The Violent Crime and Law Enforcement Act of 1994

Page 2 of 190

Walk by Faith; Serve with Abandon 

Expect to Win! 



The Advocacy Foundation, Inc. 

Helping Individuals, Organizations & Communities 

Achieve Their Full Potential 

Since its founding in 2003, The Advocacy Foundation has become recognized as an effective 

provider of support to those who receive our services, having real impact within the communities 

we serve. We are currently engaged in community and faith-based collaborative initiatives, 

having the overall objective of eradicating all forms of youth violence and correcting injustices 

everywhere. In carrying-out these initiatives, we have adopted the evidence-based strategic 

framework developed and implemented by the Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency 

Prevention (OJJDP). 

The stated objectives are: 

1. Community Mobilization; 

2. Social Intervention; 

3. Provision of Opportunities; 

4. Organizational Change and Development; 

5. Suppression [of illegal activities]. 

Moreover, it is our most fundamental belief that in order to be effective, prevention and 

intervention strategies must be Community Specific, Culturally Relevant, Evidence-Based, and 

Collaborative. The Violence Prevention and Intervention programming we employ in 

implementing this community-enhancing framework include the programs further described 

throughout our publications, programs and special projects both domestically and 

internationally. 

www.Advocacy.Foundation 

ISBN: ......... ../2017 

......... Printed in the USA 

Advocacy Foundation Publishers 

Philadelphia, PA 

(878) 222-0450 | Voice | Data | SMS 



Dedication 

______ 

Every publication in our many series’ is dedicated to everyone, absolutely everyone, who by 

virtue of their calling and by Divine inspiration, direction and guidance, is on the battlefield dayafter-day 

striving to follow God’s will and purpose for their lives. And this is with particular affinity 

for those Spiritual warriors who are being transformed into excellence through daily academic, 

professional, familial, and other challenges. 

We pray that you will bear in mind: 

Matthew 19:26 (NLT) 

Jesus looked at them intently and said, “Humanly speaking, it is impossible. 

But with God everything is possible.” (Emphasis added) 

To all of us who daily look past our circumstances, and naysayers, to what the Lord says we will 

accomplish: 

Blessings!! 

- The Advocacy Foundation, Inc. 



The Transformative Justice Project 

Eradicating Juvenile Delinquency Requires a Multi-Disciplinary Approach 

The Juvenile Justice system is incredibly 

overloaded, and Solutions-Based programs are 

woefully underfunded. Our precious children, 

therefore, particularly young people of color, often 

get the “swift” version of justice whenever they 

come into contact with the law. 

Decisions to build prison facilities are often based 

on elementary school test results, and our country 

incarcerates more of its young than any other 

nation on earth. So we at The Foundation labor to 

pull our young people out of the “school to prison” 

pipeline, and we then coordinate the efforts of the 

legal, psychological, governmental and 

educational professionals needed to bring an end 

to delinquency. 

We also educate families, police, local businesses, 

elected officials, clergy, schools and other 

stakeholders about transforming whole communities, and we labor to change their 

thinking about the causes of delinquency with the goal of helping them embrace the 

idea of restoration for the young people in our care who demonstrate repentance for 

their mistakes. 

The way we accomplish all this is a follows: 

1. We vigorously advocate for charges reductions, wherever possible, in the 

adjudicatory (court) process, with the ultimate goal of expungement or pardon, in 

order to maximize the chances for our clients to graduate high school and 

progress into college, military service or the workforce without the stigma of a 

criminal record; 

2. We then endeavor to enroll each young person into an Evidence-Based, Data- 

Driven Transformative Justice program designed to facilitate their rehabilitation 

and subsequent reintegration back into the community; 

3. While those projects are operating, we conduct a wide variety of ComeUnity- 

ReEngineering seminars and workshops on topics ranging from Juvenile Justice 

to Parental Rights, to Domestic issues to Police friendly contacts, to Mental 

Health intervention, to CBO and FBO accountability and compliance; 


4. Throughout the process, we encourage and maintain frequent personal contact 

between all parties; 

5 Throughout the process we conduct a continuum of events and fundraisers 

designed to facilitate collaboration among professionals and community 

stakeholders; and finally 

6. 1 We disseminate Monthly and Quarterly publications, like our e-Advocate series 

Newsletter and our e-Advocate Monthly and Quarterly Electronic Compilations to 

all regular donors in order to facilitate a lifelong learning process on the everevolving 

developments in both the Adult and Juvenile Justice systems. 

And in addition to the help we provide for our young clients and their families, we also 

facilitate Community Engagement through the Transformative Justice process, 

thereby balancing the interests of local businesses, schools, clergy, social 

organizations, elected officials, law enforcement entities, and other interested 

stakeholders. Through these efforts, relationships are built, rebuilt and strengthened, 

local businesses and communities are enhanced & protected from victimization, young 

careers are developed, and our precious young people are kept out of the prison 

pipeline. 

Additionally, we develop Transformative “Void Resistance” (TVR) initiatives to elevate 

concerns of our successes resulting in economic hardship for those employed by the 

penal system. 

TVR is an innovative-comprehensive process that works in conjunction with our 

Transformative Justice initiatives to transition the original use and purpose of current 

systems into positive social impact operations, which systematically retrains current 

staff, renovates facilities, creates new employment opportunities, increases salaries and 

is data-proven to enhance employee’s mental wellbeing and overall quality of life – an 

exponential Transformative Social Impact benefit for ALL community stakeholders. 

This is a massive undertaking, and we need all the help and financial support you can 

give! We plan to help 75 young persons per quarter-year (aggregating to a total of 250 

per year) in each jurisdiction we serve) at an average cost of under $2,500 per client, 

per year. * 

Thank you in advance for your support! 

* FYI: 

1 

In addition to supporting our world-class programming and support services, all regular donors receive our Quarterly e-Newsletter 

(The e-Advocate), as well as The e-Advocate Quarterly Magazine. 


1. The national average cost to taxpayers for minimum-security youth incarceration, 

is around $43,000.00 per child, per year. 

2. The average annual cost to taxpayers for maximum-security youth incarceration 

is well over $148,000.00 per child, per year. 

- (US News and World Report, December 9, 2014); 

3. In every jurisdiction in the nation, the Plea Bargaining rate is above 99%. 

The Judicial system engages in a tri-partite balancing task in every single one of these 

matters, seeking to balance Rehabilitative Justice with Community Protection and 

Judicial Economy, and, although the practitioners work very hard to achieve positive 

outcomes, the scales are nowhere near balanced where people of color are involved. 

We must reverse this trend, which is right now working very much against the best 

interests of our young. 

Our young people do not belong behind bars. 

- Jack Johnson 



The Advocacy Foundation, Inc. 

Helping Individuals, Organizations & Communities 

Achieve Their Full Potential 

…a compendium of works on 

The Violent Crime Control and 

Law Enforcement Act of 1994 

“Turning the Improbable Into the Exceptional” 

Atlanta 

Philadelphia 

______ 

Dea. John C Johnson III, J.D. 

Founding Partner & CEO 

(878) 222-0450 

Voice | Data | SMS 




Biblical Authority 

______ 

Psalm 34:14 (NIV) 

14 Turn from evil and do good; seek peace and pursue it. 

Proverbs 13:2 

2 From the fruit of their lips people enjoy good things, but the unfaithful have an appetite for 

violence. 

2 Timothy 3:1-5 

3 But mark this: There will be terrible times in the last days. 2 People will be lovers of 

themselves, lovers of money, boastful, proud, abusive, disobedient to their parents, ungrateful, 

unholy, 3 without love, unforgiving, slanderous, without self-control, brutal, not lovers of the 

good, 4 treacherous, rash, conceited, lovers of pleasure rather than lovers of God— 5 having a 

form of godliness but denying its power. Have nothing to do with such people. 

Matthew 26:51-52 

51 With that, one of Jesus’ companions reached for his sword, drew it out and struck the 

servant of the high priest, cutting off his ear. 52 “Put your sword back in its place,” Jesus said to 

him, “for all who draw the sword will die by the sword. 

Romans 12:17-18 

17 Do not repay anyone evil for evil. Be careful to do what is right in the eyes of everyone. 18 If 

it is possible, as far as it depends on you, live at peace with everyone. 

Hebrews 10:30-32 

30 For we know him who said, “It is mine to avenge; I will repay,” and again, “The Lord will 

judge his people.” 31 It is a dreadful thing to fall into the hands of the living God. 32 Remember 

those earlier days after you had received the light, when you endured in a great conflict full of 

suffering. 


1 Timothy 3:2-3 

2 Now the overseer is to be above reproach, faithful to his wife, temperate, self-controlled, 

respectable, hospitable, able to teach, 3 not given to drunkenness, not violent but gentle, not 

quarrelsome, not a lover of money. 

Galatians 5:19-21 

19 The acts of the flesh are obvious: sexual immorality, impurity and debauchery; 20 idolatry 

and witchcraft; hatred, discord, jealousy, fits of rage, selfish ambition, dissensions, 

factions 21 and envy; drunkenness, orgies, and the like. I warn you, as I did before, that those 

who live like this will not inherit the kingdom of God. 

Habakkuk 2:17 

17 The violence you have done to Lebanon will overwhelm you, and your destruction of animals 

will terrify you. For you have shed human blood; you have destroyed lands and cities and 

everyone in them. 

Ezekiel 45:9 

9 “‘This is what the Sovereign Lord says: You have gone far enough, princes of Israel! Give up 

your violence and oppression and do what is just and right. Stop dispossessing my people, 

declares the Sovereign Lord. 


Table of Contents 

…a compilation of works on 

The Violent Crime Control 

and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 

Biblical Authority 

I. Introduction: The Clinton Crime Control Bill: 

Why Is It So Controversial? ….…………………………………….19 

II. The Three-Strikes Law In The U.S.…………………………………… 25 

III. Deterrence in U.S. Criminal Justice….………………………………. 33 

IV. The Eighth Amendment to The U.S. Constitution…………………… 43 

V. Mandatory Sentencing in The U.S………..…………………………... 57 

VI. Habitual Offender Laws Around The World………………………….. 71 

VII. U.S. Federal Fair Sentencing Guidelines………………………........ 79 

VIII. References…………………………………………………….............. 99 

______ 

Attachments 

A. The Three-Strikes Laws Five Years Later 

B. Aging Behind Bars: Three-Strikes Seven Years Later 

C. Striking-Out: California’s Three-Strikes and You’re Out Law Has Not Reduced 

Violent Crime 

Copyright © 2003 – 2019 The Advocacy Foundation, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 


This work is not meant to be a piece of original academic 

analysis, but rather draws very heavily on the work of 

scholars in a diverse range of fields. All material drawn upon 

is referenced appropriately. 


I. Introduction 

The Clinton Crime Bill: Why Is It So 

Controversial? 

by Jessica Lussenhop BBC News Magazine | 18 April 2016 

A 1994 federal crime bill passed by former President Bill Clinton has become a 

problem for Hillary Clinton's campaign. But what did it actually do? 

The crime bill in question is the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, an 

enormous $30bn (£21bn) package that was the largest crime-control bill in US history. 

Critics say the bill decimated communities of colour and accelerated mass 

incarceration. Proponents say it contributed to the precipitous decline in violent crime in 

the US that began in the mid-1990s. 

So who is right? 

1. What was the 1994 Crime Bill? 

The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act was a lengthy crime control bill 

that was put together over the course of six years. Its provisions implemented many 

things, including a "three strikes" mandatory life sentence for repeat offenders, money 

to hire 100,000 new police officers, $9.7bn in funding for prisons, and an expansion of 

death penalty-eligible offences. It also dedicated $6.1bn to prevention 


programmes "designed with significant input from experienced police officers", 

however, the bulk of the funds were dedicated to measures that are seen as punitive 

rather than rehabilitative or preventative. 

2. Why was it passed and who supported it? 

At the time, violent crime was seen as out of control in the US. Starting in 1987, 

the homicide rate in the US was increasing by 5% each year, peaking in 1991 with 9.8 

deaths per every 100,000 people. Many of those victims were young African 

Americans. Robbery and assault rates had exploded beginning in the late 1960s, and 

the crack cocaine epidemic was devastating the nation's urban centres. 

The bill had bipartisan support, and easily passed both the House and Senate. The 

Clintons have pointed out that both black politicians and community leaders backed the 

law, and in general supported increased law enforcement in order to help quell street 

violence destroying communities. 

But a recent New York Times op-ed calls this a "selective hearing" of what African 

American leaders were asking for and points out that members of the Congressional 

Black Caucus asked for provisions in the bill that were left out. 

"Policy makers pointed to black support for greater punishment and surveillance, 

without recognizing accompanying demands to redirect power and economic resources 

to low-income minority communities," according to the piece, written by three Ivy 

League professors of history and African American studies. "When blacks ask for better 

policing, legislators tend to hear more instead." 

3. Did it cause mass incarceration? 

No. But many believe that it may have amplified effects that were already under way. 

Historians point out that there had already been decades worth of punitive crime control 

laws that ramped up the rate of incarceration in the US, including the Ronald Reagan 

Anti-Drug Abuse Acts which established mandatory minimum sentences for drug 

possession, or Lyndon Johnson's Safe Streets Act of 1968, which increased the flow of 

federal money to local and state police. Many pieces of punitive crime legislation predated 

the 1994 bill, on the federal, state and local levels. The prison population had 

tripled in the two decades that preceded the act. 

"The feds are very much a reactor in criminal law, not a creator. Much of this was 

already well under way," says John Pfaff, professor of law at Fordham University, who 

argues the actions of local prosecutors are a better starting point when tracing the roots 

of mass incarceration. 


The 1994 crime bill's sentencing guidelines also only applied to those charged with 

federal crimes. The vast majority - an estimated 87% - of the country's prison population 

is housed in state prisons. However, in the 22 years since the bill was passed, the 

federal prison population more than doubled. In 1994, the Bureau of Prisons held 

95,162 inmates; today that number is 214,149. 

The bill did attempt to incentivise states to pass tougher sentencing laws by offering up 

additional federal dollars, but Pfaff says only a handful of states took advantage of 

that. 

At minimum, says Marc Mauer, executive director of The Sentencing Project, the bill 

reinforced the popular thinking that the solution to crime was harsher punishments. 

"This was a national bill, it got an enormous amount of attention at the time," he says. "I 

think it very much helped to solidify the 'tough on crime' movement." 

4. Did it cause the precipitous decline in crime that began in the 1990s? 


Mr Clinton said at one point the 1994 crime bill caused "a 25-year low in crime, a 33- 

year low in the murder rate". That is probably not true, though the causes of the drop in 

crime have puzzled academics for years. 

By the time the crime bill was passed, violent crime had begun its decline in the US. It 

would continue to plummet throughout the 1990s before levelling out in the early 2000s. 

Crediting a single piece of federal legislation is a stretch, says Mauer, and furthermore, 

the White House should have taken the decrease in crime rates that was already 

happening into consideration when it drafted the bill. 

"We couldn't know then how much [the crime rate] would go down, but there should 

have at least been some recognition of that before jumping on this 'tough on crime' 

bandwagon," he says. 

5. What effect will the bill have on Hillary Clinton's legacy and her bid for the 

presidency? 

Hillary Clinton has already admitted that the 1994 bill went too far. She apologised 

for her use of the term "superpredator" when referring to a supposedly new kind of 

remorseless juvenile criminal that ultimately never emerged. She has spoken repeatedly 

on the campaign trail about ending mass incarceration. Her platform promises to 

make the Fair Sentencing Act retroactive and to reduce nonviolent drug crime 

mandatory sentences. 

But other policies enacted by the Clintons had detrimental effects for communities of 

colour and former inmates returning to society, even if they did not directly cause mass 

incarceration. One part of the Crime Bill stripped all Pell Grant funding for college 

education for prisoners, even though education is now seen as an effective tool against 

recidivism. President Clinton championed a "one strike, you're out" policy for evicting 

public housing tenants if they or their guests were involved in any criminal activity, 

causing a jump in evictions and making it more difficult for former inmates to find 

housing. 

When the 1994 Crime Bill was being drafted, Elizabeth Hinton, assistant professor of 

history and African and African American studies, says that the US Sentencing 

Commission already knew that punitive criminal control and prison policies were 

disproportionately affecting people of color. That, she says, is what people should make 

a note of when deciding whether Mrs Clinton still should pay a political price for the 

policies of the 1990s. 

"Part of this is not just reckoning with the Clinton legacy, but reckoning with the policy 

choices that both Democrats and Republicans have made since the Civil Rights 

Movement - replacing social welfare policies with punitive measures," she says. 


"The Clinton administration knew that the criminal justice system was deeply unfair and 

biased against African Americans, and chose to expand that system." 



II. The Three-Strikes Law 

In The U.S. 

In the United States, habitual offender laws (commonly referred to as three-strikes laws) 

were first implemented on March 7, 1994 and are part of the United States Justice 

Department's Anti-Violence Strategy. These laws require both a severe 

violent felony and two other previous convictions to serve a mandatory life 

sentence in prison. The purpose of the laws is to drastically increase the punishment of 

those convicted of more than two serious crimes. 

Twenty-eight states have some form of a "three-strikes" law. A person accused under 

such laws is referred to in a few states (notably Connecticut and Kansas) as a 

"persistent offender", while Missouri uses the unique term "prior and persistent 

offender". In most jurisdictions, only crimes at the felony level qualify as serious 

offenses; however, misdemeanor and/or wobbler offenses can qualify for application of 

the three-strikes law in California, whose harsh application has been the subject of 

controversy. 

The three-strikes law significantly increases the prison sentences of persons convicted 

of a felony who have been previously convicted of two or more violent crimes or serious 

felonies, and limits the ability of these offenders to receive a punishment other than 

a life sentence. 


The expression "Three strikes and you are out" is derived from baseball, where 

a batter against whom three strikes are recorded strikes out. 

History 

The practice of imposing longer prison sentences on repeat offenders (versus first-time 

offenders who commit the same crime) is nothing new, as judges often take into 

consideration prior offenses when sentencing. However, there is a more recent history 

of mandatory prison sentences for repeat offenders. For example, New York State had 

a long-standing Persistent Felony Offender law dating back to the early 20th 

century (partially ruled unconstitutional in 2010, but reaffirmed en banc shortly after). 

But such sentences were not compulsory in each case, and judges had much more 

discretion as to what term of incarceration should be imposed. 

The first true "three-strikes" law was passed in 1993, when Washington voters 

approved Initiative 593. California passed its own in 1994, when their voters passed 

Proposition 184 by an overwhelming majority, with 72% in favor and 28% against. The 

initiative proposed to the voters had the title of Three Strikes and You're Out, referring 

to de facto life imprisonment after being convicted of three violent or serious felonies 

which are listed under California Penal Code section 1192.7. 

