority of those displaced were members of the Kikuyu, Luhya, and Luo ethnic groups.
Although it seemed that the first outbreak of fighting was a simple land dispute between members of the
Luo and Kalenjin groups, the violence rapidly took on the content and ethnic breakdown of the wider
political debate. FORD, the leader of the call for multipartyism, was dominated by Kikuyu, Luo and, to a
lesser extent, Luhya, at both leadership and grassroots levels. Although the coalition included members of
other ethnic groups and based its political platform on the misuse of power by President Moi, it built much
of its appeal on the resentment of its supporters to the domination of the government by Moi's own ethnic
group, the Kalenjin, and its allies, the Maasai. Moi, for his part, portrayed the calls for multipartyism as an
43

anti-Kalenjin movement and played on the fears of the minority ethnicities at the return to power of the
economically dominant Kikuyu. At the same time, he argued that Kenya's multiethnic nature meant that
multiparty politics would inevitably break down on ethnic lines leading to violence.
Kalenjin and Maasai politicians opportunistically revived the idea of majimboism, ethnic regionalism,
championed by KADU at independence. KANU politicians close to Moi revived the calls for majimboism
as a way of countering the demand for multipartyism in Kenya. Under the cover of a call for regional
autonomy, prominent politicians demanded the forcible expulsion of all ethnic groups from the Rift Valley,
except for those pastoral groups-Kalenjins, Maasai, Turkana and Samburu-that were on the land before
colonialism. A number of majimbo rallies were held calling for 'outsiders' in the Rift Valley to return to
their 'motherland,' or for 'true' Rift Valley residents to defend themselves from opposition plots to eliminate
the indigenous peoples of the valley. While many Kenyans have no quarrel with the concept of regionalism,
per se, they viewed these calls as nothing less than ethnic expulsions." (HRW June 1997, pp. 36-39)
Peace efforts
Peace efforts in the Rift Valley
• Peace initatives include:
• Formation of Self help groups, peace building committees (PBC), Mediation workshops, Relief
food programmes, Civic education
• Obstacles to peace initiatives are: limited human and financial resources, lack of proper coordination,
mistrust between and among the affected people
"An area most affected by tribal clashes and cattle rustling and land ownership, peace processes in the
region has not enjoyed any goodwill from the Government nor that of local politicians. However,
remarkable efforts to restore peace in this vast region has been experienced.
A sizable number of relief, advocacy and development agencies work in this region including the National
Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), the Catholic Justice and Peace Commussion (CJPC), provincial
administration, NPI/Roman Catholic, ECJP, Clean, GTZ, PACVAC, SACDEP, OXFAM the media and the
donors.
Their intiatives have encompassed analysis of the situation on the ground in affected arrears and coming up
with methodologies of reconciling warring groups.
A number of response to conflicts and peace initiatives that have been tried out include: formation of Self
help groups, organisation of Mediation workshops, Relief food programmes, Formation of peace building
committees (PBC), Civic education, and the establishment of a case monitor.
Activities that have promoted interactions include: Good neighborhood groups, Seminars, Ball
games/youth festivities, rehabilitating social structures e.g. schools police posts, emergency interactions,
food, resettlement facilities, farm input, economic empowerment; women and youth and awareness
creation; posters and updates.
However, shortcomings are realised as a result of:
1. limited resources both human and financial.
2. Lack of proper co-ordination between the actors.
44

3. Mistrust between and among the affected people, peace workers and leaders mainly due to lack of
accountability and transparency."(PDN, 31 December 2002)
Peace efforts in the Nyanza and Western regions, 2001
• Peace efforts include: civic education, establishment conservation and research teams
• Obstacles include: lack of goodwill from the political and provincial administration
Response to conflicts
Different organizations have come up to partner in their efforts to adress the root causes of violence and
resolve impeding conflicts in the two regions of Nyanza and Western Kenya. Intitiaties in place has
included civic education, establishment if Mt. Elgon forest and Lake Victoria conservation and research
teams and advocacy.
Challenges
The major limitation in this region is the lack of goodwill from the political, the provincial administration
and other respective leaders.
Strategic Visioning and plan of action
Nyanza and Western Kenya region representatives' attending the "national strategic visioning and planning
forum on rapid response, early warning and emergency intervention" developed a vision of " A country
that has a systematic governance that articulates a rich but relevant profile, a thriving economy and
acceptable political leadership that allows accountability, transparency, dialogue co-existence, human
dignity and value" for Kenya.
Rapid Response Initiative: Regional Plan of Action
Consultative meetings with administration, the civic society and political leaders(mobilization
1st Week of June 2001
Regional executive committee Nyanza: Rev. Joe Asila - Chairman Western: Mr. Muga- Chairman
13 districts - Nyanza Mt. Elgon - Western
Regional
Formation of Peace Committee
May - June 2001
Regional Peace Committee in Liaison with the National PeaceNet secretariat
Mt. Elgon - Western Kenya 13 distribution
Regional
Training of Trainers (TOT)
July 2001
Nyanza and Western Regional Teams
Nyanza and Western
45

Regional
Fundraising
May - June, 2001
PeaceNet Secretariat (Co-ordination)
Stake holders, well wishes (Donor Agencies/foundation e.g. NPI, OXFAM, ACTIONAID & USAID
National
" (PDN, 31 December 2002)
Peace efforts in the North Eastern Province, 1992-2003
• Men, women and children were ruthlessly butchered and thousands of livestock lost
• Door-to-door peace campaigns
• Women convinced not to catalyse the conflict
• Elders encouraged warriors to seek cease-fire and organise reconciliatory meetings
• Faithbased leaders who preached peace in open-air markets across the district
•
"Wajir district lies in the expansive but explosive north eastern province. The district borders Somalia to
the North East and Ethiopia to the north. It also borders Moyale, Marsabit, Garissa, Mandera and Isiolo
districts of Kenya. The district is arid and only supports nomadic pastoralism.
Conflicts in Wajir district are pegged on livestock resource constraints. Competition over the control and
use of pasture and water resources among different clans and the people of the neighbouring districts,
explains the gruesome conflict.
Wajir’s geographic proximity to neighbouring war torn states has aggravated the situation. Guns have
easily found their way into hands of clan chiefs and fellow clansmen and most disturbingly, into the hands
of blood-baying hot-blooded warriors who believe in nothing but victory.
With the influx of small arms into a district whose resource base is unstable, the last thing you need is
political incitement. Unfortunately, it happened in 1992. The region suffered a devastating drought in 1991,
the year that preceded the infamous 1992 general elections. As if that was not enough, the Somali Central
Government collapsed, leading to a surge in the number of refugees, and more guns.
Men, women and children were ruthlessly butchered and thousands of livestock lost. The loss was so
devastating that community members demanded for peace and nothing but peace.
The local initiative that later became the current model Wajir Peace and Development Committee (WPDC),
commenced with door-to-door peace campaigns. Convincing women not catalyse the conflict, but instead
deconstruct the mind of the warrior was one of the vital approaches the Wajir leaders emphasised. The
women, who were drawn from different clans in the district heeded the call and formed the Women for
Peace Group. The support of civil servants was also enlisted in the peace campaigns. The women and
young local civil servants merged into Wajir Peace Group.
46

The peace crusaders next target was the elders. They approached the elders encouraging them to seek
cease-fire and organise reconciliatory meetings between the warring clans. Elders for Peace group was
formed.
The fourth target group were the faithbased leaders who preached peace in open-air markets across the
district. The four groups worked together and in a short period of time, peace was restored in the district.
The peace group found it prudent to enlist government support in their peace endeavours. A series of
meetings between the peace groups and district security committee were held and in May 1995, the peace
groups and the DSC merged under one umbrella body called Wajir Peace and Development Committee
thus the current WPDC, which has become a model homegrown peace initiative, was born. It immediately
embarked on a mission to build peace using customary mechanisms.
To date, WPDC has initiated a number of development projects that are envisaged towards nurturing a
culture of peace in the district. Rapid response to conflict exigencies in the district by the peace body has
repulsed otherwise deadly cattle raids. Peace education in schools was introduced to reconstruct and
decolonise the minds of the growing youth. Peace Education Network (PEN) has become part of the school
curriculum in the district.
The peace committee has to their credit rehabilitated youth polytechnics in the district to equip the youth
with skills that will enable them pursue alternative livelihoods and occupations. Conflict victims and school
graduates have greatly benefited from the rehabilitated technical institutions.
Based on such a background and experience WPDC believes that peace is a collective responsibility, it is a
group effort."(ITDG, 29 August 2003)
47

POPULATION FIGURES AND PROFILE
Global figures
360,000 IDPs reported in Kenya (May 2004)
• The Kenya Human Rights Commission argues in September 2004 that there could be beyond
600,000 IDPs
• UNOCHA uses, as of May 2004, the figure of 360,000 IDPs taken from a comprehensive report
of December 2002
"The Kenya Human Rights Commission, which has been working with IDPs for several years now, argues
that the total number could well be beyond 600,000.
This could be the case when you consider that in the run-up to the multiparty elections of 1992, up to
300,000 people were forced to flee their homes in the Rift Valley Province alone.
Alternatively, the violence in the Coast region caused up to 120,000 people to abandon their homes and
resulted in at least 100 deaths."(The East African Standard, 12 September 2004)
"Victims of the 1992 tribal clashes are demanding compensation amounting to 31.2 billion shillings (over
400m dollars) from the government. The victims are also demanding that a pending parliamentary Bill on
their rights be passed and implemented and that they be resettled. These IDPs number more than 360,000
and were displaced due to tribal clashes preceding and surrounding the 1992 and 1997 elections."(UN
OCHA, 31 August 2004)
“ The table below shows the present [December 2002] location and number of IDPs in Kenya. A map of the
distribution and a table of exact numbers at each location are attached as Annexes 2 and 3 of the report.
Originally displaced from Contendi
ng
parties
Nandi
Miteitei farm
Tinderet
Nyando
Buru Farm, Ainamoi, Thessalia
Bungoma
Chemondi, Kimama Kapkanai
Kalenjin/
non-
Kalenjin
(Kisii,
Luo,
Luhyia)
Kalenjin
vs Luo
Bukusu
vs
Sabaots
Conflict
issues
Land
ownership
,
Majimboi
sm and
political
incitement
Border
dispute,
cattle
rustling
Cause of
nonreturn
Land
dispute
Land
occupied
Insecurit
y, stock
theft
Current
Location
Hamisi,
Tinderet
Estate,
Mtwala B,
Nyamira
Kabazi
Lailai,Koru
, Owanga,
Lailai,
Muhoroni,
Mtwala
Mulatwa,
Kimaboli,
sirisia,
Namwela
No. Needs
279
632
123
0
Legal
aid,
Source
of
income
Legal
aid to
return
Securit
y,
shelter
material
48

Mt Elgon
Sasure, Kapsika, Chesiro, Chebwek,
Kang’ng’a,
Kolongolo, Kapkoi, Matumbei,
Kimondo, Buyanzi, Twiga,
Chemgemge,
Kacheliba, Kipsis, Peresten,
Bukusu,
Teso,
Sabaot
Bukusu
vs
Sabaot,
Bukusu
vs Pokot
Pokot vs
Ugandan
Sebei
Kisumu Sondu
miriu
power
plant vs
the
natives
TransNzoia
Chekata, Mariki, Sivanga, Maram,
Baharini, Bondeni, Ukingoni, Mango
Luhya vs
Pokot/
Sabaot
Border
dispute,
cattle
thefts,
political
difference
s
Cattle
theft,
border
dispute,
support
Cattle
raids,
effects of
small
arms
Developm
ent
induced
(Sondu
Miriu)
Cattle theft,
illegal
grazing,
small arms
Insecurit
y, land
disputes,
building
materials
Insecurit
y, land
disputes
trauma,
poverty,
lost title
deeds,
squatters
Insecurit
y
Surrende
red land
to govt
Rape,
kidnappi
ng
Cheptais,
Chebwek,
Chwele,
Kimilili,
Kapkoi,
Matunda,
Mitume,
Matisi,
Namanjalal
a, Tiwani,
Liavo,
Bosnia
Chechnya,
Sango
Khalwenge
, Ndalu,
Moi’s
Bridge,
Domiano,
Kiminini
Tongareni,
Kanyarakw
at,
Kanyerus,
Nakuyen,
Keringet,
Kelan
Kisumu
town
Louis Farm,
Kapkoi
Kolongolo,
Sidu
774
968
*
9,00
0
300
556
*
s,
Securi
ty
shelter,
health
care
Securi
ty,
Medici
ne,
shelter
material
s
As
above
Alternat
ive
settlem
ent,
shelter
Securit
y,
medical
services
,
buildin
g
49

Uasin Gishu
Kalenjin
Turbo, Kipkaren, Kambi Limuru, vs other
Cheplaskei, Londiani
tribes
Burnt Forest,
Kiptega, Bindura, Kaplanga, Chagaya,
Mugumoini, Rironi, Geiti
Nakuru
Olenguroune
Simotune, Abosket, Cheptuoch,
Amaro, Saosa, Kiptagich
Subukia, Baruti, Kihingo, Mwariki,
Rare, Deffo, Ronda, Mauche
Molo, Elburgon
Kalenjin
vs non
Kalenjin
Maasai
vs
Kikuyu;
GOK
directive
to vacate
forest
land
Kalenjin
vs
Kikuyu
Politics,
land
disputes
Land
claims,
politics and
effects of
majimbois
m
Settlemen
t on
forestland
Politics,
land
disputes
Ethnic
tensions,
building
materials
Insecurit
y
Lack of
building
materials
Squatters
, waiting
for
reallocati
on,
Region
gazetted
as forest
land
Squatters
, lost
title
deeds,
insecurit
Soi,
Matunda,
Mau
Summit,
Langas,
Turbo
town,
Kambi
Mawe,
Kambi
Miwa
Sorget,
Kivuno,
Pondo,
Kamwingi,
Burnt
Forest
town
Elburgon,
Molo,
Nakuru
town,
Njoro town
, Kieni
Kamwaura,
Kedowa,
Kabazi,
Kamara,Du
ndori,
2,56
0
5,30
0
680
2,36
5
material
s
Shelte
r
materi
als,
health
care,
legal
aid
Legal
aid,
shelter
material
s,
health
care
Legal
aid,
shelter,
health
care,
Securit
y,
buildin
g
material
50

Narok
Enoosupukia
Olekuruto, Naiberiri, Esupuko,
Nasabulai, Saktwik, Nairegia Enkare,
Enoosiyia, Konjonka
Elgeyo Marakwet
Tirap, Murkutwo, Tot, sambalat. Liter
West Pokot: Amolem, Sarmach, Lous,
Orwa, Karaya
Kapenguria, Makutano
Kalenjin Land
vs non- disputes,
Kalenji politics
Kalenjin
vs
Kikuyu
Maasai
vs
Kikuyu
and non-
Maasai
Pokot vs
Marakw
et
Pokot vs
Turkana
Pokot vs
Kikuyu
Land
claims,
politics
and
effects of
majimbois
m
Settlemen
t on Water
catchment
s and
forests
Cattle
rustling
Border
dispute,
resources
Border
disputes,
cattle
theft
Political
difference
s &
majimbois
m
y Bahati,
Nakuru
town
Trauma,
Insecurit
y, lack
of
building
materials
Ethnic
tension,
insecurit
y,
trauma,
sold the
land
Region
gazetted
as
forestlan
d,
squarters
Insecurit
y, lack
of
building
materials
Insecurit
y
Sold
land,
land
disputes
Burnt
Forest
town,
Kaptewa,
Lanet,
Kenya
Meat and
‘London’
in Nakuru
town
Keringet,
Kuresoi,
Molo
South,
Saosa,
Bahati,
Kamwaura,
Mau
Summit,
Dundori
Maela,
Ngondi,
Naivasha,
Gilgil,
Nakuru,
Kinungi,
Kinari,
Baraget
Chesos,
Tot,
Chesongoc
h, Lagam,
Lomut,
Arpolo
Cherangan
y
escarpment
Marich
Pass,
Orwa,
Silip,
Sigor,
Chesogon,
Riting
Kesogon,
Aruba,
Kipsaina,
Kapsara,
Huruma
1,70
0
4,00
0
4,36
8
323
5*
791
*
s,
health
Securit
y, legal
aid,
health
care,
shelter
material
s
Securit
y,
means
of
liveliho
od
health
care
Legal
aid,
means
of
liveliho
od
health
care
Securit
y, food,
means
of
liveliho
od
shelter,
health
Securit
y, food,
means
of
liveliho
od
health
care
Legal
aid,
means
of
liveliho
51

Isiolo
Lapsu, Garchaba
Meru North
Kina, Mulika
Meru,
Somali,
Samburu
and
Turkana
Meru &
Samburu
Migori
Luo vs
Ochodororo, Toku, Kitere, Riosiri, Kisii
Chamngewada
TransMara
Maasai
Gucha border area, Nyangusu, Getenga, vs Kisii
Konangare, Maroo
Laikipia
Pokot,
Ol Moran, Rumuruti, Mukogodo, Tugen
Doldol, Mijore, Dam Samaki, Magadi, Turkana,
Merigwet
samburu,
Kikuyu
Tana River
Garsen, Oda, Ngao Golbanti, Furaha,
Mombasa
Likoni, Waa, Mbuta
Shonda Ujamaa
Kwale
Ng’ombeni, Diani, Ukunda
Digo vs
commun
ities
from
upcountr
y
Digo vs
commun
ities
from
upcountr
y
Border,
cattle
rustlng,
banditry
Banditry,
cattle
raids
Cattle
rustling
land
disputes
Border/et
hnic
disputes,
cattle
raids, clan
rivalry
Banditry,
ethnic
tensions,
rustling
Insecurit
y
Land
dispute,
generalis
ed
insecurit
y
Insecurit
y, cattle
rusling,
building
materials
Insecurit
y, lack
of
building
materials
Insecurit
y,
drought,
rape
Building
materials
Banditry Insecurit
y, lack
of
building
materials
Majimboi Lack of
sm, means to
politicised reconstru
grievance ct homes
s
Majimboi
sm,
politicised
grievance
s
Trauma,
poverty
lack of
building
materials
Gambella,
LMD,
Ngaremare
Mulika,
Kunati
960
768
Moi Institute
of
Technology,
Ongo Health
Centre, 189
Kanyimach, 0*
Kamigudho,
Omwari,
Rongo
Kilgoris,
Awendo,
Ranen
Kinamba,
Kang’a Ol
Moran,
Survey,
Kahuho
Returned
but
dispossesse
d
Went
upcountry
or returned,
but are
dispossesse
d
570
370
*
od
Securit
y, food
Securit
y,
health
care
Securit
y,
Food,
shelter
material
s,
health
care
Securit
y,
health
care,
shelter
material
s
Securit
y, food,
shelter
material
s
Securit
y, food,
shelter,
health
care
Legal
aid
Legal
aid
Eldoret,Molo, Mombasa, other clash Kalenjin Politicised (Repatria Nyeri, 112 Legal
52

torn areas vs
Kikuyu
ethnicity ted by
the
Catholic
Church)
Ndemi in
Ol Kalou,
Sosian,
Sihundu in
TransNzoia
, Kyeni in
Thika
Total No. of families 44, 421
Total population @ 8 355,368
* Figures drawn from latest updated records of No. of families IDPs camp
(UN DPMCU, Dec 2002, pp. 26-28)
JRS report divides the IDPs into seven categories (2001)
• displaced land owners
• insecure displaced land owners
• displaced squatters
• dispersed displacees
• ‘revenge’ displacees
• orphans
• displaced pastoralists
5* aid
"The displaced people received lots of local and international attention in the early ’90s as human rights,
humanitarian and development agencies condemned the violence and advocated for them. The violence,
and media coverage, subsided after the elections, and it was assumed that calm had returned to affected
areas and people gone back to their farms. A fair section of the displaced returned, but others did not. These
include:
displaced land owners who lost the legal right of land ownership
These are people who had title deeds to their plots but returned to find that there had been transactions
involving sale or transfer of their land without their knowledge. Some found their farms redistributed to
people from certain ethnic groups, and their share certificates or title deeds were ignored as ‘invalid.’ They
are now living as squatters. Another group of land owners are those whose title deeds are invalid because
their land falls within areas recently gazetted as forest or water catchment areas and have not been resettled
on alternative land. Some of these have been resettled on another forest, but cannot till the land because the
trees in that forest have been sold to a private lumber company.
insecure displaced land owners
Such displaced have access to their land, but cannot reconstruct their homes or initiate long term
development projects because of persistent tension and insecurity. They can be found in parts of Mt. Elgon,
Molo, Njoro, Nakuru and surrounding areas. Some are able to cultivate their farms, but do so from the
safety of nearby shopping centres where they have rented shanties. Many witnessed the destruction of their
property, sometimes by people they knew, and hence fear that those who attempted to evict them then may
try again. They earn their living by small-scale farming or by providing casual labour to ADC farms or
flower-growing companies. Others are hawkers, beggars, touts or hand-cart operators.
displaced squatters
These people were living as squatters on other people’s land and were ordered to leave during the clashes.
Their houses were demolished or burnt down, so they moved mainly into the streets and shopping centres.
53

There are cases of those who were forcibly evicted together with their land owners because they belonged
to the ‘wrong’ ethnic group. Squatters have no land to call their own, and although in Kenyan law squatters
can claim title after a certain number of years, this provision has been ignored by the lands office in
affected areas. The issue of ‘return’ for these displaced therefore amounts to hiring or buying new plots.
dispersed displacees
Among these are those from the demolished Maela camp who were put in trucks and forcibly returned to
Kiriti, Ol Kalou and Ndaragwa in Central province. The majority were not able or willing to return to their
original homes due to trauma. Some moved into shanties at Maela shopping centre, or found their way into
the streets or slum areas, while others went to live with relatives. Others ‘disappeared’ (because no-one
knows where they are or what happened to them). When the government resettled 200 families at Moi
Ndabi in 1994, the rest were assumed to have returned. Some have been assisted to resettle by the Catholic
church and NCCK, but the rest have become destitute in nearby market centres or drifted to other parts of
the country.
‘revenge’ displacees
As noted above, the 1992 clashes affected mainly those originating from outside the Rift Valley but who
had bought or otherwise acquired land there. The common view is that Kalenjin and Maasai were the
aggressors, and that they had no casualties. However, many were affected, but unlike other tribes, they
sought refuge among their relatives, not in camps. Recent developments indicate that simmering ethnic
tensions have led to revenge or retaliatory violence. Multi-ethnic South Rift is most affected as incidents at
Baraget and Rare indicate. In these two cases, skirmishes involving Kalenjin and Kikuyu in 1997-9 led to
the displacement of Kalenjin families. In 2000, retaliatory attacks at the Kaptagat Saw Mill resulted in the
demolition or burning of houses belonging mainly to Kikuyu. Such ‘new’ cases of revenge and population
displacement receive little if any national and international attention because they are small-scale and not
related to obvious political incitement.
Orphans
There are over one hundred orphaned children, some of whom lost both parents during the 1992 violence.
A large number were also born during and after displacement, and have no knowledge of their homes or
origin. They do not understand (or remember) the circumstances that caused their parents to move. They
may have lost or been separated from relatives, and have no one and no place to go back to. It is also said
that most men abandoned their wives and children during the clashes, and these children remain in orphanlike
situations once their mother dies, as the other parent cannot be traced. Those who were children in
1992 have grown up and have their own families now due to early marriages. A few families, also
displaced, have been approached by NCCK to take on some of the children as foster children (in exchange
for material and monetary assistance). Most of the orphans are on the streets or offering manual labour on
nearby farms.
displaced pastoralists
Due to the nomadic nature of pastoralists and their system of communal land ownership, displacement
among them refers to relocation to another part of the land rather than moving into camps. Displacement is
marked by the absence of people in an area, abandoned farms (near watering points), homes and schools.
Since they move with their animals, some people may not see them as displacees per se because they do not
need to be resettled on another piece of land to restore their means of livelihood. However, they are indeed
IDPs because when they lose their cattle to rustling, and insecurity compels them to leave watering points,
they move to a more hostile environment with fewer survival alternatives. Restocking of herds is difficult
due to drought and excessive pressure on the land in safer areas, hence impoverishment. They also move
away from schools and other necessary social amenities. Displacement among pastoralists is a post-1992
phenomenon that has been caused by the introduction, use and abuse of small arms, and commercialization
of cattle rustling." (JRS March 2001, pp. 16-18)
54

Estimated that 230,000 remained internally displaced by end, 2002
• 3400 persons newly displaced by clashes in Tana River District during second half of 2001
2002 FIGURES
"Some 15,000 Kenyans were newly uprooted during 2002. An estimated 230,000 Kenyans were internally
displaced at year’s end.
[...]
Pockets of violence and actions by the Kenyan government caused an estimated 15,000 additional Kenyans
to flee their homes during 2002. In March, local authorities demolished more than 1,000 makeshift shelters
in and around the coastal town of Mombasa, displacing an estimated 7,000 people.
Most displaced families sought temporary shelter in churches and mosques and survived with minimal
humanitarian assistance. Many remained homeless at year’s end.
Raids by cattle-rustlers in Kenya’s Central Province killed 15 people and displaced more than 3,000 others
in September. Most of the newly uprooted people feared further violence and refused pleas from authorities
to return home.
A local church provided some 200 families with temporary shelter and food. Most others camped near
government buildings and received limited humanitarian assistance.
Unknown assailants razed several houses and crops near the village of Migori in southwest Kenya’s
Nyanza Province in December, displacing nearly 3,000 people.
Many of the displaced continued to reside in temporary camps and with relatives at the end of 2002."
(USCR 2003)
2001 FIGURES
"The numbers of those still displaced can only be estimated because there are no proper records of those
originally displaced or their present status. While a large number is dispersed, some are still returning,
while others are becoming displaced by present or simmering conflicts. Over the years, increase in
population means the 1992/3 estimates are not reliable. Figures from relief agencies are close, but also not
accurate because not all displaced people moved into camps, or sought assistance from the agencies. The
estimates in this report are therefore a function of figures derived from government sources (latest census),
the church, relief agencies, and estimates from the leaders of the displaced. It includes displaced
pastoralists from the Kerio Valley, and those displaced from Meru, Isiolo and Samburu due to boundary
disputes and the effects of small arms proliferation.
Current estimates of internally displaced persons in Kenya [March 2001]
Originally displaced from number
displaced
of families still IDP camp or settlement
Mt. Elgon 1,100 Endebbes, Liavo,
Khalwenge, Sango, Kiminini, Matisi, Namanjala,
‘Bosnia’ ‘Chechnya’
Nandi 600 Eldoret, Kisii, Kakamega, Turbo
Transmara 400 transmara
Kuria 254
Migori 220 Tinderet
Gucha 40
Kericho 1,200 Londiani, Kedowa, Kipkelion-Nyagachu
55

