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My Reading on ASQ CQA HB Part V Part 2

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<str<strong>on</strong>g>My</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Reading</str<strong>on</strong>g> <strong>on</strong> <strong>ASQ</strong> <strong>CQA</strong><br />

The Handbook 2/2 <strong>Part</strong> V (VD-VH)<br />

<str<strong>on</strong>g>My</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pre-exam Self Study Notes, 14.7%.<br />

8 th Oct 2018<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


Tokomak Fusi<strong>on</strong> Reactor<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

https://www.iter.org/sci/tkmkresearch<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


Tokomak Fusi<strong>on</strong> Reactor<br />

https://www.iter.org/sci/tkmkresearch<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


Tokomak Fusi<strong>on</strong> Reactor<br />

https://www.kennethfilar.com/hinge/<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


The Magical Book of <strong>CQA</strong><br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


国 泰 民 安<br />

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1529576/posts<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

闭 门 练 功


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang at Heil<strong>on</strong>gjiang<br />

8 th October 2018


<strong>ASQ</strong> Missi<strong>on</strong>:<br />

The American Society for Quality advances individual,<br />

organizati<strong>on</strong>al, and community excellence worldwide<br />

through learning, quality improvement, and knowledge<br />

exchange.<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


BOK<br />

Knowledge<br />

Percentage Score<br />

I. Auditing Fundamentals (30 Questi<strong>on</strong>s) 20%<br />

II. Audit Process (60 Questi<strong>on</strong>s) 40%<br />

III. Auditor Competencies (23 Questi<strong>on</strong>s) 15.3%<br />

IV. Audit Program Management and Business Applicati<strong>on</strong>s<br />

(15 Questi<strong>on</strong>s)<br />

10%<br />

V. Quality Tools and Techniques (22 Questi<strong>on</strong>s) 14.7%<br />

150 Questi<strong>on</strong>s 100%<br />

https://asq.org/cert/resource/docs/cqa_bok.pdf<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


<strong>Part</strong> V<br />

<strong>Part</strong> V<br />

Quality Tools and Techniques<br />

[26 of the <strong>CQA</strong> Exam Questi<strong>on</strong>s or 14.7 percent]<br />

_____________________________________________________<br />

Chapter 18 Basic Quality and Problem- Solving Tools/<strong>Part</strong> VA<br />

Chapter 19 Process Improvement Techniques/<strong>Part</strong> VB<br />

Chapter 20 Basic Statistics/<strong>Part</strong> VC<br />

Chapter 21 Process Variati<strong>on</strong>/<strong>Part</strong> VD<br />

Chapter 22 Sampling Methods/<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

Chapter 23 Change C<strong>on</strong>trol and C<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong> Management/<strong>Part</strong> VF<br />

Chapter 24 Verificati<strong>on</strong> and Validati<strong>on</strong>/<strong>Part</strong> VG<br />

Chapter 25 Risk Management Tools/<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> V<br />

Quality Tools and Techniques<br />

Auditors use many types of tools to plan and perform an audit, as well as to analyze and report<br />

audit results. An understanding of these tools and their applicati<strong>on</strong> is essential for the<br />

performance of an effective audit since both auditors and auditees use various tools and<br />

techniques to define processes, identify and characterize problems, and report results.<br />

An auditor must have sufficient knowledge of these tools in order to determine whether the<br />

auditee is using them correctly and effectively. This secti<strong>on</strong> provides basic informati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> some<br />

of the most comm<strong>on</strong> tools, their use, and their limitati<strong>on</strong>s. For more in-depth informati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> the<br />

applicati<strong>on</strong> of tools, readers should c<strong>on</strong>sult an appropriate textbook.


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VD1<br />

Chapter 21<br />

Process Variati<strong>on</strong>/<strong>Part</strong> VD<br />

________________________<br />

VD1. Comm<strong>on</strong> And Special Causes (Theory Of Variati<strong>on</strong>)<br />

Variati<strong>on</strong> is inherent; it exists in all things. No two entities in the world have exactly the same measurable<br />

characteristics. The variati<strong>on</strong> might be small and unnoticeable without the aid of precise and discriminative<br />

measuring instruments, or it might be quite large and easily noticeable. Two entities might appear to have the<br />

same measurement because of the limitati<strong>on</strong>s of the measuring device.


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VD1<br />

Variati<strong>on</strong>s<br />

No two entities in the world have exactly the same measurable characteristics.


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VD1<br />

Variati<strong>on</strong>s<br />

No two entities in the world have exactly the same measurable characteristics.


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VD1<br />

Factors affecting Variati<strong>on</strong><br />

Everything is the result of some process, so the chance for some variati<strong>on</strong> in output is built into every process.<br />

Because material inputs are the outputs of some prior process, they are subject to variati<strong>on</strong>, and that variati<strong>on</strong><br />

is transferred to the outputs. Variati<strong>on</strong> will exist even in apparently identical processes using seemingly identical<br />

resources. Even though a task is defined and performed in the same manner repeatedly, different operators<br />

performing the same task and the same operator performing the same task repeatedly introduce variati<strong>on</strong>.<br />

Precisi<strong>on</strong> and resoluti<strong>on</strong> of the measuring devices, and techniques used to collect data also introduce variati<strong>on</strong><br />

into the output data. Variati<strong>on</strong> can result from changes in various factors, normally classified as follows:<br />

1. People (worker) influences<br />

2. Machinery influences<br />

3. Envir<strong>on</strong>mental factors<br />

4. Material influences<br />

5. Measurement influences<br />

6. Method influences<br />

The resulting total variati<strong>on</strong> present in any product is a result of the variati<strong>on</strong>s from these six main sources.<br />

