ARISTOTLE AND THE EARLIER PERIPATETICS vol.I by Eduard Zeller, B.F.C.Costelloe 1897

METAPHYSICS 299
On the like considerations rests the other difficulty, to
which Aristotle rightly gives
special prominence 1—the
question whether it is only individual things that are actual,
or whether the universal of thegenera be actual also. 2
The former theory seems untenable because the sphere
of individual existences is
unlimited and of that which
is unlimited no knowledge is possible, and since all
knowledge in any case is of universals. The latter is
operi to all the objections which lie
against tbe theory
of a universal existing independently, or the Ideal
Theory of Plato. 3
An application of this question to a
particular case is contained in the further inquiry,
whether the conceptions of the One and of Being denote
anything substantial or are only predicates for some
subject of a different nature. Those who accept
universals at' all (e.g. Number) as in any way substantial,
must affirm the first proposition ; but the
opposite opinion is
of the
not only supported by the analogy
whole world of concrete things, but also by the
argument that you cannot treat the One as substance
without denying, as did Parmenides, the existence of
Metajj/i. iii. 4 init. o. 6 fin. Metapli. iii. 4, 999, b, 1 : «' /xiv
1
(cf. vii. 13 sq.), xiii. 6, xi. 2 init., odv f*.T]dev £otl irapa ra icad' eKaora,
ibid. 1060, b, 19. In the first obdev ttv eirj vot\tov bXKb. tt6.vto.
passage this Apory is called the 'a7KaioToTij adduces the reasons, which were
6eafnjx
a- »re doei
diction involved in the founda- %v or apiBnQ £j/ : to yip apiBp.-f %y
tions of his own system. % to KaSixaoTov \iysw $ia4pzi
2
That this Apory coincides oWiv (999, b, 33 cf. c. 6, 1002, b,
with that adduced on p. 298, 30).
Aristotle himself asserts in
300 ARISTOTLE
the Many, as such. 1 To the same head belongs the
question whether Numbers and Figures are Substances
or no, and to this also opposite answers are possible.
For as the qualities of bodies are mere predicates from
which we distinguish the bodies themselves as their
substrata, and as these bodies presuppose, as their
elements, the surface, the line, the point, and unity, it
would seem that surface and unity must be as substantial
as body is ;
while on the other hand these have
not any existence for themselves but only in corporeal
things, and they do not come to be and cease to be, as
Substances do. 2
Yet auother difficulty which leads back
to the relation of the individual to the Universal is this.
The principia must on the one hand, as it seems, be of
a potential character, since possibility precedes actuality :
on the other hand, they must be actual, since otherwise
Being would be merely accidental. 3
indeed, do actually exist :
Individual things,
whereas the universal concept,
except in so far as it has found for itself a place in
individual entities, exists only potentially. And finally,
if there be besides the corporeal, an uncorporeal, and
beside the changing, an eternal, the final question must
be whether both ot these have the same principia* or
not.
If we say Yes, it seems impossible to explain the
difference between them.
If we say No, then we must
1
Hfetaph. iii. 4, 1001, a, 3 of the Pythagorean and Platonic
sqq., and, referring to this, x. 2, doctrines.
xi 1, 1059, b, 27, c. 2, 1060,
s
Ibid. iii. 6, 1002, b, 32 cf.
a, 36. Bonitz and Schwegleb on this
2
Metaph. iii. 5 (cf . xi. 2, 1060, passage.
b, 12 sqq., and on p. 1002, b, 32 : * As Plato supposed, in full
viii. 6 init. c. 3, 1043, b, 15). We accordance with Aristotle's view,
shall meet with further objec- Cf . Zhller, Ph. d. Gr. pt. i. p. 628
tions to this view in the criticism sq. 805 sq.