Nakuru 4,000 Bahati, Nairobi slums, Elburgon
Narok 4,000 Maela,Elementaita, moi-ndabi, Kisirir, Ringitia,
Ogelegai
Transnzoia 1200 Liavo, Khalwenge
Bonia, Chechnya
Nyando 70
Uasin Gishu 989 Eldoret town and market centres
Molo 2,020 Keringet, kuresoi, Molo South, Saosa Kamwaura
Njoro 2,000 Baruti, Kihingo, Mwariki, Rare, Deffo, Ronda
Burnt Forest 700 Kipkabus, Chepauni Ainapkoi,
Kerio Valley 7,500 Escarpment
Laikipia 800 dispersed among relatives/ in towns
Meru/ 1,500 among relatives, in towns and market centres
TOTAL 28, 593(fn70)
fn70: This figure does not include the displaced persons from the Coast province. It should also be noted
that these are families, each of which has an average of eight persons, hence the number of persons is 228,
744." (JRS March 2001, pp.18-19)
"The recent clash in Tana River District occurred on the 18 th November [2001] at Tarasaa and Ngao
claiming 14 lives and displacing 3,400 persons.
[...]
FAMILIES
TARASAA 160 800
ODA 178 1276
LAILONI 104 569
CHAMWANAMUMA 150 702
TARA 10 58
Total Displaced 602 3405
" (OCHA 30 November 2001)
POPULATION
"The fate of some 3,000 people displaced during the November outbreak of violence was still unclear [by
January 2002], [...]. Although many families previously sheltering in makeshift camps had dispersed, many
homes had been burned down in the violence, and so people had been unable to return to their villages."
(IRIN 11 January 2002)
Reported that 210,000 remained displaced by early 1998
• New displacements during 1997-98 especially related to the Pokot–Marakwet conflicts
• One source estimates that 15,000 newly displaced people during 1998 in Western Kenya
• Numbers of displacement in the nomadic North Eastern province difficult to estimate as people
are on the move throughout the year
• More than 1,000 people displaced in the Tharaka-Nithi Nyabene belt
• Violence in coastal area may have displaced as many as 100,000 during 1997
56

"The most cited estimates of clash victims indicate 1,500 by early 1993. More than 350,000 people, largely
but not exclusively from the Rift Valley and Western provinces, were displaced to camp-like situations,
usually in church compounds, schools and market places [...]. These numbers exclude an estimated 100
dead and 100,000 persons displaced in the ethnic clashes that occurred in August 1997 in Mombasa. Of
those displaced, 210,000 remained so by early 1998. Commenting on the prolonged displacement in the
Rift Valley, on 9 November 1999, President Moi called for the displaced to' . . . return to their homes and
continue with their normal lives.' Only a few have returned to their home areas.
[...]
Between 1997-98 the Pokot–Marakwet conflicts produced more than 4,000 victims. Since the beginning of
1999, this area has become the theatre of violence and displacement of populations. Between January and
March 1998, clashes in Laikipia and Molo displaced and disrupted the lives of many. The numbers are less
definite in the nomadic North Eastern province where entire populations are on the move throughout the
year. In March 1999, an incident of inter-clan rivalry in Wajir left nearly 140 people dead and an unknown
number wounded.
Other areas prone to clashes and displacement are away from the prying eye of the media and remain
largely unreported. For example, since January 1998, more than 1,000 people have been displaced in the
Tharaka-Nithi Nyabene belt. Tana River, parts of Migori and northern Mwingi are areas that have
witnessed systematic depopulation as people flee attacks from bandits." (Kathina Juma May 2000, p. 15)
"About 8,000 Kenyans were refugees in Ethiopia. An estimated 200,000 Kenyans were internally displaced
[by end-1998], although sources varied widely.
[...]
In the aftermath of national elections in December 1997, clashes in western Kenya killed at least 100
people and forced several thousand people from their homes in early 1998. The Kenyan Red Cross reported
15,000 newly displaced people. Mobs burned homes. Kenyan police failed to respond to the violence for
several days, observers stated.
[...]
A third area of violence and displacement, Kenya's coast, avoided significant new upheaval in 1998.
Politically instigated violence in coastal towns in 1997 pushed tens of thousands from their homes - as
many as 100,000 people were uprooted, according to some estimates - and many families in the coastal
region remained displaced and afraid to reclaim their property in 1998." (USCR 1999)
Estimated by Human Rights Watch that some 300,000 were displaced by 1993
• Incidents of displacement caused by ethnic violence in the Rift Valley became frequent during
1992 – especially in the Bungoma District between the Kalenjin and the Luhya groups
• More than 15 000 displaced by fighting between the Kalenjin and the Kikuyu in the Burnt Forest
area near Eldoret during December 1992
• 30,000 uprooted during October 1993 as Maasai warriors attacked Kikuyu farmers in the
Enosupukia area (Narok District)
"[By March 1992] Reports of ethnic violence become commonplace in the press. The Kalenjin Assistant
Minister Kipkalia Kones declared Kericho District a KANU zone and stated that the Kalenjin youth in the
area had declared war on the Luo community in retaliation for several Kalenjins killed in earlier violence.
In the Chemichimi (the Bungoma District), the Kalenjin attacked the Luhya community. The brutal attack
against non-Kalenjin ethnic groups caused retaliatory attacks against Kalenjins in many areas. Clashes also
erupted on the border of the West Pokot and Trans Nzoia Districts which were long known for cattlerustling
between the Kalenjin and the Luo, Luhya and Kisii. The government accused the opposition parties
of fueling the violence through Libyan-trained recruits and opposition leaders accused the government of
57

orchestrating ethnic violence in order to weaken moves towards multipartyism. Moi prohibited all political
rallies, citing the threat of tribal violence.
1992 April: New clashes broke out between the Kisii and the Maasai while fighting continued to rage in
the Bungoma District between the Kalenjin and the Luhya. In the Bungoma District alone, 2,000 people
were displaced and 60 killed. Victims in the Molo Division report seeing 4 government helicopters bringing
arrows to Kalenjin attackers and that out of uniform soldiers are fighting along side the Kalenjin.
1992 July: Fighting exploded in a Kalenjin village (where 70% are Kalenjin, 20% Luhya, and 10% Teso),
the Bungoma District, when the area was attacked by the Luhya. Ten Kalenjins were killed.
[...]
1992 December 3: Fighting occurred between the Kalenjin and the Kikuyu in the Burnt Forest area near
Eldoret and Uasin Gishu Districts. 15,000 Kikuyus and Luhya fled the area as hundreds of Kalenjin
warriors killed, looted and burnt their homes. In retaliation, Kikuyu youth stoned Kalenjins' cars.
Throughout December the violence continued in the Uasin Gishu District.
[...]
The violence continued unabated throughout 1993. The Uasin Gishu, Trans Nzoia, Bungoma, and Nakuru
Districts were the most affected. The fighting in the Burnt Forest area in Uasin Gishu predominantly hit the
Kikuyu community by the Kalenjin during 1993.
The Luhya living in the Trans Nzoia (Saboti) and Bungoma (Chwele) Districts were most affected by
Kalenjin warriors. There has been strong Kalenjin (Saboat) nationalist sentiment in this area. The Saboat
nationalists in the Mt. Elgon area has demanded the government redraw district boundaries to give the
Saboat their own territory. About 2,000 Luhyas have lived in Kapkateny camp in the Bungoma District
since they fled from the attack by the Kalenjin in April 1992.
The fighting in the Nakuru District in the southwest of Rift Valley Province occurred intermittently since
the violence began in February 1992. Most of the Kikuyu (over 40,000) left this area and settled the
Elburgon or Kamwaura camps which are areas the government has not assisted.
[...]
1993 August: About 300 Kalenjin warriors attacked the Molo area of the Nakuru District, displacing
hundred of Kikuyus. The Kalenjin burnt more than 200 houses belong to Kikuyus, but the local police took
no action.
[...]
1993 October: An estimated 500 Maasai warriors attacked an area, Enosupukia (Narok District), south of
the security operation zones, burning houses of Kikuyu farmers and uprooting 30,000 Kikuyus. Throughout
1993, hundreds of Kalenjin warriors attacked and occupied farms belonged to Kikuyus, Luhyas, or Luos
without being arrested or charged for their actions. On a smaller scale, Kalenjin were attacked in retaliation.
In late October, Maasai and Kikuyu, in separate incidents, raided police stations for arms.
[...]
In early 1994, some 10,000 Kikuyu were reportedly driven from their farms near Naivasha in the Rift
valley Province by Maasai, allegedly with the backing of armed off-duty Maasai rangers." (CIDCM
October 1999)
"By 1993, Human Rights Watch/Africa estimated that 1,500 people had died in the clashes and that some
300,000 were displaced. The clashes pitted Moi's small Kalenjin tribe and the Maasai against the populous
Kikuyu, Luhya, and Luo tribes. For a while, Kenya, previously an example of relative stability in the
region, teetered on the brink of a low-level civil war." (HRW June 1997, p. 36)
58

Displacement numbers uncertain during the 1990s because of absence of systematic
registration
• Registration of IDPs difficult for logistical and political reasons
• Lack of trust toward authorities made those displaced in 1993 reluctant to register
• UNDP acknowledging that figures used during the early 1990s were estimates only
"The extent of the effects of conflict on Kenya’s populations is uncertain and speculative. Registering
displaced persons is difficult for both logistical and political reasons [...]. Many victims remain
undocumented, leaving large numbers outside assistance networks. For instance, by 1993, most victims
were reluctant to register with government institutions because they did not trust the state and its
functionaries." (Kathina Juma May 2000)
"Since the beginning of the 'ethnic' violence in 1991, the absence of accurate information on the situation
has provided an opportunity for the Kenyan government to evade its responsibility to those who remain
displaced and made it close to impossible for the NGO community to help many of those who remain off
their land. The consequences of the lack of accurate data, both qualitative and quantitative, have been tragic
for those who remain displaced in Kenya today. Even if an international program for the displaced was to
recommence, there is little or no way to identify or contact many of those who still desperately need help to
rebuild their broken lives." (HRW June 1997, p.94)
"The numbers affected remain uncertain and somewhat speculative, as is invariably the case with internally
displaced populations. Local government administrations have little or no substantive data on the numbers
affected, past or present, or those currently in need of assistance. None have undertaken any systematic
registration of displaced or otherwise affected persons. NGOs and church groups providing relief assistance
to affected populations have made considerable effort to register their clients, but most concede that their
numbers are only approximations. It is clear that there is some duplication in their registrations and that
many non-affected persons succeed in getting themselves registered as beneficiaries. On the other hand,
many displacees do not get registered at all because they have left affected regions to return to their
ancestral lands to draw upon the assistance of relatives or friends. Others have simply 'disappeared' into
urban areas. Elsewhere, displacees who have returned, or are in [the] process of returning to their farms
have remained outside the NGO assistance network and thus remain unenumerated.
(John Rogge, 'The Internally Displaced Population in Nyanza, Western and Rift Valley Province: A Needs
Assessment and a Program Proposal for Rehabilitation,' UNDP, September 1993, quoted in HRW June
1997, p.96)
"[...], UNDP relied on an approximation of 250,000, which was the estimate given in the first Rogge report.
[In its comments on the HRW report] UNDP has stated:
'The estimates throughout were just that-estimates. This was made abundantly clear in both Rogge reports
and UNDP had always indicated that the 250,000 figure that was being used was little more than a crude
estimate. The number was, however, based exclusively on data provided to Rogge by the NGOs and
Churches; at no time were any Government estimates used.'
(HRW June 1997, pp. 97-98)
See also:
Outsiders unable to monitor security situation as conflict areas in the Rift Valley became closed security
zones during 1993-1995
59

PATTERNS OF DISPLACEMENT
General
Semi-nomadic communities in the Northern Frontier District also affected by
displacements(Dec 2002)
• IDPs in camps, forests, urban areas, peri-urban areas and resettlement farms
“ While more attention has been paid to the 1992 caseload of IDPs because of the severity of the
circumstances that led to their displacement, more recent conflicts as a result of the effects of small arms
proliferation have caused sporadic population displacement amongst semi-nomadic communities in the
Northern Frontier Districts and Coast province, as well as along disputed administrative border regions
particularly in Nyanza and Western provinces. IDPs in Kenya can be found at the following places:
IDPs in camps
IDPs affected more than five years ago have gradually scattered, and can be found in isolated groups in
various urban and peri-urban centres or rural areas some distance from their original place of residence.
The ones currently living in camps are mainly those escaping recent insecurity and have not found
alternative settlement. They are found mainly in school or church compounds, abandoned buildings, and
among the Marakwet, in caves (lagams) on the steep escarpment ...
IDPs in forests
IDPs in Baraget, Kieni and other forestlands have been there by the government, pending permanent
resettlement. They are not allowed to cut the trees, cultivate or put up any permanent structures such. Their
houses are therefore makeshift, while there are no schools, churches or clinics. For these services, they have
to walk through the thicket, risking attack by wild animals and various forms of physical and sexual
violence.
IDPs in urban areas
The majority of displaced persons in Kenya live in urban areas, where they eke a living in informal
settlements, low-priced rented accommodation or on the streets. Majority of those who were displaced from
different parts of the Rift Valley moved into Nakuru and smaller towns in Central Rift Valley including
Naivasha, Molo, Elburgon, Gilgil, Njoro, Dundori and other market centres. Those interviewed said they
moved into towns because they did not have relatives living in other parts of the country and had no means
to purchase land elsewhere.
IDPs in peri-urban areas
IDPs living in market centres in Namajalala, Bahati or Dundori on the periphery of towns have generally
rented farms from the local community, or acquired strips of land in forests. Most of them are farmers
growing vegetables, potatoes and cereals, and rearing poultry.
IDPs in Resettlement Farms
IDPs in this category have land donated by the church, government, or bought through the credit scheme
discussed above. On the farm they have built a house (so they do not pay rent), and they practise different
kinds of income-generating activities, including farming, rearing poultry, goats, retail shops (kiosks), and
selling surplus farm produce. However, some locations such as Moi Ndabi are prone to flooding. The
school, borehole and hospital, as well as their homes are submerged during the heavy rains, while silting
60

has damaged the productivity of the farms. ... To access the nearest hospital, they walk through the
Kongoni Game Reserve risking attacks by wild animals.
At the Catholic Diocese of Nakuru (CDN) Temporal Resettlement Project at Elementaita, the harsh climate
has made it very difficult for sustainable agricultural activities. The same is true of the National Council of
Churches of Kenya (NCCK) Resettlement Project at Liavo in Kitale, where the soil is too poor to support
crops.
Resettlement Farms can be found in Kitale (Liavo), Elemementaita, Molo (Kangawa), Moi Ndabi, Ndoinet,
Mauche, Elburgon (Kapsita), Sululu and Kongasis " (UN DPMCU, Dec 2002, pp 35-38).
IDPs seek refugee in urban areas instead of being resettled (1997-2000)
"Typically, victims have disappeared and gravitated towards urban centres. Population growth is noticeably
up in towns near conflict areas. The dramatic increase in the numbers of street children and homeless
families is an indication of this migration phenomenon." (Kathina Juma May 2000)
"Many of those who are still displaced come from areas such as Olenguruone, Enosupukia, and Mt. Elgon
where the remaining Kalenjin and Maasai residents have sworn not to allow other ethnic groups to return to
their land, and the government has shown no signs of taking any action to put an end to this ethnic
expulsion. Most of these displaced have drifted to other areas of the country to become agricultural day
laborers or to urban areas in search of work. Others have become part of the unemployed poor, adding to
the alarming levels of crime in Kenya largely caused by poverty and government mismanagement of
resources. In 1995, UNDP had estimated that there were about 50,000 people living in 'very temporary
refuges' or 'surviving in peri-urban slum areas,' who have been 'overlooked' because of the difficulty of
finding satisfactory and quick solutions." (HRW June 1997, pp.127)
61

PHYSICAL SECURITY & FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT
Protection concerns during displacement
Children displaced during the early 1990s end up as street children in Nairobi (1997)
"Nairobi's street children are being beaten and often killed by police. Some are imprisoned in terrible
conditions. Many of the children, more then 10,000, are Kikuyu who became homeless in the aftermath of
the 1991-94 ethnic fighting." (CIDCM October 1999)
Outsiders unable to monitor security situation as conflict areas in the Rift Valley
became closed security zones during 1993-1995
• Carrying of weapons banned in the worst-affected areas
• Security measures did not prevent a large outbreak of "ethnic" violence in the Burnt Forest area
in March 1994
• Security zones also restricting flow of information
"In September 1993, after two years of inaction in providing additional security, and soon after the highly
publicized visits of representatives of two foreign human rights organizations to the clash areas, the
government declared three 'security operation zones' giving the police emergency-type powers, excluding
'outsiders,' preventing the publication of any information concerning the area when deemed necessary, and
banning the carrying of weapons in the worst-affected areas of the Rift Valley Province. For most of the
duration of the UNDP program, the restrictions were in force. They were lifted in March 1995. However,
even when they were in place, the extra security precautions in these zones did not prevent a large outbreak
of 'ethnic' violence in the Burnt Forest area in March 1994, which left at least eighteen dead and perhaps
25,000 displaced.
Burnt Forest was an area that was particularly hard hit and, for some, this was the second or even third time
they had been displaced. Communities in Burnt Forest were first attacked in December 1992 and then in
January, February, April and August 1993 and January 1994. The attacks in Burnt Forest in March 1994,
which continued for a week, left the disturbing impression that the government was unable or unwilling to
take effective measures to stop the clashes." (HRW June 1997, pp. 54-55)
IDPs not provided adequate protection or the means necessary for reintegration after
authorities dispersed their temporary settlements (1993-1996)
• Local officials and police forcibly dispersing IDP camps without providing adequate assistance or
security to facilitate return
• Periodic government harassment of the 10 000 predominantly Kikuyu IDPs at Maela camp (1993-
1994)
• Maela camp destroyed by government officials on 24 December 2000, and 2000 residents evicted
to Central Province
• UNDP and MSF denied access to assist remaining residents of Maela
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• 700 of the people moved from Maela Camp were in January 1995 further forced to leave holding
centres in Central Province
• 118 families at the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) community centre in Eldoret
ordered by authorities to leave by end 1994
"To ensure that large gatherings of clash victims were not easily visible to visiting diplomats, the media or
human rights groups, local government officials dispersed camps of the internally displaced without any
consideration of where these victims could go. One method that was frequently used was to announce to the
victims, despite evidence to the contrary, that it was safe to return to their land. In other cases, where the
displaced would not leave voluntarily, local government officials, with the assistance of the police, would
forcibly disperse camps of displaced people without providing adequate assistance or security to permit
them to return to their land. The result of the dispersals, which continued even in 1996, has made it
virtually impossible to identify those who were displaced from their land by the 'ethnic' violence today.
[...]
[...] The crowning incident of government disregard for the internally displaced, UNDP and the
international community took place in December 1994 at a camp called Maela when the government
forcibly expelled the residents. This lent credence to the charges that the government was clearing the Rift
Valley Province of certain ethnic groups.
The predominantly Kikuyu displaced population at Maela camp had sought refuge there after being
attacked on its land at Enosupukia, Narok district, by a group of Maasai in October 1993. Since that time,
they had been living at Maela camp in squalid conditions under plastic sheeting on church grounds. The
overcrowding had led to shortages of food, water, and medical supplies. Incidents of government
harassment of the displaced at this camp periodically occurred as did statements by Maasai leaders that the
displaced at Maela would never be permitted to return to their land.
In the early hours of the morning of December 24, 1994, administration police and KANU youth wingers
raided the camp of Maela which housed approximately 10,000 predominantly Kikuyu people who had
sought refuge after being attacked at Enosupukia in October 1993. Without notice, the government officials
razed the camp and transported some 2,000 residents to Central Province (the area regarded as the
'traditional' home of the Kikuyus), and proceeded to question them about their ethnicity and ancestral
background. Families were separated as they were herded into about twenty trucks which had been fueled
from a UNDP petrol account (which was later closed after UNDP discovered this fact). Each truck was
crammed with approximately one hundred people. Initially, the displaced were not provided with food or
shelter. The relocation was done late at night without notification or the participation of UNDP.
The remaining residents of Maela were left without shelter, and UNDP and the international NGO
Medecins sans Frontieres (Spain) were denied access to Maela, despite the fact that the UNDP officer had a
letter from the office of the president allowing entry into Maela. UNDP was informed that this resettlement
was in keeping with the President's promise to resettle the genuine victims of Maela before Christmas.
Some 200 'genuine' victims, as defined by the government, were relocated to a government-owned farm
near Maela called MoiNdabi and each given two acres. The land at MoiNdabi, which used to be part of a
larger farm administered by the government Agricultural Development Cooperation (ADC), is less
productive than the land the displaced were forced from in Enosupukia, and water, shelter and sanitation
facilities were non-existent when they arrived.
The other Maela camp residents, considered 'non-genuine' displacees [sic!] by the government, were
dumped at three different locations in Central Province in the middle of the night and left to fend for
themselves. At Ndaragwa, the displaced were left by the side of the road with no shelter and practically no
belongings. At Ol Kalou, they were left between the railway line and the main road. At Kiambu, they were
dropped at Kirigiti Stadium. Several days later, the makeshift camp at Kirigiti was destroyed in a police
raid at 3:00 am, leaving the twice displaced once again without shelter. The displaced were ordered to line
up and were loaded on trucks without being informed of where they were to be taken. Those who resisted
were beaten and forcibly thrown into the trucks. The government denied any harassment or beatings. None
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of those forcibly displaced to Central Province were returned by the government or UNDP to the area they
came from in the Rift Valley Province. Furthermore, the government officials responsible for the brutality
against the displaced have never been disciplined." (HRW June 1997, pp.77-79)
"[L]ocal authorities in other areas were beginning to insist on displaced people dispersing. For example, on
28 December [1994] the District Officer of Uasin Gishu ordered 118 families at the National Council of
Churches of Kenya (NCCK) community centre in Eldoret to disperse by 4 January.
On 4 January [1995] police dispersed 700 of the people moved from Maela Camp out of the three holding
centres in Central Province: Ol Kalau, Ndaragwa and Kirigiti. At Kirigiti Stadium the camp was razed. The
UNDP, the government's supposed partner in the programme to resettle displaced people, had apparently
not been informed of the government action.
The significance of the Maela removals was twofold. First, there has been a constant call from senior
officials for the expulsion of members of certain ethnic groups from the Rift Valley. This appeared to be a
first step in that direction. Secondly, it made it publicly apparent that the joint government-UNDP
resettlement programme was in serious trouble." (Carver August 1995)
Claimed in several reports that security forces have lacked impartiality (1992-1997)
• Parliamentary committee concluded in 1992 that government officials were involved in the Rift
Valley violence
• Claims that perpetrators had received support from security forces
"In September 1992 a parliamentary select committee, chaired by Kennedy Kiliku, reported on the
violence. (At this time the National Assembly was still a single-party, KANU body.) The committee
concluded that 800 people had been killed and that many government officials, security officers, provincial
administrators and others had 'abetted, perpetrated or instigated' the violence. The Kiliku report singled out
Vice-President Saitoti and minister Nicholas Biwott for responsibility, along with a number of other senior
officials. Parliament rejected the report.
Reports by Kenyan church groups have also criticized government complicity in the violence. In March
1992 the country's Roman Catholic bishops issued a pastoral letter in which they alleged that the conflict
was 'all part of a wider political strategy' involving 'well-trained arsonists and bandits' who were
'transported to the scenes of crime from outside the area'. The letter concluded:
There has been no impartiality on the part of the security forces. On the contrary, their attitude seems to
imply that orders from above were given in order to inflict injuries only on particular ethnic groups.
In June 1992 the National Council of Churches of Kenya published a report on the violence. It claimed:
There is evidence that there was cordial interaction between the warriors, security and administration
officers ... .
Evidence has been received that homes and farms of senior government officials, political leaders and
administrative officers have and are being used as hideouts for warriors, depots for weaponry, sanctuaries
... where warriors return in the event of facing resistance ...
On the strength of interviews with members of the security forces the NCCK researchers concluded that
non-Kalenjin personnel in the police and paramilitary General Service Unit were not allowed to carry arms
when dealing with the ethnic clashes. Non-Kalenjin police officers on patrol — who were unarmed — were
always accompanied by armed Kalenjins." (Article 19 October 1997, sect. 2.3)
64