The concept swiftly spread to other states, but none of them chose to adopt a law as 

sweeping as California's. By 2004, twenty-six states and the federal government had 

laws that satisfy the general criteria for designation as "three-strikes" statutes—namely, 

that a third felony conviction brings a sentence of 20 to life where 20 years must be 

served before becoming parole eligible. A 1997 study found that in California, "the 

three-strikes law did not decrease serious crime or petty theft rates below the level 

expected on the basis of preexisting trends." 

Three-strikes laws have been cited as an example of the McDonaldization of 

punishment, in which the focus of criminological and penological interest has shifted 

away from retribution and treatment tailored to the individual offender and toward the 

control of high-risk groups based on aggregations and statistical averages. A threestrikes 

system achieves uniformity in punishment of criminals in a certain class (viz., 

three-time offenders) in a way that is analogous to how a fast food restaurant achieves 

uniformity of its product. 

Enactment by States 

The following states have enacted three-strikes laws: 

New York has employed a habitual felon statute since 1797. 

North Carolina has had a law dealing with habitual felons since 1967, but the law was 

amended in 1994 and now means that a third conviction for any violent felony (which 


includes any Class A, B, C, D or E Felony) will result in a mandatory sentence of life 

imprisonment without parole. 

Maryland has had a habitual felon statute for violent offenders since 1975. The law was 

amended in 1994, meaning that a fourth conviction for a crime of violence mandates a 

sentence of life imprisonment without parole. 

Alabama has had a habitual felon statute for serious and violent felons since 1977, 

providing for up to life imprisonment, and includes a mandatory life sentence without 

parole for three or more felony convictions for any crime and one of those convictions 

were for any offense classified as a Class A Felony (10–99 years or life). 

Delaware has had a three-strikes law providing up to life imprisonment for serious 

felonies since 1973, when the Delaware Criminal Code, contained under Part I, Title 11 

of the Delaware Code, became effective. 

Texas has had a three-strikes with mandatory life sentence since at least 1952. 

In Rummel v. Estelle (1980), the US Supreme Court upheld Texas' statute, which arose 

from a case involving a refusal to repay $120.75 paid for air conditioning repair that 


was, depending on the source cited, either considered unsatisfactory or not performed 

at all, where the defendant had been convicted of two prior felony convictions, and 

where the total amount involved from all three felonies was around $230. 

In 1993: Washington 

In 1994: California,[24] Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, New 

Mexico, North Carolina, Virginia, Louisiana, Wisconsin, and Tennessee. Tennessee is 

one of the few states, together with Georgia and South Carolina, that mandates life 

without parole for two or more convictions for the most serious violent crimes, including 

murder, rape, child sexual abuse, aggravated cases of robbery, sexual abuse or child 

sexual abuse, etc. 

In 1995: Arkansas, Florida, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, 

Pennsylvania, Utah, Georgia and Vermont. Georgia has a "two strikes" law, also known 

as the "seven deadly sins" law, which mandates a sentence of life imprisonment without 

parole for two or more convictions of murder, rape, armed robbery, kidnapping, 

aggravated sexual battery, aggravated sodomy, or aggravated child molestation or any 

combination of those offenses. 

In 1996: South Carolina. South Carolina also has a "two strikes" law for crimes known 

as a "most serious offense", which are crimes like murder, rape, attempted murder, 

armed robbery, etc. whereas, the "three strikes" law applies to "serious offences" which 

are many drug offenses, other violent crimes like burglary, robbery, arson, etc. and even 

serious nonviolent crimes like insurance fraud, forgery, counterfeit, etc. Two convictions 

or three convictions under these provisions or any combination of these will 

automatically result in a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole. The 

South Carolina "two strikes" law is similar to Georgia's seven-deadly-sins law. 

In 2006: Arizona 

In 2012: Massachusetts 

Georgia, South Carolina and Tennessee are the only states in the United States to date 

that have "two strikes" laws for the most serious violent crimes, such as murder, rape, 

serious cases of robbery, etc. and they all mandate a sentence of life imprisonment 

without parole for a conviction of any such crimes a second time around. 

Application 

The exact application of the three-strikes laws varies considerably from state to state, 

but the laws call for life sentences for at least 25 years on their third strike. In the state 

of Maryland, any person who receives their fourth strike for any crime of violence will 

automatically be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. 


Most states require one or more of the three felony convictions to be for violent crimes 

in order for the mandatory sentence to be pronounced. Crimes that fall under the 

category of "violent" include: murder, kidnapping, sexual abuse, rape, aggravated 

robbery, and aggravated assault. 

Some states include additional, lesser offenses that one would not normally see as 

violent. For example, the list of crimes that count as serious or violent in the state of 

California is much longer than that of other states, and consists of many lesser offenses 

that include: firearm violations, burglary, simple robbery, arson, and providing hard 

drugs to a minor, and drug possession. As another example, Texas does not require 

any of the three felony convictions to be violent, but specifically excludes certain "state 

jail felonies" from being counted for enhancement purposes. 

One application of a three-strikes law was the Leonardo Andrade case in California in 

2009. In this case, Leandro Andrade attempted to rob $153 in videotapes from two San 

Bernardino K-Mart stores. He was charged under California's three-strikes law because 

of his criminal history concerning drugs and other burglaries. Because of his past 

criminal records, he was sentenced to 50 years in prison with no parole after this last 

burglary of K-Mart. Although this sentencing was disputed by Erwin Chemerinsky, who 

represented Andrade, as cruel and unusual punishment under the 8th Amendment, the 

Supreme Court ruled in support for the life sentencing. 

In 1995, Sioux City, Iowa native Tommy Lee Farmer, a professional criminal who had 

served 43 years in prison for murder and armed robbery was the first person in the 

United States to be convicted under the federal three-strikes law when he was 

sentenced to life in prison for an attempted robbery at an eastern Iowa convenience 

store. He was prosecuted by Stephen J. Rapp, a US Attorney appointed by Clinton. The 


sentencing was considered so significant that President Bill Clinton interrupted a 

vacation to make a press statement about it. 

Another example of the three-strikes law involves Timothy L. Tyler who, in 1992 at age 

24, was sentenced to life in prison without parole when his third conviction (a federal 

offense) triggered the federal three-strikes law, even though his two prior convictions 

were not considered violent, and neither conviction resulted in any prison time served. 

United States 

Effects 

Some states, such as California, have seen dramatic drops in their crime rates since the 

enactment of the Three- Strikes Law. In 2011, Los Angeles, California reported that 

crime had decreased by half of the current amount since 1994, which is the same year 

the Three- Strikes Law was put into place. Although this decrease in crime might be 

attributed to the enactment of stricter sentences, Los Angeles officials speculate the 

drop in crime might also be related to better relationships within the community and 

better crime-predicting tools. 

In 2004, The Effect of Three- Strikes Legislation on Serious Crime in California study 

analyzed the effect of the Three- Strikes legislation as a means of deterrence 

and incapacitation. The study found that the Three- Strikes Law did not have a very 

significant effect on deterrence of crime, but also that this ineffectiveness may be due to 

the diminishing marginal returns associated with having pre-existing repeat offender 

laws in place. 

A study, Does Three Strikes Deter? A Non-Parametric Estimation, published by 

researchers at George Mason University found that arrest rates in California were up to 

20% lower for the group of offenders convicted of two-strike eligible offenses, compared 

to those convicted of one-strike eligible offenses. The study concluded that the threestrikes 

policy was deterring recidivists from committing crimes. California has seen a 

reduction in criminal activity "Stolzenberg and D’Alessio found that serious crime in 

California’s 10 largest cities collectively had dropped 15% during the 3-year postintervention 

period" 

A study written by Robert Parker, director of the Presley Center for Crime and Justice 

Studies at UC Riverside, states that, violent crime began falling almost two years before 

California's three-strikes law was enacted in 1994. The study argues that the decrease 

in crime is linked to lower alcohol consumption and unemployment. 

A 2007 study from the Vera Institute of Justice in New York examined the effectiveness 

of incapacitation under all forms of sentencing. The study estimated that if US 

incarceration rates were increased by 10 percent, the crime rate would decrease by at 

least 2%. However, this action would be extremely costly to implement. 


Another study, I'd rather be Hanged for a Sheep than a Lamb: The Unintended 

Consequences of 'Three-Strikes' Laws, released by the National Bureau of Economic 

Research found that three-strikes laws discourage criminals from committing 

misdemeanors for fear of a life prison sentence. Although this deters crime and 

contributes to lower crime rates, the laws may possibly push previously convicted 

criminals to commit more serious offenses. The study's author argues that this is so 

because under such laws, felons realize that they could face a long jail sentence for 

their next crime, and therefore they have little to lose by committing serious crimes 

rather than minor offenses. Through these findings, the study weighs both the pros and 

cons for the law. 

A 2015 study found that three-strikes laws were associated with a 33% increase in the 

risk of fatal assaults on law enforcement officers. 

New Zealand 

In 2010, New Zealand enacted a similar three-strikes law called the Sentencing and 

Parole Reform Act 2010. The bill was sponsored by Police and Corrections 

Minister Judith Collins from the ruling National Party. It was passed into law by the 

National and ACT parties but was opposed by the opposition Labor and Green parties, 

and National's support partner, the Māori Party. While the Sentencing and Parole Act 

was supported by conservative groups such as the Sensible Sentencing Trust, critics 

attacked the law for promoting penal populism and disproportionately targeting 

the Māori community. 

In early June 2018, an attempt by the Labour-led coalition government to overturn the 

Sentencing and Parole Act was blocked by Labour's support partner New Zealand 

First and the opposition National and ACT parties. NZ First had indicated its opposition 


to overturning the three-strikes bill, prompting Justice Minister Andrew Little to abandon 

the attempt. 

Criticism 

Some criticisms of three-strikes laws are that they clog the court system with 

defendants taking cases to trial in an attempt to avoid life sentences, and clog jails with 

defendants who must be detained while waiting for these trials because the likelihood of 

a life sentence makes them a flight risk. Life imprisonment is also an expensive 

correctional option, and potentially inefficient given that many prisoners serving these 

sentences are elderly and therefore both costly to provide health care services to, and 

statistically at low risk of recidivism. Dependents of prisoners serving long sentences 

may also become burdensome on welfare services. 

Prosecutors have also sometimes evaded the three-strikes laws by processing arrests 

as parole violations rather than new offenses, or by bringing misdemeanor charges 

when a felony charge would have been legally justified. Likewise, there is potential for 

witnesses to refuse to testify, and juries to refuse to convict, if they want to keep a 

defendant from receiving a life sentence; this can introduce disparities in punishments, 

defeating the goal of treating third-time offenders uniformly. Three-strikes laws have 

also been criticized for imposing disproportionate penalties and focusing too much on 

street crime rather than white-collar crime. 


III. Deterrence In U.S. 

Criminal Justice 

Deterrence in relation to criminal offending is the idea or theory that the threat of 

punishment will deter people from committing crime and reduce the probability and/or 

level of offending in society. It is one of five objectives that punishment is thought to 

achieve; the other four objectives are denunciation, incapacitation (for the protection of 

society), retribution and rehabilitation. 

Criminal deterrence theory has two possible applications: the first is that punishments 

imposed on individual offenders will deter or prevent that particular offender from 

committing further crimes; the second is that, public knowledge that certain offences will 

be punished has a generalised deterrent effect which prevents others from committing 

crimes. 

Two different aspects of punishment may have an impact on deterrence. 

The first relates to the certainty of punishment; by increasing the likelihood of 

apprehension and punishment, this may have a deterrent effect. 


The second relates to the severity of punishment; how severe the punishment is for a 

particular crime may influence behavior if the potential offender concludes that the 

punishment is so severe, it is not worth the risk of getting caught. 

An underlying principle of deterrence is that it is utilitarian or forward-looking. As with 

rehabilitation, it is designed to change behaviour in the future rather than simply provide 

retribution or punishment for current or past behaviour. 

Categories 

There are two main goals of deterrence theory. 

Individual Deterrence is the aim of punishment to discourage the offender from 

criminal acts in the future. The belief is that when punished, offenders recognise the 

unpleasant consequences of their actions on themselves and will change their 

behaviour accordingly. 

General Deterrence is the intention to deter the general public from committing crime 

by punishing those who do offend. When an offender is punished by, for example, being 

sent to prison, a clear message is sent to the rest of society that behaviour of this sort 

will result in an unpleasant response from the criminal justice system. Most people do 

not want to end up in prison and so they are deterred from committing crimes that might 

be punished that way. 

Underlying Assumptions 

A key assumption underlying deterrence theory is that offenders weigh up the pros and 

cons of a certain course of action and make rational choices. Known as rational choice 

theory, it assumes the following: 

People are able to freely choose their actions and behaviour (as opposed to their 

offending being driven by socio-economic factors such as unemployment, poverty, 

limited education and/or addiction). 

The offender is capable of assessing the likelihood of getting caught. 

The offender knows the likely punishment that will be received. 

The offender is able to calculate whether the pain or severity of the likely punishment 

outweighs the gain or benefit of getting away with the crime. 

Other assumptions relate to the concept of marginal deterrence, based on the belief that 

it is prudent to punish a more severe crime more severely than a lesser crime and a 

series of crimes more severely than a single crime. The assumption here is that more 

severe penalties will deter criminals from committing more serious acts and so there is a 

marginal gain. 


Philosophical Basis 

Two utilitarian philosophers of the 18th century, Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham, 

formulated the deterrence theory as both an explanation of crime and a method for 

reducing it. Beccaria argued that crime was not only an attack on an individual but on 

society as well. That extended the issue of punishment beyond retribution and 

restitution to aggrieved individuals. Society was cast as victim, not merely bystander, 

and what had been seen as a dispute between individuals, expanded to an issue of 

criminal law. For the utilitarians, the purpose of punishment became the protection of 

society through the prevention of crime. 


Religious Basis 

The history of punishment in reaction to crime began in biblical times with the an eye for 

an eye guideline, although later Christians interpreted that literally by emphasizing 

compassion and tolerance, rather than punishment, even to the extent of "turning the 

other cheek." 

Although most Western populations eventually embraced some version of Judeo- 

Christian values, Medieval Europe displayed little of the restraint prescribed by this 

religious tradition. On the contrary, the level of violence among medieval populations 

were exceeded only by the force applied by emerging states in their attempts to 

maintain control and suppress it. Deciding guilt in an offender was more important than 

the nature of the offense. Once the guilt was announced, the question was not so much 

whether an execution should take place but how dramatic it should be. There were not 

many punishments besides exile and execution. 

In the Islamic system of hadd, applied 1400 years ago, the punishment for crimes was 

public and aimed at general social deterrence. 

Impact of Alcohol And Drugs 

Evidential Flaws 

Lack of Rationality 

The notion that that human beings are rational actors who consider the consequences 

of their behavior before deciding to commit a crime is seriously problematic. Although 

that level of rationality might apply to some well educated, white-collar criminals, most of 

those who end up in prison do not meet that profile. In the United States, one study 

found that at least half of all state prisoners are under the influence of alcohol or drugs 

at the time of their offence. However, the National Council on Alcoholism and Drug 

Dependence (NCADD) has found that 80% of all offending occurs under the influence of 

alcohol and drugs and that half of those in prison are clinically addicted. As such, most 

crime is committed by offenders who are too impaired to consider the pros and cons of 

their behaviour in a rational manner. 

Impact of Mental Health Disorders 

Research shows that a significant proportion of those in prison have personality 

disorders or other mental health disorders which affect their ability to make rational 

decisions. A 2016 study in Lancet Psychiatry has found that "prisoners have high rates 

of psychiatric disorders... Despite the high level of need, these disorders are frequently 

under-diagnosed and poorly treated". In 2002, a systematic review of 62 different 

studies from 12 different countries published in The Lancet found 65% of men in prison 

and 42% of women have a personality disorder. Mental health and personality disorders 


will clearly have an impact of an individual's capacity to make rational decisions about 

their offending behaviour. 

Impact of Brain Injury 

Many inmates have suffered head injuries, which can lead to loss of impulse control and 

cognitive impairment. A study in 2010 found that over 60% of prison inmates had 

experienced a significant head injury. Adults with traumatic brain injury were first sent to 

prison when quite young and reported higher rates of repeat offending. Having a head 

injury also reduces an individual's capacity for rational decision making, and the same 

goes for Fetal alcohol spectrum disorder, a neurological disability of the brain. Research 

has found that it causes "learning disabilities, impulsivity, hyperactivity, social ineptness, 

poor judgment, and can increase susceptibility to victimization and involvement in the 

criminal justice system". In fact, youths with FASD are 19 times more likely to be 

incarcerated than those without FASD in a given year because of their poor decisionmaking. 

Knowledge of Likely Punishment 

In order for a particular sanction to act as a deterrent, potential offenders must be aware 

of exactly what punishment they will receive before they commit an offence. However, 

evidence suggests that few people know what sentence will be imposed for a particular 

crime and, in the United States, generally underestimate how severe the sentence will 

be. Offenders are likely to be well aware that crimes such as assault, robbery, drug 

dealing, rape and murder will be punished but lack fine-grained knowledge of what the 

specific penalty is likely to be. An study by Anderson (2002) found that only 22% of 

offenders convicted of cultivating cannabis "knew exactly what the penalties would be". 

That is not surprising given that sentencing is a complex process: what sanction is 

imposed depends on a number of different factors including the offender's age, previous 

criminal history, whether or not they plead guilty, their perceived level of remorse, and 

any other mitigating factors. If a potential offender does not know what punishment he 

will receive, that undermines the ability to make a rational choice about whether the 


potential pain associated with committing a particular crime outweighs the potential 

gain. 

Another concern is that even if offenders have accurate knowledge about potential 

penalties, they do not necessarily take that information into account prior to committing 

a crime. Anderson's study quoted above found that 35% of offenders failed to think 

about the likely punishment prior to committing the offence. Durrant (2014) points out 

that many crimes are impulsive in nature and carried out "in the heat of the moment with 

little forethought or planning". 

Lack of Certainty of Punishment 

There are usually significant differences between the levels of crime in official statistics 

and the number of people who report they have been victimised in surveys of crime. 

Most crimes, including serious ones, do not result in arrest or conviction. in the United 

Kingdom, only an estimated 2% of offences lead to a conviction, and only one in seven 

of those convictions results in a prison sentence. The Home Office (1993) concluded 

that "the probability of being sent to prison for a crime is about one in 300". In the United 

States, it has been calculated that only one out of every 100 burglaries leads to a 

custodial sentence. In regard to drug use, the chances of getting caught are even more 

remote: less than one in 3,000. If it is unlikely that an offender will actually be caught, let 

alone punished, there is thus very little certainty of punishment, and any deterrent effect 

is substantially reduced. 

Perceptions of Risk 

Durrant (2014) argues that it is the perception of risk that has the potential to deter 

offending rather than punishment itself. He cites a study of offenders in which 76% did 

not think about getting caught or thought the chances of getting caught were slim. 

Offenders who have successfully got away with certain crimes are especially likely to 

discount the probability of getting caught, particularly for drink-driving. Durrant 

concludes: "for any given offence, the chances of actually getting punished by the 

criminal justice system are quite slim and active criminals are well aware of these 

favourable odds, thus undermining the potential deterrent effects of punishment". 

