ARISTOTLE AND THE EARLIER PERIPATETICS vol.I by Eduard Zeller, B.F.C.Costelloe 1897

.
PHYSICS 463
much, that is to say, as all art is an* imitation or completion
of nature, and the design of the
one therefore
implies that of the other. 1 If we cannot deny the
evidences of design throughout the -world of mortal
things, he argues that we must admit the same in a
far greater measure with regard to the universe at
large, where the order is more strict,
more unbroken.
and the regularity
Whence, indeed, could the laws which
govern the former have sprung except from the latter ? 2
Consequently the discovery of final causes forms the
first and most important problem of natural science.
It must direct its attention, not to the individual, but
to the whole which the individual subserves—not to the
matter but to the form. 3 But if it is suggested that, in
1
Phys. ii. 8, 198, b, 32-199,
b, 26, cf. viii. 1, 252, a, 11 : cUAA
ovSev ye UraKrov ruv tpvffei /cat
fjL$]P
Kara tpvffiv ' 7) yap tpvffts atria
iraeri Tafews. Part. An. i. 1, 641,
b, 12-30 ; De Cmlo, ii. 8, 289, b,
25 ; Gen. An. iii. 10, 760, a, 31 ;
Iletaph. xii. 10, xiv. 3; see p.
391, d. 2, supra.
1
Part. An. i. 1, 641, b, 12:
7] (pvffis eveKti rov irotel trdvra.
tpaiverat' yap, Siffirep iv rots Te^yaarots
iffrlv t) rexyt], oiirws ev
aiirols rots rrpdyfiaffw &\\7] rts
apxh Kal aWia roiavri], %v txofiev
nadairep [as well as] rb 8epfj.bv teal
tyvxpbv e/c rov iravr6s. Stb fiaWoy
etKos rbv ovpavbv yeyepyjo-Bai inrb
rotavrns airias, ei yeyove, Kal
tlvo.i Bia Toiai>T7]v alriav ft-aWov t)
ra ftpa to Qvyrd ' rb yovv rerayfxevov
Kal rb foptajievov tro\v fiaWov
(paiverai if rots ovpaviots ^ wepl
yfias, rb 5' a\\or' &Wus Kal ws
6TUXe T*?^ T^ ^vt]ra fiaWov. ol 5e
ruv [lev C4av tKaffrov (pvtret (patrlv
eivai Kal yeveffBat, rbv 5' ovpavbv
airb riffls Kal rov avrofidrov roiovrov
ffvffrrivai, ev § airb rv%Ti5 Kal
ara£tas ov5' drtovv. (palverat. Cf
also Zell. Ph. d. Gr. i. 650,
579, 1.
3
Phys. ii. 9, 200, a, 32 (after
the passage quoted p. 360, n. 1) :
Kal &/itpw fiev Tcp tpvotKqi KeKreai at
atrial, /*a\Kov Se T) rivos eveKa'
atriov yap rovro rrjs HKtjs [inasmuch
as Nature chooses her
materials with a view to the
thing that is to be produced]
dAA' ovx aSrri rov re\ovs. Gen.
et Con: ii. 9, 335, b, 29 : it is not
sufficient to give the material
causes of a thing. Matter is
merely the motum, the rnovens
in the province both of nature
and art is something quite
different ; the Kvpioirepa airia is
the form. Materialistic physics,
instead of giving us the real
causes, can tell us only of implements
of production : as if one
in answer to the question ' ,Who
saws the wood 1 ' were to reply,
464 ARISTOTLE
order to pursue definite
ends, Nature must be capable
of conscious deliberation, Aristotle considers this unreasonable
Even Art, he remarks, does not reflect,
but works in the artist unconsciously. 1
Moreover, it is
just this which, as we already know, forms to Aristotle's
mind the distinction between Art and Nature, that the
productions of the former have their
motive principle
outside themselves, and those of the latter within. 2
thus arrive for the first time at
We
the important conception
of immanent design, a point so essential to
Aristotle's system that we might define Nature, according
to his view, as the realm of internal activity toward
a fixed end.
'
The saw.' Cf. p. 360, n. 1, and
the passages quoted p. 303, n. 3,
and p. 307, n. 4, and Zbll. Ph.
d. Gr. pt. i. 788, 1, 3, 893,
2, on the neglect of final causes
in ancient physics. Part. An. i.
1, 039, b, 14 : tpaiverai Se Trpdrrj
'
[sc. airia] %\v Kiyofiev iveicd twos
\6yos yap oZtos, apxb 5' b \6yos
dfio'us iv Te rots /caret t4xvv v
teal iv rots