SUBSISTENCE NEEDS (HEALTH NUTRITION AND SHELTER)
General
IDPs reduced to beggers (September 2004)
• IDPs in squalid camps had to sell their property at throwaway prices
• People dispossessed and disillusioned 10 years after the clashes forced them to flee
"Seventy-six kilometres northwest of Nairobi, lies the Kieni Bamboo Forest.
A few metres past the Flyover, the forest is a bird-watcher’s paradise, with numerous bird species.
The forest is also a sad reminder of the woes facing internally displaced people in Kenya.
Deep inside the forest, tucked safely away from prying eyes, lies a small village. Its surroundings, unseen
and forgotten. The village reminds one of a concentration camp without the fence.
Huruma Village, comprising about 520 desolate families, bears testimony to the agony borne by people
affected by politically engineered ethnic cleansing, which occurred over a decade ago.
When we arrived at the village, it was sizzling hot. The sound of our vehicle was enough to draw little
children with running noses, followed by curious adults.
It was easy to discern the looks of expectation on their faces, faces of Kenyan citizens who have been
displaced and dispossessed in their own homeland.
The tragedy of Huruma Village and 11 similar settlements scattered on the fringes of the turbulent Rift
Valley Province lies not in the fact that its story has been told and retold, but in the fear that its inhabitants
may soon be a forgotten people.
The villagers have spent every waking day over the past decade waiting indefinitely, with hope and
optimism in their hearts. In the euphoric 2002 General Election, they excitedly voted in Narc, hoping that
this time round, political leaders would come to their rescue.
"We’ve been waiting for government intervention since they threw and abandoned us here," proclaims
Josiah Mburu, 39, who has been championing the rights of the internally displaced persons in Huruma
village.
The feelings of betrayal, displacement, dispossession and disillusionment are not unique to Huruma.
The Rift Valley is host to numerous similar villages with the Central Rift carrying the bulk of them.
Subukia, Lower Subukia, Kabazi, Bahati, Kabatini, Ndundori, Solai, Nakuru town, Kabiamet/Mugumo,
Bararget and Likia are just but a few. Kieni Forest is unique in that it hosts the victims of politically
instigated ethnic cleansing and the victims of 1988 eviction of forest dwellers who had been benefiting
from the Shamba system.
"These people have been reduced to paupers and refugees in their own country," says Keffa Karuoya
Magenyi, the co-ordinator of the Subukia internally displaced persons zone.
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A victim of multiple internal displacements occasioned by both the Shamba system and ethnic clashes,
Magenyi narrates the double tragedy that befell Huruma Village’s inhabitants.
He explains how people who had cultivated crops under the Shamba system in Kamwaura, Sitoito, Marua,
Ndeffo, Karirikania and Muchorwe divisions in Molo South were evicted.
"In addition to living in these forest areas, we also practised the Shamba system along the cut-lines of the
Ndoinet and Tinet forests," he explains.
"No sooner had the people been evicted from the forests, than the ethnic clashes started — two years later."
Mburu’s recollection of the suffering he and other villagers have undergone is as vivid as if it happened
yesterday.
"One day the government came in and ordered us to vacate the forest land. We were given a seven-day
ultimatum." recollects Mburu, then in his adolescence. They had to sell their property at throwaway prices.
"Some animals like goats, sheep and chicken were given away — there was no time to sell them," says
Mburu, adding, "we had to sell our dairy cows to slaughter houses at the price of a chicken."
Overnight people who had been self-reliant became paupers, reduced to the vagaries of urban tenancy.
For five years, between 1988 and 1993, the government closed the forest to farming. The result was that the
people become loiterers and wanderers.
Many of them rented rooms and backdoor outlets in the nearby trading centres. Soon, their meagre incomes
ran out and they could not sustain themselves and their families. When the government re-opened the
forests in 1993, the former occupants went to seek refuge in the forest once again.
However, the problem proved more complex. Political leaders, keen to hold onto power in the face of
pluralism, began fanning ethnic animosity. "Sadly, some of our people were caught up in the merciless
killings of the clashes," quips Magenyi. "We were once again on the run."
He narrates how they had to settle in areas such as Enoosupukia and Maela, where clashes once again
erupted. Those who managed to flee went to "hide" deep in the Kieni Forest. The majority of the young
sought manual jobs in the neighbouring Kamae trading area.
"After the 1997 elections, we sensed that once again all was not well," states Mburu. "We therefore began
digging holes to "burrow" ourselves, just in case."
Their fears proved true when in June 2001 the government sent the Forest Protection Unit to smoke them
out.
Before this incident, a feud had been quietly simmering. According to Mburu, some Kieni forest officials
had allegedly parcelled some sections of the Bamboo Forest, selling off the land to rich people from Kamae
and Magumo.
The Bamboo forest in question was a catchment area for the larger Thika District and its environs. When
part of it was hived off for private use, the Chania River, which feeds Thika and parts of the Ukambani
region, began to dry up.
A hue and cry ensued due to sudden fluctuations of water levels and unexpected changes in the weather
pattern.
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The forest staff accused the Kieni people of "tampering" with the bamboo forest, hoping to cover up their
actions with these accusations.
The violent eviction from the forest by the officers should be seen in this light, according to Mburu.
"They came one morning, armed to the teeth and spent the whole day burning our belongings, beating up
all and sundry before flattening everything in sight," he recollects.
With no alternative whatsoever, the villagers decided to camp along the potholed Thika-Naivasha Road.
"Camping on the shoulders of the road ensured our collective safety and we also wanted to announce to the
world our plight," Mburu explains, saying that after that, the government could not continue to pretend that
they did not exist.
On August 2001, the then Rift Valley Provincial Commissioner, Mr Zachary Ogongo, visited the site,
accompanied by Mr Uhuru Kenyatta.
The PC ordered the people to return to the forest, where each family was to be re-settled on a 100 by 100
foot piece of land.
"But when the PC left, surveyors from the Thika District office reduced the size of the plots to 10 by 10
feet," Mburu continues.
"To be registered for resettlement, one was required to have an identity card and many of the people missed
out. Initially, we were 1,000 plus but only 520 people were allocated the tiny plots. The most affected were
the old people and those who had lost their identification documents in the earlier clashes."
The lucky 500 were squeezed on a three-and-half-acre plot. Those who were displaced found their way to
towns such as Kiambu, Githunguri, and Maguu in Nyahururu.
Anxious to remind the Narc government of their plight, Huruma villagers forwarded a memo to Justice and
Constitutional Affairs Minister Kiraitu Murungi on June 12.
They are yet to hear from him."(East African Standard, 12 September 2004)
Summary of humanitarian needs of the conflict affected population in Tana River area
(November 2001)
"The recent clash in Tana River District occurred on the 18 th November at Tarasaa and Ngao claiming 14
lives and displacing 3,400 persons.
The Pokomo and Orma, farmers and pastoralists respectively, inhabit the Tana River district area. Since
December 2000, the two communities have been at conflict over pasture, water and land resources
sometimes resulting in clashes during which property was destroyed, people displaced and lives lost. And
due to these communities insistence on the use of heavy fire arms, education systems and social
development have been disrupted consequently restricting movement and causing food insecurity at the
household level as people are unable to access their farms.
Several agencies responded positively to the crises, however, there is need for more assistance in the areas
of:-
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1. Household needs in the form of clothes, cooking utensils and reconstruction materials for those whose
homes were burnt. Mosquito nets and sanitary pads for girls and women as well as Jerricans for water
storage.
2. Education where there is a serious deficiency of Books. Writing materials and desks for the affected
schools.
3. The areas of Health, nutrition, Water and sanitation are in urgent need of help especially in the camps
where there is not enough water for all and therefore little or no effort to ensure its cleanliness. The absence
of toilet facilities in these camps also poses a great risk especially with the onset of the rainy season, as they
are prone to cholera outbreak.
4. Agriculture and Livestock too need assistance in the form of drugs for the animals especially for
trypanosomosis and ticks and seeds for the farmers to start planting before the rains stop. To boost the
wavering morale, a programme to restock those whose animals were killed during the clashes is necessary.
5. Security. A police post needs to be established at Shirikisho and the security personnel should take swift
action by immediately arresting perpetrators from both communities and ridding the area of guns. Peace
and conflict management should be enhanced and the land adjudication process more participatory.
6. Food distribution. At least three months food rationing for the indirectly affected populations of Chara,
Ngao and Wachi/ Oda, Ozi and kilelengwani locations is urgently needed." (OCHA 30 November 2001)
IDPs seeking shelter in towns live in slum conditions, 1997-2001
• IDPs unable to return have drifted to other areas of the country to become agricultural day
labourers, searching for work in urban areas or becoming part of the unemployed poor
• Estimated by UNDP that there were about 50,000 people living in 'very temporary refuges' or
'surviving in peri-urban slum areas' by 1995
"Many of those who are still displaced come from areas such as Olenguruone, Enosupukia, and Mt. Elgon
where the remaining Kalenjin and Maasai residents have sworn not to allow other ethnic groups to return to
their land, and the government has shown no signs of taking any action to put an end to this ethnic
expulsion. Most of these displaced have drifted to other areas of the country to become agricultural day
laborers or to urban areas in search of work. Others have become part of the unemployed poor, adding to
the alarming levels of crime in Kenya largely caused by poverty and government mismanagement of
resources. In 1995, UNDP had estimated that there were about 50,000 people living in 'very temporary
refuges' or 'surviving in peri-urban slum areas,' who have been 'overlooked' because of the difficulty of
finding satisfactory and quick solutions. It is likely that this number is even higher now. It is unrealistic to
believe that specific programs can be introduced for the urban displaced living in the slums of Nairobi or
even in Nakuru or Kisumu. In these larger urban areas, the best that can realistically be undertaken is to
ensure that such displacees are included within existing programs for urban slum populations. However,
UNDP should ensure that any such programs do not further the government's policy of reintegration of the
displaced outside of the Rift Valley Province." (HRW June 1997, pp. 127-128)
"In 1994, the Maela camp near Naivasha was burnt to the ground; it had more than 10,000 IDPs from the
Narok area. Public outcry and extensive media coverage and criticism led to the resettlement of 200 of
these in an arid government-owned land near Maela, not to their former fertile lands. The others,
considered ‘outsiders’, were put in government trucks and dumped at Ndaragwa, Kiriti stadium and Ol
Kalau in central province, the ‘ancestral’ homeland of the Kikuyu. They were left stranded; not helped to
settle in central province. Consequently, family members were separated, while a large number of these
landless, disenfranchised people found their way into shopping centers, the streets of Nairobi and slum
areas. Others live precariously somewhere within the borders of Kenya in difficult circumstances.
[...]
Violence leads to loss of life and property as crops and livestock are looted or destroyed. This, and
abandonment of economic activities amounts to the loss of livelihood for the affected population, hence
impoverishment and destitution as families deplete savings and sell household assets below their market
68

value. Movement of displaced people into market centres has put pressure on social amenities like housing,
hospitals and schools. Those who have found their way into big towns like Nairobi live in slum areas doing
odd jobs because having been farmers, they have no practical skills to start new careers. A large number of
‘street families’ are beggars, thieves, hawkers, prostitutes or drug peddlers. " (JRS March 2001, pp.8-9, 15)
IRIN's report on 13 December 2001 from the Kibera slum in Nairobi provides some detail about the
conditions facing people resettled in such areas
Difficult living conditions for IDPs remaining in Maela camp (1996-2000)
• Reported in 1996 that assistance from international organisations to IDPs remaining in Maela
camps had ceased
• Claimed that 1,500 families who fled from the politically-instigated violence in Enoosupukia still
remained in Maela by 2000
• Most children out of school
"Human Rights Watch/Africa visited Maela [in 1996] and interviewed some of the displaced who remain
there or who had been relocated to Central Province when Maela was cleared by the government in
December 1994. Virtually abandoned and still destitute, the remaining displaced reported that no
international agency had visited Maela for over a year. The fact that UNDP was so involved in providing
services at Maela in 1994 had raised expectations that the large international agency would ensure the
safety and eventual reintegration of the displaced there. The displaced were even more crushed that UNDP
did little or nothing for them following the dispersal. One displaced man said, 'after the government did all
that to us, all UNDP did was to come back here in January 1995 and take all their office equipment and
leave." (HRW June 1997, pp. 125-126)
In October 2000 a newspaper report drew a dismal picture of the situation facing the IDPs who have
remained in the Maela area:
"Looking at their faces, one could hardly tell that the emaciated lot were once proud land owners who used
to deliver huge amounts of milk to the Kenya Co-operative Creameries every day.
They looked unkempt and sullen, a false testimony that they had been bed mates with penury for many
years. Eight years of disillusionment had undoubtedly gnawed at their dignity and few could resist the
temptation to beg for a slice of bread. They had been reduced to destitutes.
'Some of us have not eaten for days and our children are dying. We have buried our kinsmen and no one is
coming to our rescue. We don’t get relief food and no one visits us since Father Antony Kaiser died. The
Government, Press and NGOs have all forsaken us. We don’t have land or anything to turn to,' a balding
man tacitly summed up their predicament.
This is the rot that thousands of people who were evicted from Enoosupukia have degenerated to.
They languish in abject poverty at Maela trading centre, some 50 kilometres from Naivasha town.
Maela has the sully look of a mourning village, a testimony to the cruelty of tribal clashes of 1993. It is
home to over 1,500 families who fled from the politically-instigated violence in Enoosupukia following
Cabinet Minister William ole Ntimama’s order that squatters leave the water catchment area.
[...]
They camped at the St John’s Catholic Church at Maela and built what became the Maela Camp. Here, men
and women with their families lived in shacks, miniature houses built with polythene papers and depended
on the church and NGOs for subsistence for over 16 months.
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[...]
Over 1,500 families were left desolate at Maela with no food or collective identification to solicit donor
support.
'Our hope died with the disbanding of the camp. When relief agencies heard that we would be moved, they
closed shop and moved elsewhere. They never came back. In fact, it was better when we lived in camps.
There we were sure of daily rations of food,' says Martha Kamau.
Those who failed to secure land now live in squalor in Maela. It is ironical that the people are starving in
the middle of very fertile land.
Without jobs and money to start afresh, they sublet small pieces of land from their hosts for between Sh200
to Sh500 a season.
[...]
Indeed, these people are not only fighting for survival but also for their future. Despite the aura of
development as you drive through Ngondi township and hills, Maela looks like a miniature refugee camp.
Residents lead a lifestyle devoid of all basic amenities. Most children are out of school and some have
joined their parents in scavenging for survival." (East African Standard, 29 October 2000)
See also:
Government restricted access to Maela camp after many IDPs were moved from the camp in 1994
Health
Spread of HIV-AIDS is particularly high among the urban displaced (2002)
• Main reasons HIV are Rape, Unsterilized medical equipment, Breakdown of social ties and
relationships, Poverty and prostitution and Polygamy
“The spread of HIV-AIDS among IDPs is very high, particularly among the urban displaced. This may be
attributed to a number of factors, including:
Rape
As noted earlier, rape is widespread in conflict situations. It happened during the 1992/7 skirmishes and in
subsequent attacks or conflicts that have taken place in many parts of the country. Rapists do not practice
safe sex, leading to transmission of venereal diseases and/or HIV virus.
Unsterilized medical equipment
In camps where the displaced sought refuge, relief workers might not have managed to follow
recommended precautions to sterilize instruments owing to the large numbers of casualties. Needles and
syringes may therefore have been used without proper sterilisation, thereby transmitting the virus.
Breakdown of social ties and relationships
Many of the displaced women have been separated from their husbands through death, imprisonment,
abandonment, disappearance and divorce. With the breakdown of social ties and relationships, sexual
behaviours also change. Displaced people meet and form new friendships and relationships. Unprotected
sex with new partners with untreated STIs multiplies the risk of infection with the HIV virus.
Poverty and prostitution.
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Young women and mothers find themselves without basic needs and protection. They are broke and
without skills to start income-generating activities, thereby increasing their susceptibility to commercial sex
and promiscuity to secure food and other provisions and services. Displaced women working as prostitutes
and their clients are both at high risk of contracting the virus because safe or protected sex is hardly
practiced. Most dispossessed women cannot afford to buy condoms, which cost ten Kenya shillings for a
pack of three. Some of their clients also refuse to use the condoms.
Polygamy
Displacement caused the separation of many families, and many single and unaccompanied women moved
into towns and other settlements. Many of them were willing to marry as third or fourth wives for physical
security and protection, and to meet their physiological and affective needs. Sex with multiple partners
increases the risk of infection.
Different levels of knowledge and awareness about HIV and its prevention.
The effect of displacement is that people who fled from HIV-free areas suddenly found themselves living in
crowded places with others from places with high HIV rates. Sexual contact between the two groups made,
and still makes, those with little prior knowledge more vulnerable to infection. Displaced people eventually
interact with the host population. Issues and problems among the host population, such as HIV-AIDS,
affect the IDPs, and vice versa.
In parts of TransNzoia, the scourge has wiped out whole villages, leaving hundreds of orphaned children as
household heads. In towns like Nakuru, the number of street children has risen dramatically over the last
few years, a situation attributed to break-up of the family unit due to displacement, deaths due to
HIV/AIDS, prostitution and rising poverty levels. ( UNIFEM, Jan 2002, 23-24)
Children and women displaced during the early 1990s particularly vulnerable
• Women suffering from sexual assault during the clashes
• Women exposed to security risks when returning temporary to farm on their land
"Children, who constituted an estimated 75 percent of the displaced, were deeply affected. Many children
had witnessed the death of close family members, and in some cases, had suffered injuries themselves. As a
result, reports of children displaying aggressive behavior or suffering nightmares were common. The
education of children was disrupted, in many cases permanently. Where parents and volunteers attempted
to create makeshift schools at camps, local government authorities were known to close down the schools,
depriving the children of any formal educational opportunity whatsoever.
A study of the situation of displaced women in one camp in Kenya found that women had suffered rape and
other forms of sexual assault during the clashes. After becoming displaced, the study found that gender
inequalities were exacerbated. Displaced women were victims of "rape; wife-beating by their husbands;
sexually-transmitted diseases; poverty; manipulation; hunger, fear, anger, anxiety; trauma, despondency,
dehumanization; heavy workload and physical fatigue.' The report also noted that the women shouldered a
bigger burden: they often risked returning to farm on their land because the men feared death if they
returned; they frequently ate less in order to feed their husbands and children first; and they often suffered
miscarriages or complications in childbirth due to the lack of an adequate diet and the harsh living
conditions. " (HRW June 1997, p. 43)
Shelter
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IDPs forced to leave Kyeni Forest living in makeshift shelters (August 2001)
"Over 800 people reduced to living in makeshift shelters by the side of the Thika-Naivasha road have
complained that they were harassed by forestry officials into leaving Kyeni Forest, 95 km from the Kenyan
capital, Nairobi, in recent months after living there peaceably and with the government’s agreement for
eight years.
The group of 867 internally displaced persons (IDPs), forced out of Kyeni by forest station officers, were
stranded in a roadside camp in Huruma, Thika District, since 5 June, with poor access to food, water and
sanitation.
Huruma camp committee chairman Gad Wainaina told IRIN that forest rangers had beaten the IDPs and
burned their houses to the ground, forcing them to leave the forest where they had lived since 1993. 'All our
identity documents were confiscated and destroyed, forcing us to live like refugees,' he said.
Earlier this week, the process of moving the Huruma IDPs to a new plot back inside the forest began, 'to
remove them from the dangers at the roadside', according to an official from the Thika District Forest
Office. However, it was not known how long the IDPs would be allowed to stay on the new land, as it was
only intended to be a temporary measure, he said."
(IRIN 31 August 2001b)
Poor shelter conditions for IDPs during the 1990s
• Overcrowded and unsanitary shelters
• Open makeshift structures of cardboard and plastic sheeting
"Those whose lives were shattered by the killing and destruction fled to relatives, church compounds,
nearby abandoned buildings, makeshift camps, and market centers. Often, the shelters where the displaced
have congregated for years at a time have been overcrowded, unsanitary, and inadequate. Many were
forced to create open makeshift structures of cardboard and plastic sheeting and to sleep outdoors. Food
was often cooked under filthy conditions and many of the displaced routinely suffered health problems,
such as malaria, diarrhoea and pneumonia. These conditions worsened during the rainy season. Frequently,
local government officials would downplay the magnitude of insecurity in their area and disperse victims
without providing adequate assistance or security to permit them to return to their land, putting them at
risk." (HRW June 1997, p. 42)
"Displaced families, joining families uprooted in previous years, sought shelter in church compounds,
schools, and market areas. Local church leaders and human rights investigators charged that officials in
Kenya's ruling political party instigated the violence to punish local populations that had opposed the ruling
party during elections." (USCR 1999)
"This week the Red Cross completed relief distributions to over 5,000 displaced persons [in the Nakuru and
Laikipia districts] in Kenya's Rift Valley, most of them women and children.
[...]
Living conditions in these camps have been deteriorating and inadequate sanitation and overcrowding pose
a constant threat of infectious diseases. 'The Red Cross has already built a number of pit latrines and is
handing out soap and disinfectant as well as plastic sheeting and sleeping mats for the camp population',
said Emmanuel Campbell, ICRC delegate in charge of cooperation with the National Society. In Laikipia,
construction materials will be provided for the homeless." (ICRC 9 July 1998)
72

ACCESS TO EDUCATION
General
Children's education disrupted by displacement (1993-2002)
• Most of the displaced children have not been to school due to unaffordable fees, uniform,
textbooks, and pens
• In East Pokot one can travel more than 100km without seeing a school
“Most of the displaced children have not been to school due to unaffordable fees, uniform, textbooks, and
pens. Parents and guardians interviewed cited this as one of their greatest difficulties. Since most IDPs have
to buy food and meet other basic expenses such as rent, education is not given a high priority. Some
families take only one or two children to school, usually boys.
NCCK and CJPC had made arrangements with the heads of local primary schools to allow the children of
IDPs attend school without charge or at a subsidised cost that they would pay. Similar plans were made
with local health centres and maternities. This project stalled due to lack of funds, and also because parents
were unable to buy uniforms and textbooks. Food scarcity in many households compel many children to
drop out of school, and their parents send them to work as house helps, herds boys, gardeners, or in flower
and other agriculture farms to supplement the family income.
At the Catholic Diocese of Nakuru Temporal Resettlement Project, schooling is free, and the pupils need
not wear uniform. However, enrolment is still poor because of lack of food at home. Occasionally, there is
a school feeding programme, but the number of pupils dwindles as soon as the programme ends.
In the Kerio Valley, cattle rustling and other forms of violence have led to the closure of over thirty-five
schools, as most people have moved up the escarpment. Abandoned schools are almost engulfed in tall
grass and bushes. Where some schools are operational, most parents have withdrawn their children because
pupils have often been attacked or killed on their way to school. Besides, most government employees who
do not come from the region do not returned or are transferred, resulting in understaffing poor service
delivery in many departments.
In marginalized communities such as Pokot, inaccess to education is as much a result of lack of schools as
it is of displacement. For instance, there is no school in the whole of Masol Location in East Pokot, and one
can travel more than 100km without seeing a school. Displacement causes the population to move away
from these few schools (UN DPMCU, Dec 2002, p, 39).
"Forced displacement and insecurity disrupts children’s education as they leads to the closure of schools, or
migration to zones without schools. In North Rift, 35 primary schools have been closed as people have
moved to the escarpment, hence robbing a whole generation of much-needed education. In South Rift,
existing schools have been reluctant to accommodate the children of displacees, while others have no
teachers, classrooms or learning resources. Most of the displaced people have lost their source of
employment (hence the breach of their right to work), so they are unable to pay school levies. Some
children are also too traumatized to go to school, also raising the issue of their right to health. For most
displaced families, education is not a priority issue. Over seventy per cent of interviewed parents said they
work to feed and pay medical bills for their families, not to raise school fees." (JRS March 2001, p.24)
73

