Fort George G. Meade: The First 100 Years

The Garrison Prepares for War
GULF WAR
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Before the Storm
In 1990 Fort George G. Meade was a Forces Command
installation and the home of Headquarters, First
United States Army. The garrison supported three subinstallations:
Fort Indiantown Gap, Fort A.P. Hill and the
Charles E. Kelly Support Facility in Pittsburg, Pennsylvania
The installation population was approximately 43,000 and
at the time, was an “open post” with no manned gates.
Even in 1990, the installation still possessed more than
three million square feet of WWI and WWII wooden
structures, to include more than one hundred barracks
buildings. The threat that Fort Meade could be shuttered
through Base Realignment and Closure action did not
incentivize the Army to provide the necessary funding
to maintain or improve these buildings. As a result,
most of the fifty years and older structures were poorly
maintained.
Five thousand acres of training areas and firing ranges
meant Fort Meade remained a valuable Army asset. At the
time, more than 64 units and 147,000 personnel utilized
these facilities for maneuver and weapons training.
The garrison staff was relatively large, with a staff of
approximately 2,700 military personnel and government
service civilians. Major organizations included the 519th
Military Police Battalion, 85th Medical Battalion, U. S.
Army Garrison Headquarters Battalion, Office of Reserve
Component Support, Tipton Army Airfield, a Regional
Contracting Office and a Direct Support/General
Support Maintenance Facility.
During the Storm
Such was the makeup of the installation when, on Aug.
2, 1990, Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait. Five days later, on
August 7, the first US troops arrived in Saudi Arabia and
the United States launched Operation Desert Shield.
As a result, the garrison began to prepare for the
possibility of mobilizing forty-five Reserve and National
Guard units including the deployment of its own 519th
Military Police Battalion.
The Garrison Mobilization Plan called for the activation
of a Reserve component garrison headquarters to assist
By Lynn Sasser and Kent Menser
with the process. As often happens, plans changed and
a Reserve headquarters element was never assigned to
the task. Instead, the installation created a Mobilization
Headquarters to fulfil the requirement. The organization
was led by an Army Maintenance officer, who became
the MOB HQs Commander; a Civilian Logistics Program
Analyst Officer became the MOB HQs Executive Officer;
and a Civilian Maintenance & Repair Supervisor, became
the MOB HQs Logistics Officer. All were from the Fort
Meade Directorate of Logistics and none of them had
prior experience mobilizing units. In their favor, they were
Viet Nam War tested senior non-commissioned officers
and officers that were supported by a knowledgeable
and resilient government workforce. They faced their
gargantuan task with determination to execute.
To complicate matters further, the garrison received
notice that two of our three garrison battalions had been
ordered to deploy to the gulf. We were not surprised that
the 519th MP Battalion, an 18th Airborne Corps asset,
was going, but the deployment of the 85th Medical
Battalion was a shock to everyone. Much of their mission
was imbedded into the installation’s Kimbrough Army
Hospital and they had not deployed overseas since WWII.
The 519th completed its deployment preparation on Oct.
7, and the 85th was “wheels up” only ten days later, on
Oct. 17, 1990.
Looking back on the amazing Desert Storm Victory, it
is easy to lose sight of our command’s concerns during
that intense September. All we knew was that we were
sending two of our battalions to join the fight with the
fourth largest land Army in the world, which possessed
a significant chemical warfare capability. Because of the
lack of mission specifics, we focused all of our resources,
time, money and people, on unit readiness. We secured
every item of equipment we thought our units might need
if they found themselves without support upon their
arrival “in country.”
In just one example, we knew lack of terrain features
was going to make navigation tough in the desert and
at that time Global Positioning Systems were not in
the Army inventory even though the systems were just