Certainty vs. Severity 

It is commonly assumed that increasing the severity of punishment increases the 

potential pain or cost of committing a crime and should therefore make offending less 

likely. One of the simplest methods to increase the severity is to impose a longer prison 

term for a particular crime. However, there are limits to how severe a punishment can 

be imposed because of the principle of proportionality: the severity of the punishment 

should be roughly proportionate to the gravity of the offending. In a review of the 

literature, Durrant found that "most systematic reviews of the effects of sentencing 

severity on crime conclude, with a few exceptions, that there is little or no evidence that 

increasing the punitiveness of criminal sanctions exerts an effect on offending". This is 


partly because many offenders get used to being in prison with the result that longer 

sentences are not necessarily perceived as being more severe than shorter sentences. 

Criminologists have found that enhancing the certainty of punishment produces a 

stronger deterrent effect than increasing the severity of the punishment; offenders who 

perceive that sanctions for particular crimes are almost inevitable are less likely to 

engage in criminal activity. However, because of low apprehension rates in most 

criminal justice systems, in practice it is much easier to make penalties more severe 

than it is to make them more certain. 

Effectiveness 

Measuring and estimating the effects of criminal sanction on subsequent criminal 

behavior are difficult. Despite numerous studies using a variety of data sources, 

sanctions, crime types, statistical methods and theoretical approaches, there remains 

little agreement in the scientific literature about whether, how, under what 

circumstances, to what extent, for which crimes, at what cost, for which individuals and, 

perhaps most importantly, in which direction do various aspects of contemporary 

criminal sanctions affect subsequent criminal behavior. There are extensive reviews of 

this literature with somewhat conflicting assessments. 

As a General Deterrent 

Daniel Nagin (1998), one of the leading authorities on the effectiveness of deterrence, 

believes the collective actions of the criminal justice system exert a very substantial 

deterrent on the community as a whole. He says it is also his "view that this conclusion 

is of limited value in formulating policy". He argues that the issue is not whether the 


criminal justice system in itself prevents or deters crime but whether a new policy, 

added onto the existing structure, will have any additional deterrent effect. 

As an Individual Deterrent 

More recent research by Nagin (2009) found that increased severity of punishment had 

little deterrent effect on individual offenders. 

A meta-analysis of the deterrent effect of punishment on individual offenders also 

suggests little benefit is gained from tougher sentences. In 2001 Canadian criminologist, 

Paul Gendreau, brought together the results of 50 different studies of the deterrent 

effect of imprisonment involving over 350,000 offenders. This included studies which 

compared the impact of prison over community sentences and the impact of longer 

versus shorter prison sentences on recidivism rates. The results revealed no support for 

the deterrent effects of punishment. Gendreau wrote: "None of the analyses found 

imprisonment reduced recidivism. The recidivism rate for offenders who were 

imprisoned as opposed to given a community sanction was similar. In addition, longer 

sentences were not associated with reduced recidivism. In fact the opposite was found. 

Longer sentences were associated with a 3% increase in recidivism. This finding 

suggests some support for the theory that prison may serve as a ‘school for crime’ for 

some offenders". 

Durrant states that "reviews of 'enhanced punishment' such as boot camps, intensive 

supervision, 'scared straight' programs, and electronic monitoring all seem to confirm 

that increasing the severity of punishment are typically consistent with the thesis that 

increasing the severity of punishment does not act as a significant deterrent to 

offenders". 

In a different kind of study, Kuziemko found that when parole was abolished (as a result 

of which prisoners served their full sentence), that increased the crime rate and the 

prison population by 10%. This is because prisoners who know they may get out early if 

they behave are psychologically invested in rehabilitation. When parole was eliminated 

for certain offenders (meaning there was no hope of early release), those prisoners 

accumulated more disciplinary infractions, completed fewer rehabilitative programs, and 

re-offended at higher rates than inmates who were released early. 

Death Penalty 

The death penalty is still retained in some countries, such as some of the United States, 

due to the perception that it is a potent deterrent for the most serious offences. In 1975, 

Ehrlich claimed the death penalty was effective as a general deterrent and that each 

execution lead to seven or eight fewer homicides in society. More recent research has 

failed to find such effects. Durrant (2014) believes that different outcomes achieved by 

different researchers depend largely on which research model is used. 


A major difficulty in evaluating the effectiveness of the death penalty as a deterrent in 

the United States is that very few people are actually executed. Fagan (2006) points out 

that "the rare and somewhat arbitrary use of execution in states (which still have the 

death penalty) means that it serves no deterrent function, because no would-be 

murderer can reasonably expect to be executed". 



IV. The Eighth Amendment 

to The U.S. Constitution 

The Eighth Amendment (Amendment VIII) of the United States Constitution prohibits the 

federal government from imposing excessive bail, excessive fines, or cruel and unusual 

punishments. This amendment was adopted on December 15, 1791, along with the rest 

of the United States Bill of Rights. The phrases in this amendment originated in the 

English Bill of Rights of 1689. 

The prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments has led courts to hold that the 

Constitution totally prohibits certain kinds of punishment, such as drawing and 

quartering. Under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, the Supreme Court has 

struck down the application of capital punishment in some instances, but capital 

punishment is still permitted in some cases where the defendant is convicted of murder. 

The Supreme Court has held that the Excessive Fines Clause prohibits fines that are 

"so grossly excessive as to amount to a deprivation of property without due process of 

law." The Court struck down a fine as excessive for the first time in United States v. 

Bajakajian (1998). Under the Excessive Bail Clause, the Supreme Court has held that 

the federal government cannot set bail at "a figure higher than is reasonably calculated" 

to ensure the defendant's appearance at trial. 

The Supreme Court has ruled that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause applies to 

the states as well as to the federal government, but the Excessive Bail Clause has not 


een applied to the states. On February 20, 2019, the Supreme Court ruled 

unanimously in Timbs v. Indiana that the Excessive Fines Clause also applies to the 

states. 

Text 

Background 

“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, 

nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” 

The Eighth Amendment was adopted, as part of the Bill of Rights, in 1791. It is almost 

identical to a provision in the English Bill of Rights of 1689, in which Parliament 

declared, "as their ancestors in like cases have usually done...that excessive bail ought 

not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 

inflicted." 

The provision was largely inspired by the case in England of Titus Oates who, after the 

ascension of King James II in 1685, was tried for multiple acts of perjury that had led to 

executions of many people Oates had wrongly accused. Oates was sentenced to 

imprisonment, including an annual ordeal of being taken out for two days pillory plus 

one day of whipping while tied to a moving cart. The Oates case eventually became a 

topic of the U.S. Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. The punishment of 

Oates involved ordinary penalties collectively imposed in a barbaric, excessive and 

bizarre manner. The reason why the judges in Oates' perjury case were not allowed to 

impose the death penalty (unlike in the cases of those whom Oates had falsely 

accused) may be because such a punishment would have deterred even honest 

witnesses from testifying in later cases. 

England's declaration against "cruel and unusual punishments" was approved by 

Parliament in February 1689, and was read to King William III and his wife Queen Mary 

II on the following day. Members of Parliament then explained in August 1689 that "the 

Commons had a particular regard…when that Declaration was first made" to 

punishments like the one that had been inflicted by the King's Bench against Titus 

Oates. Parliament then enacted the English Bill of Rights into law in December 1689. 

Members of parliament characterized the punishment in the Oates case as not just 

"barbarous" and "inhuman" but also "extravagant" and "exorbitant". 

There is some scholarly dispute about whom the clause intended to limit. In England, 

the "cruel and unusual punishments" clause may have been a limitation on the 

discretion of judges, requiring them to adhere to precedent. According to the great 

treatise of the 1760s by William Blackstone entitled Commentaries on the Laws of 

England: 

[H]owever unlimited the power of the court may seem, it is far from being wholly 

arbitrary; but its discretion is regulated by law. For the bill of rights has particularly 


declared, that excessive fines ought not to be imposed, nor cruel and unusual 

punishments inflicted: (which had a retrospect to some unprecedented proceedings in 

the court of king's bench, in the reign of king James the second).... 

Virginia adopted this provision of the English Bill of Rights in the Virginia Declaration of 

Rights of 1776, and the Virginia convention that ratified the U.S. Constitution 

recommended in 1788 that this language also be included in the Constitution. 

Virginians such as George Mason and Patrick Henry wanted to ensure that this 

restriction would also be applied as a limitation on Congress. Mason warned that, 

otherwise, Congress may "inflict unusual and severe punishments." Henry emphasized 

that Congress should not be allowed to depart from precedent: 

What has distinguished our ancestors?--That they would not admit of tortures, or cruel 

and barbarous punishment. But Congress may introduce the practice of the civil law, in 

preference to that of the common law. They may introduce the practice of France, 

Spain, and Germany.... 

Ultimately, Henry and Mason prevailed, and the Eighth Amendment was adopted. 

James Madison changed "ought" to "shall", when he proposed the amendment to 

Congress in 1789. 

Excessive Bail 

In England, sheriffs originally determined whether to grant bail to criminal suspects. 

Since they tended to abuse their power, Parliament passed a statute in 1275 whereby 


ailable and non-bailable offenses were defined. The King's judges often subverted the 

provisions of the law. It was held that an individual may be held without bail upon the 

Sovereign's command. Eventually, the Petition of Right of 1628 argued that the King did 

not have such authority. Later, technicalities in the law were exploited to keep the 

accused imprisoned without bail even where the offenses were bailable; such loopholes 

were for the most part closed by the Habeas Corpus Act 1679. Thereafter, judges were 

compelled to set bail, but they often required impracticable amounts. Finally, the English 

Bill of Rights (1689) held that "excessive bail ought not to be required." 

However, the English Bill of Rights did not determine the distinction between bailable 

and non-bailable offenses. Thus, the Eighth Amendment has been interpreted to mean 

that bail may be denied if the charges are sufficiently serious. 

The Supreme Court has also permitted "preventive" detention without bail. In United 

States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), the Supreme Court held that the only limitation 

imposed by the Excessive Bail Clause is that "the government's proposed conditions of 

release or detention not be 'excessive' in light of the perceived evil." In Stack v. Boyle, 

342 U.S. 1 (1951), the Supreme Court declared that a bail amount is "excessive" under 

the Eighth Amendment if it were "a figure higher than is reasonably calculated" to 

ensure the defendant's appearance at trial. 

The incorporation status of the Excessive Bail Clause is unclear. In Schilb v. Kuebel, 

404 U.S. 357 (1971), the Court stated in dicta: "Bail, of course, is basic to our system of 

law, and the Eighth Amendment's proscription of excessive bail has been assumed to 

have application to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment." In McDonald v. City 

of Chicago (2010), the right against excessive bail was included in a footnote listing 

incorporated rights. 

Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas 

Excessive Fines 

In Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86 (1909), the Supreme Court held that 

excessive fines are those that are "so grossly excessive as to amount to a deprivation of 

property without due process of law". The Court wrote in its syllabus: 

The fixing of punishment for crime and penalties for unlawful acts is within the police 

power of the state, and this Court cannot interfere with state legislation in fixing fines, or 

judicial action in imposing them, unless so grossly excessive as to amount to deprivation 

of property without due process of law. Where a state antitrust law fixed penalties at 

$5,000 a day, and, after verdict of guilty for over 300 days, a defendant corporation was 

fined over $1,600,000, this Court will not hold that the fine is so excessive as to amount 

to deprivation of property without due process of law where it appears that the business 

was extensive and profitable during the period of violation, and that the corporation has 

over $40,000,000 of assets and has declared dividends amounting to several hundred 

percent 


The Court further stated in its opinion: 

[I]t is contended that the fines imposed are so excessive as to constitute a taking of the 

defendant's property without due process of law. It is not contended in this connection 

that the prohibition of the Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution against 

excessive fines operates to control the legislation of the states. The fixing of punishment 

for crime or penalties for unlawful acts against its laws is within the police power of the 

state. We can only interfere with such legislation and judicial action of the states 

enforcing it if the fines imposed are so grossly excessive as to amount to a deprivation of 

property without due process of law. 

In essence, the government must not be able to confiscate such a large amount of 

property without following an established set of rules created by the legislature. 

Browning-Ferris v. Kelco 

In Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 

(1989), the Supreme Court ruled that the Excessive Fines Clause does not apply "when 

the government neither has prosecuted the action nor has any right to receive a share 

of the damages awarded". 

While punitive damages in civil cases are not covered by the Excessive Fines Clause, 

such damages were held to be covered by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment, notably in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 

U.S. 408 (2003). 


Austin v. United States 

In Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993), the Supreme Court ruled that the 

Excessive Fines Clause does apply to civil asset forfeiture actions taken by the federal 

government, in the specific case, the government's seizure of the petitioner's auto body 

shop on the bases of one charge of drug possession for which he had served seven 

years in prison. 

United States v. Bajakajian 

In United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998), the Supreme Court ruled that it was 

unconstitutional to confiscate $357,144 from Hosep Bajakajian, who had failed to report 

possession of over $10,000 while leaving the United States. In what was the first case 

in which the Supreme Court ruled that a fine violated the Excessive Fines Clause, the 

Court held that it was "grossly disproportional" to take all of the money Mr. Bajakajian 

had attempted to take out of the United States in violation of a federal law that required 

that he report an amount in excess of $10,000. In describing what constituted "gross 

disproportionality", the Court could not find any guidance from the history of the 

Excessive Fines Clause, and so relied on Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause case 

law: 

We must therefore rely on other considerations in deriving a constitutional excessiveness 

standard, and there are two that we find particularly relevant. The first, which we have 

emphasized in our cases interpreting the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, is that 

judgments about the appropriate punishment for an offense belong in the first instance to 

the legislature. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983) ("Reviewing courts ... 

should grant substantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures necessarily 

possess in determining the types and limits of punishments for crimes"); see also Gore v. 

United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958) ("Whatever views may be entertained regarding 

severity of punishment, ... these are peculiarly questions of legislative policy"). The 

second is that any judicial determination regarding the gravity of a particular criminal 

offense will be inherently imprecise. Both of these principles counsel against requiring 

strict proportionality between the amount of a punitive forfeiture and the gravity of a 

criminal offense, and we therefore adopt the standard of gross disproportionality 

articulated in our Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause precedents. See, e.g., Solem 

v. Helm, supra, at 288; Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 271 (1980). 

Thus the Court declared that, within the context of judicial deference to the legislature's 

power to set punishments, a fine would not offend the Eighth Amendment unless it were 

"grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant's offense". 

Timbs v. Indiana 

In Timbs v. Indiana the Supreme Court ruled that the Excessive Fines Clause applies to 

state and local governments under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment. The case involves the use of civil asset forfeiture to seize a $42,000 

vehicle under state law in addition to the imposition of a $1,200 fine for drug trafficking 

charges, house arrest, and probation. 


Cruel and Unusual Punishments 

According to the Supreme Court, the Eighth Amendment forbids some punishments 

entirely, and forbids some other punishments that are excessive when compared to the 

crime, or compared to the competence of the perpetrator. 

In Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947), the Supreme Court 

assumed arguendo that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause applied to the 

states through the Due Process Clause 

of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 

Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 

(1962), the Court ruled that it did apply 

to the states through the Fourteenth 

Amendment. Robinson was the first 

case in which the Supreme Court 

applied the Eighth Amendment against 

the state governments through the 

Fourteenth Amendment. Before 

Robinson, the Eighth Amendment had 

only been applied previously in cases 

against the federal government. 

Justice Potter Stewart's opinion for the 

Robinson Court held that "infliction of 

cruel and unusual punishment is in 

violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth 

Amendments." The framers of the 

Fourteenth Amendment, such as John 

Bingham, had discussed this subject: 

Many instances of State injustice and 

oppression have already occurred in the 

State legislation of this Union, of flagrant violations of the guarantied privileges of 

citizens of the United States, for which the national Government furnished and could 

furnish by law no remedy whatever. 

Contrary to the express letter of your Constitution, "cruel and unusual punishments" 

have been inflicted under State laws within this Union upon citizens, not only for crimes 

committed, but for sacred duty done, for which and against which the Government of 

the United States had provided no remedy and could provide none. 

In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), Justice Brennan wrote, "There are, then, 

four principles by which we may determine whether a particular punishment is 'cruel and 

unusual'." 


The "essential predicate" is "that a punishment must not by its severity be degrading to 

human dignity," especially torture. 

"A severe punishment that is obviously inflicted in wholly arbitrary fashion." 

"A severe punishment that is clearly and totally rejected throughout society." 

"A severe punishment that is patently unnecessary." 

Justice Brennan also wrote that he expected no state would pass a law obviously 

violating any one of these principles, so court decisions regarding the Eighth 

Amendment would involve a "cumulative" analysis of the implication of each of the four 

principles. In this way, the United States Supreme Court "set the standard that a 

punishment would be cruel and unusual [if] it was too severe for the crime, [if] it was 

arbitrary, if it offended society's sense of justice, or if it was not more effective than a 

less severe penalty." 

Punishments Forbidden Regardless of The Crime 

In Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878), the Supreme Court commented that drawing 

and quartering, public dissection, burning alive, or disembowelment constituted cruel 

and unusual punishment. In Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), the 

Supreme Court ruled that the death penalty constituted cruel and unusual punishment if 

the defendant is under age 16 when the crime was committed. Furthermore, in Roper v. 

Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), the Court barred the executing of people who were 

under age 18 when the crime was committed. In Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), 

the Court declared that executing people who are mentally handicapped constituted 

cruel and unusual punishment. 

Punishments Forbidden for Certain Crimes 

The case of Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), marked the first time that 

the Supreme Court exercised judicial review to overturn a criminal sentence as cruel 

and unusual. The Court overturned a punishment called cadena temporal, which 

mandated "hard and painful labor," shackling for the duration of incarceration, and 

permanent civil disabilities. This case is often viewed as establishing a principle of 

proportionality under the Eighth Amendment. However, others have written that "it is 

hard to view Weems as announcing a constitutional requirement of proportionality." 

In Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), the Supreme Court held that punishing a naturalborn 

citizen for a crime by revoking his citizenship is unconstitutional, being "more 

primitive than torture" because it involved the "total destruction of the individual's status 

in organized society." 

In Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), the Court decided that a California law 

authorizing a 90-day jail sentence for "be[ing] addicted to the use of narcotics" violated 

the Eighth Amendment, as narcotics addiction "is apparently an illness," and California 

was attempting to punish people based on the state of this illness, rather than for any 

specific act. The Court wrote: 


“To be sure, imprisonment for ninety days is not, in the abstract, a punishment which is 

either cruel or unusual. But the question cannot be considered in the abstract. Even one 

day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a 

common cold.” 

However, in Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), the Court upheld a statute barring 

public intoxication by distinguishing Robinson on the basis that Powell dealt with a 

person who was drunk in public, not merely for being addicted to alcohol. 