ISSUES OF SELF-RELIANCE AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
General
Income-generating activities within IDP camps are non-existent
• Some IDPs are able to go to their own farms during the day to tend their crops
• IDPs living in urban areas have to contend with rent, electricity, water and other bills, as well as
buying food
• The number of commercial sex workers is said to have risen dramatically in such towns as
Naivasha, Gilgil and Nakuru
“ Income-generating activities within camps are non-existent, and IDPs rely mainly on relief food, where it
is available. At ‘Bosnia’ and Louis Farm, adults and children walk long distances to large agriculture farms
to provide casual labour, for which they earn between Ksh 30 and Ksh 100 per day. Sometimes children are
picked up each morning in tractor-drawn trailers and returned to the camp in the evenings. Wealthy
members of the host community hire some women and children to perform household chores such as
laundry, drawing water, fetching firewood and cooking.
Agricultural activities
Some IDPs are able to go to their own farms during the day to tend their crops, but return to rented
accommodation or camps in the evenings. Sometimes the crops are stolen just before harvest time, or
pastoralist communities illegally graze their cattle on their crops. This leads to despair and apathy,
especially because of apparent inaction by local authorities. The Marakwet on the escarpment are forced to
go down into the valley during the day to gather food. Some men, having lost all livestock, have shifted
their attention to beekeeping, while women produce beads, baskets, ornaments and other souvenirs made
from local materials. However, they lack ready market for these items because trade in the entire region is
hampered by insecurity. Others have hired small plots of land on the outskirts of the towns, where they
grow vegetables and cereals to meet their food requirements.
Petty Trade
IDPs living in urban areas have to contend with rent, electricity, water and other bills, as well as buying
food. This can be particularly challenging for those without a steady source of income. Many engage in
petty trade, buying and selling vegetables, second-hand clothes and shoes (mitumba), food items, fuel
(paraffin, charcoal, firewood), while others operate small retail shops. A few work in factories, others have
started small businesses such as brewing illicit liquors and tailoring. The main economic activity among the
Pokot encamped at Orwa, Marich and Sigor is charcoal burning, but the forestry department has banned
this due to serious environmental degradation in the area. Given the harsh natural environment, loss of
livestock, lack of capital, and limited survival alternatives, encamped IDPs are particularly destitute.
Commercial sex work
In the last decade, the number of commercial sex workers is said to have risen dramatically in such towns
as Naivasha, Gilgil and Nakuru. The sex workers cite displacement, death of or abandonment by spouses,
dispossession, lack of skills for anything else, poverty and idleness for engaging in the practice. Some
married women also practice commercial sex because they have bills to pay and the men ‘are like children’.
Some women alleged they have to sleep with or bribe policemen to avert arrest for brewing illicit liquor.”
(UN DPMCU, Dec 2002, pp, 38-39)
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IDPs feel that someone took the land that belonged to them (2002)
• Families become increasingly concerned by the difficulties of housing their families in cramped
spaces
• IDPs feel like refugees in their own country
“With no available land nearby, and the prospect of further violence should they attempt a return, the
Thessalia families have little option but to remain on the tiny parcels of land provided by the church.
'We have to raise our families, eat and sustain ourselves on a quarter acre of land. We can’t do it. I feel like
I am a refugee in my own country,' the Thessalia community chairman told IRIN recently.
Although the Thessalia IDPs hope of getting access to some additional land nearby, or maybe a little
financing for income generation activities, what they want more than anything is to return to their land in
the Rift Valley, which they still claim is rightfully theirs, Florence Oduor, of People for Peace in Africa, a
nongovernmental organisation working with the Thessalia community, told IRIN recently.
'They still feel they have been wronged all these years. They still feel that someone took land that belonged
to them. There is no way you are going to convince them that that land is now owned by someone else,'
says Oduor.” (IRIN, 14 Nov 2002).
The violence has condemned a formerly self-sufficient and productive sector of the
economy to permanent dispossession and poverty (September 2004)
• Displaced farmers have been reduced to begging or crime in order to survive for lack of valid
skills in the salaried sector
• IDPs living from hand to mouth
• Many IDP children have become hardcore criminals
"To ensure that large gatherings of clash victims were not easily visible to visiting diplomats, the media or
human rights groups, local government officials dispersed camps of the internally displaced without any
consideration of where these victims could go.
[...]
The violence and the ensuing government harassment has condemned a formerly self-sufficient and
productive sector of the economy to permanent dispossession and poverty. Many are renting homes or
living on hired land. Others have become part of the urban poor, either unemployed or working as day
laborers who receive barely enough to survive. Many of the displaced are farmers by occupation who did
not receive much formal education or training in skills of the salaried sector. As a result, some of the
displaced have been reduced to begging or crime in order to survive. In recent years, there has been an
alarming rise in the number of street children in Kenya. Among them are many children who were
displaced and dispossessed by the clashes." (HRW June 1997, p.77)
"Inside Kayole’s Soweto slums, where Elizaphan Njoroge lives on what used to be a sisal plantation, his
two-roomed tin shack is the envy of the many people who were evicted from Muoroto, never to get a place
to settle.
Njoroge is a lucky man as far as city land problems go: he was allocated a quarter acre plot in a swampy
area after Muoroto residents were brutally evicted from Muoroto.
Of the 2,500 people who once resided in Muoroto, only 350 were resettled.
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In the rainy season, Njoroge’s luck temporarily runs out." Although the rains are a good thing, we always
dread them because the water fills our house and drenches everything," he says. "This was once a sisal
plantation."
Once a budding entrepreneur who ran a food kiosk in Muoroto, Njoroge now says: "My food kiosk was
known by many people, some of whom came all the way from the city centre," he says nostalgically. "They
liked my food because the prices were affordable and the food was of good quality," he adds.
Fourteen years down the road, Njoroge has moved from a proud breadwinner who used to provide for his
family to a man who lives from hand to mouth.
His youngest daughter saunters into the sitting room, oblivious of her father’s predicament.
"Fourteen years ago, providing for my family was not a problem because I had the money. Today, I don’t
know what to tell her," says Njoroge, fishing a rusty coin from his pocket for his daughter’s sweets.
"I was a hardworking man and God had blessed me with a good business. All I’d wanted in life was to see
my family live like other Kenyan families," said Njoroge.
Like all ex-Muoroto residents, Njoroge still finds it painful to recall the events leading to his violent
expulsion from Muoroto in 1990.
"We were not beggars or dependants," said Njoroge. "Today, the people have lost all hope and are scattered
all over. We don’t even know where some of the people went."
Njoroge, who has been the de facto leader of the Muoroto squatters since the dispersal and has taken it
upon himself to track down many of the families that lived beside his.
"I’ve been keeping tabs on some of our people, trying to keep records of those who have died and those
who moved elsewhere."
Njoroge recalls that they were transported to the swampy Kayole area by City Council lorries in November
1990.
He says a District Officer he only remembers as Kimemia was ordered by the Nairobi Provincial
Commissioner at the time, Mr Fred Waiganjo, now deceased, to supervise the re-location.
The Muoroto families who had been promised new homes in the expansive Soweto plains were dumped
and abandoned there.
"For two years, we lived with our families in the cold like lorries, with nothing to eat, after we were
dispossessed of everything," recounted one Githongo, also an ex-Muoroto resident.
Githongo relived the first two years of their stay in the cold in Soweto, saying they used to hunt for hares
and antelopes for food.
Although they were made to understand that government land surveyors would allocate them land,
Githongo says that the surveyors, in cahoots with the local chief, bypassed them and sold the plots to those
who could afford to pay for them.
Only 350 of the former Muoroto residents who were resettled in Soweto — divided into "Muoroto original"
and Kayole Riverside.
Others were taken to Dandora Area Five.
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"We don’t know where the rest are scattered," says Njoroge.
Residents here claim that Embakasi MP David Mwenje, then an assistant minister in the Kanu government,
displaced Muoroto people in collusion with the area chief.
In a rare admission, Njoroge said many of their children had become hardcore criminals. "We became so
poor that our children had to go out to fend for themselves," says Njoroge. "It is our children who loiter the
estates of Umoja, Doonholm and Buru Buru.
Toddlers when we were thrown out of Muoroto, they have become dangerous and social misfits."
When a new government was elected in December 2002, the ex-Muoroto people had great expectations.
Nearly two years down the line, the optimism has turned into scepticism and disillusionment.
"People are dying, people are hurting and the government has become insensitive and negligent," said a
resident." (East African Standard, 12 September 2004)
77

DOCUMENTATION NEEDS AND CITIZENSHIP
General
Displaced women not registered as voters (2002)
• Women are not represented in traditional decision-making and justice systems
• Many displaced women and youth are not registered voters mainly for the following three
reasons:
• Loss or destruction of identification documents and inability to replace them
• They are traumatized by the memory of their experiences and associate elections with violence
• The emergence of the Mungiki sect with its emphasis on cultural ‘renaissance’ and disassociation
from the current government discourages many youth from taking identity cards
“Many married displaced women interviewed do not have control over decisions about the management of
resources at home, for example what proportion of the food produced can be sold to meet other expenses.
Sometimes the men sell off everything to drink beer, or go off with prostitutes. The men decide what
activities are to be done by the household, e.g., casual labour, or going to the market. Most men restrict
their wives’ movement, and beat them up when they complain or come home late. The common view is
that what a man says holds and cannot be challenged (especially by the wife), because he is the head of the
family. The wife is expected to obey and support him in whatever he decides, whether she agrees with him
or not.
Women are not represented in traditional decision-making and justice systems. They are therefore not
empowered to participate in making decisions on matters that affect their lives, or to defend themselves
effectively on gender-insensitive cultural practices, particularly those pertaining to land ownership and
inheritance. These cultural attitudes and practices, in addition to delays to compensate the displaced, have
deepened their dispossession. Corruption in the land adjudication office, the judicial system and reluctance
to address the question of loss of property and compensation compound the dispossession of the displaced.
Many displaced women and youth are not registered voters, and they did not vote in the 1997 General
Elections. This is due to three reasons. Firstly, loss or destruction of identification documents and inability
to replace them prevented them from registering as voters. Secondly, they are traumatized by the memory
of their experiences and associate elections with violence, loss and the disruption of their lives. They want
to ‘have nothing to do with elections’, and believe that their vote would not make any difference because,
in their view, elections are bound to be technically rigged anyway. Thirdly, the emergence of the Mungiki
sect with its emphasis on cultural ‘renaissance’ and disassociation from the current government discourages
many youth from taking identity cards, hence registering as voters. This is setting a dangerous precedent of
disenfranchisement among the youth, particularly the thousands who have grown up in displacement,
illiteracy, poverty, and with dim future prospects.
The Mungiki Sect appeals to the disaffected youth because; basically it is a movement for the youth,
articulating their problems and challenges. The sect is keen on promoting the participation of the youth in
decision-making, with the ultimate aim of taking over power and management of the economy. They are
very unhappy about the problems facing Kenya today, including poor governance, population displacement
and concomitant poverty, illiteracy, unemployment and disenfranchisement.
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The movement emphasizes the human rights and freedoms of Kenyan citizens, but fails to highlight to its
followers and supporters the duties and obligations that must go hand in hand with such rights and
freedoms. For example, Mungiki members believe that since they are Kenyans by birth, they do not have to
prove their nationality by acquiring national identity cards. The sect is popular among the youth also
because its leaders take an aggressive and rebellious stance on various issues (UNIFEM, Jan 2002, p,26).
People displaced in the Coast area could not vote in 1997 elections because of loss,
destruction or denial of identification documents
"Intimidation and displacement of coastal up-country people and opposition sympathizers in other parts of
the country changed the electoral demography by distorting the voter distribution pattern. Many of the
displaced could not register as voters due to loss, destruction or denial of identification documents. This
played a key role in predetermining the outcome of the elections." (JRS March 2001, p.9)
79

ISSUES OF FAMILY UNITY, IDENTITY AND CULTURE
General
Lack of employment during displacement alters pattern of sex roles
• Men feel that they loose authority, status and respect
• Women take up the task of feeding the familiy
“Conflict and displacement affect men and women in different ways. The effects of conflict, including
dispossession, loss of means of livelihood, and general disruption of life have a more lasting impact on
women and children than on men. In all conflict situations, women and girls constitute the most vulnerable
group. Men either go off to take part in the armed hostilities or are imprisoned, leaving women behind as
household heads, or they are killed in the violence leaving them widowed or orphaned. Women are the ones
usually left with the burden of escaping with the children, and meeting all their needs in absolute poverty
and in new, unfamiliar environments and difficult circumstances. This role overload is particularly difficult
for the women where conflict has resulted in the breakdown of former support structures and kinship ties
through separation of family members. Women household heads now take up the responsibility of taking
care of children and ageing relatives. Displaced women have few or no opportunities to continue their
livelihoods, and often have no access to remunerative work. The lack of information about the whereabouts
of some family members adds to their trauma and sense of uncertainty. Their situation is worse where
cultural values or beliefs and practices reinforce marginalization or isolation of raped, widowed or
handicapped women.
During conflict, women fleeing violence face the danger of physical and sexual violence including torture,
humiliating interrogation procedures, rape and the trauma of watching their loved ones killed or raped and
their property looted or destroyed. In some situations, such as the recent clashes in the Kerio Valley,
women and girls become targets for deliberate attacks by the opposing parties for purposes of revenge. For
various articles on gender and displacement, see Forced Migration Review, Issue No. 9, March 2001.
Men react to displacement differently from women. Loss of property and lack of alternative employment
reduces men’s capacity to provide for their families. This demoralises them, and many break down and start
abusing drugs. That women take up the task of feeding the family and meeting other needs is not always
taken kindly by men, who feel that they have lost their authority, status and respect. Changes in or reversal
of gender roles and concomitant resentment triggers resource-related violence as the women, now
household heads, access and control the management of resources. Some men abandon their wives and
children to take other wives and start ‘afresh’, or go away to look for jobs and never come back.
The reality of displacement places various challenges to women, especially the widowed or abandoned
wives who have large families to feed. Loss of property, lack of social security from the extended family
and lack of access to means of livelihood create conditions for sexual-based violence including rape,
prostitution and forced or child marriages (UNIFEM January 2002, pp. 8-9).
As many as fourteen children per mother in some households
• Teenage mothers have between one and five children, fathered by different men
• As many as four couples sharing one room with all their children and grandchildren
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“During the field study, The lives and life choices of dispossessed women in Kenya one hundred and
twenty displaced families were visited. It was observed that the size of households was very large, with as
many as fourteen children per mother. Those living in urban and peri-urban areas are larger, due to
illegitimate offspring born to teenage mothers. A number of widows and abandoned women also had
young children born from sexual relations with men in the host community, and commercial sex in the
urban areas. Teenage mothers have between one and five children, fathered by different men. None of these
men assume their responsibilities to the woman or the children. The children are usually left in the care of
the female grandparents. Teenage mothers living with their parents are also dependants, as they do not have
skills or capital to start income-generating activities.
In camp situations, as at Louis Farm in TransNzioa or ‘Bosnia’ in Kitale, family members live in crowded
shelter together. There may be as many as four couples sharing one room with all their children and
grandchildren. One household may therefore have twenty persons and as many mouths to feed.
In ‘Resettlement Farms’ run by the NCCK, CJPC and the government, the number of people per household
is much smaller. At Elementaita, for example, there is an average of five people per household, who are
mainly old women and their grandchildren. Men and the youth have shifted to towns and other places to
seek employment, because of the harsh natural environment and because poor prices fetched by the farm
produce are not enough to feed the families. The youth are also bored and try their luck elsewhere.
In peri-urban areas like Bahati and Dundori in Nakuru, households have about ten persons. They are mainly
farmers living in rented accommodation and have hired plots of land from the host community or in the
forests. They also burn charcoal or provide casual labour to large agricultural farms. Young people are
conspicuously absent, as they have moved to towns to look for jobs in timber mills, hotels, shops,
nightclubs or industries. (UNIFEM January 2002, p 8-9).
Disruption of lives compelled families to minimize costs by sharing houses, kitchens,
food, and work
• Reallocation of land has affected the size of families
• Women-headed households constitute more than half the total number of families among IDPs
“Among Kenya’s IDPs, the average family has eight (8) members. Some have as many as twenty persons,
due to traditional living arrangements that promote extended families to live in one household. Moreover,
disruption of lives through loss of means of livelihood compelled several families to minimize costs by
sharing houses, kitchens, food, and work. Families of the newly married are small, although most are still
dependent on their parents for accommodation and remain registered as dependents. Those who were
children during the clashes in 1992 have grown up and started their own families; thus a household
registered as one may have several sons, their wives and children, as well as uncles and aunts with their
extended families!
Such huge families can be attributed to the fact that during the registration of IDPs for reallocation of land
in such places as Kapsita, only those with titles were considered. While some household heads had already
subdivided land to their sons, the said sons had not acquired title deeds for the parcels they had inherited,
and therefore could not be considered as separate families. They (and their families) were registered as
dependents, and their father had to subdivide his five-acre plot to them. This has created congestion and
conflict within families, especially because over the years, the population has grown and young adults are
asking for land to start their own families.
Women-headed households constitute more than half the total number of families among IDPs. They are
widowed, separated or unwed single parents. Cases of separation are high for various reasons: firstly,
81

women and children remain in safer areas while men go to cultivate their farms, or migrate outwards in
search of jobs. Secondly, men unable to cope with the pressures of inability to provide become violent or
abandon their families. Abandoned/divorced women eventually get involved in other relationships,
resulting in a growing population of children born out of wedlock, most of whom drift into the streets.
Displaced girls are largely illiterate and deprived, which predisposes them to commercial sex work and
early marriage, sometimes in polygamous unions. Married couples have many children due to lack of
awareness or access to family planning methods. Most reproductive health services are expensive or far
away, while some customary, social or religious beliefs inhibit the use of contraceptives. Consequently,
children below fifteen constitute more than 65 per cent of displaced population in Kenya today "(UN
DPMCU, Dec 2002, p. 30).
Breakdown of social support systems (2000)
• Trust between families, neighbours, communities and regions undermined by conflict
"Perhaps the greatest casualty of the clashes was the trust that existed between families, neighbours,
communities and regions. Distrust, resentment, suspicion and hatred replaced harmonious existence and
long term interaction. While the impact of these conflicts has not been systematically assessed, evidence
suggests massive losses and intense trauma. Areas affected have experienced declining standards of living
manifested in deteriorating heath status, diminishing income levels, elevated school dropout rates, largescale
trauma, and a general sense of hopelessness [...]. The fracture experienced by communities led to a
breakdown in social support systems and normative structures that regulate interaction and behaviour. This
in turn, increased both social and physical insecurity. In the words of the Nigerian novelist, Chinua Achebe,
the things that held people together were no more, and communities had fallen apart." (Kathina Juma May
2000, p.16)
82

