ARISTOTLE AND THE EARLIER PERIPATETICS vol.I by Eduard Zeller, B.F.C.Costelloe 1897

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METAPHYSICS 411
the changes of birth and destruction—the heavenly
spheres with the spirits that move and animate them,
and the immortal part of the human soul P 1 What
explanation does Aristotle offer us of
the existence and
peculiar nature of these beings ? We cannot suppose
2
them to be God's creatures ;
for not only does such a
notion obtain no support from his system and writings, 3
be, Psych, d. Arist. 198, 234 sqq.
Bullingbr goes even further,
Des Arist. Erhabenheit iiber alien,
Dualismus etc. (1878), p. 2 sq.
According to his view, Aristotle
supposed not only the whole
world, but even the material of
which it is made, to originate in a
divine act of creation. Thus 'the
material out of which God
creates the world ' would, according
to Aristotle, be nothing else
indeed (Mtitaph. v. I, 1013, a, 16,
20 sq.), is used in as many senses
as oXtiov, and includes especially
1
That these three classes of
being are uncreated and indestructible
not only follows from
the eternity of the world and its the conception of final cause.
motion, but is also expressly Since it is God who, as the mostperfect
stated by Aristotle ; cf. p. 474 sq.
being in the universe,
and Ch. IX. infra.
gives unity of aim to the whole,
2
As Bkentano holds them to and who causes the all-governing
motion of the first sphere, He is
also the irpdrTj Kal KupiwrdrTj dpx^i,
the
on Him the whole order of
universe may be said to depend
(p. 394, n. 1, and 395, n. 6), and
to Him we are justified in applying
" eh Kolpavos eVrw " (p. 391, n.
2). The commander, however, is
not therefore the creator of his
subordinates. And as little does
it follow from Metaplh. ix. 8, 1050,
b,3 (seep. 385,n.l,»?y?ra)that the
creative activity of God precedes
than the power and might eternally
'
actual in God, whereby the all being in time; for the del
world is actualised,' &c. (p. 15). kivovv irptiiTus does not (as ,Ps.
It will be sufficiently evident from Alex, in loc. certainly thought)
the account already given in the refer to God as the first cause of
text that speculations are here motion in the universe. On the
attributed to Aristotle which contrary (as is obvious from the
are as foreign to the range of his explanation upon p. 1049, b,
thought as they are in conflict 17 sqq. which the &tnrep eiirofiey
with his definite declarations. recalls), the reference is here to
3
That God is called irpiirr\ the fact that every individual
dpxh (see p. 403, svpra), proves thing presupposes as the condition
of its production another
nothing ; for this may mean, not
only that He has produced every similar already existing thing,
He
1
thins
and this likewise another, ewj toO
but also that is the
,
condition of the eternal order del KtvovvTos irpt&Tcos : i.e. until we
and activity of the world : dpxh, come to the first member of the
412 ARISTOTLE
but it would involve us in the contradiction of supposing
the uncreated to be at the same time created,
that which has been declared to be eternal to have had
a beginning in time. 1 The same question arises with
series in question which has
given the first impulse to the
whole series, the pri/mum movens
in each case (not the irparov
wi/oBy); and this is the reason why
the ael kiv. irp. is repeated from
p. 1049, b, 26, where (as Phys.
viii. 10, 267, a, 1, 3) this is undoubtedly
its meaning. Aristotle
was precluded from holding
any theory of creation by his
view of the eternity of the
world. Such a theory, moreover,
is incompatible, not only with the
assertion that to God belongs
neither trp&TTtiv nor itoieiv (see
p. 400, n. 1), but also with the
principle ex nihilo nihil Jit
{Phys. i. 4, 187. a, 34, c. 7, 190, a,
14;' Gen. An. ii. 1, 733, b, 24 ;
Metaph. iii. 4, 999, b, 6, vii. 7,
1032, a, J 3, 20, b, 30, c. 8 init.,
ix. 8, 1049, b, 28, xi. 6, 1062, b,
24), from which we have not the
smallest right to make an exception
in favour of the Deity, as
Brentano, 249, does.
1
Bkentano, p. 210, indeed,
believes that the eternity in time
of immaterial substances as little
dispenses with the necessity of
an efficient principle for them as
the eternity of motion dispenses
with the necessity of a, mover ;
in other words, he endeavours to
reconcile the eternity of the
world with the theory of its
creation by means of the conception
of an eternal creative
activity in God. But upon the
principles of the Aristotelian as
of every subsequent theism this
is impossible. One who conceives
of God as the substance
of the world, and of finite things
as mere manifestations of the
divine force immanent in them,
may, and even must, in consequence,
declare that the one is as
eternal as the other. One, on
the other hand, who treats God
as a personal being outside the
world, distinguishing other beings
from Him as so many independent
substances, would involve
himself in a palpable contradiction
were he to hold that
the latter are eternally created
by the former. Creation as an
act proceeding from a personal
will must necessarily be in time,
and an individual being in order
to produce other beings must
necessarily exist before them.
For only eansce irnmanentes have
contemporaneous effects ; eausce
trameuntes always precede their
effects : the father precedes the
son, the artist the work of art,
the creator the creature. Such a
contradiction we should be justified
in attributing to Aristotle,
only if we could show that he
held alike to the eternity of the
world and to a creative activity
of God. The opposite, however,
is the case. Aristotle holds, indeed,
quite definitely the doctrine
of the eternity of the world, but
of a creative activity in God we
not only find no word in his
writings, but he expressly de-