Traditionally, the length of a prison sentence was not subject to scrutiny under the 

Eighth Amendment, regardless of the crime for which the sentence was imposed. It was 

not until the case of Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), that the Supreme Court held 

that incarceration, standing alone, could constitute cruel and unusual punishment if it 

were "disproportionate" in duration to the offense. 

The Court outlined three factors that were to be considered in determining if a sentence 

is excessive: " 

(i) 

(ii) 

(iii) 

the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; 

the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and 

the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other 

jurisdictions." 


The Court held that in the circumstances of the case before it and the factors to 

consider, a sentence of life imprisonment without parole for cashing a $100 check on a 

closed account was cruel and unusual. 

However, in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991), a fractured Court retreated 

from the Solem test and held that for non-capital sentences, the Eighth Amendment 

only constrains the length of prison terms by a "gross disproportionality principle." Under 

this principle, the Court sustained a mandatory sentence of life without parole imposed 

for possession of 672 grams (1.5 pounds) or more of cocaine. The Court acknowledged 

that a punishment could be cruel but not unusual, and therefore not prohibited by the 

Constitution. Additionally, in Harmelin, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, 

said "the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee," and that "what was 

'cruel and unusual' under the Eighth Amendment was to be determined without 

reference to the particular offense." Scalia wrote "If 'cruel and unusual punishments' 

included disproportionate punishments, the separate prohibition of disproportionate 

fines (which are certainly punishments) would have been entirely superfluous." 

Moreover, "There is little doubt that those who framed, proposed, and ratified the Bill of 

Rights were aware of such provisions [outlawing disproportional punishments], yet 

chose not to replicate them." 

In Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), the Supreme Court declared that a life 

sentence without any chance of parole, for a crime other than murder, is cruel and 

unusual punishment for a minor. Two years later, in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ___ 

(2012), the Court went further, holding that mandatory life sentences without parole 

cannot be imposed on minors, even for homicide. 

Death Penalty for Rape 

In Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), the Court declared that the death penalty was 

unconstitutionally excessive for rape of a woman and, by implication, for any crime 

where a death does not occur. The majority in Coker stated that "death is indeed a 

disproportionate penalty for the crime of raping an adult woman." The dissent countered 

that the majority "takes too little account of the profound suffering the crime imposes 

upon the victims and their loved ones." The dissent also characterized the majority as 

"myopic" for only considering legal history of "the past five years". 

In Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008), the Court extended the reasoning of 

Coker by ruling that the death penalty was excessive for child rape "where the victim's 

life was not taken." The Supreme Court failed to note a federal law, which applies to 

military court-martial proceedings, providing for the death penalty in cases of child rape. 

On October 1, 2008, the Court declined to reconsider its opinion in this case, but did 

amend the majority and dissenting opinions to acknowledge that federal law. Justice 

Scalia (joined by Chief Justice Roberts) wrote in dissent that "the proposed Eighth 

Amendment would have been laughed to scorn if it had read 'no criminal penalty shall 

be imposed which the Supreme Court deems unacceptable.'" 


Special Procedures for Death Penalty Cases 

The first significant general challenge to capital punishment that reached the Supreme 

Court was the case of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). In a 5–4 decision, the 

Supreme Court overturned the death sentences of Furman for murder, as well as two 

other defendants for rape. Of the five justices voting to overturn the death penalty, two 

found that capital punishment was unconstitutionally cruel and unusual, while three 

found that the statutes at issue were implemented in a random and capricious fashion, 

discriminating against blacks and the poor. Furman v. Georgia did not hold – even 

though it is sometimes claimed that it did – that capital punishment is per se 

unconstitutional. 

States with 

capital punishment rewrote their laws to address the 

Supreme Court's decision, and the Court then revisited 

the issue in a murder case: Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 

153 (1976). In Gregg, the Court found, in a 7–2 ruling, that 

Georgia's revised death penalty laws passed Eighth 

Amendment scrutiny: the statutes provided a bifurcated trial in 

which guilt and sentence were determined separately; and, the 

statutes provided for "specific jury findings" followed by state 

supreme court review comparing each death sentence "with the 

sentences imposed on similarly situated defendants to ensure that 

the sentence of death in a particular case is not disproportionate." Because of the 

Gregg decision, executions resumed in 1977. 

Some states have passed laws imposing mandatory death penalties in certain cases. 

The Supreme Court found these laws unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment, in 

the murder case of Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), because these 

laws remove discretion from the trial judge to make an individualized determination in 

each case. Other statutes specifying factors for courts to use in making their decisions 

have been upheld. Some have not: in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980), the 

Supreme Court overturned a sentence based upon a finding that a murder was 

"outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, and inhuman," as it deemed that any murder 

may be reasonably characterized in this manner. 

Similarly, in Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988), the Court found that an 

"especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" standard in a homicide case was too vague. 

However, the meaning of this language depends on how lower courts interpret it. In 

Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990), the Court found that the phrase "especially 

heinous, cruel, or depraved" was not vague in a murder case, because the state 

supreme court had expounded on its meaning. 

The Court has generally held that death penalty cases require extra procedural 

protections. As the Court said in Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993), which involved 

the murder of a police officer, "the Eighth Amendment requires increased reliability of 

the process..." 


Punishments Specifically Allowed 

In Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878), the Court stated that death by firing squad 

was not cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 

In Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980), the Court upheld a life sentence with the 

possibility of parole imposed per Texas's three strikes law for fraud crimes totaling $230. 

A few months later, Rummel challenged his sentence for ineffective assistance of 

counsel, his appeal was upheld, and as part of a plea bargain Rummel pled guilty to 

theft and was released for time served. 

In Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991), the Court upheld a life sentence without 

the possibility of parole for possession of 672 grams (1.5 pounds) of cocaine. 

In Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003), the Court upheld a 50 years to life sentence 

with the possibility of parole imposed under California's three strikes law when the 

defendant was convicted of shoplifting videotapes worth a total of about $150. 

In Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008), the Court upheld Kentucky's execution protocol 

using a three drugs cocktail. 

In Glossip v. Gross, No. 14-7955, 576 U.S. ___ (2015) the Court upheld the use of 

lethal injections using the drug midazolam. 

Evolving Standards of Decency 

In Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), Chief Justice Earl Warren said: "The [Eighth] 

Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark 

the progress of a maturing society." Subsequently, the Court has looked to societal 

developments, as well as looking to its own independent judgment, in determining what 

are those "evolving standards of decency". 

Originalists like Justice Antonin Scalia argue that societies may rot instead of maturing, 

and may decrease in virtue or wisdom instead of increasing. Thus, they say, the framers 

wanted the amendment understood as it was written and ratified, instead of morphing 

as times change, and in any event legislators are more competent than judges to take 

the pulse of the public as to changing standards of decency. 

The "evolving standards" test is not without its scholarly critics as well. For example, 

Professor John Stinneford asserts that the "evolving standards" test misinterprets the 

Eighth Amendment: 

The Framers of the Bill of Rights understood the word "unusual" to mean "contrary to 

long usage." Recognition of the word's original meaning will precisely invert the 

"evolving standards of decency" test, and ask the Court to compare challenged 


punishments with the longstanding principles and precedents of the common law, rather 

than shifting and nebulous notions of "societal consensus" and contemporary 

"standards of decency. 

On the other hand, Professor Dennis Baker defends the evolving standards of decency 

test as advancing the moral purpose of the Eighth Amendment to ban all forms of unjust 

punishment. 

Proportionality 

The Court has applied evolving standards not only to say what punishments are 

inherently cruel, but also to say what punishments that are not inherently cruel are 

nevertheless "grossly disproportionate" to the offense in question.[41] An example can 

be seen in Jackson v. Bishop (8th Cir., 1968), an Eighth Circuit decision outlawing 

corporal punishment in the Arkansas prison system: "The scope of the Amendment is 

not static....[D]isproportion, both among punishments and between punishment and 

crime, is a factor to be considered...." 


Professor Stinneford asserts that the Eighth Amendment forbids punishments that are 

very disproportionate to the offense, even if the punishment by itself is not intrinsically 

barbaric, but Stinneford argues that "proportionality is to be measured primarily in terms 

of prior practice" according to the word "unusual" in the amendment, instead of being 

measured according to shifting and nebulous evolving standards.[8] Similarly, Professor 

John Bessler points to "An Essay on Crimes and Punishments," written by Cesare 

Beccaria in the 1760s, which advocated proportionate punishments; many of the 

Founding Fathers, including Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, read Beccaria's 

treatise and were influenced by it. 

Thus, Stinneford and Bessler disagree with the view of Justice Scalia, joined by Chief 

Justice Rehnquist, in Harmelin v. Michigan where they denied that the Punishments 

Clause contains any proportionality principle. With Scalia and Rehnquist, Richard 

Epstein argues that the amendment does not refer broadly to the imposition of 

penalties, but rather refers more narrowly to the penalties themselves; Epstein says that 

judges who favor the broad view tend to omit the letter "s" at the end of the word 

"punishments". 


V. Mandatory Sentencing 

in The U.S. 

Mandatory Sentencing requires that offenders serve a predefined term for certain 

crimes, commonly serious and violent offenses. Judges are bound by law; these 

sentences are produced through the legislature, not the judicial system. They are 

instituted to expedite the sentencing process and limit the possibility of irregularity of 

outcomes due to judicial discretion. Mandatory sentences are typically given to people 

who are convicted of certain serious and/or violent crimes, and require 

a prison sentence. Mandatory sentencing laws vary across nations; they are more 

prevalent in common law jurisdictions because civil law jurisdictions usually prescribe 

minimum and maximum sentences for every type of crime in explicit laws. 

Mandatory sentencing laws often target "moral vices" (such as alcohol, sex, drugs) and 

crimes that threaten a person's livelihood. The idea is that there are some crimes that 

are so heinous, there is no way to accept the offender back into the general population 


without first punishing them sufficiently. Some crimes are viewed as serious enough to 

require an indefinite removal from society by a life sentence, or sometimes capital 

punishment. It is viewed as a public service to separate these people from the general 

population, as it is assumed that the nature of the crime or the frequency of violation 

supersedes the subjective opinion of a judge. Remedying the irregularities in sentencing 

that arise from judicial discretion are supposed to make sentencing more fair and 

balanced. In Australia and the United Kingdom, sentencing has been heavily influenced 

by judicial idiosyncrasies. Individual judges have a significant effect on the outcome of 

the case, sometimes leading the public to believe that a sentence reflects more about 

the judge than the offender. Subsequently, creating stricter sentencing guidelines would 

promote consistency and fairness in the judicial system. Mandatory sentences are also 

supposed to serve as a general deterrence for potential criminals and repeat offenders, 

who are expected to avoid crime because they can be certain of their sentence if they 

are caught. This is the reasoning behind the "tough on crime" policy. 

United States federal juries are generally not allowed to be informed of the mandatory 

minimum penalties that may apply if the accused is convicted because the jury's role is 

limited to a determination of guilt or innocence. However, defense attorneys sometimes 

have found ways to impart this information to juries; for instance, it is occasionally 

possible, on cross-examination of an informant who faced similar charges, to ask how 

much time he was facing. It is sometimes deemed permissible because it is a means of 

impeaching the witness. However, in at least one state court case in Idaho, it was 

deemed impermissible. 

Notably, capital punishment has been mandatory for murder in a certain number of 

jurisdictions, including the United Kingdom until 1957 and Canada until 1961. 

History 

United States 

Throughout US history prison sentences were primarily founded upon what is known as 

Discretionary Sentencing. Leading up to this period of time sentencing practices were 

largely criticized due to the discretionary applications utilized in sentencing. The 

assessment for sentencing was determined by three separate decisions (1) policy 

decisions, (2) factual decisions, and (3) decisions applying policy decisions to particular 

facts. In review of these policies regarding the applications of sentencing, the policy 

decisions are those that dictate what considerations should affect punishment. The 

second, which is factual determinations are the means by which a judge determines 

whether to apply a particular policy to an offender. The third decision judges make in 

discretionary schemes is how to apply the sentencing policies to the particular facts. 

This authority was applied by the judge under the discretionary sentencing system as 

historically practiced. It was not until the mid-twentieth century that mandatory 

sentencing was implemented. In short, the difference between mandatory and 

discretionary sentencing system lies in policy and application decisions. 


Now that historical practices of sentencing have been introduced, it is just as important 

to outline examples in reference to (1) policy decisions, (2) factual decisions, and (3) 

decisions applying policy vs. decisions to particular facts. 

Policy Decisions – Policy guidelines that determine what should be acknowledged in 

an individuals sentencing criteria. For example: One judge might consider a reduction in 

time to be served vs. a judge who intends to exercise the fullest extent of the law in 

reference to the crime committed. 

Factual Decisions – A review of details 

that would enable particular policies to be 

applied at the discretion of the assigned 

judge. Hypothetically consider, two or 

more individuals who to attempt to 

commit a crime using a deadly weapon. 

Assume these individuals reach their 

destination point, where they plan to 

commit such a crime. Then the one 

individual who is primarily carrying the 

weapon takes it out to threaten another 

individual and waves it about, but is suddenly spooked enough that the weapon is 

dropped. While the other individual who accompanied the perpetrator decides to pick up 

the weapon, wave it about and even inflicts force of use with the weapon in order to 

attempt or commit the crime. 

Their actions would result in punishment as a part of the sentencing process, regardless 

of the type of weapon in question. The 1st. individual in fact waved the weapon, but the 

2nd. wave'd and inflicted force of use of the weapon. Therefore, the two individuals in 

question regarding the same crime would receive two separate sentences. 

Decisions Applying Policy vs. Decisions to Particular Facts - This form of 

application is the core of discretionary sentencing. It allows for sentencing to be tailored 

to an individual. For example, consider a minor juvenile who has committed a crime that 

would allow for a lengthy sentencing period, but because the individual is a minor the 

assigned judge can exercise discretion and decrease the sentence to be served vs. 

applying the full length of the sentencing as outlined in policy and the facts associated 

with the crime. 

Overtime the United States has under gone developmental growth in implementation of 

laws, sentencing guidelines and monumental transition points in time. Beginning in the 

early 1900, the United States began to assess its role on the use of drugs, their purpose 

and the responsibilities within the law. During this time in 1914, opiate drug use outside 

of medical purpose was prohibited. It was not until 1930 that marijuana would reach the 

same platform as opiates, prohibiting use. This further led to stiffer regulations, even 

though the use of marijuana was not believed to evoke violent tenancies as previously 

suggested in earlier years, but this level of awareness had not reached public 


acknowledgment. Which further led to the implementation of sentencing guidelines in 

reference to drug use as well as sales consisting of opiates primarily (heroin and 

morphine), but also to include marijuana. The sentencing guidelines outlined applied to 

the use and sales of drugs. However, during this time discretionary sentencing was 

actively practiced. Therefore, the individuals who were guilty of utilizing such drugs vs. 

the sale of such use typically resulted in different sentences. Mandatory sentencing and 

increased punishment were enacted when the United States Congress passed the 

Boggs Act of 1951. The acts made a first time cannabis possession offense a minimum 

of two to ten years with a fine up to $20,000; however, in 1970, the United States 

Congress repealed mandatory penalties for cannabis offenses. With the passage of 

the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 Congress enacted different mandatory minimum 

sentences for drugs, including marijuana. 

 

 

1st Offense: 2–5 years. 

2nd Offense: 5–10 years. 

The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 is the one act known for shaping America. The 

implementations of this act has had many profound affects in the legal system, as we 

know it today. This act led to a Drug Free initiative regarding an individual’s 

employment, a Drug Free work place and certification requirements for employers, and 

a Drug Free environment for those who receive government benefits regarding lowincome 

recipients and their housing. This act further addresses interventions regarding 

illegal sales of imports, the ability to overtake ones assets, if an individual is found guilty 

of distribution. The act also implemented the first laws surrounding money laundering, 

which also led to the exposure of professional dealers and further identifies the crisis we 

are faced with today in reference to "The War on Drugs" we still combat today. Those 

found guilty of distribution were sentenced as outlined. 

5g. of Crack vs. 500 g. of Powder Cocaine resulted in a minim sentencing of 5 

years. 

 

 

50 g. of Crack vs. 5,000 g. of Powder Cocaine resulted in a minim sentencing of 

10 years. 

50 g. of Powder Cocaine imported resulted in No Mandatory Sentence 

Separate from each state's own courts, federal courts in the United States are guided by 

the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. (See War on Drugs for more information about US 

drug laws.) When a guideline sentencing range is less than the statutory mandatory 

minimum, the latter prevails. Under the Controlled Substances Act, prosecutors have 

great power to influence a defendant's sentence and thereby create incentives to accept 

a plea agreement. In particular, defendants with prior drug felonies are often subject to 

harsh mandatory minimums, but the prosecutor can exercise his discretion to not file a 

prior felony information. Then the mandatory minimum will not be applied. 


Safety Valve was created in 1994 to reduce mandatory sentencing for drug offenders 

under the following provisions: 

 

 

 

 

 

the defendant does not have more than 1 criminal history point, as determined 

under the sentencing guidelines; 

the defendant did not use violence or credible threats of violence or possess a 

firearm or other dangerous weapon (or induce another participant to do so) in 

connection with the offense; 

the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury to any person; 

the defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of others in 

the offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines and was not 

engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise, as defined in section 408 of the 

Controlled Substances Act; and 

not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the defendant has truthfully 

provided to the Government all information and evidence the defendant has 

concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct 

or of a common scheme or plan, but the fact that the defendant has no relevant 

or useful other information to provide or that the Government is already aware of 

the information shall not preclude a determination by the court that the defendant 

has complied with this requirement. 

In October 2011 a report was issued to assess the impact of United States v. 

Booker mandatory minimum penalties on federal sentencing by the United States 

Sentencing Commission.[17][clarification needed] 

In 2013, United States Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr. announced that the Justice 

Department would follow a new policy restricting mandatory minimum sentences in 

certain drug cases. Prosecutions dropped, drug enforcement agent morale dropped, 

and fentanyl and heroin overdoses soared, reported The Washington Post in 2019. In 

Alleyne v. United States (2013) the Supreme Court held that increasing a sentence past 

the mandatory minimum requirement must be submitted by a jury and found factual 

beyond a reasonable doubt. It increases the burden on the prosecutor to prove that the 

sentence is necessary for the individual crime by requiring that a mandatory minimum 

sentence be denied for defendant unless they fulfill certain criteria. Attorney General 

Holder held that the charges placed on an individual should reflect the uniqueness of 

the case and consideration in assessing and fairly representing his/her given conduct. 

This is supposed to prevent recidivism. 

Criminal justice advocates in the United States argue that mandatory minimum 

sentences are a major cause of the removal of the "bottom income half to quartile" of its 

population from the general public. As part of police targeting and surveillance and often 

harsh sentencing, mandatory sentencing often is proposed as "fairness" by those 


unfamiliar with the penal systems in the US. Mandatory sentencing still has not been 

linked to other areas such as racial profiling, a 700% increase in US prison incarceration 

rates, zero tolerance and prison growth at the expense of employment, housing, 

education, family support and quality of life. 