PROPERTY ISSUES
General
Both victims and perpetrators of displacements seek compensation from the
government(2004)
• The nomadic Maasai people, held responsible for the displacement of thousands of farmers, claim
compensation from the government for land they signed away to British settlers 100 years ago
• There is controversy as to the legality and length of the treaties signed by the British settlers and
the Maasai
• Protests over the lost land have become increasingly violent
• Victims of the displacements in the 1990s collect information on the property lost and want the
government to resettle them or compensate them
"The Maasai community has been demonstrating in the streets of Nairobi demanding the return of their
ancestral land that was taken over by British settlers. The lands extend from Laikipia, Nakuru, Naivasha,
Mau Narok and Nanyuki all situated in the Rift Valley province. The Maasai leaders signed two treaties in
1904 and 1911 with the then British colonial government who then received huge swathes of land. The
lease for 99 years expires this year although the Minister for Lands has added confusion to the situation by
announcing that the leases have not expired and that the British occupants have an additional 900 years to
their leases. This statement however goes against the provisions of the draft constitution. The draft nullifies
leases allocated to non-citizens for a period longer than 99 years. The Maasai community is currently
actively seeking restitution. Solutions floated to address this predicament include requesting the British to
give back the land to the Massai community or equitably compensate the Maasai community for lands that
they occupy. The ministry is studying the Anglo-Maasai treaty to ascertain how it was sanctioned.
Meanwhile, with the prevailing drought conditions, the Massai have invaded private ranches in search of
pasture. The government has announced that it will look into providing other areas where the Maasai will
be able to access land for pasture in order to avoid conflict among communities over scarce resources."
(UNOCHA, 15 September 2004)
"Maasai leaders have put a Sh10 billion price tag on ancestral land they signed away 100 years ago.
That is the amount they are floating as possible compensation for the land they lost in Laikipia through a
treaty with the colonial government, signed in 1904.
They say the treaty expired after 99 years and that they are now entitled to have the land returned.
But the Government insists the treaty was for 999 years and they have asked the Maasai for proof of their
claim.
Protests over the lost land have become increasingly violent, with one herdsman shot dead following attack
on police which followed an Maasai invasion of private ranches in Laikipia, and 13 people arrested during
demonstrations in Nairobi.
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The new demand for Sh10 billion in compensation was put by Cabinet minister William ole Ntimama at a
meeting called to discuss ways of settling the issuing and ending the protests.
He told the talks, chaired by National Security minister Chris Murungaru, "The Government should take
care of Maasai interests instead of beating them up."
And he went on: "If it can write off a Sh5 billion loan owed by coffee farmers, it can also set aside Sh10
billion to buy land for the Maasai."
Mr Ntimama, the Public Service minister, said the battle for lost land would not end until the Maasai were
given compensation.
The Narok North MP said that in the era of Independence, the government was given money by the British
to settle people who had lost land.
"The departing colonialists paid the Kenya government money to settle its people but no Maasai benefited,"
he was reported to have said.
Mr Ntimama claimed the Kenyatta government instead used the Settlement Transfer Fund (STF) to settle
landless people from other communities.
The succeeding regime of President Moi regime, he added, also settled people from other communities on
Maasai land.
He said the Maasai were not demanding that they should be allowed to go back to their lost farms but
instead should be compensated for their land.
The meeting, in the 10th floor conference room of Harambee House, Nairobi, on Tuesday afternoon, was
called by Dr Murungaru to ask Maasai and Samburu leaders to pacify those of their people who had started
to invade farms in Laikipia.
Apart from Dr Murungaru and Mr Ntimama other who took part in the meeting were Education minister
George Saitoti (Kajiado North), assistant ministers Gideon Konchellah (Kilgoris), Simeon Lesirma
(Samburu West), and Mwangi Kiunjuri (Laikipia East), and MPs Joseph ole Nkaiserry (Kajiado Central),
G.G. Kariuki (Laikipia West) and National Assembly Speaker Francis ole Kaparo.
Dr Murungaru started the talks by urging leaders to ask their people not to take the law into their own
hands.
He was said to have expressed fears that if not stopped, the land invasions were likely to become tribal
clashes.
"He said the government would not wish to see its citizens taking the law into their hands as if the issue at
hand was unmanageable," said one person present.
The Kajiado Central MP, Mr Nkaiserry, accused the Government of using excessive force against the
Maasai who met at Uhuru Park, Nairobi, to present their demands.
The Kanu MP said threats and intimidation would not prevent the community from demanding their land.
The MPS urged the Government to move quickly to compensate the communities.
Prof Saitoti said that although it was wrong for the Maasai to invade private farms, the legal aspects
surrounding the original lease should be addressed.
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The community, he said, had raised legal concerns about the lease and it was the Government's duty to
scrutinise them and come up with a solution.
Mr Lesirma, the assistant Planning minister, said should the claim that the lease had expired be proved
right, the Government should be in the forefront of getting land for their communities.
Mr Nkaiserry accused Lands minister Amos Kimunya of annoying the Maasai more by claiming the lease
was for 999 years and not 99.
While the Maasai and Samburu leaders were defending their communities, Mr Kiunjuri and Mr Kariuki
defended Kenyans who had bought land in Laikipia.
They said the legal aspects surrounding the acquisitions should be addressed in solving the problem.
Dr Murungaru later gave a warning to anyone inciting the Maasai into invading the ranches that they would
face the law.
In a statement issued after the talks, which set out the Government's position, he said: "The Government
expresses its disappointment at the recent invasion of private ranches and people's land by some members
of the Maasai community in Laikipia District, after being incited by some NGOs."
The Maasai had been "made to believe in false propaganda that the land leases had expired".
Then, in a crucial paragraph, Dr Murungaru stated: "Even if the leases were to expire, such land would
revert to the Government, which would them decide what to do with it.
"The Government therefore urges wananchi (the public) in the affected areas, particularly the Maasais, to
strictly observe the law and ensure peace prevailed."
He said that following the Tuesday talks, it was agreed the Maasai, "like many other communities in
Kenya," do have outstanding issues that require attention but which must be resolved within the law."(Daily
Nation, 26 August 2004)
“More than 150 families displaced during the tribal clashes in the 1990s have resolved to seek
compensation from the Government. They will form a committee for the purpose and also collect
information on displaced people and the property lost. The representatives of the Internally Displaced
Persons group met in Nakuru and said they wanted the Government to resettle them and provide them with
security. They were formerly resident in the South Rift Valley districts of Nakuru, Laikipia, Kericho and
Koibatek. They asked the Government to interrogate those behind the clashes and hear the views of
survivors so that justice could be done” (UN DPMCU, 7 July 2003).
Commission urges the Government to issue land title documents
• Disputes over land ownership and use were considered to be one of the causes of the violence
" 'To inspire confidence in the government, all those who were displaced from their farms during the tribal
clashes should be assisted to resettle back on their farms and appropriate security arrangements made for
their peaceful stay', said the report on the 'Judicial Commission Appointed to Inquire into Tribal Clashes in
Kenya', according to excerpts published in the 'Daily Nation' newspaper.
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Because disputes over land ownership and use were considered to be one of the causes of the violence, the
government should also issue land title documents to people who had either been allocated land, or had
bought land from previous owners, the report said. The lack of legal titles to land is an obstacle in attempts
by some displaced people to return to the areas they occupied before the clashes, according to a 2001 report
on internal displacement in Kenya by the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS).
The Commission, led by Justice Akilano Akiwumi, was appointed by Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi in
July 1998, and handed in the report to the president in 1999.
Until last week, however, the government had withheld the document, despite calls from civil society
groups and a judgement from a court in Mombasa that it should be released in order to be used as evidence
in a compensation suit brought by a Kenyan farmer against the government.
The report calls for a number of politicians, local administration officials, and security and police officers
to be investigated over their alleged roles in clashes, which led to the deaths of more than 800 people and
the displacement of some 130,000 between 1991 and 1994, according to the Commission.
JRS estimates, however, that some 300,000 people were displaced in violence sparked by the 1992 return to
multi-partyism, with tens of thousands more being displaced in 1997, again around election time. Some
220,000 Kenyans are currently living under temporary arrangements, having had to flee their homes as a
result of conflict and natural disasters, though not all associated with the 1992 and 1997 elections, JRS
says.
Among the names of people to be investigated were several current cabinet ministers, including Trade and
Industry Minister Nicholas Biwott and Minister in the Office of the President Julius Sunkuli, both for
alleged involvement in violence in Kenya's Rift Valley Province.
However, Kenya's chief lawyer has criticised the report for alleged bias. 'The government is of the view
that the report was not objective in its analysis of the evidence before it,' Attorney- General Amos Wako
said in announcing the report's release on 18 October.
The government has released its own document, making comments on the Commission's findings. In it, the
government says the 'Akiwumi' report is biased against the Kalenjin and Maasai ethnic groups, and ignores
the role played by other groups such as the Kikuyu, Kenya's most populous tribe, according to a 'Daily
Nation' report.
According to the JRS report, an informal coalition of Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and Samburu was set up in
the Rift Valley to rid the area of 'opposition elements.'
The 'Akiwumi' Commission also criticised the Kenyan police force, and provincial administrations in
several provinces for failing to prevent the violence, and for inciting the violence in some cases. The report
criticises the 'negligence and unwillingness on the part of the Police Force and provincial Administration to
take firm and drastic action which would surely have prevented the clashes from erupting'.
The report therefore recommends that the police forces should be de-linked from the provincial
administrations and be made an independent unit. It also recommends that the provincial administration
should be 'divorced wholly' from the activities of political parties.
The 'incitement and abetment of tribal and inter-clan clashes by social and political leaders as well as by
members of the security, police and administrative services, should no longer be tolerated,' the report said
as quoted by the 'Daily Nation' " (IRIN, 24 Oct 2002).
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Individualizing public land has generated new types of disputes (2000)
• Main disputes over the boundaries and actual ownership of holdings
• Land is also given as grants to political elites to maintain patronage securing political loyalty
• The privatisation of land has led to evictions
• Land tenure reform hinges not only on issues of land productivity but also on issues of social
restructuring, polarisation and exclusion
"The Kenyan practice of individualizing public land has created more people without rights to land and has
generated new types of disputes over ownership, a new report concludes. Further, giving private ownership
titles does not appear to have had much effect on credit as very few people use titles for loans, nor does it
give positive environmental effects.
These are the main conclusions of a new study by Karuti Kanyinga, Re-distribution from above. The
Politics of Land Rights and Squatting in Coastal Kenya, published by the Nordic Africa Institute.
Kanyinga, basing his studies in coastal Kenya, criticizes the proponents of the individualization of land
titles in Africa.
They "have hinged their position primarily on the argument that it would encourage land holders to access
credit, invest more of their resources, including labour and time, in the land, engage in responsible,
environmentally-friendly land use, and, overall, raise the level of agricultural productivity whilst limiting
the damaging consequences of the 'tragedy of the commons'." The coastal districts of Kenya are an area
with a long history of private land ownership which is also situated in a country with one of the most
comprehensive efforts at land tenure reform dating from the colonial period.
Maize cropping in Kenya Source: IITA/CGIAR
The Kenyan reform of land tenure has been accompanied by different types of disputes, of which the main
ones are those over the boundaries and actual ownership of holdings. Some of these disputes have brought
the members of the Kenyan Land Adjudication Committee into disrepute because of favours done for those
who have the ability to pay. "Arguably, the reform process is gradually eroding popular confidence in
traditional institutions for dispute arbitration because the ability to bribe and influence has become an
important element in arbitration processes whether one has a legitimate claim or not," Kanyinga argues. -
Furthermore, the reform process has intensified with corrupt modes of land acquisition.
These have in turn resulted in elites accumulating more land at the expense of others. - One of the principle
arguments of the proponents of land indivualization is that a title to the land would give farmers access to
credit, which could be used to modernise land tenure. However, "titling appears not to have had much
effect on credit as very few people use titles for loans. The fear of high interest rates and of subsequent loss
of land on default prevents most title holders from using the title as collateral," Kanyinga finds.
One of the most serious problems in the Kenyan land reform to which Kanyinga points is the actual
maldistribution of land titles. "Land is also given as grants to political elites not for the purposes of
economic development and the nurturing of indigenous capital but principally for the purpose of
maintaining patronage relations and of securing political loyalty," Kanyinga has observed. "Most
beneficiaries do not utilize the land but turn their grants over to private developers, a majority of whom are
foreign hoteliers."
Assessing the implications of these actions, Kanyinga concludes that this accumulation "has washed away
the bases of indigenous capitalism and replaced them with Asian and foreign corporate ones which,
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however, are connected to central state elites." At the local level, he states, "these forms of accumulation
have resulted in economic and social domination over the local people."
In general, therefore, "the state's practice of individualizing public land according to political considerations
has created more people without rights to land and has generated new types of disputes over ownership.
The most important of these concerns the allocations of public land in prime, high potential areas, leading
to the eviction of those already settled on the land in disregard of the improvements that occupants have
made over long periods of occupation."This brilliant study demonstrates the complexity of land reform and
individualization of public land.
The discussion suggests that land tenure reform hinges not only on issues of land productivity but also on
issues of social restructuring, polarisation and exclusion.Kanyinga's report thus strongly challenges the key
assumptions of the proponents of land indivualization." (NAI, 31 December 2000)
Privatisation of land and concentration of power over land in the Presidency prompted
violence and displacements
• The colonial administration granted land to chiefs and the wealthy at the expense of lower social
groups
• This has generated continued post-colonial land disputes based on decreased tenure security
amongst the majority
• The President holds land in trust for the state and granted land to retain a clientele of loyalists in
advance of elections
• 20% of the Kenyan population own over 50% of the arable land
• 13% are landless
• The rest own an average of one acre
"In Kenya colonial land injustices and contemporary land policies have had far-reaching and varying
effects on the control and access to land by the majority of the people. Increasingly land ownership patterns
are derived from endowments arising from class differentiation strategies which emerged in the
colonial era (Lumumba and Kanyinga, 2003), and have lead to growing landlessness. Thus 20% of the
Kenyan population own over 50% of the arable land, while the rest own an average of one acre, and 13%
are landless, or do not have any protectable right over land, and are referred to as “squatters,” “trespassers”
or “adverse possessors” (Ibid). The colonial Swynnerton land tenure reform plan led to a markedly skewed
distribution of land, with chiefs, loyalists, and the wealthy acquiring more land than others while the lower
social groups lost considerable amounts of land, especially where they had not participated in this colonial
adjudication of land rights (Lumumba and Kanyinga, 2003). This has generated continued post-colonial
land disputes based on decreased tenure security amongst the majority
(Haugerud, 1983, 1989, 1992; Shipton, 1988; Fleuret, 1988; Mackenzie, 1990), and has led to open abuse
of land allocations by those involved in defining the existing structure of land rights.
Because Kenya’s land law grants enormous powers of control of land to the President who holds land in
trust for the state, the President tends to grant land to a few individuals and corporate interests. This
concentration of power over land in the Presidency and the central government has undermined the
pressure for the democratisation of land ownership, and has eroded the social bases of popular institutions
for regulating land allocations, due to individualization of much of the land. This process has affected the
majority of the lands utilized by pastoralists who occupy and use over two thirds of Kenya landmass (Ibid).
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From the early 1990s, pressures for political liberalization led to the appropriation of government land by
political elites at an even a faster pace, as Moi struggled to retain a clientele of loyalists (Ibid). Thus elites
appropriated the land in question for their political project against the multi-partyist opposition and
resurrected the Majimbo land demand to deflect the multiparty debates. This reactivated demands for
territory in the Rift Valley and on the coast (as happened in the 1960s) and led to ethnic land clashes
between members of former KADU groups and the immigrant population in the Rift Valley, and later on in
the coast, between the Mijikenda and upcountry Kikuyu and Luo immigrants. Large groups of Kikuyu
families were evicted from the Rift Valley, their titles to land notwithstanding." (UNDP, 12 March 2003,
pp. 36-37)
Vast areas of land in the Rift valley and the Coast Province concentrated in the hands
of a few powerful families (October 2004)
• Allies of former president Kenyatta established huge farms in the Rift Valley either jointly or on
their own in the post-independence period
• The acquistions of huge chunks of land came at the expense of the landless who were meant to be
the beneficiaries of a land-distribution scheme
"Some of the most affected regions in the scramble and partition for land by the politically powerful are the
Rift Valley and Coast provinces.
The Rift Valley, for instance, has two categories of landowners—the inheritors of the early white settler
farms and the beneficiaries of the now demarcated Agricultural Development Corporations (ADC) land.
Besides, some of them were actually beneficiaries of the Settlement Transfer Fund Scheme at
independence, while others were beneficiaries of direct political patronage in the first two postindependence
regimes.
Most of the power brokers in the Kenyatta regime who formed land-buying companies established huge
farms in the Rift Valley either jointly or on their own. There is, for instance, Munyeki Farm—which stands
for Murang’a, Nyeri, Kiambu – (4,000 acres), Wamuini Farm (6,000 acres), Amuka Farm (2,000 acres),
Gituaraba Farm and Githatha Farm (1,000 acres each). A few of them are being utilized, with the owners
growing various crops ranging from coffee, tea, maize and dairy keeping.
The other big farms include Chepchomo Farm (18, 000 acres), owned by the former Provincial
Commissioner Ishmael Chelang’a. The family of the late Peter Kinyanjui, who was a close friend of
President Mwai Kibaki and a former DP Chairman in Trans Nzoia between 1998 and 1999 owns 1,800
acres.
In Nakuru, several politically connected individuals have acquired many acres of prime land within the
town—they include lawyer Mutula Kilonzo, who owns an 800-acre farm for dairy farming. The immediate
former Auditor General, D S Njoroge, owns 500 acres, while an unidentified investor boasts a 100-acre
piece where he is growing roses.
Njoroge also owns the extensive Kelelwa Ranch in Koibatek, which is less than 10km from Kabarak, where
he rears cattle and goats. The 10,000 acre Gitomwa Farm—acronym for Gichuru, Tony and Mwaura—is
owned by the family of the former Kenya Power and Lighting Company Limited (KPLC) managing
director, Samuel Gichuru. Tony and Mwaura are his sons.
Another 10,000 acre farm in Mau Narok belongs to the family of the late Mbiyu Koinange, Kenyatta’s
side-kick and powerful minister of state in the Office of the President. His Muthera Farm (4,000ha) is
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leased to different people to grow wheat, while a group of squatters is demanding a piece of it. The owners
are yet to clear the Sh7 million Settlement Transfer Fund loan.
Ford-People leader Simeon Nyachae’s Kabansora Holdings owns 4,000ha in the area. Former Rongai MP
Willy Komen’s family owns 10,000 acres — 5,000ha adjacent to Moi’s Kabarak Farm and another 4,800ha
near Ngata in Njoro.
At the height of land buying companies—during the Kenyatta regime—most of the power brokers acquired
huge chunks of land at the expense of the landless who were meant to be the initial beneficiaries of the
scheme. They included Njenga Karume, the then Chairman of Gema Holdings, who acquired 20,000 acres
in Molo where he is growing tea, coffee, pyrethrum and potatoes. It was around the same time that Hon GG
Kariuki acquired his 5,000 acres at Rumuruti, Laikipia Division, while former Attoney-General Charles
Njonjo bought into the 100,000 acre Solio Ranch. Former MP Munene Kairu has 32,000 acres at Rumuruti.
Mr Isaiah Mathenge, the former powerful Provincial Commissioner under Kenyatta and an MP under Moi,
is arguably the largest land owner in Nyeri municipality. He owns Seremwai Estate, which is 1,000 acres.
Other big landholders in the municipality include Kim Ngatende, a former government engineer, who has
500 acres and Senior Chief Munyinge from Muiga with 400 acres. Initially, senior chief Munyinge was
allocated only 70 acres but with time he managed to acquire 330 more acres.
Mathenge also owns—jointly with former Provincial Commissioner Lukas
Daudi Galgalo—the 10, 000-acre Manyagalo Ranch in Meru." (The East African Standard, 5 October
2004)
"Experts tell us that of the 582,646 square kilometres or 44.7 million hectares of land that is Kenyan
territory; only 17 per cent is suitable for rainfed cultivation. This means an area less than 100,000 square
kilometres is available for agriculture. Subtract about 2.4 million hectares of forest cover and the only land
available to Kenyans leading a sedentary life is about 70,000 square kilometres or 5 million hectares.
Kenya’s economy is, and will for the foreseeable future remain, primarily agricultural. It is estimated that
70 per cent of Kenyans are agriculturalists. With five million hectares to share, we have an average of 0.2
hectares or 0.48 acres per person available for cultivation. What this means is that the Kenyatta family
owns close to 1,000,000 times the average acreage. Top 20 landowners in Kenya are reputed to share close
to 2.5 million hectares of arable and between them, leaving the rest of us to share the other 2.5 ha. This is
the height of injustice.
The treatment of the land question in this country has, since independence, remained an inventory of
injustice. It came in two phases. First was the ten-mile Coastal strip, which for some time had been under
the sultanate of Zanzibar. Through a Concession Agreement, the Imperial British East Africa Company
(IBEAC) acquired all the rights to land in the Sultan’s territory, save for private land. Private land in this
context meant land held under certificates of ownership issued by the Sultan. They were issued to Arabs.
Thus, with a stroke of a pen, the Mijikenda and related indigenous people were disinherited. To put to rest
any claims by indigenous coastal people to land ownership, the colonial government promulgated the Land
Titles Ordinance which required "all persons being or claiming to have an interest in whatever immovable
property … before the expiration of six clear months … (to) make a claim in respect thereof…" and
declared that "all land … concerning which no claim or claims for a certificate of ownership shall have
been made … shall be deemed to be Crown land".
The indigenous coastal people made no claims for a variety of reasons. First, they were unaware of the
Ordinance. Secondly, the Ordinance had no relevance to their ownership system for they could not
understand why they should be asked to lay claims against the soil. Thirdly, the colonial government and
courts believed that no African, individually or as community, had any title to land. Hence for the purposes
of the Ordinance, land occupied by Africans was treated as ownerless. The time given for the claims was
also extremely short. The indigenous coastals thus lost land and products of the land such as coconuts.
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The second phase saw the settlers’ acquisition of land in the so-called White Highlands which once again
proceeded from the premise that the land was unoccupied. They were only required to pay a fee of 10 cents
per acre to Her Majesty’s government. The colonial government, acting on the advice of the Law Officers
of the Crown, declared on December 13, 1899 that under Britain’s Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1890, the
imperial power had control over and could dispose of "waste and unoccupied land in protectorates where
there was no settled form of government and where land had not been appropriated to the local sovereign or
to individuals".
It is these two situations that created a loophole for the Kenyattas, Mois, Kibakis and other landed gentry of
our time to amass so much land after independence. Coining a dubious policy of "willing seller, willing
buyer", the new rulers found it prudent to perpetuate the injustices of the colonial era, leaving little
openings for the dispossessed communities to seek restitution. As far as they are concerned, they bought
"waste and unoccupied land".
Land Minister Amos Kimunya was recently quoted as saying that the Government has no quarrel with the
size of land one owns. In my view, it should. Why should half of Taita Taveta be owned by only three
landlords (the Kenyatta family, the Criticos family and the Kenya wildlife Service)? Why should the Pokot
pastoralists be squeezed into one small corner when their ancestral land in Trans Nzoia is owned by a
handful of well-wired politicos and bureaucrats of today and yesterday?
If the Government cannot help end the squatter problems at the Coast, then who can? Who should the
Laikipia Maasai turn to?" (The East African Standard, 6 October 2004)
IDPs seeking legal claim to their farms have little success (2001)
• Arbitrary allocation of displaced persons’ farms
• Lack of political will at the top level to resolve land disputes
"The causes of displacement and obstacles to resettlement have not been adequately addressed. There is a
lack of political will at the top level to resolve land disputes, as evidenced by the policy of resettlement
schemes rather than helping displaced people to go return to their own farms. The presence of two or three
title deeds for one piece of land and arbitrary allocation of displaced persons’ farms indicate a complex web
of collussion in various government departments to keep displaced people out of their farms. Most
displacees have not been resettled or compensated. Some have also been declared squatters by the
government in spite of having formal proof of having bought their farms. Those seeking legal claim to their
farms are making little headway because of the feeling among lawyers, politicians and the general public
that talking of clashes and reparations now can only open old wounds and lead to fresh bitterness and
conflict. Displaced people are also not able to afford lawyers to represent them in court. There are also
many loopholes in the Kenyan judicial system due to corruption and political interference. Key government
officials have often talked of their hands being ‘tied’ whenever the IDP problem is raised. This has created
a culture of silence on this very sensitive issue. The situation of IDPs in Kenya is particularly desperate
because of official blindness to their needs (the government maintains there are no IDPs in the country),
and because Kenya has escaped keen international attention because of more serious refugee-generating
conflicts in neighbouring Horn of Africa countries and the Great Lakes region." (JRS March 2001, p.23)
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The conflicts and the displacement have caused a lasting alteration of land occupancy
and ownership patterns (1997-2000)
• Government has continued to pursue its policies of removing certain ethnic groups from the ethnic
clash areas
• Some land completely occupied, while boundaries have been illegally moved to expand the farms
of particular ethnic groups in others
• Many of the displaced landholders are poor and unaware of their legal rights
• Reported that title deeds of Kikuyu landowners in the Nakuru district have been transferred
without their knowledge into the possession of Kalenjin owners
• Claimed that IDPs in 1992 had their identification documents and papers relating to land
ownership destroyed
• Some efforts by the Government in 1997 to regularize land ownership for some of the displaced
persons in the Molo region
"Some uprooted families have permanently lost their land, according to local analysts. Many displaced
landowners have surrendered their land title documents under duress, and the government has subsequently
nationalized some land left vacated after the violence." (USCR 2000)
"The [1992] NCCK report claimed that most of those displaced — whom it estimated at 50,000 at the time
— had had their identification documents and papers relating to land ownership destroyed, so that they
were unable to register to vote or to reclaim their land. It concluded: 'Many potential voters are
disenfranchised thereby affecting the electoral process in those areas substantially.' According to the
Commonwealth Observer Group which monitored the elections, the ruling party won 16 Rift Valley
parliamentary seats unopposed as a result of violent intimidation.
[...]
Apart from the ill-fated government/UNDP partnership, official attempts to resettle the displaced victims of
clashes have been equivocal and ambivalent at best. Nor has the government committed itself to resettling
them on their original land which would have sent a clear signal that it would safeguard the constitutional
right of all Kenyans to live and own property anywhere in the country. Instead it has offered alternative
settlements on land whose ownership is itself contested." (Article 19 October 1997, sect. 2.3)
"A long-term effect of the violence is the lasting alteration of land occupancy and ownership patterns in the
areas where the 'ethnic' clashes took place, and a significant reduction of the number of non-Kalenjin
landholders, particularly in the Rift Valley Province. The government has continued to pursue its policies
of removing certain ethnic groups from the ethnic clash areas by allowing and cooperating in the illegal
expropriation of land owned primarily by Kikuyus, Luhyas, and Luos. The increased possession of land by
Kalenjins and Maasai in the Rift Valley benefits the Moi government by allowing it to cater to the
sentiments of ethnic nationalism among its supporters: it expects their political support by claiming to have
got 'their' land back and for increasing their economic wealth. In the meantime, thousands of people with
title deeds or mortgage notes have been rendered virtually destitute because of their ethnicity.
In some cases, the land has been completely occupied. In others, the boundaries have been illegally moved
to expand the farms of neighboring Kalenjins onto parts of the land of the displaced. In other cases, those
kept from their land are being offered sums significantly below market value for their farms. Those who
refuse to sell are given warnings by their Kalenjin neighbors that a time will come when they will not only
have to sell, but will have to accept the price given to them by Kalenjins. Other non-Kalenjins have
exchanged land with people who are willing to take their plot in return for land in another province. In
some areas, local Kalenjin authorities have explicitly instructed clash victims to exchange their land with
Kalenjins from outside the Rift Valley. For example, in Tapsagoi, a local Kalenjin chief threatened renewed
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violence unless the non-Kalenjins, who had fled their land after an attack by Kalenjins, exchanged it with
Kalenjins, which is in violation of the Land Control Board rules.
Government officials have also not hesitated to misuse their legal authority to expropriate land under the
guise of exercising 'eminent domain,' which allows the government to take over land for the public interest
under limited circumstances. In September 1993, the minister for local government, William ole Ntimama,
a Maasai who has led the majimbo calls, declared an area in his district a trust land for the Narok County
Council. His action was then reinforced by Minister for Environment and Natural Resources John Sambu,
who told residents of the forty-four kilometer area that they had to move, because the land would soon be
gazetted as a protected area. Not coincidentally, the area's 15,600 inhabitants were Kikuyu. Most had
purchased land from Maasai leaders in the 1960s. They believed that they were being harassed for not
having supported KANU in the election.
Those displaced who attempt to report the illegal occupation or transfer of their land to the government are
sent futilely from one office to the next until they finally are forced to give up. The government is well
aware that many of the displaced landholders are poor and unaware of their legal rights, making it unlikely
that these transactions will ever be challenged. The government has taken no steps to address the
irregularities in land ownership and sales resulting from the violence, portraying the problems as mere
contract disputes that need to be dealt with among the affected individuals.
In Olenguruone, Nakuru district, in the Rift Valley Province, Kikuyu landowners are discovering that their
title deeds have been transferred without their knowledge into the possession of Kalenjin owners by the
Commissioner of Lands in Nakuru. The government has also taken no steps to discipline those civil
servants in the land offices who are illegally altering land title deeds to transfer land into the hands of
Kalenjins. In 1939, the colonial government settled some 4,000 Kikuyu squatters on the land, which had
originally been part of Maasai land. Olenguruone was one of the most affected areas during the clashes, and
most of those driven off their land in 1992 and 1993 still remain displaced. One Kenyan characterized
Olenguruone as 'Kenya's West Bank,' referring to the contested Israeli/Palestinian area. Few, if any,
Kikuyus from the area are returning to their land because of security fears. Increasingly, the likelihood of
their return is being further diminished because of illegal land transfers that are revoking their titles. Human
Rights Watch/Africa interviewed several displaced Kikuyu who inadvertently discovered that their title
deeds have been illegally altered by the Commission of Lands. According to lawyer Mirugi Kariuki, 'the
Land Control Board has become an instrument of control for the government to further its discriminatory
policies. The government cannot claim that it is not aware of this because such a process cannot take place
without the knowledge of the D.O. in the area." (HRW June 1997, pp. 71-72)
"Many of the rural residents displaced by the violent ethnic clashes in Rift Valley in 1991-93 still have not
returned to their homes and remain displaced in urban areas. In 1997 the Government made some efforts to
regularize land ownership for some of the displaced persons in the Molo region. Some of the several
thousand persons displaced by ethnic clashes on the coast in August 1997, in Rift Valley in January, and in
the Pokot-Marakwet region throughout the year, likewise have not returned to their homes due to fear of
renewed violence." (US DOS 26 February 1999, sect. 2d)
Resettlement difficult because of destroyed homes and property (1992)
"The extreme partiality of the authorities towards the Rift Valley violence has also been shown in their
attitude towards those displaced from their homes. The NCCK[National Council of Churches in Kenya]
found in mid-1992 that 'Resettlement of the victims is hampered by the lack of trust in the government
which has been a result of the involvement of government officers' in the attacks. The NCCK report noted:
Further no proper security has been provided to the displaced people in the event of return to their homes
particularly in the Mt Elgon region. Many of the victims have no resources to enable them reassemble [sic]
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homes as all their property has been destroyed. Families have lost parents leaving orphans who will be
unable to re-establish new homes. Others are aged and therefore incapable of re-establishing homes."
(Article 19 October 1997, sect. 2.3)
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PATTERNS OF RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT
General
Fear and uncertainty main reasons for not returning (2002)
• Attempts to return to such places as Kapenguria, Miteitei, Mango have been met with death
threats or warnings
• Proliferation of arms has caused economic stagnation, closure of schools, lack of social services,
food and water
“Many of the people displaced and dispossessed during the 1991/ 7 violence have since returned to their
farms, or been resettled on alternative land. It is assumed that those who have not gone back to their former
homes are not interested in doing so, because there is adequate security. The political sensitivity of this
subject compels many individuals and organisations, including UN agencies, to operate in a discreet
manner to ensure freedom of access and unrestricted activities”(UNIFEM, Jan 2002, p 27).
“A large number of those originally displaced went back to their farms without outside material assistance.
The Catholic Church, NCCK and NGOs such as Action Aid, Oxfam, and World Vision assisted others with
reconstruction materials and alternative land. The government gave alternative land at Elburgon, Naivasha,
Thika and Baraget. Relief food has also been provided, but more to alleviate the effects of drought and
floods than to address the plight if IDPs.
Relief and Resettlement projects have gradually been scaled down or phased out all together, since IDPs
returned to their farms, scattered, or adopted sustainable livelihoods elsewhere. However, some remain
displaced to date due to:
Insecurity
Over 80% of IDPs interviewed cited this as a main cause of non-return. Fear, uncertainty and anxiety result
from firstly, tension between communities. While generally ethnic relations have improved, some alleged
that attempts to return to such places as Kapenguria, Miteitei, Mango and other farms have been met with
death threats or warnings. Ongoing conflicts particularly around disputed boundaries hamper sustained
return. Politicians have also continued to make inflammatory statements inciting communities into
violence.
Proliferation of arms in northern Kenya has, as earlier discussed, increased insecurity in the region, and led
to other problems as well, including economic stagnation, closure of schools, lack of social services, food
and water. Negotiation efforts are undermined by the use of arms, criminalized cattle rustling and nonadherence
to peace agreements. By providing arms to only certain communities, the KANU government
was perceived as partisan, which created conditions for militarization of the entire region.
Trauma
Lingering memories of hurts inflicted and loss of property, coupled with complete lack of compensation for
losses or punitive action against the perpetrators of violence have deterred some people from ever
returning. They are too traumatized to return to the very place they lost their loved ones and property. Some
allege that the former government presided over their harassment and dispossession, and argue that the
same could not be trusted to protect them if they returned and similar attacks recurred. Impunity and
bitterness have perpetuated ethnic mistrust and sour relations. IDPs fear to be attacked again, while those
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who remained are afraid the displaced are likely to exact revenge should they return. Some fear to be
exposed for crimes committed, while others would like to continue cultivating the IDPs’ farms. Uncertainty
about what could happen if illegal occupants refused to vacate IDPs’ farms deter many from returning.
Poverty and lack of shelter materials
There are families who wish to go back, but have no means of reconstructing their houses. Many of these
had their houses and property burnt or destroyed during the clashes. Some do not have any identification
documents and cannot obtain or replace them at their present place of residence. They cannot access loans
to start income generating activities due to lack of necessary documents or collateral.
Land disputes
Thousands of families remain displaced because there is a dispute on ownership or use of land. Multiple
title deeds exist for the same piece of land in such places as Kapsita, Miteitei, Mango and Pole farms.
Those without legal proof of ownership are considered squatters by the government, although this is
controversial especially at Miteitei where some have formal proof (e.g. receipts and share certificates) of
having paid for their farms. Land has also been arbitrarily nationalised, transferred, exchanged or illegally
occupied by powerful individuals.
Alternative settlement
Over the years, IDPs have adopted alternative livelihoods and moved on with their lives. They have little
attachment to their former place of residence, and have abandoned or sold the land they owned. Among
them are squatters and those resettled on small plots by church groups (UN DPMCU, Dec 2002, pp 37-38).
The new "rainbow" government criticised for not resettling IDPs (August 2004)
• A bishop claims the government does not seem to be willing to resettle the IDPs
• A "Justice and Reconciliation Commission" promised by the government 2 years ago has as of
August 2004 not been formed
"The government has been asked to stop dragging its feet and immediately resettle victims of tribal clashes
who were displaced from their lands 13 years ago.
Bishop Peter Kairo, the chairman of the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace at the Kenya Episcopal
Conference level, speaking on the 4th anniversary since the death of Mill Hill Missionary priest Fr John
Anthony Kaiser, said that the government does not seem to be willing to resettle the victims.
"Even the Justice and Reconciliation Commission that the government promised 2 years ago has not been
formed to date," he said during the Fr Kaiser anniversary celebrations held at the Holy Family Basilica,
Nairobi, on Saturday, August 28, 2004.
The Bishop asked the government to release the findings by the Njonjo Commission on Land as "knowing
the truth is the beginning of the healing process".
Asking President Mwai Kibaki to speak up on national issues, Bishop Kairo called for unity among
ministers in government, saying that Kenyans were lacking guidance from their political leaders.
Bishop Maurice Crowley of the Catholic Diocese of Kitale asked the government to speed up the inquest
into the death of Fr Kaiser.
"We are asking the Attorney General to stop procrastinating and speed up the inquiry -we want to know the
truth," he said.
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For the fourth anniversary since the death of Fr Kaiser, the Catholic Church in Kenya and the Mill Hill
missionaries chose to highlight the plight of internally displaced persons (IDP) and victims of tribal
clashes."(CISA, 31 August 2004)
3,000 IDPs who had temporarily resettled in Kyeni Forest in Thika District forced to
further move in 2001
• New relocation plan supposed to allow the IDPs to cultivate a different part of the forest
"On 13 February, after eight years in Kyeni, 3,000 farmers were told by the forest ranger that they had
seven days to vacate their homes or be forcibly evicted, Wainaina said.
The group had been living and farming in the forest with the consent of the Kenyan government since
1993, having fled political violence in surrounding districts that was associated with Kenya’s first multiparty
parliamentary elections in 1992.
An agreement between the Kyeni IDPs and forest officials had allowed the farmers to stay and build homes
in the forest, in return for an annual rent of Ksh 350 per hectare and four days’ free labour per month in the
forest’s tree nursery.
[...]
Over two-thirds of the population had fled Kyeni after being threatened with eviction, according to
Wainaina. Others had been unable to leave and were forced to hide in the forest for several months,
foraging for food and evading further attacks. Eventually, they had come to stay on the roadside where they
were visible to passing vehicles and their safety was improved, Wainaina said. " (IRIN 31 August 2001b)
"A group of 867 internally displaced persons (IDPs), forced out of Kyeni Forest in Thika District in early
June [2001]and who have been living in a roadside camp in Huruma, Thika, since, have complained that
they were harassed, intimidated and beaten by forestry officials into leaving their forest homes of eight
years. Huruma camp committee chairman Gad Wainaina told IRIN that forest rangers had beaten the IDPs
and burned their houses to the ground, forcing them to leave the forest where they had lived since 1993,
with the consent of the government. Earlier this week, the process of moving the Huruma IDPs to a new
plot back inside the forest began, “to remove them from the dangers at the roadside”, according to an
official from the Thika District Forest Office. However, it was not known how long the IDPs would be
allowed to stay on the new land, as it was only intended to be a temporary measure, he said.
[...]
Under a new relocation plan agreed by the government following pressure by local MP Patrick Kariuki, the
Kyeni IDPs may be able to cultivate a different part of the forest than they were in, pay an increased but
still nominal annual rent per hectare, and work a number of days a month (unpaid) for the Ministry of
Environment and Natural Resources, planting trees. Some among the IDPs fear that the relocation plan is a
ruse to move them from the roadside, and that violent attacks from forest officials could start again once
they are out of public view, but that they have no option but to take up the government’s offer. “Our
alternative is to die,” said one of their number. [for more details, see separate IRIN story of 31 August
headlined: “KENYA: Kyeni displaced protest treatment, conditions”]" (IRIN 31 August 2001)
"The 800 people who were expelled, 5 June, from the Kyeni forest (Kiambu district, 95kms from Nairobi)
where they had been living since 1993 and who set up camp beside the roadside have now moved to the
new site within the forest. Currently living under plastic sheeting, the IDPs, who were originally displaced
in the 1993 land clashes, have received assistance from the Kenya Red Cross as well as church groups.
Water access needs to be improved. An inter-agency mission, 20 August, comprised MDM Spain, Kenya
Red Cross, UNICEF, OCHA and IRIN ascertained that following interventions from the local MP and
Provincial Commissioner, the situation of the IDPs was improving, were being reassigned a new site and
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would soon be able to resume their farming activities in the forest. The Kenya Red Cross is monitoring the
situation." (OCHA 31 August 2001)
People displaced in the Coast region returned after calm was restored (1997-1998)
"In the 1992 clashes, the affected are estimated to be about 300,000 people. At the coast, displacement was
temporary, as the targeted population moved from residential areas to Nairobi and up-country, but returned
to their jobs and businesses once calm was restored. During the height of the violence, the church,
especially the Catholic Church, helped to evacuate people from trouble spots to safer grounds. These also
returned to their homes later, through the help offered by the Christian and Muslim groups. In the Rift
Valley, the end of the elections was not followed by the return of the displaced to their former land. Rather,
those who had camped at market, church and school compounds were violently dispersed." (JRS March
2001, p.8)
Politicians and senior government officials reluctant to let IDPs return to their former
homes (1994-2000)
• Minister for Local Government stated in 1994 that some 11,000 people displaced from
Enoosopukia in Narok District in October 1993 would not be returned to their homes
• Ruling party (KANU) MPs voted in November 2000 against a proposal to support resettlement of
victims from the politically motivated violence
"Another apparent sign of the government's commitment to resolve the situation in the Rift Valley was its
collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in a US$ 20 million programme
to resettle those displaced by the violence. However, at the same time some senior officials were sending a
clear message that they did not favour resettlement. The Minister for Local Government, William ole
Ntimama, who is a prominent representative of the Maasai community, made it plain [in 1994] that some
11,000 people displaced from Enoosopukia in Narok District in October 1993 would not be returned to
their homes. The displaced were encamped at Maela in Nakuru District. In early 1994 it was reported that
Maasai were taking over the farms of the Enoosopukia displaced." (Carver August 1995)
"Kanu has [in November 2000] voted down calls for the Government to resettle the victims of tribal
clashes.
In a heated and bitter debate, the Government won when the matter was twice put to the vote; firstly
through acclamation and then through a physical count 58 -23, with one abstention.
Kanu MPs, particularly from Nandi District, expressed their discomfort with the plan when it was proposed
by West Mugirango MP Henry Obwocha.
He listed areas of resettlement for those displaced in the clashes that rocked Rift Valley Province and other
parts of the country in 1991 to 1992.
They included Meteitei, Kitochi, Kamalelo, and Simotwo, all in Nandi.
The debate saw MPs attempt to explain what caused the clashes and it saw Cabinet Minister William ole
Ntimama defend the Maasai against those tribes that, he said, had invaded their land.
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'The Maasai have been subjects of victimisation during colonial days and the two successive postindependence
regimes. We were accommodative, but only became enemies with other communities simply
because we asked them to quit the water catchment areas in Enoosupukia,' Mr Ntimama said.
He claimed the Kenyatta administration had presided over the invasion of Maasai land in Rift Valley
Province, and warned MPs that times had changed." (Daily Nation 23 November 2000)
IDPs not returning to their homes due to fear of renewed violence or because they
have lost their land (1999)
• Many attempting to resume their lives at other locations
• Call by President Moi in November 1999 for the displaced to return questioned by NGOs because
major obstacles for return were not addressed
"Although most families displaced by the earlier violence had not regained their land by the end of 1999, a
large proportion were no longer counted as displaced. Many were attempting to resume their lives at other
locations. Some received food aid and grants for school fees from local donors." (USCR 2000)
"Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi this week [November 1999] called on thousands of displaced people in
the country’s Rift Valley province to return to their homes and continue with their normal lives, a move
that has been met with scepticism some quarters.
[...]
KHRC’s Programmes Officer Njuguna Mutahi asked where the displaced people were supposed to return
to. 'Their lands were occupied by their assailants who forced them out,' he pointed out. 'These are people
who saw their neighbours hack their loved ones, raze their houses and farms...their lives were shattered.' He
added that the chances of violence erupting again were 'quite high'.
'This call is a political gimmick because considering the extent of the damage and destruction of property of
the victims, rehabilitating them cannot be done by one institution,' Mutahi said. 'It needs an amalgamated
approach which includes all stakeholders like the religious groups and the NGOs.'
An official of the Catholic Justice, Peace and Reconciliation Commission pointed out that the land in one of
the affected areas, Enoosupukia, was nationalised in 1993 and that some of the displaced in another
affected area Olenguruoni - who were given land elsewhere - were told by the government to surrender the
title deeds of their original land. 'How are they going to go back without their title deeds?' she asked. 'We
want the government to shed some light on how this resettlement is going to be done.'
She acknowledged that people wanted to return to their land. 'The communities have realised, through the
peace and reconciliation process, that they need each other since one is an agriculture-based community
and the other is pastoral,' she explained. 'They still fear that incitement could recur and that since the same
administrative officers are still in charge, there are no security guarantees.' Four days after the president’s
directive, there was no sign of anything happening, she told IRIN on Thursday." (IRIN 11 November 1999)
" Insecurity
Over ninety per cent of those interviewed cited this as the main cause of non-return. Fear, uncertainty and
anxiety result from firstly, severe tension between communities, accompanied by little (if any) interaction.
Those who left the area cannot contemplate going back because hostility is intense. Some who have
attempted going back have been killed or harassed and warned never to set foot there again. Displaced
people from Mt. Elgon who have resettled on tiny plots at Khalwenge have been receiving tracts and
leaflets reminding them not to go back, or telling them to leave Khalwenge as well. Other affected areas
include West Pokot, Transmara, Migori, Transnzoia and parts of Nakuru. Secondly, lingering memories of
hurts inflicted and mutual mistrust in parts of Uasin Gishu, Nandi, Nyando, Mt. Elgon and Transnzoia has
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perpetuated sour relations and bred fear. While the displaced fear going back in case they are attacked
again. Those who remained are also afraid that the displaced are bound to exact revenge should they come
back. There is a consensus that returning people to their original land is likely to spark off fresh clashes due
to this, or due to the refusal by new occupants to vacate the displaced people’s land. Thirdly, proliferation
of arms in the Kerio Valley has increased insecurity in the region, and led to other problems as well,
including lack of food and water.
poverty
There are families who wish to go back, but have no means of rebuilding their homes or starting new
income-generating activities. These are mainly those whose houses and property were burnt or otherwise
destroyed. Some do not have any identification documents and cannot obtain or replace them at their
present place of residence because they need signatures from administrators from their former home areas.
Some of these administrators have died, been transferred, or cannot recognize the displacees because they
ran away when they were children. Lack of identification documents and valid title deeds or other
collateralmeans they cannot access loans to start new businesses. They need material assistance to resettle
on their farms.
land disputes
About 1500 families are displaced because there is a dispute of some kind regarding the ownership of their
land. There are places where two or more title deeds exist for the same piece of land. Examples include
Buru farm in Nyando, Miteitei in Nandi, and Mengo and Pole farms in Transnzoia. Those who have no
proof of ownership are considered squatters by the government, although this has become very
controversial especially at Miteitei because some have formal proof (e.g. receipts and share certificates) of
having paid for their farms. Some people also found that their land had been nationalised, transferred,
exchanged or illegally occupied by ‘politically correct’ individuals." (JRS March 2001, pp.18-19)
See also:
The ethnic conflicts and the displacement have caused a lasting alteration of land occupancy and ownership patterns
(1997-2000)
People displaced from clashes in the Pokot and Marakwet areas in 1999 started to
return (October 2000)
• Return preceded by meetings between community leaders and a Red Cross operation that supplied
villagers with food and drinking water
• ICRC project implemented by the American Red Cross aims to bring about the conditions
necessary for IDP return
• Work carried out to repair and upgrade schools
"The Pokot and Marakwet people from the villages of Kolowa and Tot (north-west of Nairobi) are slowly
returning to their homes. The trek down from the Cherangani escarpment, where both clans had sought
refuge since fighting erupted between them in October 1999, began about two months ago after meetings
were held between community leaders and a Red Cross operation was launched to supply villagers with
food and drinking water.
'This is a conflict over access to resources', says Alfred Petters, an engineer for the American Red Cross. 'It
is exacerbated by the drought presently affecting large parts of Kenya, a country that hasn't received
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adequate rains for the last two years'. The drought has had a particularly severe effect on pastoral
communities such as the Pokot and the Marakwet, who desperately need to find grazing pastures for their
cattle to replace the barren land they are sharing.
Clashes between the Marakwet and Pokot communities quickly grew more violent when the fighters
stopped using traditional weapons, such as spears and arrows, in favour of modern automatic firearms.
Several people, including women and children, were killed and large numbers of people fled their villages.
In some cases they took their cattle with them, but the animals proved unable to adapt to the new
environment on the escarpment and many died.
The ICRC project to help the victims, which is financed and implemented by the American Red Cross,
aims to bring about the conditions necessary for these displaced people to return to their villages. The first
step was to distribute maize seed to those living on the escarpment. The maize, which has now been
harvested, is being consumed while a sorghum crop grows in the abandoned villages in the valley. In order
for the sorghum to grow and for the population to have access to drinking water during the drought, several
water projects (hand-dug wells, desilting of dams, etc.) have been carried out in the villagers' absence.
School grounds were used during the fighting as secure places for the cattle to graze. However, this resulted
in damage to the schools. Work has now been carried out to repair and upgrade the facilities, including
installation of functional latrines and fences to keep the cattle out. Several schools have also been equipped
with rainwater catchment systems and pupils are being served a meal a day. Of the 780 children in the
village of Tot, 300 have returned to school so far. And in Kolowa, the market is gradually returning to its
colourful, busy routine.
Restoring access to food and water has served to attenuate the causes of conflict and enabled both
communities to seek lasting solutions. They have agreed to improve control over their youths and, in the
event of new tensions, meet before these have a chance to escalate." (ICRC 6 October 2000)
Church organisations assist more than 1,000 families resettle and 800 families to
relocate (1999)
• 800 families relocated to Elburgon after they failed to return to their farms in Olenguruone in
Molo
• Church plan to settle more families that were displaced from attacks in Nakuru district
• Returnees allocated land and given rehabilitation materials to build houses
• Most tribal clash victims in the Mt Elgon district not able to return to their farms in Chebwek,
Kipsis and Chepkube
"The Catholic church has in the last three years helped resettle more than 1,000 families displaced by the
1992/93 tribal clashes that hit various parts of the country.
Three hundred families have been settled in a one-and-a-half-acre pieces of land each near Elmentaita.
These are among the families that lost their land in Narok and parts of Molo.
According the latest issue of Update, a newsletter of the National Council of Churches of Kenya, another
800 families were relocated to Elburgon jointly by the church and the government after they failed to return
to their farms in Olenguruone in Molo.
The newsletter quotes the Nakuru diocese executive secretary of peace and justice, Mr Ernest Murimi, as
saying that the church planned to settle more families that were displaced during the heinous attacks in
Nakuru district.
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Mr Murimi, however, said the settlement programme only benefited only those who were unable to return
to their farms.
He said the Catholic church was opposed to people selling off or exchanging their farms because doing so
will only justify the reasons why they were thrown out of their farms.
He said this year, 102 families were settled near Elburgon. He said most of those targeted for settlement
were drawn from Nairobi, Subukia, Molo, Wanyororo, Bahati and Naivasha. Others came from Longonot,
Njoro, Gilgil, Elburgon, Nyahururu and Burnt Forest in Uasin Gishu.
The peace and justice official said apart from being allocated land, the families were given rehabilitation
materials to enable them build houses on the plots.
On the situation at those places where the clashes occurred, the NCCK newsletter indicated that most of the
areas remained peaceful except for cases of livestock thefts.
On the Bungoma-Mt Elgon border, the report says there were reported cases of thuggery and cattle thefts in
isolated areas of Mt Elgon district. It said most of the tribal clashes victims had not been able to return to
their farms in Chebwek, Kipsis and Chepkube.
In Uasin Gishu, the situation remained peaceful and peace seminars were held mostly in those areas that
experienced the clashes.
In the cattle rustling prone area between West Pokot and Trans Nzoia, the reports say the area remained
tense with 14 attacks being reported during the month of July alone. Kesogon area on the border between
the two district had the majority attacks.
The report says one police officer was killed at Kiringeti in Trans Nzoia during a shoot out between
security forces and rustlers in July.
The government, the report says, had moved swiftly to arrest youths who had been terrorizing motorists at
Kamatira on the Kitale-Lodwar road. Many people had lost their valuables after being robbed by the armed
thugs.
Many raids were reported on the border between Pokot and Marakwet. The report however indicates that
most people displaced during past clashes in these areas were returning to their farms and NCCK provided
building materials to some." (Daily Nations 28 August 1999)
See also:
National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) and Action Aid have assisted resettlement and peace
building in the Rift Valley (1997-1999)
Claims that UNDP programme had resettled 180,000 by 1995 questioned by local
observers
"The number of people permanently resettled by UNDP's 'Displaced Persons Program' remained a matter of
controversy. UNDP officials estimated that their program resettled 180,000 people in the west. Kenyan
NGOs and church groups alleged that far fewer people benefited from the resettlement program because of
Kenyan government manipulation. Advocacy groups estimated that thousands of families remained
uprooted and apparently permanently dispossessed in western areas in 1997." (USCR 1998)
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"In late 1995, when UNDP ended its displaced persons program, it announced that some 180,000 persons
had been resettled as a result of the program. While Human Rights Watch/Africa is not in the position to
verify the exact number of displaced remaining at this time, it does appear from interviews with local and
international relief workers who were, and still are, assisting the displaced that the UNDP estimate is
greatly inflated. David Round-Turner, former policy advisor with the UNDP program, is also of the opinion
that the figures are high. He said, 'UNDP was counting as returned even those who were staying at market
centers, but who were returning to cultivate their land during the day. If you do that, you get a much larger
figure of returnees.'
Ernest Murimi of the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission flatly refuted UNDP's estimate that its
program has reintegrated some 180,000:
'That figure surprised us. People in the field were not consulted about that figure. Where did it come from?
The government? We asked UNDP to give us the names of the people who have been resettled here, we
were told to ask the D.C. [District Commissioner]. UNDP should have-as its first priority-created a reliable
registration system. Now it is too late. UNDP failed miserably. Where did they resettle people? Where is
their evaluation? These numbers they put out-ask them where they got them from. Where is the list of
names? Which regions are they from? We [the Justice and Peace Commission] can show you our list of
people. Where they came from, where they are, if they are back on their land. UNDP has not been
transparent." (HRW June 1997, p. 102)
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HUMANITARIAN ACCESS
Opportunities for outsiders to monitor and assist the IDPs
Limited access for outsiders to monitor the displacement situation (1997)
• Attacks on people trying to monitor and report on the displacement situation
• Media denied access to three of the worst-hit areas during 1994-95
"Another dimension of the violence has been attacks on those who try to monitor and report on it. A
number of the attacks on the independent press have resulted from their coverage of the violence. For
example, Reverend Jamlick Miano, editor of the Presbyterian church magazine Jitegemea, was arrested in
May 1993 after an issue of the magazine had criticized President Moi's allegedly divisive policies. It
referred to the 1990 demolition of Nairobi's Muoroto slum in which several people were alleged to have
been killed, as well as the clashes in western Kenya and the demolition of vendors' kiosks in Nakuru."
(Article 19 October 1997, sect. 2.3)
"One of the government's tactics was to restrict the flow of information. Reporting on events pertaining to
the conflict was made particularly difficult for journalists. There were numerous charges of government
harassment of the press for reporting on the clashes including arrests without charge, the bringing of
patently political charges such as subversion, police interrogation, and the illegal impounding of issues of
publications and newspapers that carried articles on the clashes. During the year and a half in which the
Security Operation regulations were in effect, the media were denied access to three of the worst-hit areas.
According to the former Rift Valley P.C., Ishmael Chelanga, the primary reason for the creation of the
security zone was to keep away 'those who did not wish us well and those who were spreading rumors, lies,
and propaganda.' By contrast, there has been a general failure to investigate reports of involvement or
collusion of government officials, at all levels of responsibility. At no time has President Moi taken steps to
censure or discipline those officials who were responsible for this harassment." (HRW June 1997, p.65)
Government restricted access to Maela camp after many IDPs were moved from the
camp in 1994
• UNDP and MSF officials denied access to Maela camp in December 1994
• Outsiders threatened with deportation if attempting to enter the camp
"In late December 1994, UNDP and the international NGO Medecins sans Frontieres (Spain) officials were
denied access to Maela camp after forced government dispersals of some 2,000 displaced, despite the fact
that the UNDP officer had a letter from the Office of the President allowing entry into Maela. The
displaced were transported out of the Rift Valley Province, without notification to UNDP, and left in
Central Province in the middle of the night on Christmas eve. An American priest, Fr. John Kaiser, who
had been working for the Catholic diocese in Maela, was put under house arrest when he protested the
action. He was then taken to nearby Naivasha and warned that he would be deported if he attempted to
enter the camp again[...].
[...]
These, and other incidents, indicate that ongoing harassment and intimidation was taking place in the clash
areas on a regular basis. UNDP should have seen it as part of its responsibilities to call for government
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estraint toward the displaced and those working with or reporting on the displaced, and should have
worked towards greater access and transparency in the clash areas. Yet UNDP frequently remained silent
about government harassment, and in some cases, made excuses for the Kenyan government by dismissing
an incident as a misunderstanding or a temporary setback. Its failure to make public pronouncements
critical of government actions was matched by a failure to serve even as a back channel advocate by
supporting the agencies by providing factual reporting to donor governments which might have been less
constrained to make representations to the Kenyan authorities. A worker with the international NGO
Medecins sans Frontieres (Spain) noted that several times during the course of the UNDP program, local
government officials destroyed their equipment, arrested their staff, or denied them access to areas where
the UNDP program was being administered and where they had permission to enter. They felt that they
could not rely on UNDP, either at the field or national level, to speak up on their behalf." (HRW June 1997,
pp. 66, 68)
The above mentioned priest, John Kaiser, continued during the 1990s to assist the displaced in the
Maela camp. He died on 23 August 2000 by a gun wound. A web site has been set up to inform about
Kaiser's work and his death.
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NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES
Coordination
National IDP Network
• Kenya Human Rights Commission is working with the survivors and families of victims of ethnic
violence
• Activities include: reporting and strengthening of local IDP committees, the establishment of a
IDPs national network
"The Internally Displaced Persons Network
A cursory review of the Campaign against Impunity shows that a number of objectives under the campaign
have been achieved. Among the objectives that have been realized are;
• The creation of awareness on the culture of impunity in Kenya, and the need to eradicate it
• The release of the findings of the Akiwumi Commission of Inquiry
• Peaceful, free and fair 2002 elections
• Peaceful succession and political transition
But much remains to be done with regard to addressing the plight of those KHRC targeted for this
campaign - the survivors and families of victims of ethnic violence. Our partner communities are located in
areas identified as hotspots of ethnic violence in Kenya. To date, KHRC has been working with IDPs from
Transmara - Gucha, Thessalia (Nyando) Muhoroni, Giri Mori, Koru, Likoni, Ukunda (Kwale) to establish
rapport with the survivors, fact-find, and also identify issues of critical concern to survivors of ethnic
violence. Majority of the survivors appear to have realized the need to constitute themselves into loose
associations/ committees that function as mediums for addressing their concerns. But owing to the
circumstances in which they live, these structures are feeble and can only do very little in terms of
articulating and lobbying their issues.
Thus, the current phase of this campaign aims at investing efforts in strengthening the survivors
committees, and also facilitates the establishment of a survivor’s national network. Such a structure would
operate as an umbrella body for survivors, and is expected would have the legitimacy and authority by
reason of numbers and the involvement of a cross section of survivors drawn form all over the Republic."
(KHRC, January 2004)
"Human rights centered governance and transitional justice mechanisms have become the benchmark for
auditing social, cultural, economic and political development. Emerging from a culture of human rights
abuse, impunity and hypocrisy by the state and key-non-state actors in both the local and international
forums occasioned the need for a global human rights agenda. The Campaign Against Impunity (CAI) and
the entrenchment of the rule of law, by holding the both the perpetrators and abettors of human rights
violations accountable, is one of the key dimensions in institutionalizing a culture of democracy and
accountability.
The KHRC’s CAI project was launched in September 2001 to lobby and advocate for the eradication of the
culture of impunity. The campaign had four broad goals. First, KHRC wanted to make impunity an issue
of national interest. Second, was to ensure accountability over past human rights violations. Third, the
KHRC wanted to put Kenya to a truly democratic transition by ensuring that the 2002 elections and
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transition were free, fair and peaceful. With the first and third goals realized, the project entered the
2003/2004 phase anticipating that the newly elected NARC government would uphold their promise to end
the culture of impunity, and begin an era of the enjoyment of human rights and good governance.
Unfortunately, rather than give the country a new lease on life, very little has changed."(KHRC, June 2004)
"LAUNCH OF A NATIONAL SURVIVORS NETWORK FOR THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED
PERSONS (IDPs) IN KENYA – SEPTEMBER 26TH TO 28TH, 2003
Impunity, as manifested by the flagrant violation of citizens’ rights without holding the perpetrators
accountable and responsible has been a pervasive culture in the Kenya for the last forty years. Impunity is
sanctioned or perpetuated by the state and perfected by non-state actors such as organizations, groups and
individuals in several covert engagements. These engagements take the form of: -
• Economic crimes, sabotage and mismanagement of national resources and public utilities
• Social injustices and disparities as characterized by poverty, diseases, landlessness,
unemployment, famine, hatred among social problems in the society
• Political repression, tyranny and ineptitude
• Abuse of office, disrespect for law and atrocities against citizens
To address impunity, the Kenya Human Rights Commission launched a Campaign Against Impunity
Project in 2001 with several objectives and demands. These are available elsewhere.
Since then, this Campaign has graduated in strength through the following phases;
CONSULTATIVE FORUMS
Phase I (July, 2001 to February, 2003)
Consultative Forums served the purpose of mapping flash areas for the project by visiting IDPs in their
respective areas, namely Kisumu, Mombasa, Nakuru, Kieni and Gucha Transmara.
Phase II (February 2003 – July, 2003)
This second phase had two components: -
February 2003 A workshop was held in Nairobi for IDPs representatives from the above areas apart from
Gucha/Transmara. Several outputs emerged from this workshop
• IDPs shared their diverse experiences
• IDPs identified their common problems and prepared a memorandum which they presented to the
Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs
• It was a forum for the IDPs to create linkages among themselves and various actors
• An interim committee for IDPs network was launched. This was mandated to mobilize and
organize the IDPs at the grassroots so as to concretize and articulate their issues.
June – July 2003 A series of field visits were held which climaxed with workshops for the IDPs in their
respective areas. The aims of the workshops were;
• To evaluate progresses and sharing experience of the IDPs since February, 2003
• To create more awareness for the IDPs on various issues
• To concretize and formulate the IDPs agenda at local, regional to national level.
• To draft a memorandum to the task force on TJRC
• To establish leadership mechanisms/committees to pursue the IDPs agenda at the said levels.
• To prepare for the launch of the National Network for the IDPs
During the June-July 2003 series of workshops, it was clear that despite the “new dawn” in Kenya, the
IDPs are still distressed as reflected in the following observations.
Observations
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• IDPs still remain neglected and dispersed
• Their living conditions remain appalling and inimical to basic human survival
• All IDPs consider settlement/ resettlement, protection of their rights, provision of basic needs and
compensation as the key issues in addressing their problem
• While women, elderly and children are the most devastated by their circumstances and are out
rightly sidelined in articulating the IDPs plight.
• The government in power made empty promises to them during the campaign trail
• It is clear that the government seems to lack policies and laws to protect the IDPs and other
landless people in Kenya despite its political will to address the past atrocities
• The IDPs strongly hold that the government remains their only hope in addressing their problems
though they still believe it is government
• Time has come to hold all leaders accountable to prevent abuse of office, and misuse of power
• IDPs recognize themselves and the government as key stakeholders is solving their problems
• Several interested groups and organizations have been working with IDPs. These either deal with
humanitarian assistance and human rights protection
• Despite this assistance, stakeholders lack a common initiative in pushing the IDPs issues.
• However, the IDPs remain vulnerable and exploited by some stakeholders and other opportunists
including the wider society
• Determined to solve their problems, the survivors are willing to pursue their agenda with
committed and sincere stakeholders
• Having discovering that divided they fall, IDPs have resolved to unite to address their
predicament.
• IDPs as survivors and victims of impunity are committed to knowing truth over the clashes,
getting justice from the government and are ready to forgive and reconcile for the interest of this country.
Indeed they support the establishment of a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission
• IDPs issues are not given much prominence
• It evident that impunity is endemic in our society. One wonders whether Kenya has undergone a
true transition."(KHRC, 28 September 2003)
National response
Controversial report on irregular land allocations witheld by the government (October
2004)
• Commission of inquiry into irregular land allocations presented its results to President Kibaki on
22 July 2004
• The content could reportedly plunge the country into a civil crisis far worse than the Zimbabwe
situation
• Almost the entire political leadership, past and present has been named in the report
• The content of the report could trigger invasion of farms and ranches in all provinces of Kenya by
landless and destitute people
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" You will never know. This is the message the Government will communicate to the public when the first
part of the Ndung’u report on irregular land allocations is released, tentatively, next week.
Tuesday’s Cabinet meeting resolved that the second part of the report, which names and shames the land
grabbers, must remain secret.
"The Cabinet sat and differed on the release of the whole report," said impeccable sources.
Mr Paul Ndung’u, leading a commission of inquiry into irregular land allocations, presented to President
Kibaki the team’s findings on July 22.
The President promised to release the report "as soon as possible" to help redress the land grabbing issue, a
promise that has led to impatience with politicians, civil society groups and media commentators calling for
the immediate release of the contents of the report.
The sources revealed that the names and details could not be released because the majority of Cabinet
members were afraid the contents had the potential of plunging the country into a civil crisis far worse than
the Zimbabwe situation
"It (the report) could even lead to civil war because it touches the very heart of Government, and the
opposition. If anything, almost the entire political leadership, past and present has been named."
According to the sources, a section of the report is being prepared for release next week. It will explain the
grabbing of public land without naming the grabbers.
While providing some names that we withhold, the sources said the report would not only enrage the urban
landless, but it could also lead to communities in all provinces of Kenya invading farms and ranches.
"The fear expressed in the (Cabinet) meeting is that details could geode the victims to invade the land just
as it happened in Zimbabwe,
"The heated debate concluded that the first report detailing grabbed land be released without the second
annexure that contains names of grabbers," said the sources.
Assistant Lands minister Orwa Ojode, commenting from his Ardhi House office when contacted, said the
sensitivity of the report called for caution by the Government before making it public.
He said the Government had to tread with caution on anything to do with land to avoid disrupting the agroeconomy,
which feeds the country.
Our sources said classified information from the National Security Intelligence Service had warned of a
possible civil war if the report was released to the public.
The sources said some members of the intelligence network, the armed forces and influential civil servants
were named in the report, hence the warmongering during the Cabinet meeting.
Some of the ministers were in favour of the names of the grabbers being released, but they were overruled
by their colleagues, who thought it would be unwise to do so.
The sources named an opposition politician with 50,000 acres lying fallow at the Coast, where there is a
major squatter crisis. And a former senior civil servant owns the playing field of Kenya Science Teachers
College, which he cannot develop because it is in the middle of the institution.
, according to the sources.
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The report also names two institutions which own 63,000 acres in Kibwezi, but use only 6,000.
Asked whether the ministry would start settling people on idle land, Ojode said a proper policy should be
put in place to ensure the land is developed for commercial reasons and the squatters settled nearby for
employment opportunities.
He said the Government would consider setting up a tribunal on how to best solve the land issue in a
manner that would be beneficial to the people and the economy."(East African Standard, 1 October 2004)
The government is not moving fast enough to resettle IDPs (September 2004)
• The President met to discuss resettlement with members of parliament from one of the worst
affected districts in July 2004
• Resettlement could rekindle animosity and hostility from Kanu political leaders
• Some of the chiefs who presided over and orchestrated the ethnic violence are still in office which
prevents IDPs from returning
• The President would reportedly agree to set up a national committee encompassing all the
internally displaced persons in the country
"MPs from Nakuru District, whose constituencies carry the majority of the internally displaced people in
Rift Valley Province, are worried that the government is not moving fast enough to resettle them.
Subukia MP Koigi wa Wamwere is exasperated that "the government seems lax on finding a lasting
solution by re-settling the clash victims. It is as if the government is wishing away the problem away."
On July 16, the day the President went to open the Nakuru Agricultural Show, five of the six MPs in the
district – save for Kuresoi’s Moses Kipkemboi Cheboi who chose to attend a Kanu meeting in Nairobi –
met the President to discuss the issue.
Others who attended the crucial meeting were Rift Valley Provincial Commissioner Wilfred Ndolo, the
Nakuru Diocese Catholic Justice and Peace Commission (CJPC) secretary, Mr Earnest Murimi, Nakuru
District Narc Chairman Mr Alex Muriithi and a representative of the National Christian Council of Kenya.
For six hours, from 9 am to 3 pm, the President listened to the MPs. The MPs prevailed upon him to form a
committee that would expedite the resettlement of the victims of ethnic clashes, forest inhabitants and
squatters. It was agreed that two committees be formed – a presidential and a parliamentary one.
According to Foreign Affairs Assistant Minister Mirugi Kariuki, the MP for Nakuru Town, all the
legislators who attended the State House meeting were in favour of a Presidential Committee.
"A Presidential Committee sets up the mandate that would be followed to the conclusive end," said Mirugi,
"as opposed to the Parliamentary Committee that would be restrictive and generally ad hoc". Last year on
July 23 and 30, Koigi put forward a Motion in Parliament seeking to compel the government, through the
formation of a Parliamentary Commission, to provide a lasting solution to the problem of internally
displaced people by resettling them.
Some of the people who attended the meeting and were interviewed thereafter claim that the President was
of the view that a national committee encompassing all the internally displaced persons in the country
110

