ARISTOTLE AND THE EARLIER PERIPATETICS vol.I by Eduard Zeller, B.F.C.Costelloe 1897

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LOGIC 221
the Concept of any object, 1 yet it is not this object of
sense itself, but only this determinate mode of sensible
existence, only the universal form
'
of the object, which
can be defined. 2 It follows as a consequence of this
that the conception does not relate to individual objects
of sense 3 as such ; but this applies also to all Individuals
in general. Knowledge, in fact, aims always at a
Universal, 4 and the words of which a definition is made
up are themselves general terms. 5 Bach concept
ovk eoriv 6piff/j.bs aWa perk voi\-
(T€, ei fify o~tb*7]-
pods, tan yap Kal eV rtfi \6yu IVia
l+opia us ii\r] tov \6yov. Cf. Metaph.
vii. 10, 1035, a, 1, b, 14, and
ch. 11, 1037, a, 29.
2 If on the one hand we
deny that matter belongs to the
concept of a thing, and on the
other are obliged to admit that
numberless things cannot be
defined without giving their
matter, this seems, at first sight,
a contradiction. In the passage
referred to (Metaph. vii. 10)
Aristotle seeks to escape this
contradiction by saying that in
such cases, not this individual
object, formed by the combination
of a specific concept with
this definite matter, is defined,
but only its form ; it is not this
circle, but the circle, or the
k{ik\w elvai, not this soul, but the
soul, the tyvxfi ehai. But the
difficulty is, indeed, by no means
removed in this way. If, for
instance, the soul is the Entelechy
of an organic body (Be
'
'
An. ii. 1), the vl 9jv elvai tQ
roupSe aipaTi (Metaph. ibid. 1035,
b, 16), then a matter constituted
in a stated way belongs
to the concept of the soul.
3
Metaph. vii. 15, 1039, b, 27,
as at p. 220, n. 2, supra.
1
Vid. supra, p. 163, n. 2.
5
Metaph. ibid. 1040, a, 8:
not only are sensible things incapable
of definition, but also
ideas : t&v yap jtafl' eKaffTov t\ i8e'a,
ws 0cc(j), Kal xtu/wrtj. ava.yit.alov 8'
e| oyofidrav elvai rby X6yov • ovo/xa
S' ov iroffiffGi & dpt£6/xevos, &yvu>o-TOv
222 ARISTOTLE
embraces several individuals, or at least can embrace
several
l
and even if we descend to the lowest species
we are still always met by universal determinations
only. Within these, the individual entities are distinguished
no longer by anything relating to species,
but only by accidental marks of difference. 2 Between
•yap eirrcu. Ta Se nd/ieva xotva
iraffiv. avdyKT} apa inrt&pxew Kal
a\\(p ravTa ' otnv e¥ rts