The U.S. state of Florida has a 10-20-Life mandatory sentence law regarding sentences 

for the use of a firearm during the commission of another crime, and many PSA posters 

were created after the law was passed, which coined the slogan “Use a gun, and you’re 

done.” It gave a minimum mandatory sentence of 10 years if the offender pulls a gun, 

but does not fire a shot, 20 years if at least one shot is fired, and 25 years to life if the 

offender shoots someone. It has significantly reduced the amount of repeat offenders in 

the state since. 

Australia 

In 1996, 12 month mandatory sentencing laws around third offence home burglary were 

introduced by Western Australia through amendments to the 1913 Criminal Code. In 

1997 mandatory sentencing was introduced to the Northern Territory in Australia. 

The three strikes and out policy raised incarceration rates of indigenous women by 

223% in the first year. The incarceration rate for men rose by 57% and 67% for 

indigenous men.[citation needed] The mandatory sentencing laws sparked debate of 

the laws being discriminative (indirectly) as indigenous people are overrepresented in 

the crime statistics in the Northern Territory. 

New South Wales has two mandatory sentences currently. The Crimes Amendment 

(Murder of Police Officers) Bill 2011 introduced mandatory life sentence without parole 

for a person convicted of murdering a police officer. Also, the Crimes and Other 

Legislation (Assault and Intoxication) Amendment 2014 introduced mandatory minimum 

sentencing of 8 years for alcohol fuelled acts of violence, as a response to the cases 

of king hit assaults in Sydney. These laws were championed by NSW Premier Barry 

O'Farrell largely due to the wide media coverage of similar cases, in particular the case 

of Kieren Loveridge who killed Thomas Kelly. 

Life imprisonment is mandatory for murder in Queensland, South Australia, and the 

Northern Territory. Life imprisonment is only mandatory in the other states for aircraft 

hijacking or with a minimum non-parole period of 20 years (25 years in South Australia 

and the Northern Territory) if a criminal is convicted of the murder of a police officer or 

public official. 

Australia also has legislation allowing mandatory prison sentences of between five and 

25 years for people smuggling, in addition to a fine of up to $500,000, and forfeiture and 

destruction of the vessel or aircraft used in the offence. 

In 2017, the government of Victoria introduced a "two-strike" policy, with a minimum sixyear 

jail sentence for repeat violent offenders. 


Victoria also has a mandatory 10 year minimum sentence for people convicted of killing 

someone in a so-called "one punch" attack. 

Mandatory Death Sentence 

In Canada until 1961, murder was punishable only by death, provided that the offender 

was a sane adult. 

In 1930, the city of Canton (now Guangzhou), in China, enacted a mandatory death 

penalty for three-time offenders. 

In Czechoslovakia, under Beneš decree No. 16/1945 Coll., informing to German 

authorities during World War II's occupation was subject to mandatory death sentence if 

it led to death of the person concerned by the act. 


In pre-1833 France, before jury were allowed to find mitigating circumstances to 

felonies, death penalty was the only available sentence for capital offenses. 

In Hong Kong, murder carried a mandatory death sentence until 1993 when capital 

punishment was legally abolished. However, the last execution was in 1966; since then 

all death sentences were automatically commuted into life imprisonment. 

In India, murder committed by a convict serving a life sentence carries a mandatory 

death sentence. The mandatory death penalty provided in Section 31A of India Law is in 

the nature of minimum sentence in respect of repeat offenders of specified activities and 

for offences involving huge quantities of specified categories of narcotic drugs. As of 

August 2005, aircraft hijacking also mandates use of the death penalty. 

In Japan, the only crime punishable by a mandatory death sentence is instigation of 

foreign aggression. 

In Malaysia and Singapore, there is a mandatory death penalty for certain offences, 

most notably murder and possession of a certain amount of controlled drugs 

(see Capital punishment in Singapore and Capital punishment for drug trafficking). 

In Taiwan, there used to be a large number of offenses that carried a mandatory death 

penalty; by 2006 all these laws have been relaxed to permit judicial discretion. 

In the United Kingdom, crimes punishable by a mandatory death sentence included 

murder (until 1957; from 1957 to 1965, only if certain aggravating criteria were met), 

treason (until 1998), sedition and espionage. 

In the United States, mandatory death sentences have been unconstitutional 

since Woodson v. North Carolina; they were mainly used for murder and assault by life 

convicts. 

Other 

Denmark has mandatory minimum sentences for murder (five years to life) 

and regicide (life in prison § 115), deadly arson is punished with imprisonment from 4 

years to life, and for an illegal loaded gun one year in state prison. 

The state of Florida in the United States has a very strict minimum sentencing policy 

known as 10-20-Life, which includes the following minimums: 10 years' imprisonment 

for using a gun during a crime, 20 years' imprisonment for firing a gun during a crime, 

and 25 years' imprisonment in addition to any other sentence for shooting somebody, 

regardless of whether they survive or not. 

In Canada and Ireland, life imprisonment is mandatory for murder if committed, at the 

time of the offence, as an adult. Parole ineligibility periods vary, but under Irish and 

Canadian law, are not less than 7 and 10 years, respectively. 


In New Zealand, life imprisonment is mandatory for murder. Murders with certain 

aggravating factors have a mandatory 17-year non-parole period, instead of the default 

10 years for life imprisonment. Since 2002, judges have the ability to overrule 

mandatory sentences where they would be deemed "manifestly unjust", such as in 

cases involving mercy killings and failed suicide pacts. 

In Germany, murder for pleasure, sexual gratification, greed or other base motives, by 

stealth or cruelly or by means that pose a danger to the public or in order to facilitate or 

cover up another offense is mandatorily punished by life imprisonment. 

In the United Kingdom, upon conviction for murder, the court must sentence the 

defendant to life imprisonment. The law requires that courts must set a minimum term 

before they become eligible for parole. For this purpose a number of "starting points" 

are in place that give guidance to a judge in order to impose a sentence in each 

different case of murder. There are currently five "starting points" for murder in England 

and Wales, namely: 12 years' imprisonment for cases of murder committed by a person 

under 18; 15 years' imprisonment for all "other" cases of murder committed by a person 

over 18; 25 years' imprisonment for cases of murder where a person over 18 uses a 

knife or other weapon at the scene; 30 years' imprisonment for cases of murder with 

"particularly" high aggravating factors, such as those that involve the use of a firearm or 

explosive, or a murder in the course of committing another offence such as robbery or 

burglary; and a whole life order, in cases that involve such "exceptionally" high 

aggravating factors, such as the murder of two or more persons, or the murder of a child 

following abduction or with sexual/sadistic motivation, meaning the person will never 

become eligible for parole. 

The United Kingdom currently also has three more mandatory minimum sentences for 

certain offences, namely: a minimum of 7 years' imprisonment for a person over 18 

convicted of trafficking, supplying or producing Class A drugs for the third or subsequent 

time; a minimum of 5 years' imprisonment (for a person over 18) or 3 years' 


imprisonment (for a person aged 16–17) for possession, purchase, acquisition, 

manufacture, transfer or sale of a prohibited firearm or weapon for the first or 

subsequent time; and a minimum of 3 years' imprisonment for a person over 18 

convicted of a domestic burglary for the third or subsequent time. 

Three Strikes Law 

In 1994, California introduced a "Three Strikes Law", which was the first mandatory 

sentencing law to gain widespread publicity. This state is known for fully enforcing laws 

and is considered most severe in comparison to other states. The Three strikes law was 

intended to reduce crime by implementing extended sentencing to deter repeated 

offenders. This consideration further restricts one’s ability to commit new crimes. 

Similar laws were subsequently adopted in most American jurisdictions. 

However, California's "Three Strikes Law" is clearly outlined for all, especially those who 

are subjected to such sentencing. 

Strike 1 

Strike 2 

Strike 3 

Directly affects individuals who exhibit a history regarded as violent or 

serious pertaining to their initial felony conviction. Should this history exist, 

it could greatly impact sentencing guidelines surrounding an individuals 

present felony conviction. 

An individual who has committed a crime resulting in their 2nd felony 

conviction, would be affected by the second strike as well. This would 

impact the length of the individuals sentencing by doubling the sentence 

one would initially be subject to, if it were their first felony conviction. 

Is intended individuals who appear to be repeated offenders. Therefore, 

this strike is for individuals who have two or more felony convictions, their 

sentencing would result in a minimum of 25 years to life. 

A similar "three strikes" policy was introduced to the United Kingdom by 

the Conservative government in 1997. This legislation enacted a mandatory life 

sentence on a conviction for a second "serious" violent or sexual offence (i.e. "two 

strikes" law), a minimum sentence of seven years for those convicted for a third time of 

a drug trafficking offence involving a class A drug, and a mandatory minimum sentence 

of three years for those convicted for the third time of burglary. An amendment by 

the Labor opposition established that mandatory sentences should not be imposed if the 

judge considered it unjust. 

According to figures released by the British government in 2005, just three drug dealers 

and eight burglars received mandatory sentences in the next seven years, because 

judges thought a longer sentence was unjust in all other drug and burglary cases where 

the defendant was found guilty. However, in 2003 a new "two strikes" law was enacted 

(effective from April 4, 2005), requiring courts to presume that a criminal who commits 

his second violent or dangerous offence deserves a life sentence unless the judge is 


satisfied that the defendant is not a danger to the public. This resulted in far more life 

sentences than the 1997 legislation. In response to prison overcrowding, the law 

was changed in 2008 to reduce the number of such sentences being passed, by 

restoring judicial discretion and abolishing the presumption that a repeat offender is 

dangerous. 

Australia's Northern Territory in March 1997 introduced mandatory sentences of one 

month to one year for the third offence regarding property and theft. They were later 

adopted by Western Australia. 

Race 

Concerning US federal 

prisons, Barbara S. 

Meierhoefer, in her report for 

the Federal 

Judicial 

Center stated: "The proportion 

of black offenders grew from 

under 10% in 1984 to 28% of 

the mandatory minimum drug 

offenders by 1990; whites 

now constitute less than a 

majority of this group. This is 

a much more dramatic shift 

than found in the federal 

offender population in 

general." 

Harsh penalties lead to racial 

disparity. According to the 

Statistical Overview of 

Mandatory Minimum Penalties 

presented in October 2011, "[o]f all offenders convicted of an offense carrying a 

mandatory minimum punishment and who remained subject to that penalty at 

sentencing, 38.5 percent were Black (n=4,076), 31.8 percent were Hispanic (n=3,364), 

and 27.5 percent (n=2,913) were White." 

Although exceptions such as the safety valve are authorized, demographics associated 

with race relevant to mandatory sentencing continue to show. "Hispanic offenders 

received relief from applicable mandatory minimum penalties at the highest rates, with 

rates of 65.9 percent in fiscal year 2000, 57.7 percent in fiscal year 2005, and 55.7 

percent in fiscal year 2010. Other Race offenders had the next highest rates (52.8% in 

fiscal year 2000, 53.1% in fiscal year 2005 and 58.9% in fiscal year 2010). Black 

offenders consistently had the lowest rates (45.7% in fiscal year 2000, 32.8 percent in 

fiscal year 2005, and 34.9% in fiscal year 2010). White offenders received relief at 60.3 


percent in fiscal year 2000, 42.5 percent in fiscal year 2005, and 46.5 percent in fiscal 

year 2010." 

Arguments For and Against 

Opponents of mandatory sentencing point to studies that show criminals are deterred 

more effectively by increasing the chances of their conviction, rather than increasing the 

sentence if they are convicted. In a hearing of the House Judiciary Committee, Judge 

Paul G. Cassell, from the United States District Court for the District of Utah, described 

mandatory sentencing as resulting in harsh sentencing and cruel and unusual 

punishment, stating that the sentencing requirements punish defendants "more harshly 

for crimes that threaten potential violence than for crimes that conclude in actual 

violence to victims". A hearing in 2009 heard testimony from the American Bar 

Association which stated that "Sentencing by mandatory minimums is the antithesis of 

rational sentencing policy". In 2004 the association called for the repeal of mandatory 

minimum sentences, stating that "there is no need for mandatory minimum sentences in 

a guided sentencing system." A 1997 study by the RAND Corporation found that 

mandatory minimums for cocaine offenses were not cost-effective in regards to either 

cocaine consumption or drug crime. 

Some judges have expressed the opinion that mandatory minimum sentencing, 

especially in relation to alcohol-fueled violence, is not effective. In R v O’Connor, 

the High Court of Australia gave the opinion that when an offender is intoxicated, there 

will likely be a change in their personality and behavior, which will then affect their selfcontrol; 

that, while an offender may commit an act which is voluntary and intentional, it 

is not something that they would have done in a sober state. Intoxication is not a 

justification for criminal behavior, nor (in most jurisdictions in the U.S. and 

Commonwealth) a legal defense; but since an intoxicated person's decisions are less 

likely to be shaped by rational assessment of consequences than those of a sober 

person, deterrence is likely to be less effective for intoxicated people. 

Research indicates that mandatory minimum sentencing effectively shifts discretion 

from judges to the prosecutors. Prosecutors decide what charges to bring against a 

defendant, and they can "stack the deck", which involves over-charging a defendant in 

order to get them to plead guilty. Since prosecutors are part of the executive branch, 

and the judicial branch has almost no role in the sentencing, the checks and balances of 

the democratic system are removed, thus diluting the notion of separation of 

powers. Opponents of mandatory sentencing argue that it is the proper role of a judge, 

not a prosecutor, to apply discretion given the particular facts of a case (e.g., whether a 

drug defendant was a kingpin or low-level participant, or whether sex offender 

registration is an appropriate measure for a given crime and offender). When 

prosecutors apply discretion, they tend to invoke sentencing disparities when choosing 

among a variety of statutes with different sentencing consequences. In addition to 

fairness arguments, some opponents believe that treatment is more cost-effective than 

long sentences. They also cite a survey indicating that the public now prefers judicial 

discretion to mandatory minimums. 


In 2015, a number of United States reformers, including the ACLU, the Center for 

American Progress, Families Against Mandatory Minimums, Koch family foundations, 

the Coalition for Public Safety, and the MacArthur Foundation, announced a bipartisan 

resolution to reform the criminal justice system and reduce mandatory sentencing laws. 

Their efforts were lauded by President Obama who noted these reforms will improve 

rehabilitation and workforce opportunities for those who have served their sentences. In 

their arguments they noted that mandatory sentencing is often too harsh of a 

punishment and cripples someone's livelihood for minor crimes. 

Australia, Mexico, New Zealand and some other countries employ a system of 

mandatory restorative justice, in which the criminal must apologize to the victim or 

provide some form of reparation instead of being imprisoned for minor crimes. In 

serious crimes, some other form of punishment is still used. 

People Sentenced to Mandatory Sentences 

Weldon Angelos – 55 years for possessing a handgun while he sold $350 worth of 

marijuana to a police informant on three separate occasions 

Leandro Andrade – 50 years without parole for theft of nine video tapes 


Morton Berger – 200 years without probation, parole or pardon for twenty counts of 

sexual exploitation of a minor; each count represented a separate child pornography 

image he had possessed 

Genarlow Wilson – 10 years for aggravated child molestation; released in 2007 after 

serving four years because the courts decided his sentence was disproportionate to the 

actual facts of the crime 

Chantal McCorkle – 24 years for fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud; sentence 

subsequently reduced to 18 years on appeal 

Richard Paey – 25 years for 15 counts of drug trafficking and other charges including 

fraud; granted a pardon in 2007 after serving three and a half years due to the 

circumstances of his drug use 

Timothy L. Tyler – Life in prison for possessing 13 sheets of LSD. 

John the Painter – Sentenced to death for arson in royal dockyards. 

Van Tuong Nguyen - Sentenced to death for trafficking 396.2g 

of heroin through Singapore 


VI. Habitual Offender Laws 

Around The World 

A habitual offender, repeat offender, or career criminal is a person convicted of a 

new crime who was previously convicted of a crime(s). 

Various state and jurisdictions may have laws targeting habitual offenders, and 

specifically providing for enhanced or exemplary punishments or other sanctions. They 

are designed to counter criminal recidivism by physical incapacitation via imprisonment. 

The nature, scope, and type of habitual offender statutes vary, but generally they apply 

when a person has been convicted twice for various crimes. Some codes may 

differentiate between classes of crimes (for example, some codes only deal with violent 

crime) and the length of time between convictions. Usually, the sentence is greatly 

enhanced; in some circumstances, it may be substantially more than the maximum 

sentence for the crime. 

Habitual offender laws may provide for mandatory sentencing - in which a 

minimum sentence must be imposed, or may allow judicial discretion in allowing 

the court to determine a proper sentence. One example of a habitual offender statute is 

a provision requiring the revocation of a driver's license for a person convicted multiple 

times of driving under the influence. 


The practice of imposing longer prison sentences on repeat offenders than on first-time 

offenders who commit the same crime is not an innovation. For example, New York has 

a persistent felony offender law that dates back to the late 19th century. These early 

habitual offender laws did not provide for mandatory sentencing. 

Australia 

In Specific Jurisdictions 

In Australia, various states and territories have adopted habitual offender legislation. 

New South Wales 

Under the provisions of the Habitual Criminals Act 1957 (NSW), an offender can be 

designated a habitual criminal and given an additional protective sentence of between 

five and 14 years imprisonment. The offender must be at least 25 years of age, have 

served sentences for at least two indictable offenses, and the sentencing judge must 

decide that preventive detention is required to protect the public. 

Tasmania 

An offender who is at least 17 years of age and has been convicted of at least two 

violent or sexual offences can be declared a dangerous offender and detained 

indeterminately. A judge must consider the potential of future harm that could be caused 

by offenders, the circumstances of their offenses, medical and psychiatric opinion and 

any other matters of relevance. The decision passed by the court is not reviewable; the 

indeterminate sentence(s) commence upon the expiration of any determinate sentence 

imposed and release is by way of an order from the Supreme Court. 

Western Australia 

The Criminal Code Act 1913 (WA) and the Crimes (Serious and Repeat Offenders) Act 

1992 (WA) contain provisions for the indeterminate incarceration of youths and adults 

convicted of particular offenses. The indeterminate sentence(s) commence upon the 

expiration of any determinate sentence imposed, and release is through a Supreme 

Court Order or at the discretion of the Governor. 

The Northern Territory and South Australia 

The Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) and the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) 

allow for the indeterminate incarceration of a person who is determined to be a habitual 

criminal and/or incapable of controlling their sexual urges. 


In South Australia, the indeterminate sentence(s) commence upon the expiration of any 

determinate sentence imposed, and are reviewed every three years after that. Release 

is only by way of an order from the Supreme Court. 

In the Northern Territory, a prisoner serving indefinite sentence(s) has a nominal 

sentence set at half the sentence that would have been imposed if not they were not 

dangerous, or 20 years (25 years in some circumstances) if the sentence imposed 

would have been one or more consecutive sentences of life imprisonment. The 

indeterminate sentence(s) must be reviewed by the court when the nominal sentence 

(the minimum term the offender would have been required to serve if they 

were not dangerous) has expired, and every three years after. 