would suffice. Mirugi argues: "It is a good starting point and from there we can build on the committee to
come up with a concrete solution."
Ideally, he believes the fundamental way to solving the whole issue is to ultimately form a Truth and
Reconciliation Commission that would "heal the wounds and right the wrongs perpetrated against the
displaced people".
Yet, says another MP who prefers not to be identified, "the government fears resettling the internally
displaced persons because the move would rekindle animosity and hostility from Kanu political leaders,
who the state is currently busy wooing." He feels the government wants to "sacrifice the internally
displaced persons" in its efforts to win Kanu on its side as it fights the rebellious Liberal Democratic Party.
Although Mirugi and Koigi felt that the President seemed "clear and enthusiastic" about the plight of
internally displaced persons, he however didn’t seem to be in the whole picture. "Some of the chiefs who
presided over and orchestrated the ethnic violence are still in office, even though some of them have been
sacked," claimed the MPs.
They argue that chiefs suspected of having abetted the clashes should be investigated, and where possible
prosecuted and dismissed. "As long as these chiefs are still in office, it will be difficult for the people to
return; they are afraid of these chiefs."
Mirugi says the government can utilise its two huge farms in Lanet and in Subukia to resettle landless
people. One of the huge farms that the MP was referring to is the Lanet Beef Farm.
"In my constituency, which incorporates Nakuru town centre, there are many hawkers who were erstwhile
internally displaced persons and today they cannot access their land," Mirugi said, adding, "They are not
hawking because they are not exactly poor people." The President is said to have also enquired about the
displaced people camping at the Holy Family Basilica in Nairobi and voiced his concern that the nine
families were far too few not to be re-settled.
The Holy Family Basilica has been hosting the nine families, who are victims of ethnic clashes. These
families, who were originally 10, fled the country 10 years ago through the Malaba border into Uganda,
where they were accorded refugee status in Mbarara.
They eventually returned to the country last year and have been pleading with the government to resettle
them. He is also said to have directed the Rift Valley PC to order the people who were evicted from the
forests return.
The President, according to impeccable sources, said the people practising the shamba system had a mutual
agreement with the forest management and therefore the Forest Department should not find it difficult to
work out an amicable solution with them.
The President is also believed to have commented that the Mt Kenya situation was different because the
forest, unlike others, had been invaded as opposed to being settled on mutual agreement.
The President may have been speaking in reference to the Ndundori Forest occupants who lost about two
million nursery trees when they were evicted.
"The two million nursery tree seedlings belonged to the people who practised the shamba system," said
Koigi. "When the people were kicked out, the nursery trees were left to waste."(East African Standard, 12
September 2004)
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IDPs in the spotlight as priest’s death is commemorated (August 2004)
• IDPs receive renewed attention following the commemoration of the suspected murder of an
American missionary four years ago
• Church and human rights groups addressed IDP issues and requested the new government to
resettle the remaining IDPs
• In his testimony to a Commission set up to investigate the politically-instigated clashes, Fr Kaiser
implicated officials serving in the ousted KANU government
"As the Church in Kenya marks the fourth anniversary of the mysterious death of Mill Hill missionary, Fr
John Kaiser, attention will be drawn to the plight of internally displaced people (IDPs) in the country.
During the anniversary celebrations, at the Holy Family Basilica, Nairobi, on August 27-28, church and
human rights groups will petition the government to resettle all IDPs, the majority of whom were uprooted
from their homes in politically-instigated clashes in the 1990s.
The past three commemorations have been at the site in Naivasha (Nakuru Diocese) where Fr Kaiser's body
was found on August 24, 2000, with a bullet wound to the head. The manner of his death is still the subject
of a public inquest, which sits next on September 1, 2004 at the Nairobi Law Courts.
All day tomorrow there will be a special forum on the IDPs of Kenya at the Holy Family Basilica hall.
Participants will hear testimonies from the survivors of the politically instigated clashes of the 1990s, and
watch thematic performances. The highlight of the day will be the presentation of a petition to the
government, a memorandum prepared by the participating organizations with the help of the IDPs, seeking
resettlement.
Expected guests include Bishop Peter Kairo of the Catholic Diocese of Nakuru, the Speaker of the National
Assembly; ministers in charge of land and justice, Members of Parliament and the chair of the Kenya
National Commission on Human Rights.
On Saturday there will be a peaceful procession starting from Freedom Corner on Uhuru Park at 10am,
followed by Mass at the Holy Family Basilica at 12.30pm.
The Catholic bishops of Kenya, are requesting everyone to participate in these two days. This year the
event is organized by the Kenya Episcopal Conference, in conjunction with NGOs and religious orders.
Fr Kaiser, a human rights campaigner and an American national, who served in Ngong Diocese for 30
years, took great risks to his life in order to speak the truth and ensure a voice to the oppressed.
In his testimony to the Akiwumi Commission set up to investigate the politically-instigated clashes, Fr
Kaiser implicated officials serving in the then government, and some of its ministers for the instigation and
sustenance of the atrocities.
Catholic bishops and human rights groups in Kenya rejected the verdict arrived at by America's Federal
Bureau of Investigations (FBI) in April 2001, that Fr Kaiser's death was "consistent with suicide".
They then demanded a public inquest, which was granted by a new government in 2003, and whose work is
still in progress. More than 20 witnesses have so far testified."(ICN, 26 August 2004)
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"In its hopeless efforts to water down the spirited clamour for political, legal and constitutional reforms in
Kenya, the despotic Kanu regime instigated political and ethnic violence in Kenya in 1991 – 93 and 1997 –
98. This led to displacement of more than 600,000 people not withstanding the enormous destruction and
loss of lives, property and opportunities.
Due to flagrant disregard and complicity exhibited by the government over these events, development,
human rights and religious organizations became and still are the most consistent agitators for justice for
the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Kenya. In the process, Fr. John Anthony Kaiser emerged as one
of the most passionate crusader and agitator for the human rights and welfare of IDPs in Kenya. His
mission was to ensure the resettlement and justice for the victims of clashes, which he saw as the only
lasting solution.
Unfortunately, Father Kaiser passed away on 28th August 2002. His mysterious death raised disturbing
questions as the KANU government was suspected to have been involved. Since then, the Catholic Justice
and Peace Commission (CJPC) together with other stakeholders have been commemorating his death. This
year’s 4th Anniversary since Fr. Kaiser demise will serve as a platform to advocate for justice and the
resettlement of IDPs in Kenya. The theme for the anniversary is “Justice Now for Clash Victims.” A series
of activities have been scheduled to take place as a build up to the major event – the procession and mass
on 28th August 2004.
One is special forum for the IDPs, intended to serve as a platform for reflection, agitation and publicity on
the IDPs experiences, struggles and issues.
Much has been said than done about issues affecting the IDPs. This is the moment for IDPs to devise very
practical and time bound programmes on how to vigorously engage with government in ensuring
resettlement and justice for clash victims. Thirteen years of torture and distress has been too long a period
waiting for justice to be done!
We Demand Justice for and Resettlement of Survivors of Clashes NOW!" (KHRC, 25 August 2004)
Presidential Commission on Ethnic Clashes formed in 1998, report released in Oct
2002
"In August 1999, a presidential Commission on Ethnic Clashes, a government-appointed panel of three
judges formed in 1998, submitted to President Moi its report on the cause of ethnic clashes that occurred in
the Rift Valley in 1992 and 1997, the Coast province in 1997, and the areas of Molo and Laikipia in 1998.
Many of the hearings were public, and witnesses often directly accused local politicians of abetting the
combatants, although they rarely provided other than hearsay evidence. However, key churches and NGO's
claim that a number of witnesses were prevented from testifying, especially after, half way through the
investigation, the Government changed the Commission's aggressive prosecutor John Nyagah Gacivih to
the more progovernment Deputy Attorney General Bernard Chunga. The Government still had not released
the report or announced that it was taking any formal action on its findings by year's end." (US DOS
February 2001, Section 5)
The report was released to the public in October 2002.
For information about how the Government's Standing Committee on Human Rights has dealt with the
political violence, see HRW's report "Protectors or Pretenders? Government Human Rights
Commissions in Africa"
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The psycho-social needs of displaced and dispossessed women and their access to
justice systems have not been addressed for the last six or so years (2002)
• The Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA) researched the psycho-social needs of displaced
women (1994)
• The type of assistance given to the displaced is minimal
“The psycho-social needs of displaced and dispossessed women and their access to justice systems have not
been addressed for the last six or so years. In 1994, the Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA), with
financial assistance from AFWICAfrican Women in Crisis researched the psycho-social needs of displaced
women in Maella and Thessalia camps. The organisation then provided trauma counselling services to help
them deal with the reality of displacement, gender and sexual-based violence (rape, wife-beating),
facilitated gynaecological and referral services, provided legal aid to the dispossessed, and conducted legal
rights education to enable them know their rights so as to pursue rape and other cases in court. The two
camps were closed by the end of 1994, and similar services have since not been availed to the thousands of
IDPs who are poor, abused and without access to any form of justice. ...
Plots of land for ‘resettlement’
These are given on credit to squatters and the ‘poorest of the poor’ displaced by the church groups NCCK
National Council of Churches in Kenya and CDN–J&PCatholic Diocese of Nakuru. The beneficiaries also
received building materials, planting seeds, farm implements and fertilizers. Those relocated by the
government from places like Olenguruone were given only land. The government resettled 600 families,
the CDN-C&P 400, and NCCK another 800 families. These 1,800 families, which have benefited from
‘Resettlement’ projects, constitute less than 1 per cent of the original 300,000 displaced.
Building materials
Iron sheets, doors, windows, posts, and nails were provided by NCCK and CJPC for those whose houses
were burnt down, but who could return to their farms in places where relative security has been restored.
The beneficiaries of this programme are no longer considered displaced, because they have returned and
reconstructed their homes.
Boreholes and water pumps.
Provided in some of the ‘Resettlement’ farms by the European Union, German Technical Cooperation
(GTZ), AMREF, Red Cross, Médicines sans Frontières and others.
The NCCK and CDN-C&J mobilize funds for a wide range of displaced people’s needs, such as raising
medical bills, school fees, water filters, latrines, etc, but neither organisation has an established, staffed
programme specifically targeting the displaced. The NCCK has been encouraging displaced women to form
women’s groups. Training workshops such as the one referred to in the text are part of an initiative to
encourage them to take charge of their lives. Such initiatives, however, are hampered by lack of capacity
(funds and personnel) to coordinate and document cases specifically targeting displaced persons.
Consequently, the needs of displaced women remain unattended to at the NCCK offices for long periods of
time. This makes them feel discriminated against" ( UNIFEM, Jan 2002, pp. 27-28).
Police reservist disarmed as an effort to improve security in Tana River District
(December 2001)
• Kenyan police and security forces began in October 2001 an operation to recover illegal firearms
in the district
• Kenyan church official claiming that that police had released a large number of illegal firearms
just days before the outbreak of violence
• 638 police reservists disarmed in December to consolidate an uneasy calm
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• President Daniel arap Moi ordered the police on 4 January 2002 to immediately return all
confiscated weapons to the home guards.
"Kenyan police and security forces in October began an operation to recover illegal firearms in the district,
and the government announced last week that it would repossess all firearms that had earlier been given to
homeguards in the Pokomo and Orma communities. "We have a total of 500 homeguards in the whole
district and we want to repossess all their weapons to improve security," Tana River District Commissioner
James Waweru said on Monday.
A Kenyan church official claimed on 22 November, however, that police had released a large number of
illegal firearms just days before the outbreak of violence. "We have information that a lorry full of
sophisticated illegal weaponry was recently apprehended [by police] and knowingly released into the
community by local Tana River District personnel," Bishop Julius Kalu of the Anglican Church of Kenya
was quoted as saying by AFP." (IRIN 4 December 2001)
"The Kenyan government has disarmed 638 police reservists in Tana River District, eastern Kenya, to
consolidate an uneasy calm that has returned to the area after violent clashes between the two communities
in November and December, the East African Standard newspaper reported on Monday, 24 December.
Moving out the reservists has helped security, though tensions in the district are still high, according to
humanitarian sources on the ground. The government has also transferred some policemen belonging to the
two communities and serving in the area who were believed to have taken sides in the skirmishes.
The local district commissioner, James Waweru, said 80 illegal guns suspected to have been used during
the clashes had also been recovered, the Standard reported. Among the illegal guns recovered were 60
home-made ones and an assortment of 20 assault rifles, and more than 14 people have been arrested on
suspicion that they had played a role in the tribal feuds, he said. One hundred and eight people had been
killed in the clashes since March this year, Waweru added." (IRIN 26 December 2001)
"Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi blamed local leaders for failing to prevent and bring a swift end to the
fighting. During a public rally in Garsen town on 4 January 2002, Moi acknowledged the admission by
local MPs Muhammad Galgalo (Bura), Tola Kofa (Galole) and Molu Shambaro (Garsen) that they had
done little to prevent the violence from escalating.
'From today, I am ordering them to go out there and preach peace to stop this fighting,' the Daily Nation
newspaper quoted the president as saying.
Some local leaders have been accused of inciting the violence, rather than just failing to prevent it,
according to Alex Nyago, spokesman for the Peace and Development Network (PEACE-NET), an umbrella
body for nongovernmental organisations working to resolve local conflicts in Kenya." (IRIN 11 January
2001)
"Following accusations that guns held by Tana River police reservists had been used in the year-long
clashes, 638 reservists were disarmed in late December. During a visit to the district on 4 January, however,
Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi ordered Police Commissioner Philemon Abong'o to immediately return
all confiscated weapons to the home guards.
[...]
Fears remain that some of the weapons taken from police reservists, if returned, could become available to
one or other community for attacks on the other." (IRIN 14 January 2002)
115

