ARISTOTLE AND THE EARLIER PERIPATETICS vol.I by Eduard Zeller, B.F.C.Costelloe 1897

C
41
ARISTOTLE
being. 1 nnrryftrsely
;
METAPHYSICS 415
•
the .Forms of t hin gs onnnnt he
thougQta^fjhe^DeJi^sijnc^^cording to Aristotle, the
Form is the substance of the things andSubstance can
neither be predicated of nor.JielQng to anvthjng. 2
Thoughts cannot be substances, since they exist in the
soul as their substratum. 3
Again, we find no analogy
in Aristotle for the notion of a self-development
of the
divine thoughts : indeed, it is directly contradicted by
the proposition 4 that there is no change in the thought
of God, no transition from one thing to another.
Finally,
while Brandis maintains that all things strive towards
Deity, because the active forces which emanate from
Him struggle to return to Him again, Aristotle himself
rather ascribes this striving, like all motion, to
Matter, which desires to complement and complete itself
by means of the foraes. 5 Nor is it the least important-
objection to this view that it clashes with the
whole character of Aristotle's system. For supposing
the thoughts of Deity to be the supporters of concrete
existences and of their mutations, the relation of finite
reality to God would be one of immanence : the Deity
would by virtue of his thoughts be inherent in things,
and the latter would have in. God the permanent ground
of their shifting properties. Instead of Aristotle's
dualistic theism, we should arrive at a system of
dynamic pantheism. 6 But not only is it impossible to
1
See p. 398, n. 1, and p. £97, stratum; seep. 214, nAfin. supra.
n. 2, supra. * P. 397, D. 2, supra.
'
See p. 330 sq., and p. 373 sq. s Uf. p. 404 sq., p. 344, n. 1,
supra. and p. 379, n. J, and on the
s 'Eirurr^/Mj is the very ex- doctrine that motion resides in
ample which Aristotle mentions the motum and therefore in the
ot that which is at once predicate material, 386, n. 1.
and inherent attribute of a sub- « This is made still more
discover such a system in the works of the Philosopher,
but even his
school were unacquainted with anything
of the sort, until the influence of Stoic opinions introduced
that
fusion of things diverse and fundamentally
distinct which meets us in the spurious book upon the
World and still more in Neoplatonism. Aristotle leaves
it quite uncertain how we are to define the relation of
the particular and individual Forms to the Deity.
From his utterances upon the subject we can only say
that he placed them side by side, without explaining
satisfactorily the existence and the special motions of
finite things by the operation of the Deity, or even
attempting such an explanation. They are given
factors, just as Matter is a given factor
not attempt to deduce from Form or Deity.
which he does
It is true
that the unity of his system, the ovk ayaObv vroXv-
Koopavit), is thus rendered more than doubtful. 1
This brings us to the conclusion of the Metaphysics.
God being defined as the First Cause of Motion, philosophy
passes from the Unmoved to the Moved— or, in
other words, to Nature.
obvious by Kym ; cf. ibid. p. 242 tajrii.), 7 : rb tie ^rh tout' fjS-n
246sq.,256,258sq.,andp.402,n.l, Xdyov Se7rai irKeiovos irepl rrjs
fin. supra. According to Kym, e^eVecus, iroia xal rivav, eVeiS^
God is said to be, not only the irKelu to Kvit\Ma [the heaveDly
creative conception, but also the spheres] k«! at