The Australian Capital Territory, Queensland, and Victoria 

The Sentencing Act 2005 (ACT), the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 

2003 (Qld), and the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) govern habitual offenders. An offender 

can be incarcerated indeterminately if there is a high probability, given the offender's 

character, the nature of their offense, psychiatric evidence as to the dangerousness of 

the defendant, and any other relevant circumstances, that the offender poses a serious 

threat to the community. The indeterminate sentence(s) must be reviewed by the court 

when the nominal sentence (the minimum term the offender would have been required 

to serve if they were not dangerous) has expired, and every three years after. 

The minimum nominal sentence that can be imposed is ten years, but the sentencing 

judge can extend this if they believe that the prisoner's criminal history and/or the nature 

of the prisoner's offending warrants it. 

The longest nominal sentence on sentence(s) of indeterminate imprisonment is 30 

years, currently being served by serial pedophile Geoffrey Robert Dobbs (Queensland), 

who pleaded guilty to 124 sex offences and one count of attempting to pervert the 

course of justice committed against 63 girls aged between one month and 15 years 

(including five family members) under his care as a teacher and youth leader from 1972 

to 2000. 

Canada 

In Canada, the Habitual Offender Act in Canada dealt with multiple offenders. The law 

was repealed after a Law Commission Report of 1969 found it to be erratically applied 

and was often used against non-violent and non-dangerous offenders. In 1977, Part 

XXIV of the Criminal Code was enacted for habitual offenders, providing for 

indeterminate or determinate sentences for offenders found to be dangerous who would 

be eligible for parole after three years and has the authority to extend such 

indeterminate non-parole period at any time. 

China 

On 1930, the town of Guangzhou enacted a mandatory death penalty for those 

offenders who received their third conviction. 

France 

From 2007 to 2014, France had peines planchers (literally "floor sentences"), which set 

a minimum floor to the sentences of recidivist offenders. 

Enacted under President Nicolas Sarkozy, they were repealed under his 

successor François Hollande, which made this point a part of his platform. 


Germany 

Based on earlier reform plans, the National Socialist regime issued in 1933 the socalled 

Gewohnheitsverbrechergesetz against 'criminals by habit'; not only was the 

punishment raised, it also introduced a preventive detention to be reconsidered every 

three years. After 1945, the Allied military governments did not contest this law, and its 

regulations were taken over in 1953 into the German penal code Strafgesetzbuch. In 

1969, the liberalization of civil and penal law made it more difficult to impose preventive 

detention and other measures. Contrary to the situation in the US, the discretion lies 

with the sentencing judge. 

Hungary 

In Hungary, the Fidesz-dominated new parliament changed the Penal Code, introducing 

a habitual criminal statute for repeat offenders and acts of recividism on June 8, 2010. 

The change has been signed into law. The law is codified under Sections 89 and 90 of 

the Hungarian Criminal Code. The law explicitly denies parole for any person convicted 

of certain serious offences, including murder, that was a repeat offender at the time of 

the offence. Moreover, the law mandates a sentence of life imprisonment for any person 

that is a repeat offender of any offences that would exceed twenty years, or if any of the 

offenses carry a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. 

India 

The Criminal Tribes Act, 1872 was amended a number of times. After Independence, 

the leaders and social reformers paid attention to this problem. In 1949, the Central 

government appointed a committee to study the utility of the existence of this law. The 


committee viewed that the act was against the spirit of the Indian Constitution. It 

recommended suitable steps to be taken for amelioration of the pitiable conditions of the 

Criminal Tribes rather than stigmatizing them as criminals. As a result, the Criminal 

Tribes Act of 1871 was repealed in 1952 and the Habitual Offenders Act was enacted 

in its place. According to the Habitual Offenders Act, a habitual offender is one who has 

been a victim of subjective and objective influences and has manifested a set practice in 

crime, and also presents a danger to the society in which they live. The Habitual 

Offenders are usually hardened criminals whose major part of life has been spent in 

jails. It is because they commit offences at frequent intervals and are sent back to jail. 

Pakistan 

Section 75 of the Pakistan Penal Code deals with Habitual Offenders. The provisions 

are activated upon a second conviction for a crime with a minimum sentence of three 

years imprisonment. The Guidelines for sentencing given to criminal court indicate that 

the discretion lies with the judge, and an enhanced sentence is not mandatory, and 

should usually not be given in less serious criminal cases (such as petty theft) or where 

the convictions are old. The judge is expected to adopt an individualized view and tailor 

both the decision of awarding an enhanced sentence and the length of it to the case at 

hand. For this the transcripts of the previous trials can be used. 

United States 

In the United States, several state governments have passed laws which require 

the state courts to hand down a mandatory and extended sentences to habitual 

offenders (for example, making the repeated commission of the 

same misdemeanor a felony). Three strikes laws specifically target those who have 

been convicted of a serious criminal offense on three or more separate occasions. 

Criticism 

There has been various criticism of Habitual Offender Laws. Some examples are 

included below. 

Unjust and Unusual Results 

Habitual Offender laws, depending on their scope and discretionary room given to 

judges, can lead to persons being punished quite severely for relatively minor offenses. 

The discretionary nature of the laws means that they can be applied unevenly. 

In Australia, laws relating to dangerous and Habitual offenders have been criticized as 

ignoring the principle of certainty in sentencing. Another major concern in Australia is 

the considerable disparity that exists in the requirements for dangerous offender status 

and in the available sentences for such offenders across jurisdictions. Age and offense 

requirements, indeterminate or fixed sentencing provisions, and review procedures are 


quite different from state to state; these inconsistencies have been removed to some 

extent in the past decade. 

Some unusual scenarios have arisen, particularly in California in the United States — 

the state punishes shoplifting and similar crimes involving over $500 in property 

as felony petty theft if the person who committed the crime has a prior conviction for any 

form of theft, including robbery or burglary. As a result, some defendants have been 

given sentences of 25 years to life in prison for such crimes as shoplifting golf clubs 

(Gary Ewing, previous strikes for burglary and robbery with a knife), nine videotapes 

(Leandro Andrade, 50 years to life for two counts of shoplifting), or, along with a violent 

assault, a slice of pepperoni pizza from a group of children (Jerry Dewayne Williams, 

four previous non-violent felonies, sentence later reduced to six years on appeal). 

Undue Prosecutorial Leverage 

Habitual Offender laws also give prosecutors more power to force a defendant to plea 

bargain, as often the only deviation from a mandatory minimum sentence is with 

prosecutor approval. 

Compatibility with Fundamental Rights 

The laws have been challenged on the basis of violating fundamental rights. 


In the US on March 5, 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court held by a 5–4 majority that such 

sentences do not violate the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits 

"cruel and unusual punishment." 


VII. U.S. Federal Fair 

Sentencing Guidelines 

The United States Federal Sentencing Guidelines are rules that set out a uniform 

policy for sentencing individuals and organizations convicted of felonies and serious 

(Class A) misdemeanors in the United States federal courts system. The Guidelines do 

not apply to less serious misdemeanors. 

Although the Guidelines were initially styled as mandatory, the US Supreme Court's 

2005 decision in United States v. Booker held that the Guidelines, as originally 

constituted, violated the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury, and the remedy chosen 

was to excise those provisions of the law establishing the Guidelines as mandatory. 

After Booker and other Supreme Court cases, such as Blakely v. Washington (2004), 


the Guidelines are now considered advisory only. Federal judges (state judges are not 

affected by the Guidelines) must calculate the guidelines and consider them when 

determining a sentence, but are not required to issue sentences within the guidelines. 

Enabling Legislation 

History 

The Guidelines are the product of the United States Sentencing Commission, which 

was created by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. The Guidelines' primary goal was to 

alleviate sentencing disparities that research had indicated were prevalent in the 

existing sentencing system, and the guidelines reform was specifically intended to 

provide for determinate sentencing. This refers to sentencing whose actual limits are 

determined at the time the sentence is imposed, as opposed to indeterminate 

sentencing, in which a sentence with a maximum (and, perhaps, a minimum) is 

pronounced but the actual amount of time served in prison is determined by a parole 

commission or similar administrative body after the person has started serving his or her 

sentence. As part of the guidelines reform in 1984, parole on federal level was 

abolished. 

The federal effort followed guidelines projects in several states, initially funded by 

the United States Department of Justice, and led by Jack Kress and his research team 

during the late 1970s. The first sentencing guidelines jurisdictions were county-wide, 

in Denver, Newark, Chicago and Philadelphia. Statewide guidelines systems were next 

established in Utah, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Michigan, Washington, 

and Delaware, before the federal sentencing guidelines were formally adopted in 1987. 

Given that the vast majority of criminal sentencing is done at the state level, 

the American Law Institute and the American Bar Association have each recommended 

such systems for all the states, and nearly half the states presently have such systems, 

although significant variations exist among them. For example, Minnesota's Sentencing 

Guidelines Commission initially sought consciously not to increase prison capacity 

through guidelines. That is, Minnesota assumed that the legislature should determine 

how much would be spent on prisons and that the sentencing commission's job was to 

allocate those prison beds in as rational a way as possible. The federal effort took the 

opposite approach. It determined how many prisons would be needed and Congress 

was then essentially required to fund those beds. 

Promulgation and Modification 

In drafting the first set of guidelines, the Commission used data drawn from 

10,000 presentence investigations, the differing elements of various crimes as 

distinguished in substantive criminal statutes, the United States Parole Commission's 

guidelines and statistics, and data from other sources in order to determine which 

distinctions were important in pre-guidelines practice. Sentencing criteria already in use 

by judges was thus codified as guidelines. The Commission essentially codified existing 

practice. Future modifications often reflected Congressional mandates, as in the case of 


the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 that imposed increased and mandatory minimum 

sentences. 

In 2003, Congress considered the Feeney Amendment to the PROTECT Act. This 

amendment would have totally rewritten the guidelines. Among other changes, the 

original amendment would have eliminated all un-enumerated downward departures 

and all downward departures for family ties, diminished capacity, aberrant behavior, 

educational or vocational skills, mental or emotional conditions, employment record, 

good works, or overstated criminal history. Defense lawyers, law professors, current 

and former Sentencing Commissioners, the President of the American Bar 

Association, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and others wrote to Congress opposing the 

amendment. The enacted bill limited the changes described above to crimes involving 

pornography, sexual abuse, child sex, and child kidnapping and trafficking. It also raised 

penalties for child pornography and child sex abuse. It also greatly increased 

prosecutorial discretion and influence by limiting judges' power to depart from the 

guidelines and granting prosecutors greater power over departures. For instance, it 

made a prosecutorial motion a prerequisite for a three-level reduction for acceptance of 

responsibility. It also instructed the Sentencing Commission to authorize four-level "fasttrack" 

downward departures in illegal-reentry immigration cases upon motion of the 

prosecutor. 


United States v. Booker 

Though the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were styled as mandatory, the Supreme 

Court's 2005 decision in United States v. Booker found that the Guidelines, as originally 

constituted, violated the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury, and the remedy chosen 

was excision of those provisions of the law establishing the Guidelines as mandatory. In 

the aftermath of Booker and other Supreme Court cases, such as Blakely v. 

Washington (2004), Guidelines are now considered advisory only. Federal judges (state 

judges are not affected by the Guidelines) must calculate the guidelines and consider 

them when determining a sentence but are not required to issue sentences within the 

guidelines. Those sentences are still, however, subject to appellate review. The 

frequency in which sentences are imposed that exceed the range stated in the 

Guidelines has doubled in the years since the Booker decision. 

Guidelines Basics 

The Guidelines determine sentences based primarily on two factors: 

1. the conduct associated with the offense (the offense conduct, which produces 

the offense level) 

2. the defendant's criminal history (the criminal history category) 

The Sentencing Table in the Guidelines Manual shows the relationship between these 

two factors; for each pairing of offense level and criminal history category, the Table 

specifies a sentencing range, in months, within which the court may sentence a 

defendant. For example, for a defendant convicted on an offense with a total offense 

level of 22 and a criminal history category of I, the Guidelines recommend a sentence of 

41–51 months. If, however, a person with an extensive criminal history (Category VI) 

committed the same offense in the same manner in the same modern timeline and not 

during the older guideline periods, the Guidelines would recommend a sentence of 84– 

105 months. 

Offense Level 

There are 43 offense levels. The offense level of a defendant is determined by looking 

up the offense in Chapter 2 and applying any applicable adjustments. The originally 

proposed sentencing guidelines had 360 levels, and there are proposals to substantially 

reduce the current number of offense levels. 

Criminal History 

There are six criminal history categories. Each category is associated with a range of 

criminal history points. Thus, for example, a defendant with 0 or 1 criminal history points 

would be in Criminal History Category I, while a defendant with 13 or more criminal 

history points would be in Criminal History Category VI. The criminal history points are 


calculated by adding 3 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one 

year and one month; adding 2 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment of at least 

sixty days but not more than 13 months; adding 1 point for each prior sentence of less 

than sixty days; adding 2 points if the defendant committed the instant offense while 

under any criminal justice sentence, including probation, parole, supervised release, 

imprisonment, work release, or escape status; adding 2 points if the defendant 

committed the instant offense less than two years after release from imprisonment on a 

sentence of sixty days or more or while in imprisonment or escape status on such a 

sentence, except that if 2 points are added committing the offense while under a 

criminal justice sentence, adding only 1 point for this item; and adding 1 point for each 

prior sentence resulting from a conviction of a crime of violence that did not receive any 

points because such sentence was counted as a single sentence, up to a total of 3 

points for this item. 

The guidelines require 

"counting 

prior 

adult diversionary dispositions if 

they involved a judicial 

determination of guilt or 

an admission of guilt in open 

court. This reflects a policy that 

defendants who receive the 

benefit of a rehabilitative 

sentence and continue to 

commit crimes should not be 

treated with further leniency." 

Zones 

There are four sentencing 

zones: A, B, C, and D. Zone A 

consists of sentencing ranges of 0–6 months. Zone B consists of sentencing ranges 

above Zone A but with a maximum penalty of no more than 15 months. Zone C consists 

of sentencing ranges above Zone B but whose minimum penalty is less than 12 months. 

Zone D consists of sentencing ranges above Zone C. 

A defendant in Zone A is eligible for Federal Probation, and no term of imprisonment is 

required. Probation is also authorized if the applicable guideline range is in Zone B of 

the Sentencing Table and the court imposes a condition or combination of conditions 

requiring intermittent confinement, community confinement, or home detention as 

provided in U.S.S.G. § 5C1.1(c)(3) (2012), but at least one month of the sentence must 

be satisfied by imprisonment. A split sentence is authorized for defendants in Zone C. 

That is, Zone C defendants must serve at least half of their sentence in prison. 


In 2010, the U.S. Sentencing Commission proposed expanding Zones B and C, in 

recognition of the fact that many offenders are sentenced to 12 months and 1 day in 

order to receive the benefit of good time under U.S. federal law. 

Reductions in Time to Be Served 

Adjustments 

A 2- or 3-level offense level decrease is typically granted for acceptance of 

responsibility if the defendant accepts a plea bargain. However, the decrease will not 

apply if the defendant demonstrates behavior, such as continued criminal activity, that is 

inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility. 

Increase in Time to Be Served 

There are victim-related adjustments for hate crime motivation or vulnerable 

victims; official victims; restraint of victims; and terrorism. Adjustments can apply 

depending on the offender's role in the offense, which can include an aggravating role, a 

mitigating role. Enhancements apply for abuse of a position of trust or use of a special 

skill, using a minor to commit a crime, and use of body armor or a firearm in drug 

trafficking crimes and crimes of violence. 

In addition, there are enhancements related to obstruction of justice, including 

obstructing or impeding the administration of justice, reckless endangerment during 

flight, commission of an offense while on release, and false registration of a domain 

name. 

Adjustments also apply in cases involving multiple counts. 

Departures 

Departures upward or downward from the guideline range are appropriate for cases that 

deviate from the heartland of cases. 

Departures are allowed in cases involving substantial assistance to authorities in the 

investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense. Indeed, 

the Sentencing Reform Act even allows a departure below the applicable statutory 

mandatory minimum in such cases. There is no penalty for refusal to assist authorities. 

The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and U.S. Sentencing Guidelines require that 

the prosecution file a motion allowing the reduction. The court is not required to grant 

the reduction, and may decline to do so if it deems the information provided by the 

defendant to be untruthful, incomplete, unreliable, insignificant, not useful, or untimely. 

The Guidelines provide, "Substantial weight should be given to the government's 

evaluation of the extent of the defendant's assistance, particularly where the extent and 

value of the assistance are difficult to ascertain." 


Some defendants attempt to provide substantial assistance, but their assistance is 

ultimately deemed not to be substantial, which prevents them from getting the departure 

even if they made incriminating statements. 

Other grounds for departure: 

 

Death (§5K2.1) 

If death resulted, the court may increase the sentence above the authorized guideline 

range. 

Loss of life does not automatically suggest a sentence at or near the statutory 

maximum. The sentencing judge must give consideration to matters that would normally 

distinguish among levels of homicide, such as the defendant's state of mind and the 

degree of planning or preparation. Other appropriate factors are whether multiple 

deaths resulted, and the means by which life was taken. The extent of the increase 

should depend on the dangerousness of the defendant's conduct, the extent to which 

death or serious injury was intended or knowingly risked, and the extent to which the 

offense level for the offense of conviction, as determined by the other Chapter Two 

guidelines, already reflects the risk of personal injury. 

For example, a substantial increase may be appropriate if the death was intended or 

knowingly risked or if the underlying offense was one for which base offense levels do 

not reflect an allowance for the risk of personal injury, such as fraud. 


Physical Injury (§5K2.2) 

If significant physical injury resulted, the court may increase the sentence above the 

authorized guideline range. The extent of the increase ordinarily should depend on the 

extent of the injury, the degree to which it may prove permanent, and the extent to 

which the injury was intended or knowingly risked. When the victim suffers a 

major, permanent disability and when such injury was intentionally inflicted, a 

substantial departure may be appropriate. If the injury is less serious or if the defendant 

(though criminally negligent) did not knowingly create the risk of harm, a less substantial 

departure would be indicated. In general, the same considerations apply as in §5K2.1. 

 

Extreme Psychological Injury (§5K2.3) 

If a victim or victims suffered psychological injury much more serious than that normally 

resulting from commission of the offense, the court may increase the sentence above 

the authorized guideline range. The extent of the increase ordinarily should depend on 

the severity of the psychological injury and the extent to which the injury was intended 

or knowingly risked. 

Normally, psychological injury would be sufficiently severe to warrant application of this 

adjustment only when there is a substantial impairment of the intellectual, psychological, 

emotional, or behavioral functioning of a victim, when the impairment is likely to be of an 

extended or continuous duration, and when the impairment manifests itself by physical 

or psychological symptoms or by changes in behavior patterns. The court should 

consider the extent to which such harm was likely, given the nature of the defendant's 

conduct. 

