Social Justice Activism

FAMILIES IN SOCIETY • Volume 83, Number 4
During the twentieth century, the most popular approach
to the problem of distribution was based on utilitarian
arguments, whose calculus presupposes the rational
ordering of social goods to achieve what John Stuart Mill
(1971) termed the “greatest net balance of satisfaction” for
society. In the late twentieth century, this view was often
linked with the assumption that the prioritization of social
goals occurs through a process equally accessible to all
members of society in a manner that promotes generalized
benevolence. Yet, in his contemporary classic, A Theory of
Justice (1971, 1999), Rawls argues that as a philosophical
guide utilitarianism creates no imperative of social justice,
since it can be used to rationalize a concentration of goods
benefiting the privileged classes of society. Instead, the justice
of a system must be measured, he argued, based “on
how fundamental rights and duties are assigned and on the
economic opportunities and social conditions in the various
sectors of society” (p. 7; see also Rawls, 2001).
Rawls based his conception of distributive justice on the
premise that “all social values … are to be distributed equally
unless an unequal distribution of any, or all, of these values
is to everyone’s advantage” (p. 62). He derived what he
called his maximin theory from two fundamental principles:
• Each person has an equal right to the most extensive system
of personal liberty compatible with a system of total liberty
for all
• Social and economic inequality are to be arranged so that
they are both (a) to the greatest benefit to the least advantaged
in society and (b) attached to positions open to all
under conditions of fair equality of opportunity
From these principles of justice, Rawls articulated a
“principle of redress,” which established the philosophical
basis for social policies directed toward a more just distribution
of social goods. Other scholars have applied this
principle to support policies like affirmative action and
reparations for African Americans (Maguire, 1980; Robinson,
2000). As stated by Rawls, the principle seems particularly
well-suited to the social work profession’s goal of
eliminating racial, gender, and economic inequalities.
Undeserved inequalities call for redress; and since
inequalities of birth and natural endowment are
undeserved, these inequalities are to be somehow
compensated for. Thus, the principle holds that in
order to treat all persons equally, to provide genuine
equality of opportunity, society must give more attention
to those with fewer native assets and to those
born into the less favorable social positions. The idea
is to redress the bias of contingencies in the direction
of equality. (1971, p. 100)
This view of distributive justice found adherents in religious
circles as well. In their famous pastoral letter
(1986), the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops went
even further than Rawls. The bishops asserted that “distributive
justice requires that the allocation of income,
wealth, and power in society be evaluated in light of its effect
on persons whose basic needs are unmet” (paragraph
70). The document also stated that “social justice implies
that persons have an obligation to be active and productive
participants in the life of society and that society has a
duty to enable them to participate in this way.” Thus, the
concept of social justice “also includes a duty to organize
economic and social institutions so that people can contribute
to society in ways that respect their freedom and the dignity
of their labor” (paragraphs 71 & 72, emphases added).
Part of the appeal of Rawls’ theory and the Bishops’ letter
is in the synthesis they forged between two competing
meta-analyses—liberalism and socialism—whose conflicting
influences have been regarded as central to the development
of modern Western social welfare (George &
Wilding, 1994). Rawls’ “difference principle” and the duties
articulated by the pastoral letter seek to equalize life
chances for people across racial, gender, and class lines, but
never at the expense of the basic liberal freedoms protected
by the “equal liberty principle” (Tomasi, 2001; Gutman,
1989; Moon, 1988; Sandel, 1982; Ackerman, 1980).
This synthesis is particularly compelling for the social work
profession because of its historic emphasis on both the
preservation of individual human rights and dignity—best
expressed through the concept of self-determination—and
the redistribution of resources to promote the well-being
of disadvantaged populations (National Association of Social
Workers, 1996). It also offers social reformers a conceptual
escape from the trap laid by conservative opponents
of social welfare that have often obfuscated appeals for justice-centered
social policies by labeling them with antidemocratic
rhetoric, such as quotas (Hayek, 1976; Mead,
1986; Nozick, 1974; Sunstein, 1997).
Two fundamental problems are often overlooked, however,
in discussions of applying justice principles to contemporary
social policy debates. The first is the paradox of
attempting to develop principles of justice within a political,
economic, and social context based largely, if tacitly, on
the preservation of injustice. As Smith (1988) argues, “the
longstanding history of invidious discrimination in the
United States demonstrates that attention must always be
paid to the threats [it] poses to liberal values” (p. 247).
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