ARISTOTLE AND THE EARLIER PERIPATETICS vol.I by Eduard Zeller, B.F.C.Costelloe 1897

say
266 ARISTOTLE
LOGIC 265
•
everything which admits of demonstration does r
the collection of data, and the acuteness with which he
equally admit of definition ; for negatives, particula
strove to explain the facts he knew, cannot but be
and propositions predicating properties, can all be c
appreciated if we try to judge him by any standards
monstrated, whereas definition is always universal a:
that conform to the knowledge and the opportunities
affirmative, and is not concerned with mere propert:
of his day.
but with the substantial essence only. 1 The convei
To enter into the details of Aristotle's Topics, or to
is no less true—not everything that can be defin
examine his refutation of the Sophistic fallacies, are
admits of demonstration, as may be seen at on
equally beyond our present scope. No wider view of
from the fact that demonstrations must start frc
his scientific principles is to be got from them, but only
undemonstrable definitions. 2 Indeed, it seems to
an application of them to a field beyond the limits of
true in general, that the contents of a definition i
Science properly so called. But 1 this is the proper
undemonstrable by syllogisms : for demonstration p
place to touch upon his researches into Definition,
supposes a knowledge of the essence of the object, wh
which we find partly in the second Analytics, partly
this is precisely what definition seeks. The one poii
in the Topics? As the Concept forms the starting
out that a property belongs as predicate to a certs
point of all scientific research, so we may . conversely
that a complete acquaintance with the Con-
subject; the other does not concern itself with in
vidual properties, but with the essence itself. The c
cept—which is Definition—is the goal toward which it
4
a
strives. Knowledge is indeed nothing but insight into
in order to specify what anything is, we must first kn
the grounds of things, and in the concept this insight
that it is.
is summed up. The what ' ' is the same 5 Here, however, we must draw a distinctii
as the ' why.'
The fact is that a definition cannot be derived throug
We apprehend the concept of the thing as soon as we
single syllogism. We cannot take that which is assen
apprehend its causes? So far, Definition has the same
in the definition of an object and use it as the predic
problem as Demonstration. In both we try to discover
of a middle term in our major premiss, in order to atts
the means by which the object has been brought to be
what it is. 4
it again in the conclusion to the object which was
Nevertheless, they do not, with Aristotle,
be defined : for if, in such a process, we are deali
entirely coincide. In the first place, it is clear that
with not merely one or other of the properties, 1
1
Beandis, pp. 288-345 gives Hbydbb, Vergl. d. arist. u. Jiegel.
with the whole concept of the object, then it m
a sketch of both. Dialeldih, p. 247 sqq., and
2 1
Besides the general works Kampb, Brltenntnisstli. d. Arist.
Anal. Post. ii. 3.
3 8ti t) eo"n ritic nark toB
on Aristotelian Logic, see Kuhn, 195 sqq.
1 Ibid. 90, b, 18 sqq. (cf. oiiK imiv.
3
De notionis definitions, etc., and Vid. supra, p. 163, n. 2, and
supra, p. 246 sqq.). Another *
Anal. Post. ibid. 90, b
Bassow, Arist. de notionis defini- p. 173, n. 2.
kindred reason is there given sqq. ; of. c. 7, 92, b, 12.
Hone (cf. supra; p. 212, n.
4
2) ;
Vid. supra, p. 173, u. 2.
inquires for a ' that,' 3 the other for a ' what ' ;
also. 5 Ibid. o. 7, 92, b, 4.