 

Abduction or Unlawful Restraint (§5K2.4) 

If a person was abducted, taken hostage, or unlawfully restrained to facilitate 

commission of the offense or to facilitate the escape from the scene of the crime, the 

court may increase the sentence above the authorized guideline range. 

 

Property Damage or Loss (§5K2.5) 

If the offense caused property damage or loss not taken into account within the 

guidelines, the court may increase the sentence above the authorized guideline range. 

The extent of the increase ordinarily should depend on the extent to which the harm 

was intended or knowingly risked and on the extent to which the harm to property is 

more serious than other harm caused or risked by the conduct relevant to the offense of 

conviction. 

 

Weapons and Dangerous Instrumentalities (§5K2.6) 

If a weapon or dangerous instrumentality was used or possessed in the commission of 

the offense the court may increase the sentence above the authorized guideline range. 


The extent of the increase ordinarily should depend on the dangerousness of the 

weapon, the manner in which it was used, and the extent to which its use endangered 

others. The discharge of a firearm might warrant a substantial sentence increase. 

 

Disruption of Governmental Function (§5K2.7) 

If the defendant's conduct resulted in a significant disruption of a governmental function, 

the court may increase the sentence above the authorized guideline range to reflect the 

nature and extent of the disruption and the importance of the governmental function 

affected. Departure from the guidelines ordinarily would not be justified when the 

offense of conviction is an offense such as bribery or obstruction of justice; in such 

cases interference with a governmental function is inherent in the offense, and unless 


the circumstances are unusual the guidelines will reflect the appropriate punishment for 

such interference. 

 

Extreme Conduct (§5K2.8) 

If the defendant's conduct was unusually heinous, cruel, brutal, or degrading to the 

victim, the court may increase the sentence above the guideline range to reflect the 

nature of the conduct. Examples of extreme conduct include torture of a victim, 

gratuitous infliction of injury, or prolonging of pain or humiliation. 

 

Criminal Purpose (§5K2.9) 

If the defendant committed the offense in order to facilitate or conceal the commission 

of another offense, the court may increase the sentence above the guideline range to 

reflect the actual seriousness of the defendant's conduct. 

 

Victim's Conduct (§5K2.10) 

If the victim's wrongful conduct contributed significantly to provoking the offense 

behavior, the court may reduce the sentence below the guideline range to reflect the 

nature and circumstances of the offense. In deciding whether a sentence reduction is 

warranted, and the extent of such reduction, the court should consider the following: 

1. The size and strength of the victim, or other relevant physical characteristics, in 

comparison with those of the defendant. 

2. The persistence of the victim's conduct and any efforts by the defendant to 

prevent confrontation. 

3. The danger reasonably perceived by the defendant, including the victim's 

reputation for violence. 

4. The danger actually presented to the defendant by the victim. 

5. Any other relevant conduct by the victim that substantially contributed to the 

danger presented. 

6. The proportionality and reasonableness of the defendant's response to the 

victim's provocation. 

Victim misconduct ordinarily would not be sufficient to warrant application of this 

provision in the context of offenses under Chapter Two, Part A, Subpart 3 (Criminal 

Sexual Abuse). In addition, this provision usually would not be relevant in the context of 

non-violent offenses. There may, however, be unusual circumstances in which 

substantial victim misconduct would warrant a reduced penalty in the case of a non- 


violent offense. For example, an extended course of provocation and harassment might 

lead a defendant to steal or destroy property in retaliation. 

 

Lesser Harms (§5K2.11) 

Sometimes, a defendant may commit a crime in order to avoid a perceived greater 

harm. In such instances, a reduced sentence may be appropriate, provided that the 

circumstances significantly diminish society's interest in punishing the conduct, for 

example, in the case of a mercy killing. Where the interest in punishment or deterrence 

is not reduced, a reduction in sentence is not warranted. For example, providing 

defense secrets to a hostile power should receive no lesser punishment simply because 

the defendant believed that the government's policies were misdirected. 

In other instances, conduct may not cause or threaten the harm or evil sought to be 

prevented by the law proscribing the offense at issue. For example, where a war 

veteran possessed a machine gun or grenade as a trophy, or a school teacher 

possessed controlled substances for display in a drug education program, a reduced 

sentence might be warranted. 


Coercion and Duress (§5K2.12) 

If the defendant committed the offense because of 

serious coercion, blackmail or duress, under circumstances not amounting to a 

complete defense, the court may depart downward. The extent of the decrease 

ordinarily should depend on the reasonableness of the defendant's actions, on the 

proportionality of the defendant's actions to the seriousness of coercion, blackmail, or 

duress involved, and on the extent to which the conduct would have been less harmful 

under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be. Ordinarily coercion will 

be sufficiently serious to warrant departure only when it involves a threat of physical 

injury, substantial damage to property or similar injury resulting from the unlawful action 

of a third party or from a natural emergency. Notwithstanding this policy statement, 

personal financial difficulties and economic pressures upon a trade or business do not 

warrant a downward departure. 

 

Diminished Capacity (§5K2.13) 

A downward departure may be warranted if (1) the defendant committed the offense 

while suffering from a significantly reduced mental capacity; and (2) the significantly 

reduced mental capacity contributed substantially to the commission of the offense. 

Similarly, if a departure is warranted under this policy statement, the extent of the 

departure should reflect the extent to which the reduced mental capacity contributed to 

the commission of the offense. 

However, the court may not depart below the applicable guideline range if (1) the 

significantly reduced mental capacity was caused by the voluntary use of drugs or other 

intoxicants; (2) the facts and circumstances of the defendant's offense indicate a need 

to protect the public because the offense involved actual violence or a serious threat of 

violence; (3) the defendant's criminal history indicates a need to incarcerate the 

defendant to protect the public; or (4) the defendant has been convicted of an offense 

under chapter 71, 109A, 110, or 117, of title 18, United States Code. 

 

Public Welfare (§5K2.14) 

If national security, public health, or safety was significantly endangered, the court may 

depart upward to reflect the nature and circumstances of the offense. 

 

Voluntary disclosure of offense (§5K2.16) 

If the defendant voluntarily discloses to authorities the existence of, and accepts 

responsibility for, the offense prior to the discovery of such offense, and if such offense 

was unlikely to have been discovered otherwise, a downward departure may be 

warranted. For example, a downward departure under this section might be considered 

where a defendant, motivated by remorse, discloses an offense that otherwise would 

have remained undiscovered. This provision does not apply where the motivating factor 

is the defendant's knowledge that discovery of the offense is likely or imminent, or 


where the defendant's disclosure occurs in connection with the investigation or 

prosecution of the defendant for related conduct. 

Semiautomatic Firearms Capable of Accepting Large Capacity 

Magazines (§5K2.17) 

If the defendant possessed a semiautomatic firearm capable of accepting a large 

capacity magazine in connection with a crime of violence or controlled substance 

offense, an upward departure may be warranted. A semiautomatic firearm capable of 

accepting a large capacity magazine' means a semiautomatic firearm that has the ability 

to fire many rounds without reloading because at the time of the offense (A) the firearm 

had attached to it a magazine or similar device that could accept more than 15 rounds 

of ammunition; or (B) a magazine or similar device that could accept more than 15 

rounds of ammunition was in close proximity to the firearm. The extent of any increase 

should depend upon the degree to which the nature of the weapon increased the 

likelihood of death or injury in the circumstances of the particular case. 

 

Violent Street Gangs (§5K2.18) 

If the defendant is subject to an enhanced sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 521 (pertaining 

to criminal street gangs), an upward departure may be warranted. The purpose of this 

departure provision is to enhance the sentences of defendants who participate in 

groups, clubs, organizations, or associations that use violence to further their ends. It is 

to be noted that there may be cases in which 18 U.S.C. § 521 applies, but no violence is 


established. In such cases, it is expected that the guidelines will account adequately for 

the conduct and, consequently, this departure provision would not apply. 

 

Post-Sentencing Rehabilitative Efforts (§5K2.19) 

Prior to October 2010: 

[p]ost-sentencing rehabilitative efforts, even if exceptional, undertaken by a defendant 

after imposition of a term of imprisonment for the instant offense [were] not an 

appropriate basis for a downward departure when resentencing the defendant for that 

offense. 

After Pepper v. United States (2011) but before November 1, 2012: 

When a defendant's sentence has been set aside on appeal, a district court at 

resentencing may consider evidence of the defendant's postsentencing rehabilitation, 

and such evidence may, in appropriate cases, support a downward variance from the 

now-advisory Guidelines range. 

After November 1, 2012: 

Deleted. 

 

Aberrant Behavior (§5K2.20) 

IN GENERAL.—Except where a defendant is convicted of an offense involving a minor 

victim under section 1201, an offense under section 1591, or an offense under chapter 

71, 109A, 110, or 117, of title 18, United States Code, a downward departure may be 

warranted in an exceptional case if: 

1. the defendant's criminal conduct meets the requirements of subsection (b); and 

2. the departure is not prohibited under subsection (c) 

REQUIREMENTS.—The court may depart downward under this policy statement only if 

the defendant committed a single criminal occurrence or single criminal transaction that 

1. was committed without significant planning; 

2. was of limited duration; and 

3. represents a marked deviation by the defendant from an otherwise law-abiding 

life. 

PROHIBITIONS BASED ON THE PRESENCE OF CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES.— 

The court may not depart downward pursuant to this policy statement if any of the 

following circumstances are present: 


1. The offense involved serious bodily injury or death. 

2. The defendant discharged a firearm or otherwise used a firearm or a dangerous 

weapon. 

3. The instant offense of conviction is a serious drug trafficking offense. 

4. The defendant has either of the following: (A) more than one criminal history 

point, as determined under Chapter Four (Criminal History and Criminal 

Livelihood) before application of subsection (b) of §4A1.3 (Departures Based on 

Inadequacy of Criminal History Category); or (B) a prior federal or state felony 

conviction, or any other significant prior criminal behavior, regardless of whether 

the conviction or significant prior criminal behavior is countable under Chapter 

Four. 

 

Dismissed and Uncharged Conduct (§5K2.21) 

The court may depart upward to reflect the actual seriousness of the offense based on 

conduct (1) underlying a charge dismissed as part of a plea agreement in the case, or 

underlying a potential charge not pursued in the case as part of a plea agreement or for 


any other reason; and (2) that did not enter into the determination of the applicable 

guideline range. 

 

Specific Offender Characteristics as Grounds for Downward Departure in 

Child Crimes and Sexual Offenses (§5K2.22) 

In sentencing a defendant convicted of an offense involving a minor victim under section 

1201, an offense under section 1591, or an offense under chapter 71, 109A, 110, or 

117, of title 18, United States Code: 

1. Age may be a reason to depart downward only if and to the extent permitted by 

§5H1.1. 

2. An extraordinary physical impairment may be a reason to depart downward only 

if and to the extent permitted by §5H1.4. 

3. Drug, alcohol, or gambling dependence or abuse is not a reason to depart 

downward. 

 

Discharged Terms of Imprisonment (§5K2.23) 

A downward departure may be appropriate if the defendant (1) has completed serving a 

term of imprisonment; and (2) subsection (b) of §5G1.3 (Imposition of a Sentence on a 

Defendant Subject to Undischarged Term of Imprisonment) would have provided an 

adjustment had that completed term of imprisonment been undischarged at the time of 

sentencing for the instant offense. Any such departure should be fashioned to achieve a 

reasonable punishment for the instant offense. 

 

Commission of Offense While Wearing or Displaying Unauthorized or 

Counterfeit Insignia or Uniform (§5K2.24) 

If, during the commission of the offense, the defendant wore or displayed an official, 

or counterfeit official, insignia or uniform received in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 716, an 

upward departure may be warranted. 

Controversies 

Among the controversial aspects of the Sentencing Guidelines have been the 100:1 

disparity between treatment of crack and cocaine (which has been amended to 18:1 by 

the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010) and the immigration guidelines which call for hefty 

enhancements for illegal re-entrants with prior felony records, despite the prior offenses 

already being taken into account via the Criminal History Category. Heavy penalties 

for child pornography offenders have also come under fire. Many judges are refusing to 

apply the Guidelines in these cases. 


It has been argued that the Sentencing Guidelines actually increase unwarranted 

sentencing disparities. Joseph S. Hall writes, "Factors such as whether or not the 

defendant can afford a skilled attorney capable of making innovative legal arguments or 

performing detailed factual investigations have a profound influence on a defendant's 

sentence. The prosecutor's power to extract guilty pleas, previously held in check by 

judges, is now counterbalanced only by the diligence of the defense attorney." William 

J. Stuntz claims that "when necessary, the litigants simply bargain about what facts will 

(and won't) form the basis for sentencing. It seems to be an iron rule: guidelines 

sentencing empowers prosecutors, even where the guidelines' authors try to fight that 

tendency ... In short, plea bargains outside the law's shadow depend on prosecutors' 

ability to make credible threats of severe post-trial sentences. Sentencing guidelines 

make it easy to issue those threats." 

The federal guilty plea rate has risen from 83% in 1983 to 96% in 2009, a rise attributed 

largely to the Sentencing Guidelines. 

Sentencing Table 

The sentencing table is an integral part of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. 

The Offense Level (1–43) forms the vertical axis of the Sentencing Table. The Criminal 

History Category (I–VI) forms the horizontal axis of the Table. The intersection of the 

Offense Level and Criminal History Category displays the Guideline Range in months of 

imprisonment. "Life" means life imprisonment. For example, the guideline range 

applicable to a defendant with an Offense Level of 15 and a Criminal History Category 

of III is 24–30 months of imprisonment. 

Offense 

Level ↓ 

Zone A 

Sentencing Table 

Effective Nov. 2012 (showing months of imprisonment) 

I 

(0 or 1) 

II 

(2 or 3) 

Criminal History Category 

(Criminal History Points) 

III 

(4, 5, 6) 

IV 

(7, 8, 9) 

V 

(10, 11, 

12) 

VI 

(13+) 

1 0–6 0–6 0–6 0–6 0–6 0–6 

2 0–6 0–6 0–6 0–6 0–6 1–7 

3 0–6 0–6 0–6 0–6 2–8 3–9 

4 0–6 0–6 0–6 2–8 4–10 6–12 

5 0–6 0–6 1–7 4–10 6–12 9–15 

6 0–6 1–7 2–8 6–12 9–15 12–18 

7 0–6 2–8 4–10 8–14 12–18 15–21 

8 0–6 4–10 6–12 10–16 15–21 18–24 

Zone B 9 4–10 6–12 8–14 12–18 18–24 21–27 


10 6–12 8–14 10–16 15–21 21–27 24–30 

11 8–14 10–16 12–18 18–24 24–30 27–33 

Zone C 

Zone D 

12 10–16 12–18 15–21 21–27 27–33 30–37 

13 12–18 15–21 18–24 24–30 30–37 33–41 

14 15–21 18–24 21–27 27–33 33–41 37–46 

15 18–24 21–27 24–30 30–37 37–46 41–51 

16 21–27 24–30 27–33 33–41 41–51 46–57 

17 24–30 27–33 30–37 37–46 46–57 51–63 

18 27–33 30–37 33–41 41–51 51–63 57–71 

19 30–37 33–41 37–46 46–57 57–71 63–78 

20 33–41 37–46 41–51 51–63 63–78 70–87 

21 37–46 41–51 46–57 57–71 70–87 77–96 

22 41–51 46–57 51–63 63–78 77–96 84–105 

23 46–57 51–63 57–71 70–87 84–105 92–115 

24 51–63 57–71 63–78 77–96 92–115 100–125 

25 57–71 63–78 70–87 84–105 100–125 110–137 

26 63–78 70–87 78–97 92–115 110–137 120–150 

27 70–87 78–97 87–108 100–125 120–150 130–162 

28 78–97 87–108 97–121 110–137 130–162 140–175 

29 87–108 97–121 108–135 121–151 140–175 151–188 

30 97–121 108–135 121–151 135–168 151–188 168–210 

31 108–135 121–151 135–168 151–188 168–210 188–235 

32 121–151 135–168 151–188 168–210 188–235 210–262 

33 135–168 151–188 168–210 188–235 210–262 235–293 

34 151–188 168–210 188–235 210–262 235–293 262–327 

35 168–210 188–235 210–262 235–293 262–327 292–365 

36 188–235 210–262 235–293 262–327 292–365 324–405 

37 210–262 235–293 262–327 292–365 324–405 360–life 

38 235–293 262–327 292–365 324–405 360–life 360–life 

39 262–327 292–365 324–405 360–life 360–life 360–life 

40 292–365 324–405 360–life 360–life 360–life 360–life 

41 324–405 360–life 360–life 360–life 360–life 360–life 

42 360–life 360–life 360–life 360–life 360–life 360–life 

43 life life life life life life 


Fines 

For individuals, the fine table is as follows: 

Offense level Minimum Maximum 

3 and below $200 $9,500 

4–5 $500 $9,500 

6–7 $1,000 $9,500 

8–9 $2,000 $20,000 

10–11 $4,000 $40,000 

12–13 $5,500 $55,000 

14–15 $7,500 $75,000 

16–17 $10,000 $95,000 

18–19 $10,000 $100,000 

20–22 $15,000 $150,000 

23–25 $20,000 $200,000 

26–28 $25,000 $250,000 

29–31 $30,000 $300,000 

32–34 $35,000 $350,000 

35–37 $40,000 $400,000 

38 and above $50,000 $500,000 

The Guidelines state that the court can impose a fine above the maximum set out in the 

table if the defendant is convicted under a statute authorizing a maximum fine greater 

than $250,000, or a fine for each day of violation. The court can waive the fine if the 

defendant is unlikely to be able to pay or if the fine would unduly burden the defendant's 

dependents; however, the Guidelines state that the court must still impose a total 

combined sanction that is punitive. 

Probation and Supervised Release 

The Guidelines state that the term of probation shall be at least one year but not more 

than five years if the offense level is 6 or greater, and no more than three years in any 

other case. The Guidelines provide that the term of supervised release under U.S. 

federal law shall be at least three years but not more than five years for a defendant 

convicted of a Class A or B felony; at least two years but not more than three years for a 

defendant convicted of a Class C or D felony; and one year for a defendant convicted of 

a Class E felony or a Class A misdemeanor. However, a life term of supervised release 

may be imposed for any offense listed in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B), the commission of 

which resulted in, or created a foreseeable risk of, death or serious bodily injury to 

another person; or a sex offense. Supervised release is recommended by the 

Guidelines for most offenders who are serving a prison sentence of more than a year. 



