ARISTOTLE AND THE EARLIER PERIPATETICS vol.I by Eduard Zeller, B.F.C.Costelloe 1897

'':
LOGIC 231
universal negatives) in the way of contrary opposition,
which does not exclude a third possible case. 1
But in truth we must not expect a perfectly clear
exposition of these relations from Aristotle. As he
was not yet able to distinguish the Copula expressly
from the Predicate, 2 he was naturally unable to discover
the true status of the Negative. He nowhere
states that negation concerns the
which by the result. But Aristotle
only regards as ' true
those assertions which assert
actuality ; and since this, in the
given case, is itself undetermined,
no definite proposition can, with
truth, be then affirmed. When
it is equally possible that something
will happen, and that it
will not happen, the assertion
that it will happen is neither
true nor false; it only tecimies
one or other, according as a corresponding
or a contradictory
state of fact arises. Cf. Simpl.
Catey. 103, Bas. : according to
the teaching of the Peripatetic
school only the disjunctive proposition
is true, A ' will either
be or not be ; '
but which part of
this disjunction will be true, and
which false, &\t)Trrov elvcu tj?
ipiaei xa\ HffTarov. Hence all that
class of assertions, ijSi) p.iv oix
effrty ^ a\ij6rj fi QcvSt} %ffrai 8e
f) rota ?i Tola.—It is from the
Megareans that Aristotle took the
subject-matter of the ' Aporia
which he discusses in the passage
cited : cf . Zeller, Ph. d. Gr.
pt. i. p. 220, 1.
1
Be Interpr. c. 7, 17, b, 20
cf. what has been said at pp.
224-5, about the 4vavri6riis. The
particular affirmative and particular
negative propositions which,
Copula alone, that it
according to later terminology,
are opposed as subeontraries, axe,
in Anal. Pr. ii. 8, 59, b, 10,
reckoned among the havrias av-n-
Ktip.zvoA. Aristotle, however, remarks
(c. 15 in.it.) that this is
only according '
to the words, not
as to the thing itself.'
2
Vid. supr. p. 229, n. 2. In Be
Interpr. c. 10, 19, b, 19, a case
is certainly before his mind, faav
to eiTTi rpirov •7rpacrKaTT}yop7Jrai
J
as
in the proposition eori Slisaios
&v6pairos. This, however, does
not relate to the separation of
the copula from the predicate,
but only to the fact that,
in existential propositions : tatai
&v8pa)iros, ovk eartv &., &c, the
subject can be expanded by
means of an added adjective,
which itself may be put either
affirmatively (Si'/caios &.), or negatively
(oil SiKaios £.) : iari Six. 5.
means 'there is a just man,'
which is different from &vdpaitos
SIkmos iari, 'man is just.' Aristotle
nowhere says that every
proposition, or even that the
existential proposition logically
considered, consists of three
parts ; and the treatise n. cpnyveias
even shows a preference for
selecting examples from those
existential propositions which fall
into two parts only.
232 ARtSTOTLE
has to do only with the connection of the subject to
the predicate, and does not in fact deny the subject or
the predicate itself. 1 The omission caused him to
treat propositions with a negative subject or
predicate
as a special class, 2 whereas there is in fact no ground
for doing so. 3
Aristotle proceeds to consider the Quantity of
Judgments, distinguishing between those which relate
to many objects at once and those which relate to one,
and then subdividing the former into universals and
particulars. He has therefore a general division into
judgments universal, particular, and individual. 4 But
1 3
In Anal. Pr. i. 46 init. o. 3, For that in which consists
25, b, 19, he shows that there is the form of the judgment—the
a distinction between f/.ii
elrai toSI definite conjunction of the suband
ehai fnj rovro, piti etvcu KevKor ject with the predicate—remains
and efoai pii \eviebv, inasmuch as the same, whether the subject
propositions of the last kind have and predicate be positive or negative
concepts. And Aristotle
the form of affirmative propositions
; but he does not detect the himself admits (Anal. Pr. i. 3,
real reason of this either here or
in De Interpr. c. 12 (to which
Beandis, p. 165, refers).
2
De Interpr. c. 3, 16, a, 30,
b, 12, he says: ovK-&v9panros is
no iivofta, and ovx-iryuxivei no
pri/ia; but he wants to call the
former ttvo/m a6piarov, and the
latter ffifm a.6ptffrov : and in c.
10, along with the propositions
tarw &v0pairos, ovk e. &., &c, he
introduces also the corresponding
ones made up of negative
concepts : ia-riv ovK-&vBponros,
ovk effTiv ovk-&., Kfrrui ov-Siicaios
OVK-&l/8p., OVK tffTIV OU-SlK. OVK-
&vBp., &c. Theophrastus called
25, b, 19, cf. c. 13, 32, a, 31),
that expressions such as : 4vS4-
Xeroi fj.T]Sevl virdpxeiv >
'so'tlv ovk
ayadbv, have a o~XTJpui KaratpaTiKov.
4 Still, this is only the case
in De Interpr. c. 7. Universal
judgments, which are also called
eirl tSiv KaQ6\ov awotpaivoj/Tcu
ku66\ov, and particulars, which
are also called iv ftepet or kot&
fj.4pos (Anal. Pr. i. 1, 24, a, 17,
c. 2, 25, a, i, 10, 20, &c), are
also designated as those which
iirl rS)V KaQ6\ov fiey fi^j koB6\ov Se
airocpali/oi/rat, i.e. in both the subject
is a kb.86Kov, M ir\ei6vuv
•xe