ARISTOTLE AND THE EARLIER PERIPATETICS vol.I by Eduard Zeller, B.F.C.Costelloe 1897

;
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—
but if it were- more correctly stated it
METAPHYSICS £00
•
would lead to the
substitution of matter' (conceived '
of as one and without
qualities) for the infinite variety of primary bodies
which Anaxagoras assumed. The 1
theory, common to
him and others, of a beginning of movement among
matter, after infinitely continued rest, would contradict
the regularity of the order of nature. 2
recognises the
Aristotle freely
advance made when Anaxagoras formulated
the doctrine of universal mind, but he considers
it to be still unsatisfactory, inasmuch as, on the one
hand, it did not bear fruit in the explanation of nature,
and, on the other hand, as applied even to man, it mis--
conceived the distinction between the spirit and the
soul. 3
With regard to the Eleatics (among whom he takes
little account of Xenophanes and Melissus), 4
Aristotle's
first point is that their philosophy contains no basis for
any explanation of phenomena. 5
Their primary axioms
he takes to be vitiated by grave obscurities ; they talk
of the unity of being ' ' without keeping distinct the
different meanings of unity ; and thus they attribute to
being such qualities as negate in turn its unconditional
unity (e.g. limit in Parmenides, and limitlessness in
Melissus). They do not understand that every proposition
involves the duality of subject and predicate, of
thing), that it destroys the Pliya. i. 2, 185, a, 10, i. 3 init.,
principle of contradiction. See and De Cailo, ii. 13, 21)4, a, 21
Zbllbb, Ph. d. Or. pt. i. 911.
;
on the other hand Parmenides is
1
Metaph. i. 8, 939, a, 30. always treated with respect.
2
Phys. viii. 1, 252. a, 10 sqq. 5
Metaph. i. 5, 986, b, 10 sqq.
s
See Zblleb, iUd. 887, 4, P/ii/s. i. 2, 184, b,.25; De Cwl„,
893, 2; De An. i. 2, 404, b, J, iii. 1, 298, b, 14; Gen. et dorr. i.
405, a, 13. 8, 325, a, 17 ;
cf. Sext. Math, x,
* Metaph. i. 5, 986, b, 26 ; 46,
310 ARISTOTLE
thing and quality, so that we cannot even pay that
'
Being is ' without distinguishing between Being as
substance and the Being we attribute to it as quality
which latter, if there were only one Being, would
necessarily be something other than Being, i.e. notbeing.
1 The Eleatics assert the unity of Being and
deny not-being, whereas in fact ' Being ' is only a common
predicate of all things, and ' Not-being ' is perfectly
thinkable as the negation of some definite kind of being
(e.g. not large, &c.). 2 They attack the divisibility of
Being, and yet at the same time describe it as extended
in space. 3 They deny all ' Becoming,' and therefore
the multiplicity of things, on the ground that every
process of becoming must start either from Being or
from Not-being, and both hypotheses are untenable.
They overlook a third possibility, which not. only
makes Becoming conceivable, but is the sole expression
of any actual process of becoming—namely, that
anything becomes what it is, nob out of absolute Notbeing,
but out of that which is relatively not-being. 4
Aristotle holds that Zeno's polemic against movement
rests upon similar misconceptions, inasmuch
as he treated space and time not as fixed but as
discrete quantities, and argued on the assumption
1
This is the essential point 3
Metaph. iii. 4, 1001, b, 7; cf.
of the complicated dialectical Zeller, ibid. 541
discussion in Phys. i. 2, 105, a,
4 Phys. i. 8, cf. Metaph. xiv.
20-c. 3 vers. fin. On the second 2, 1009, a, 26 sqq. (The point will
half of these discussions (c. 3), be treated more in detail in ch.
cf. Plato, Parm. 142, B sq., viii. ivfm.) On the other hand,
Soph. 244, B sqq.; and see the Eleatic hypothesis is an-
Zblleb, ibid. p. 562 sq. swejed in Gen. et Corr. i. 8, 325,
2
Phys. i. 3, 187, a, 3; cf. a, 13 merely by a reference to'
Zbller, ibid, 563 sq. the opposed facts of experience.