ARISTOTLE AND THE EARLIER PERIPATETICS vol.I by Eduard Zeller, B.F.C.Costelloe 1897

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LOGIC « 209
is the first thing, and only on the presupposition
he recognise the possibility of
of such abstraction will
coming to any knowledge of universal essence at all. To
Aristotle the direction of the mind upon the common
essence of the empirical data is the main point, and
is
only as an inevitable consequence of this that abstraction
from the particulars of sense comes in. For a
like reason, Aristotle also defends the truth of the
knowledge derived by sensation
against the objectors
for he shows that, notwithstanding the contradictions
and deceptions of the senses, a true
possible, and that the actuality
it
perception is still
of what we perceive is
beyond doubt, although its value is relative :
that the doubts attaching to sensible perception '
in a word,
are due
solely to want of caution in the use we make of it. 2
He even maintains that perception of itself never leads
us astray, and that it is in our imaginations and our
judgments that we are first exposed to error. 3
1
Cf. Metaph. iv. 5, 6, 1010, b, yap avaipeBevros ata8t\ai.s ukv avaisqq.,
where, among other things peirat, aurfhubi Se %arai, oTov
(1010, b, 30 sqq.), it is stated aSpa, Sepiibv, y\vnb, iriKpbv «ol
that although we might say in a r&Wa oaa early aXaBiyri..
certain sense that without a per- 2
To this refer Metaph. iv. 5,
ceiving being there would be no 1010, b, 3 sqq., 14 sqq. ; xi. 6,
alaBiyrh. as such, still it is impos- 1062, b, 13 sqq.
3 sible to say that without the De An. iii. 3. 427, b, 11 : r)
atadriais the viroKeifieva a iroie? rriv fiev yap ataBrjais r&v ISlaiy txel
alaBrfaiv could not exist
ov yap oArjfl^s Kal Ttaaiv inrdp^i roTs
Sri 7}
y' aXaBrjais atrri eavrrjs early, Gyois, BiayoeiaBai 5' eytiexerat Kal
a\\' tan rt Kal erepov irapa ri)v i|/eyBajy Kal ovoeyl inrdpxei fy fir] Kal
aXa&riaiv, b avdyKTj irpdrepoy elvai \6yos. Ibid. 428, a, 11 : at jxiv
rr)s aiaB^aeas' rb yap Ktyovy tov [the aladi)aeis\ a\7]Be?s alel, at 5£
Kiyovfieyov trp&rep6v iart. Likewise tpavraaiai yivovrai at irXeiovs
Cat. c. 7, 7, b, 36 : rb yap aiaBrirbv tyevSels. Similarly ii. 6, 418, a, 11
rrp6repov rrjs aioBrjaeus Soxei ehcu. sqq. ; and in Metaph. iv. 5, 1010, b,
1
rb fiey yap alaBrjrby dvatpe&ev aw- 2 : ovS 7) aia&rjais tyevSris tov iZlov
avaipeiT^vaiff0rjo'ty ) 7]b'e aiffBTjffisrb early, aAA.' 7) (pavraaia ov ravrbv
aiaByyrbv ov avvavaipei . . . $ov tj? aiafrfjasi.
VOL. I.
p
210 ARISTOTLE
He shows in fact that simple-minded confidence in
the truth of sensible perceptions which is natural to
every uncritical consciousness. This is in his case
the more easy to understand because he has as little
notion as the other Greeks of making any close inquiry
into the part which a subjective activity plays in the
construction of our experience, and refers it simply
to an operation of the objects upon us whereby they
impress their images upon the soul ; ' while, on the other
hand, the philosopher who attributed so high a value to
observation, and the naturalist who required so
wide a
basis of empirical facts, could hardly be expected to take
sufficient account of the attacks which some of his
predecessors
had made upon the trustworthiness of the
senses. 2 Of course he does not seek to deny the delu-
1
See the account of Aristotle's
theory of sensation, i/nfira, ch. x.
ad fin.
1 It has been shown at p. 209,
n. 1, how Aristotle, in Cat. 7, treats
as given objectively even those
sensible properties which Democritus
had already shown to be
merely subjective (Zbll. Ph. d.
Gr. i. 772, 1. 783, 2). Similarly
in Phyg. viii. 3, in combating the
opinion (of Parmenides), itavra
%>E/ieiK, he follows up the striking
remark (254, a, 30) that such
a view could not explain B