Government officially encouraging return but new refugee bill does not address the
problem of IDPs (1999-2001)
• President call in November 1999 for remaining IDPs in Rift Valley "to return to their homes and
continue with their normal lives"
• Human rights activists and religious organisations uncertain about the commitment behind the
statement
• The responsibility for assistance to IDPs under the Relief department at the Office of the
President, but nobody specifically charged with addressing the problem of those displaced during
or around election time
"Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi this week called on thousands of displaced people in the country’s Rift
Valley province to return to their homes and continue with their normal lives, a move that has been met
with scepticism some quarters.
[...]
Moi, who was addressing a gathering in the Rift Valley town of Nakuru on Monday, reassured the
displaced that 'maximum security' would be ensured so that the problems did not recur, Kenyan media
reports said. He directed provincial and district commissioners in the affected areas to 'ensure that this
programme of resettlement in the families’ original farms is effected within a week'.
Moi further told politicians to ensure that 'their utterances were not inflammatory', saying that conflicts in
the region had been ignited by 'careless leaders who issued emotive statements without assessing their
destructive potential'.
However, human rights activists and religious organisations in the area are skeptical, and have adopted a
'wait and see' stance. The Kenya Human Rights Commission’s (KHRC) Management Coordinator, James
Nduko, described the president’s comments as 'non-committal'. 'Without a firm commitment, it remains just
his usual one-touch statements or ideas which are never followed up,' he told IRIN.
[...]
Meanwhile, the Office of the President said some 'official activity' was underway on the ground. 'Of course
there could be logistical problems in getting these people to return from wherever they sought refuge, but it
is a presidential directive that has to be implemented,' an official told IRIN. He however agreed that the
situation in the region was 'fluid'.
The land issue is very sensitive, the official said, and until the process was undertaken 'one cannot know
what to expect'. 'But you can be sure trespassers who are occupying land illegally will have to go,' he
added." (IRIN 11 November 1999)
"In Kenya, the problem of refugees and forced displacement falls under the Ministry of Home Affairs,
Immigration and Police departments. The draft refugee bill does not address the problem of IDPs at all, nor
does the refugee desk at the Ministry of Home Affairs. Instead, the IDP problem has been shifted to the
Relief department at the Office of the President. An interview at OP revealed that no-one is specifically
charged with addressing the problem of those displaced during or around election time. Relief, including
food, medicine and other basic necessities, is provided for victims of cattle rustling and natural disasters
only." (JRS March 2001, p.24)
Official non-recognition of IDPs belongs to the past (Dec 2002)
• Widely expected that a Truth, Reconciliation and Justice Committee will be established
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“In Kenya, the problem of forced displacement falls under the Department of Ethics and Governance in the
Office of the Vice President. Kenya does not have domestic refugee law or a concrete policy on IDPs. The
KANU government denied the existence of IDPs caused by political causes, and stated that cattle rustling
and natural disasters were the only causes of forced population displacement in Kenya. A Relief Desk at the
Office of the President addressed the needs of IDPs, although no one was specifically directed to
investigate the plight of the survivors of ethnic clashes.
Official non-recognition of IDPs is now a thing of the past with the new government’s establishment of the
Department of Governance and Ethics, part of whose mandate is to resettle displaced people back to their
land and implement the recommendations of various Commissions of Inquiry, including the Akiwumi
Commission. The establishment of this new department is a significant landmark in legal recognition as
well as the starting point in meeting protection and assistance needs of IDPs. This sets the stage for the
formulation and implementation of a national policy on internal displacement. Such a policy should reflect
the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, and establish principles that will serve as a standard to
guide government institutions, humanitarian and development agencies in providing assistance to IDPs in
Kenya by specifying the roles and responsibilities of each stakeholder. It is widely expected that a Truth,
Reconciliation and Justice Committee will be established to facilitate the healing of ethnic relations and
promotion of reconciliation and reintegration.” (UN DPMCU, Dec 2002, pp. 44-45)
Government security initiative between 1993-1995 stabilised the ethnic violence in the
Rift Valley
• Elburgon, Molo, Londiani and Burnt Forest declared security operation zones
• Security zones isolated areas and interfered with the work of NGOs
• Continued displacement of people from their homes during 1994 despite increased presence of
police and civil servants
"After two years of continued conflicts and displacement of people, the government acted to stop the
violence in mid 1993. The President toured areas affected by clashes, ordered that violence stop, and
appealed for calm. In the most insecure areas he invoked the Preservation of Public Security Act and
declared the hardest hit areas of Elburgon, Molo, Londiani and Burnt Forest security operation zones. This
act banned outlawed the possession of firearms, instituted curfews, and prohibited movement into these
areas. As one young man explained, 'When the President came to Mt. Elgon and told people the fighting
should stop, it stopped.'
While the President’s tour became a reference point for peace building activities, the declaration of security
zones isolated these areas. The bans on entering or working in the zones interfered with the work of certain
NGOs and prohibited certain individuals from visiting them. Among those obstructed were Aurelia
Brazeal, the US Ambassador to Kenya and a team of MPs from the United Kingdom and Denmark.
More government administrators went to affected areas. Their first tasks were to increase security and
oversee the return of displaced people. Molo, one of the hardest hit sites, received an additional 15 district
and police officers. The presence of government officers, some of whom were eager to begin their
assignments, stabilised populations and provided a basis for peace work.
These efforts did not go far enough in punishing the perpetrators of violence, leaving this as an unresolved
issue in most of the areas affected by clashes. These government-driven efforts encouraged little
participation from affected communities. For the most part, these communities remained suspicious of the
government and reluctant to seek meaningful involvement." (Kathina Juma May 2000, p. 17)
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"The decline in the number of violent incidents in 1994 was claimed by the government as a victory for its
policy of imposing 'security zones', introduced in September 1994. This involved restricting movement to
and from three of the worst affected areas: Molo, Londiani and Burnt Forest [...]. Human rights groups and
journalists claimed that the main aim of the policy was to prevent a flow of accurate information about the
violence[...]. In March 1995 the security zone restrictions were lifted[...]. In fact the security zone areas
continued to be the epicentre of the violence, with some 25-30,000 people driven from their homes during
1994, despite the restrictions in force[...]." (Carver August 1995)
National actors reasserted their role and engagement following withdrawal of
international agencies in 1991 1992
• Initial response by international actors did not integrate food aid and assistance for return and
rebuilding
• Local peace initiatives emerged out of a situation with scarce resources
"Local peace-building activities emerged out of despair and exasperation with conflict. Initial responses
were based on the relief model and dominated largely by international actors. In this model, food relief
comes first, followed by returning displaced populations, rehabilitation, and reconstruction. Peace and
reconciliation are part of rehabilitation. However, persistent problems with displacement led to outside
actors experiencing burnout. Furthermore, resources were diminishing because of donor fatigue, and
frustration with the government was increasing. Therefore, most foreign actors left the scene in less than 24
months after the eruption of conflict in 1991-2.
Although the departure of foreign actors created a vacuum, it did leave local actors with the space to
reassert their role and engage in a wide range of activities related to returning, rehabilitation and
reconstruction. Peace building posed particular challenges for most local actors. It required specific skills
and institutional support, both of which were scarce at the local and national levels. The withdrawal of
foreign actors translated into reduced funds for local actors working with displaced populations. For
example, the abrupt withdrawal of UNDP from Western Province in March 1995 curtailed the start-up of a
range of quick impact projects, all of which had a peace and reconciliation component. A third set of
challenges were generated at the ground level where most displaced persons began to show signs of
weariness with assistance programmes and eagerness to return to their homes. This generated immense
pressure for actors to look to issues beyond relief, a challenge that required big budgets and long term
commitments.
Constrained by limited expertise, resources, and government support, local actors were forced to turn to
local resources. They sought skills, capacities, and available opportunities among members of communities
with which they worked. Through intense interaction and working together, peace actions were initiated
and the process of transforming conflict began. In short, local peace builders learned while working for
peace." (Kathina Juma May 2000, p. 19)
The report by Dr. Monica Kathina Juma contains several case studies of local peace initiatives in Kenya
during the 1990s
National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) and Action Aid have assisted
resettlement and peace building in the Rift Valley (1997-1999)
• NCCK providing displaced families with building materials to enable them to rebuild their homes
• Two hundred village level Peace Committees have been created during the 1996-1999 period
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"As at February 1996, according to the local member of parliament, most of the 10,000 families evicted
from Olenguerone in Nakuru District in the Rift Valley in 1993 had not returned to their land. But while the
government was dragging its feet over the issue of resettlement, non-governmental organizations, notably
the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) and Action Aid, were embarking on resettling some of
the displaced families. Action Aid's project, which was due to end in September 1997, aimed at resettling
1,800 families who had been displaced after clashes in Bungoma and Mount Elgon. NCCK's ongoing work
aims at providing displaced families with building materials to enable them to rebuild their homes.
But these NGO efforts, laudable as they are, are modest and cannot resettle all the affected families. The
government has given little support and in some cases has failed even to guarantee security for returnees,
making it impossible for the NGOs to proceed." (Article 19 October 1997, sect. 2.3)
"The influential Protestant National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) - staff, 300; membership, six
million) - and its Peace and Rehabilitation Programme (initially called 'Land Clashes Project') also deserve
special mention. The Programme was started in 1992 to help resolve several devastating conflicts in Kenya.
These were initially political in nature but soon turned different ethnic communities against each other. The
Programme allows the NCCK to cooperate closely with other NGOs, including Muslim organisations, and
with officials at district and local level. The Nairobi Peace Initiative (NPI) has been a frequent partner in
the training and workshops for members of parliament and others.
[The Programme] has evolved through three phases. During phase I (1992-1993) emergency relief was
central to its activities. In phase II (1993-1996) rehabilitation and reconciliation activities were added.
During phase III (1996-1999) Good Neighbourliness Workshops have been held, two hundred village level
Peace Committees have been created and Peace Facilitators have been identified and trained. For the
communities bazaras (public gatherings) have been organised in consultation with the local administration.
On many occasions local government officials have been made moderators of meetings encouraging them
to listen to the debate. President Moi has frequently accused the NCCK of fuelling tensions in the country
and on one occasion he almost banned the NCCK’s Peace and Reconciliation Programme. In 1998, a
slander campaign against an NCCK official was started by a pro-government magazine. In the next phase,
the NCCK will, in cooperation with its national and regional partners and its own country-wide network,
publish a national agenda for peace. In the nine areas where the Programme has worked, only one has
remained 'hot'." (EPCPT November 2000)
Peace building initiatives blocked as NGOs had to avoid activities with a "political
character" (1991-1995)
• Catholic Church and the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) major actors in the
assistance to the displaced
• IDPs offered free medical services from hospitals and dispensaries during the first phase of the
displacement situation
• More than twenty NGOs assisting the displaced populations in the Mt. Elgon area by mid-1993
• Humanitarian actors experienced harassment from government agents
"The people were unprepared for the eruption of violence because they failed to acknowledge the early
warning signs. These included tension generated by the Katakwa issue and the manipulation of ongoing
political changes. People fleeing destruction and persecution in their homes sought sanctuary in local
churches and markets. The Catholic Church and the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) were
among the first to initiate assistance programmes through their established networks and institutions.
Church buildings, schools, and some parishioners gave shelter to those fleeing the hostilities. Perceiving
displacement as temporary, provisional and short-term assistance focussed primarily on relieving material
needs. Relief providers hoped that violence would end so people could return to their homes within a short
119