VIII. References 

1. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-36020717 

2. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three-strikes_law 

3. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deterrence_(penology) 

4. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eighth_Amendment_to_the_United_States_Constitution 

5. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_sentencing 

6. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Habitual_offender 

7. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Federal_Sentencing_Guidelines 

8. https://static.prisonpolicy.org/scans/sp/3strikes.pdf 

9. https://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/sp/inc_aging.pdf 

10. 

http://www.cjcj.org/uploads/cjcj/documents/Striking_Out_Californias_Three_Strikes_And_Your 

e_Out_Law_Has_Not_Reduced_Violent_Crime.pdf 


Notes 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 


Notes 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 



Attachment A 

The Three-Strikes Laws 

Five Years Later 

































Attachment B 

Aging Behind Bars: Three-Strikes 

Seven Years Later 

















Attachment C 

Striking-Out: California’s Three-Strikes and 

You’re Out Law Has Not Reduced Violent Crime 


















The e-Advocate Quarterly 


Issue Title Quarterly 

Vol. I 2015 The Fundamentals 

I 

The ComeUnity ReEngineering 

Project Initiative 

Q-1 2015 

II The Adolescent Law Group Q-2 2015 

III 

Landmark Cases in US 

Juvenile Justice (PA) 

Q-3 2015 

IV The First Amendment Project Q-4 2015 

Vol. II 2016 Strategic Development 

V The Fourth Amendment Project Q-1 2016 

VI 


Juvenile Justice (NJ) 

Q-2 2016 

VII Youth Court Q-3 2016 

VIII 

The Economic Consequences of Legal 

Decision-Making 

Q-4 2016 

Vol. III 2017 Sustainability 

IX The Sixth Amendment Project Q-1 2017 

X 

The Theological Foundations of 

US Law & Government 

Q-2 2017 

XI The Eighth Amendment Project Q-3 2017 

XII 

The EB-5 Investor 

Immigration Project* 

Q-4 2017 

Vol. IV 2018 Collaboration 

XIII Strategic Planning Q-1 2018 

XIV 

The Juvenile Justice 

Legislative Reform Initiative 

Q-2 2018 

XV The Advocacy Foundation Coalition Q-3 2018 


XVI 

for Drug-Free Communities 


Juvenile Justice (GA) 

Q-4 2018 



Vol. V 2019 Organizational Development 

XVII The Board of Directors Q-1 2019 

XVIII The Inner Circle Q-2 2019 

XIX Staff & Management Q-3 2019 

XX Succession Planning Q-4 2019 

XXI The Budget* Bonus #1 

XXII Data-Driven Resource Allocation* Bonus #2 

Vol. VI 2020 Missions 

XXIII Critical Thinking Q-1 2020 

XXIV 

The Advocacy Foundation 

Endowments Initiative Project 

Q-2 2020 

XXV International Labor Relations Q-3 2020 

XXVI Immigration Q-4 2020 

Vol. VII 2021 Community Engagement 

XXVII 

The 21 st Century Charter Schools 

Initiative 

Q-1 2021 

XXVIII The All-Sports Ministry @ ... Q-2 2021 

XXIX Lobbying for Nonprofits Q-3 2021 

XXX 

XXXI 

Advocacy Foundation Missions - 

Domestic 

Advocacy Foundation Missions - 

International 

Q-4 2021 

Bonus 


Vol. VIII 

2022 ComeUnity ReEngineering 

XXXII 

The Creative & Fine Arts Ministry 

@ The Foundation 

Q-1 2022 

XXXIII The Advisory Council & Committees Q-2 2022 

XXXIV 

The Theological Origins 

of Contemporary Judicial Process 

Q-3 2022 

XXXV The Second Chance Ministry @ ... Q-4 2022 

Vol. IX 2023 Legal Reformation 

XXXVI The Fifth Amendment Project Q-1 2023 

XXXVII The Judicial Re-Engineering Initiative Q-2 2023 

XXXVIII 

The Inner-Cities Strategic 

Revitalization Initiative 

Q-3 2023 

XXXVIX Habeas Corpus Q-4 2023 

Vol. X 2024 ComeUnity Development 

XXXVX 

The Inner-City Strategic 

Revitalization Plan 

Q-1 2024 

XXXVXI The Mentoring Initiative Q-2 2024 

XXXVXII The Violence Prevention Framework Q-3 2024 

XXXVXIII The Fatherhood Initiative Q-4 2024 

Vol. XI 2025 Public Interest 

XXXVXIV Public Interest Law Q-1 2025 

L (50) Spiritual Resource Development Q-2 2025 


LI 

Nonprofit Confidentiality 

In The Age of Big Data 

Q-3 2025 

LII Interpreting The Facts Q-4 2025 

Vol. XII 2026 Poverty In America 

LIII 

American Poverty 

In The New Millennium 

Q-1 2026 

LIV Outcome-Based Thinking Q-2 2026 

LV Transformational Social Leadership Q-3 2026 

LVI The Cycle of Poverty Q-4 2026 

Vol. XIII 2027 Raising Awareness 

LVII ReEngineering Juvenile Justice Q-1 2027 

LVIII Corporations Q-2 2027 

LVIX The Prison Industrial Complex Q-3 2027 

LX Restoration of Rights Q-4 2027 

Vol. XIV 2028 Culturally Relevant Programming 

LXI Community Culture Q-1 2028 

LXII Corporate Culture Q-2 2028 

LXIII Strategic Cultural Planning Q-3 2028 

LXIV 

The Cross-Sector/ Coordinated 

Service Approach to Delinquency 

Prevention 

Q-4 2028 


Vol. XV 2029 Inner-Cities Revitalization 

LXIV 

LXV 

LXVI 

Part I – Strategic Housing 

Revitalization 

(The Twenty Percent Profit Margin) 

Part II – Jobs Training, Educational 

Redevelopment 

and Economic Empowerment 

Part III - Financial Literacy 

and Sustainability 

Q-1 2029 

Q-2 2029 

Q-3 2029 

LXVII Part IV – Solutions for Homelessness Q-4 2029 

LXVIII 

The Strategic Home Mortgage 

Initiative 

Bonus 

Vol. XVI 2030 Sustainability 

LXVIII Social Program Sustainability Q-1 2030 

LXIX 

The Advocacy Foundation 

Endowments Initiative 

Q-2 2030 

LXX Capital Gains Q-3 2030 

LXXI Sustainability Investments Q-4 2030 

Vol. XVII 2031 The Justice Series 

LXXII Distributive Justice Q-1 2031 

LXXIII Retributive Justice Q-2 2031 

LXXIV Procedural Justice Q-3 2031 

LXXV (75) Restorative Justice Q-4 2031 

LXXVI Unjust Legal Reasoning Bonus 


Vol. XVIII 2032 Public Policy 

LXXVII Public Interest Law Q-1 2032 

LXXVIII Reforming Public Policy Q-2 2032 

LXXVIX ... Q-3 2032 

LXXVX ... Q-4 2032 


The e-Advocate Monthly Review 

2018 

Transformational Problem Solving January 2018 

The Advocacy Foundation February 2018 

Opioid Initiative 

Native-American Youth March 2018 

In the Juvenile Justice System 

Barriers to Reducing Confinement April 2018 

Latino and Hispanic Youth May 2018 


Social Entrepreneurship June 2018 

The Economic Consequences of 

Homelessness in America S.Ed – June 2018 

African-American Youth July 2018 


Gang Deconstruction August 2018 

Social Impact Investing September 2018 

Opportunity Youth: October 2018 

Disenfranchised Young People 

The Economic Impact of Social November 2018 

of Social Programs Development 

Gun Control December 2018 

2019 

The U.S. Stock Market January 2019 

Prison-Based Gerrymandering February 2019 

Literacy-Based Prison Construction March 2019 

Children of Incarcerated Parents April 2019 


African-American Youth in The May 2019 

Juvenile Justice System 

Racial Profiling June 2019 

Mass Collaboration July 2019 

Concentrated Poverty August 2019 

De-Industrialization September 2019 

Overcoming Dyslexia October 2019 

Overcoming Attention Deficit November 2019 

The Gift of Adversity December 2019 

2020 

The Gift of Hypersensitivity January 2020 

The Gift of Introspection February 2020 

The Gift of Introversion March 2020 

The Gift of Spirituality April 2020 

The Gift of Transformation May 2020 

Property Acquisition for 

Organizational Sustainability June 2020 

Investing for Organizational 

Sustainability July 2020 

Biblical Law & Justice TLFA August 2020 

Gentrification AF September 2020 

Environmental Racism NpA October 2020 

Law for The Poor AF November 2020 

… 


2021 

Biblically Responsible Investing TLFA – January 2021 

International Criminal Procedure LMI – February 2021 

Spiritual Rights TLFA – March 2021 

The Theology of Missions TLFA – April 2021 

Legal Evangelism, Intelligence, 

Reconnaissance & Missions LMI – May 2021 

The Law of War LMI – June 2021 

Generational Progression AF – July 2021 

Predatory Lending AF – August 2021 

The Community Assessment Process NpA – September 2021 

Accountability NpA – October 2021 

Nonprofit Transparency NpA – November 2021 

Redefining Unemployment AF – December 2021 

2022 

21 st Century Slavery AF – January 2022 

Acquiesce to Righteousness TLFA – February 2022 

ComeUnity Capacity-Building NpA – March 2022 

Nonprofit Organizational Assessment NpA – April 2022 

Debt Reduction AF – May 2022 

Case Law, Statutory Law, 

Municipal Ordinances and Policy ALG – June 2022 

Organizational Dysfunction NpA - July 2022 

Institutional Racism Collab US – August 2022 


The Ripple Effects of Ministry TLFA - September 2022 

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 NpA – October 2022 

Organized Crime (In The New Millennium) ALG – May 2022 

Nonprofit Marketing NpA – June 2022 

The Uniform Code of Military Justice AF – July 2022 

Community Policing NpA – August 2022 

Wills, Trusts & Estates AF – September 2022 

International Incidents Series 

I. Ten Conflicts to Watch In 

The New Millennium LMI – October 2022 

II. International Hotspots LMI – November 2022 

III. International Cyber Terrorism LMI – December 2022 

2023 

I. International Sex Trafficking LMI – January 2023 

II. Brexit LMI – February 2023 

III. Global Jihad LMI – March 2023 

IV. The Global Economy LMI – April 2023 

Judicial Mistakes ALG May 2023 

The Political Dynamics of Justice TJP June 2023 

Reform in The U.S. 

The Violent Crime Control and 

Law Enforcement Act of 1994 TJP July 2023 

… 


The e-Advocate Quarterly 

Special Editions 

Crowdfunding Winter-Spring 2017 

Social Media for Nonprofits October 2017 

Mass Media for Nonprofits November 2017 

The Opioid Crisis in America: January 2018 

Issues in Pain Management 

The Opioid Crisis in America: February 2018 

The Drug Culture in the U.S. 

The Opioid Crisis in America: March 2018 

Drug Abuse Among Veterans 

The Opioid Crisis in America: April 2018 

Drug Abuse Among America’s 

Teens 

The Opioid Crisis in America: May 2018 

Alcoholism 

The Economic Consequences of June 2018 

Homelessness in The US 

The Economic Consequences of July 2018 

Opioid Addiction in America 


The e-Advocate Journal 

of Theological Jurisprudence 

Vol. I - 2017 

The Theological Origins of Contemporary Judicial Process 

Scriptural Application to The Model Criminal Code 

Scriptural Application for Tort Reform 

Scriptural Application to Juvenile Justice Reformation 

Vol. II - 2018 

Scriptural Application for The Canons of Ethics 

Scriptural Application to Contracts Reform 

& The Uniform Commercial Code 

Scriptural Application to The Law of Property 

Scriptural Application to The Law of Evidence 


Legal Missions International 



Vol. I 2015 

I 

II 

God’s Will and The 21 st Century 

Democratic Process 

The Community 

Engagement Strategy 

Q-1 2015 

Q-2 2015 

III Foreign Policy Q-3 2015 

IV 

Public Interest Law 

in The New Millennium 

Q-4 2015 

Vol. II 2016 

V Ethiopia Q-1 2016 

VI Zimbabwe Q-2 2016 

VII Jamaica Q-3 2016 

VIII Brazil Q-4 2016 

Vol. III 2017 

IX India Q-1 2017 

X Suriname Q-2 2017 

XI The Caribbean Q-3 2017 

XII United States/ Estados Unidos Q-4 2017 

Vol. IV 2018 

XIII Cuba Q-1 2018 

XIV Guinea Q-2 2018 

XV Indonesia Q-3 2018 

XVI Sri Lanka Q-4 2018 


Vol. V 2019 

XVII Russia Q-1 2019 

XVIII Australia Q-2 2019 

XIV South Korea Q-3 2019 

XV Puerto Rico Q-4 2019 


Vol. VI 2020 

XVI Trinidad & Tobago Q-1 2020 

XVII Egypt Q-2 2020 

XVIII Sierra Leone Q-3 2020 

XIX South Africa Q-4 2020 

XX Israel Bonus 

Vol. VII 2021 

XXI Haiti Q-1 2021 

XXII Peru Q-2 2021 

XXIII Costa Rica Q-3 2021 

XXIV China Q-4 2021 

XXV Japan Bonus 

Vol VIII 2022 

XXVI Chile Q-1 2022 


The e-Advocate Juvenile Justice Report 

______ 

Vol. I – Juvenile Delinquency in The US 

Vol. II. – The Prison Industrial Complex 

Vol. III – Restorative/ Transformative Justice 

Vol. IV – The Sixth Amendment Right to The Effective Assistance of Counsel 

Vol. V – The Theological Foundations of Juvenile Justice 

Vol. VI – Collaborating to Eradicate Juvenile Delinquency 


The e-Advocate Newsletter 

Genesis of The Problem 

Family Structure 

Societal Influences 

Evidence-Based Programming 

Strengthening Assets v. Eliminating Deficits 

2012 - Juvenile Delinquency in The US 

Introduction/Ideology/Key Values 

Philosophy/Application & Practice 

Expungement & Pardons 

Pardons & Clemency 

Examples/Best Practices 

2013 - Restorative Justice in The US 

2014 - The Prison Industrial Complex 

25% of the World's Inmates Are In the US 

The Economics of Prison Enterprise 

The Federal Bureau of Prisons 

The After-Effects of Incarceration/Individual/Societal 

The Fourth Amendment Project 

The Sixth Amendment Project 

The Eighth Amendment Project 

The Adolescent Law Group 

2015 - US Constitutional Issues In The New Millennium 


2018 - The Theological Law Firm Academy 

The Theological Foundations of US Law & Government 

The Economic Consequences of Legal Decision-Making 

The Juvenile Justice Legislative Reform Initiative 

The EB-5 International Investors Initiative 

2017 - Organizational Development 

The Board of Directors 

The Inner Circle 

Staff & Management 

Succession Planning 

Bonus #1 The Budget 

Bonus #2 Data-Driven Resource Allocation 

2018 - Sustainability 

The Data-Driven Resource Allocation Process 

The Quality Assurance Initiative 

The Advocacy Foundation Endowments Initiative 

The Community Engagement Strategy 

2019 - Collaboration 

Critical Thinking for Transformative Justice 

International Labor Relations 

Immigration 

God's Will & The 21st Century Democratic Process 

The Community Engagement Strategy 

The 21st Century Charter Schools Initiative 

2020 - Community Engagement 


Extras 

The Nonprofit Advisors Group Newsletters 

The 501(c)(3) Acquisition Process 

The Board of Directors 

The Gladiator Mentality 

Strategic Planning 

Fundraising 

501(c)(3) Reinstatements 

The Collaborative US/ International Newsletters 

How You Think Is Everything 

The Reciprocal Nature of Business Relationships 

Accelerate Your Professional Development 

The Competitive Nature of Grant Writing 

Assessing The Risks 



About The Author 

John C (Jack) Johnson III 

Founder & CEO – The Advocacy Foundation, Inc. 

________ 

Jack was educated at Temple University, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and Rutgers 

Law School, in Camden, New Jersey. In 1999, he moved to Atlanta, Georgia to pursue 

greater opportunities to provide Advocacy and Preventive Programmatic services for atrisk/ 

at-promise young persons, their families, and Justice Professionals embedded in the 

Juvenile Justice process in order to help facilitate its transcendence into the 21 st Century. 

There, along with a small group of community and faith-based professionals, “The Advocacy Foundation, Inc." was conceived 

and developed over roughly a thirteen year period, originally chartered as a Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Educational 

Support Services organization consisting of Mentoring, Tutoring, Counseling, Character Development, Community Change 

Management, Practitioner Re-Education & Training, and a host of related components. 

The Foundation’s Overarching Mission is “To help Individuals, Organizations, & Communities Achieve Their Full Potential”, by 

implementing a wide array of evidence-based proactive multi-disciplinary "Restorative & Transformative Justice" programs & 

projects currently throughout the northeast, southeast, and western international-waters regions, providing prevention and support 

services to at-risk/ at-promise youth, to young adults, to their families, and to Social Service, Justice and Mental 

Health professionals” in each jurisdiction served. The Foundation has since relocated its headquarters to Philadelphia, 

Pennsylvania, and been expanded to include a three-tier mission. 

In addition to his work with the Foundation, Jack also served as an Adjunct Professor of Law & Business at National-Louis 

University of Atlanta (where he taught Political Science, Business & Legal Ethics, Labor & Employment Relations, and Critical 

Thinking courses to undergraduate and graduate level students). Jack has also served as Board President for a host of wellestablished 

and up & coming nonprofit organizations throughout the region, including “Visions Unlimited Community 

Development Systems, Inc.”, a multi-million dollar, award-winning, Violence Prevention and Gang Intervention Social Service 

organization in Atlanta, as well as Vice-Chair of the Georgia/ Metropolitan Atlanta Violence Prevention Partnership, a state-wide 

300 organizational member violence prevention group led by the Morehouse School of Medicine, Emory University and The 

Original, Atlanta-Based, Martin Luther King Center. 

Attorney Johnson’s prior accomplishments include a wide-array of Professional Legal practice areas, including Private Firm, 

Corporate and Government postings, just about all of which yielded significant professional awards & accolades, the history and 

chronology of which are available for review online at LinkedIn.com. Throughout his career, Jack has served a wide variety of 

for-profit corporations, law firms, and nonprofit organizations as Board Chairman, Secretary, Associate, and General Counsel 

since 1990. 


Clayton County Youth Services Partnership, Inc. – Chair; Georgia Violence Prevention Partnership, Inc – Vice Chair; Fayette 

County NAACP - Legal Redress Committee Chairman; Clayton County Fatherhood Initiative Partnership – Principal 

Investigator; Morehouse School of Medicine School of Community Health Feasibility Study Steering Committee; Atlanta 

Violence Prevention Capacity Building Project Partner; Clayton County Minister’s Conference, President 2006-2007; Liberty In 

Life Ministries, Inc. Board Secretary; Young Adults Talk, Inc. Board of Directors; ROYAL, Inc Board of Directors; Temple 

University Alumni Association; Rutgers Law School Alumni Association; Sertoma International; Our Common Welfare Board of 

Directors President 2003-2005; River’s Edge Elementary School PTA (Co-President); Summerhill Community Ministries 

(Winter Sports Athletic Director); Outstanding Young Men of America; Employee of the Year; Academic All-American - 

Basketball; Church Trustee; Church Diaconate Ministry (Walking Deacon); Pennsylvania Commission on Crime & Delinquency 

(Nominee).

The Violent Crime and Law Enforcement Act of 1994

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?