period. As conflict became more protracted, the capacity of local structures was overwhelmed. In the words
of Tecla Wanjala, a pillar of peace in this monograph who was then the Development Co-ordinator with the
Catholic Church:ng others, are presented in subsequent chapters.
'We all thought that the violence [would be] short-lived and that it would end after the 1992 [December]
elections. To the frustration of most of us [relief workers], this assumption turned out wrong. This
realisation posed the single most difficult challenge: how to reorient relief programme beyond [the current]
relief assistance engaged in by all actors.'
In the aftermath of the December 1992 elections, clashes escalated and more people were displaced.
Following a Presidential visit to Mt. Elgon in July 1993, access to the mountain was granted. Soon, more
than twenty humanitarian agencies were engaged in working with displaced populations in both districts.
This generated a set of challenges related to the organisation and disbursement of assistance. Among the
most prevalent challenges was the marked competition for operational space and funding which resulted in
increased duplication of the relief efforts and uneven distribution of peace building services. Humanitarian
actors were struggling with the growing emergency in a crowded, competitive arena. They experienced
continuous harassment from government agents as the main obstacle to their relief efforts. Tecla observes:
'At the time [1993], the government was harassing all of us [relief agencies], in some cases we were even
denied access to the internally displaced populations (IDPs). At three different times, police officers
stopped me from entering a camp where the IDPs were held.'
Negative attitudes among government functionaries made daily operations difficult and led to enormous
energies being spent in negotiating access and trying to cultivate goodwill from officers on the ground.
Further, lack of consistent goodwill by the government made NGOs delay the start-up of any activity that
could be associated with peace building. Unsure of how far they could push the government agents, NGOs
remained reluctant to engage in any activity that could trigger government suspicion beyond what it was.
Subsequently, intervention efforts focussed on relief assistance and emphasised their non-political character
to the exclusion of matters that could have political implications. Peace building was an essential victim in
this situation. Everyone was trying to avoid addressing directly the return of IDPs and justice. These two
controversial issues could have questioned the role of government agencies in the clashes. Until late 1994
and early 1995 when some people began to return to their homes, peace building remained an arena where
no one was brave enough to venture. Delayed starts and the failure to address issues of justice and
compensation threatened the viability of peace. These concerns are elaborated later." (Kathina Juma May
2000, pp. 36-37)
International response
The KANU government considered it in the interest of state security to deny local and
international attention on IDPs
• No agencies seem to be doing anything on the ground
• Lack of information or literature on Kenya’s IDPs create the impression that there are none in the
country
• Lack of information makes it easy for donors to dismiss proposals for assistance as exaggerations
designed to get funding for other projects
“Generally, international response to internal displacement in Africa is minimal, delayed or non-existent,
and the reaction of governments to the protection needs of IDPs usually lethargic. As with refugees,
governments are quick to deny, withhold or manipulate information about numbers, security, and socio-
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economic well being of displaced persons. Sometimes authorities limit access to affected areas and camps
by ‘outsiders.’ In Kenya, the KANU [Kenya African National Union] government considered it in the
interest of state security to deny local and international journalists, researchers and humanitarian workers
access to IDPs, or information on the security situation in affected areas. Denial of access to clash zones
was explained as a security measure, although it was deliberate obstruction. Due to what was understood to
be official indifference, many actors in humanitarian work did not pursue programmatic activities to assist
IDPs. To avoid cancellation of licences or straining their relationship with the host government, some
NGOs and donors funded small-scale projects, usually in a discreet manner.
There is a distinct lack of academic interest in the subject of internal population displacement in Kenya. It
is a relatively green area lacking in literature, and students are deterred from researching by the fact that no
agencies seem to be doing anything on the ground. Besides, IDPs are found in politically charged
environments that many fear to venture into, especially when research permits are denied or movement
within affected regions restricted by the authorities. Agencies, research and learning institution’s lack of
information or literature on Kenya’s IDPs create the impression that there are none in the country. It
therefore becomes quite easy for donors to dismiss proposals for assistance as exaggerations designed to
get funding for other projects" (DPMCU, Dec 2002, p. 42).
UNDP has not been involved in follow-up activities on the situation of the displaced
since 1995 (2002)
• Silence and inaction by the UN and a large section of civil society in Kenya may be attributable to
political sensitivity of the IDP issue
“Since the UNDP ‘Displaced Persons Program in Kenya’ was wound up in 1995, UNDP has not been
involved in research or follow-up activities on the situation of the displaced. Nor have other UN agencies in
Kenya been vocal about the subject. This omission is all the more glaring in the light of the UNDP’s
priority of addressing poverty. IDPs remain the poorest of the poor, and UNDP in its Poverty Eradication
Programmes needs to look at population displacement and dispossession as an on-going problem in Kenya.
Given that IDPs far outnumber the number of recognized cross-border refugees in Kenya, UNDP needs to
recognize them as a subgroup of the most impoverished and marginalized and set up assistance
programmes targeting them. Silence and inaction by the UN and a large section of civil society in Kenya
may be attributable to political sensitivity of the issue (and for NGOs, this and lack of resources), but
general opinion among many academics and practitioners interviewed in this instance is that the UN is
embarrassed about the failure of the UNDP programme, a situation that has contributed to the silence and
indifference. Yet UNDP, having previous experience with the displaced in the 1990s, and in its mandate to
alleviate poverty, is very well placed to revive interest in this subgroup of the most poor by lobbying the
government to recognize their existence and assistance needs. UNDP could also spearhead a process of
inter-agency response.” (UNIFEM, Jan 2002, pp, 10-11)
Limited international attention given to the conflicts within Kenya (2000)
• Ethnic conflicts regarded as internal affairs
• Conflicts considered relatively insignificant in comparison to conflicts in nearby countries
"To date there have been no conflict resolution initiatives from international sponsors, largely because
Kenyan conflicts tend to be regarded as internal affairs which are relatively insignificant in comparison to
conflicts in nearby countries. The fact that the elections of 1992 and 1997, although criticised by political
groups inside Kenya, were judged as relatively free and honest by international monitors has also
contributed to this neglect. The regime is regarded as legitimate.
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The government denies any involvement in the conflicts which makes it hard to identify the conflicting
parties and to bring them to the negotiating table. There is no organised, armed resistance against the
government. There is no acceptable alternative to President Moi.
Kenya’s various conflicts have aroused little attention in the foreign media. The Rift Valley has been
practically closed to foreign journalists in the belief that international intervention in domestic conflicts is
directly linked to the amount of media coverage they receive. The North-Eastern Province is remote from
the capital, and for unaccompanied UN-officials, other aid-workers and travelers it is a no-go area.
President Moi’s consistent denial of any government involvement in the political violence, however, is
becoming less and less credible. Kenya’s foreign donors have supported international human rights
organisations in their criticism of the Moi regime. What little public awareness exists of the conflicts in
Kenya, has been generated largely by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and African Rights."
(EPCPT November 2000)
UNDP's reconciliation and reintegration programme (1993-1995)
• HRW claims that the programme was obstructed by lack of government commitment to restore
the displaced to their lost land and livelihood
• HRW report criticising UNDP programme for not giving attention to protection needs and the
political causes of the displacement
• Forced expulsion of some 2,000 Kikuyu from Maela camp in December 1994 made UNDP more
outspoken advocate of the displaced
• Programme terminated in November 1995
"In 1993, UNDP took commendable initiative to create a reconciliation and reintegration program for those
displaced from the 'ethnic' clashes. The stated objective of the proposed U.S.$20 million Programme for
Displaced Persons was 'the reintegration of displaced populations into local communities, prevention of
renewed tensions and promotion of the process of reconciliation.' The program was implemented jointly
with the government. The program plan was based largely on two reports, known as the Rogge Reports,
after the author.
[...]
The first Rogge report provided a sound and well-conceived proposal for action that included short-term
relief assistance needs; medium-term needs for general development initiatives including the rehabilitation
of destroyed institutions, reconciliation seminars, employment training, and regularization of the land
tenure system; and long-term protection and security issues which, the report stressed, were paramount to
the program's success.
By the time the UNDP program began, levels of violence had diminished significantly, and reintegration
had begun to occur in some areas, particularly Nyanza and Western Province. However, at the same time,
the government steadily undermined reintegration through active obstruction of reintegration efforts on
some fronts and inaction on others. During the UNDP program, and since, there was no government
commitment to reverse the damage that had been caused, and to restore the displaced to their lost land and
livelihood without regard for ethnicity.
Even while progress was made in alleviating the emergency food and material assistance needs in the first
year of the UNDP program and some reintegration occurred, a climate of mistrust and insecurity persisted
in many parts of the Rift Valley. Numerous difficulties remained largely due to government resistance to
full reintegration, and a lack of political will to restore security, to redress past and continuing injustices
against the displaced, and to find lasting solutions particularly with regard to land reform. The Kenyan
122

government continued to harass and intimidate the displaced after they were driven from their land. The
government brought charges against critics of the government's policies towards the displaced, while at the
same time it allowed the instigators and perpetrators of the violence to enjoy complete impunity. [...].
[...]
In the face of this largely predictable resistance from government quarters, UNDP appeared unprepared and
unqualified to deal with the rights and protection implications that this raised. The manner in which the
program was initially structured did not put into place safeguards to minimize government control or
manipulation of the program. Instead of addressing the key impediments to lasting change, UNDP ignored
the political, human rights, and development dimensions of the displacement. Building its approach on
experience acquired previously through a drought alleviation program, UNDP proceeded as if all that was
necessary was to provide relief supplies to enable people to return-while doing nothing more than
acknowledging the political causes of the displacement and the attendant human rights violations that
needed to be addressed. Also, based on its usual working approach, UNDP partnered itself closely with the
government. Many of the issues that the Rogge reports identified as fundamental were disregarded in the
implementation of the program. Where UNDP encountered government resistance to addressing an issue,
such as human rights violations or land law reform, the agency's approach was to retreat rather than to press
for these fundamental changes to be made. The narrow perspective adopted by UNDP resulted in a program
that ignored issues responsible for the humanitarian crisis in Kenya which were key to finding lasting
solutions.
[...]
Ultimately, the manner in which the program was administered resulted in the greatest attention being
placed on that part of the program that was relatively the easiest and least politically controversial to
administer-the relief part-and a neglect of protection, human rights, and long-term needs, which would have
required UNDP to adopt a more critical advocacy role in relation to the Kenyan government. In the end,
UNDP was immobilized. UNDP was neither able to address the long-term developmental issues for
reintegration which it had the expertise to do, nor was it able to channel sufficient pressure on the
government where needed because it lacked the experience and political will.
The final blow to the flagging program was the forced expulsion of some 2,000 Kikuyu from Maela camp,
who were trucked out of the camp after a police raid in the middle of the night on December 24, 1994,
without the knowledge of UNDP, and dumped at three sites in their 'ancestral' home of Central Province. A
few days later, many of the same people were subjected to a second round of police raids, as the
government tried to disperse them as quickly as possible. For the first time, UNDP became an outspoken
advocate of the displaced, calling on the government and the world to stop these abuses. By that time,
however, UNDP's position was so compromised, it was in no position to mobilize donor and NGO support.
Despite assurances from UNDP that it would protect those who had been displaced from Maela, UNDP
never returned them to Maela, nor did the agency succeed in pressuring the government to punish the
responsible officials. At one point, UNDP's resident representative to Kenya characterized the forced
dispersal as a 'temporary hiccup' in the program, in a bid to urge donors and others not to allow this incident
to detract from the positive contributions of the program. Moreover, because UNDP had such poor NGO
relations and a record of praising the government, UNDP became a target of blame for the Maela camp
incident, irreparably damaging its image and credibility in Kenya. The Maela incident brought the UNDP
Displaced Persons Program in Kenya to a halt. It was formally ended in November 1995." (HRW June
1997, pp. 6, 7, 8, 10, 11)
"While UNDP cannot be held responsible for the Kenyan government's recalcitrance, it does bear some
responsibility for the thousands who remain displaced today. There are a number of identifiable factors that
could have strengthened UNDP's contribution. UNDP did not put into place a working agreement with the
government setting out basic operating conditions for the program. UNDP misread the situation and did not
put into place mechanisms to guard against government abuse. UNDP did not prioritize data collection. In
the context of forced dispersals by the government, the absence of a monitoring and reporting function
meant that there was no sustained follow-up or means of identifying those displaced who were expelled
from identifiable camp-like situations. UNDP also did not play a vigorous and outspoken advocacy and
protection role to protect the displaced against human rights abuses. UNDP was silent on the need for
123

accountability, and too ready to accept and to propound arguments that only a few officials were involved
as an alternative to confronting the government's betrayal of the very premise of its program. Its program
did not support and strengthen the local NGO community. As a result of these omissions and the
government's obstruction, UNDP was forced to end the program prematurely without addressing the longterm
solutions, including land reform, leaving thousands abandoned. An examination of these factors, if
acted on by UNDP, may avoid the same errors from being repeated in programs elsewhere." (HRW June
1997, pp. 83-84)
The Global IDP Database has not succeeded in accessing the original UNDP documents related to this
project. However, the hardcopy version of the HRW report includes an eight-page comment by UNDP on
the content of the HRW report. Among other comments, UNDP indicates that its support for IDPs was
not suspended in 1995 as the Government had agreed that it should "incorporate activities in favour of
displaced persons in its social dimension of development programme" (HRW June 1997, p. 151)
References to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement
No moves to use the Guiding Principles for policy on internal displacement by the
former government (Dec 2002)
”Feelings of abandonment have been heightened by claims from the authorities that there are no IDPs in
Kenya, aside from those temporarily displaced by drought, floods and other natural disasters, humanitarian
sources told IRIN recently.
'We keep hearing that Kenya is a peaceful country and that all the internally displaced have been resettled.
We are still here,' says one Thessalia resident. Partly because of this official position and the accompanying
'culture of silence', awareness of the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement among IDPs is
thought to be very low, according to humanitarian sources.
The issue of internal displacement has 'remained largely unaddressed at the advocacy and policy levels,'
sources said. Unlike neighbouring Uganda, for example, there have been no moves to use the Guiding
Principles as a model for an explicit policy on internal displacement, they added” (IRIN 14 Nov 2002).
124

LIST OF SOURCES USED
(alphabetical order)
Amnesty International (AI), 10 June 1998, Kenya:Political Violence Spirals
Internet : http://www.web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/index/AFR320191998 , accessed 10 July
2000
Article 19, December 1998, Kenya: Post-election political violence
Internet : http://www.article19.org/docimages/313.htm , accessed 10 July 2000
Article 19, October 1997, Deadly Marionettes: State-Sponsored Violence In Africa
Internet : http://www.article19.org/docimages/477.htm#2.3 , accessed 10 July 2000
BBC News, 16 August 2004, Kenya Maasai land claims rejected
Internet : http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3570656.stm , accessed 16 November
2004
BBC News, 24 August 2004, Nairobi police disperse Maasai
Internet : http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3594184.stm , accessed 16 November
2004
Carver, Richard , August 1995, Kenya: Update to end of July 1995 (WRITENET
Internet :
http://web.archive.org/web/19970221160105/www.unhcr.org/refworld/country/writenet/w
riken02.htm , accessed 9 September 2002
Catholic Information Service for Africa (CISA), 26 October 2004, KENYA: Illegal
Guns Cause Violence in the North, Leaders Say
Internet : http://www.salesians.org.za/newsletter-371.php , accessed 5 November 2004
Catholic Information Service for Africa (CISA), 31 August 2004, KENYA:
Government Urged to Urgently Resettle Landless Victims
Internet : http://www.salesians.org.za/newsletter-355.php , accessed 5 November 2004
Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM), October
1999, "Kikuyu, Kisii, Luhya, and Luo in Kenya" by Shin-wha Lee and Anne Pitsch
(Update by Alexander Danso)
Internet :
http://web.archive.org/web/20001206133300/www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar/kenkik.htm
accessed 18 July 2002
Christina Nyström , August 2000, KENYA: The Party System from 1963-2000
Internet : http://www.janda.org/ICPP/ICPP2000/Countries/9-CentralEastAfrica/96-
Kenya/96-Kenya63-00.htm , , accessed 10 November 2004
125

Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (CKRC), October 2001, REFUGEES IN
KENYA AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW PROCESS : The way forward.
Internet : http://www.kenyaconstitution.org/docs/07d048.htm , accessed 3 November
2004
Daily Nation (Nairobi), 23 November 2000, Kanu MPs block help for clashes victims
Internet : http://www.nationaudio.com/News/DailyNation/23112000/News/News76.html
accessed 6 December 2000
Daily Nation (Nairobi), 26 August 2004, Maasai seek Sh10bn for all their lost land
Internet :
http://www.nationmedia.com/dailynation/nmgcontententry.asp?category_id=1&newsid=
14371 , , accessed 27 August 2004
Daily Nation (Nairobi), 28 August 1999, "Church resettles over 1,000 displaced
families"
Internet : http://www.frontier.net/~johnnyd/kaiser/nation82899.htm , accessed 6
December 2000
East African Standard (Nairobi), 12 September 2004, Fourteen years later, it‘s a hard
life in the cold
Internet :
http://www.eastandard.net/archives/september/sun12092004/reports/rep12090407.htm ,
accessed 10 November 2004
East African Standard (Nairobi), 12 September 2004, Huruma residents are the picture
of disillusionment
Internet :
http://www.eastandard.net/archives/september/sun12092004/reports/rep12090405.htm ,
accessed 10 November 2004
East African Standard (Nairobi), 12 September 2004, It’s a tough life for the displaced
Internet :
http://www.eastandard.net/archives/september/sun12092004/reports/rep12090406.htm ,
accessed 10 November 2004
East African Standard (Nairobi), 12 September 2004, Kimunya: Internally displaced
opportunists
Internet :
http://www.eastandard.net/archives/september/sun12092004/reports/rep120904010.htm ,
accessed 30 November 2004
East African Standard (Nairobi), 12 September 2004, Revenge mission fanned the
flames of ethnic war
126

Internet :
http://www.eastandard.net/archives/september/sun12092004/reports/rep12090401.htm ,
accessed 10 November 2004
East African Standard (Nairobi), 12 September 2004, Rift Valley MPs seek justice for
clashes victims
Internet :
http://www.eastandard.net/archives/september/sun12092004/reports/rep12090403.htm ,
accessed 10 November 2004
East African Standard (Nairobi), 16 August 2004, Mass burial for victims
Internet :
http://www.eastandard.net/archives/august/mon16082004/headlines/news15080409.htm ,
accessed 25 October 2004
East African Standard (Nairobi), 29 October 2000, "A people scavenging for a
desperate future"
Internet : http://www.frontier.net/~johnnyd/kaiser/standard1029.htm , accessed 6
December 2000
East African Standard (Nairobi), 5 October 2004, Coast and Rift Valley bore the brunt
of land craze
Internet : http://www.eastandard.net/archives/sunday/hm_news/news.php?articleid=2259
accessed 28 October 2004
East African Standard (Nairobi), 6 October 2004, The ultimate solution to land crisis in
Kenya
Internet : http://www.eastandard.net/archives/sunday/hm_news/news.php?articleid=2302
accessed 28 October 2004
East African Standard (Nairobi), 6 September 2004, Search for lasting peace in the
vast Kerio Valley
Internet :
http://www.eastandard.net/archives/september/mon06092004/headlines/new06090401.ht
accessed 25 October 2004
East African Standard (Nairobi), 6 September 2004, Will peace deal hold over
boundary feud?
Internet :
http://www.eastandard.net/archives/september/mon06092004/headlines/new06090404.ht
accessed 25 October 2004
East African Standard (Nairobi), October 2004, Land report will be withheld
Internet : http://www.eastandard.net/archives/cl/hm_news/news.php?articleid=1925 , m ,
accessed 28 October 2004
127

East African Standard (Nairobi), October 2004, Who owns Kenya?
Internet : http://www.eastandard.net/archives/cl/hm_news/news.php?articleid=1916 , m ,
accessed 28 October 2004
European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation (EPCPT),
November 2000, Searching for Peace in Africa-An Overview of Conflict Prevention and
Management Activities: Kenya
Human Rights Watch (HRW), June 1997, Failing The Internally Displaced: The UNDP
Displaced Persons Program In Kenya
Internet : http://www.hrw.org/hrw/reports/1997/kenya2/ , , , accessed 10 July 2000
Independent Catholic News , 26 August 2004, Kenya remembers Fr John Kaiser
Internet : http://www.indcatholicnews.com/kenkasco.%20html , accessed 1 September
2004
Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 11 January 2002, IRIN Focus on
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