Because the ramificati<strong>on</strong>s of variati<strong>on</strong> in quality are enormous for managers, knowing a process’s capabilities<br />

prior to producti<strong>on</strong> provides for better utilizati<strong>on</strong> of resources. Operating costs are reduced when inspecti<strong>on</strong>,<br />

rework, safety stock storage, and troubleshooting are eliminated. Proper management requires a deep<br />

appreciati<strong>on</strong> of the existence of variati<strong>on</strong> as well as an understanding of its causes and how they can be<br />

corrected.<br />

Meaning: Safety stock is a term used by logisticians to describe a level of extra stock that is maintained to<br />

mitigate risk of stockouts (shortfall in raw material or packaging) caused by uncertainties in supply and demand.<br />

Adequate safety stock levels permit business operati<strong>on</strong>s to proceed according to their plans.<br />

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Safety_stock


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VD1<br />

Types of Variati<strong>on</strong><br />

Walter Shewhart, the father of modern quality c<strong>on</strong>trol, was c<strong>on</strong>cerned with the low- cost reducti<strong>on</strong> of variati<strong>on</strong>.<br />

Shewhart distinguished two kinds of processes:<br />

(1) a stable process with ―inevitable chance variati<strong>on</strong>‖ and<br />

(2) an unstable process with ―assignable cause variati<strong>on</strong>.‖<br />

Walter Andrew Shewhart.March 18, 1891 – March 11, 1967) was an<br />

American physicist, engineer and statistician, sometimes known as the<br />

father of statistical quality c<strong>on</strong>trol and also related to the Shewhart cycle.<br />

W. Edwards Deming said of him:<br />

As a statistician, he was, like so many of the rest of us, self-taught, <strong>on</strong> a<br />

good background of physics and mathematics.<br />

Born in New Cant<strong>on</strong>, Illinois to Ant<strong>on</strong> and Esta Barney Shewhart, he<br />

attended the University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign before being<br />

awarded his doctorate in physics from the University of California,<br />

Berkeley in 1917. He married Edna Elizabeth Hart, daughter of William<br />

Nathaniel and Isabelle "Ibie" Lippencott Hart <strong>on</strong> August 4, 1914 in Pike<br />

County, Illinois.<br />

• If the limits of process variati<strong>on</strong> are well within the band of customer<br />

tolerance (specificati<strong>on</strong>), then the product can be made and shipped<br />

with reas<strong>on</strong>able assurance that the customer will be satisfied.<br />

• If the limits of process variati<strong>on</strong> just match the band of customer<br />

tolerance, then the process should be m<strong>on</strong>itored closely and<br />

adjusted when necessary to maximize the amount of satisfactory<br />

output.<br />

• If the limits of process variati<strong>on</strong> extend bey<strong>on</strong>d the band of customer<br />

tolerance, output should be inspected to determine whether it meets<br />

customer requirements.<br />

State of Statistical C<strong>on</strong>trol (Stable)<br />

When the amount of variati<strong>on</strong> can be predicted with c<strong>on</strong>fidence, the<br />

process is said to be in a state of statistical c<strong>on</strong>trol (stable). Although a<br />

singular value cannot be predicted exactly, it can be anticipated to fall<br />

within certain limits. Similarly, the l<strong>on</strong>g- term average value can be<br />

predicted.<br />

In an unstable process every batch of product is a source of excitement!<br />

It is impossible to predict how much, if any, of the product will fall within<br />

the band of customer tolerance.


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VD1<br />

The costs necessary to produce satisfactory product are unknown because the organizati<strong>on</strong> is forced to carry<br />

large quantities of safety stock, and bids for new work must include a safety factor. Shewhart developed simple<br />

statistical and graphical tools to inform operators and managers about their processes and to detect promptly<br />

when a stable process becomes unstable and vice versa.<br />

These tools, called c<strong>on</strong>trol charts, come in various forms to accommodate whether measures are attributes or<br />

variables, whether samples are of c<strong>on</strong>stant size or not.<br />

Deming also recognized Shewhart’s two sources of variati<strong>on</strong>, calling them:<br />

• comm<strong>on</strong> causes and<br />

• special causes<br />

He also distinguished between the duties of those who work in the process and the managers who work <strong>on</strong> the<br />

process.<br />

William Edwards Deming (October 14, 1900 – December 20, 1993) was an American engineer, statistician, professor, author, lecturer, and management c<strong>on</strong>sultant. Educated initially as an electrical engineer and later specializing<br />

in mathematical physics, he helped develop the sampling techniques still used by the U.S. Department of the Census and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. In his book, The New Ec<strong>on</strong>omics for Industry, Government, and Educati<strong>on</strong>,[1]<br />

Deming champi<strong>on</strong>ed the work of Walter Shewhart, including statistical process c<strong>on</strong>trol, operati<strong>on</strong>al definiti<strong>on</strong>s, and what Deming called the "Shewhart Cycle"[2] which had evolved into Plan-Do-Study-Act (PDSA). This was in<br />

resp<strong>on</strong>se to the growing popularity of PDCA, which Deming viewed as tampering with the meaning of Shewhart's original work.[3] Deming is best known for his work in Japan after WWII, particularly his work with the leaders of<br />

Japanese industry. That work began in August 1950 at the Hak<strong>on</strong>e C<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong> Center in Tokyo, when Deming delivered a speech <strong>on</strong> what he called "Statistical Product Quality Administrati<strong>on</strong>". Many in Japan credit Deming as <strong>on</strong>e<br />

of the inspirati<strong>on</strong>s for what has become known as the Japanese post-war ec<strong>on</strong>omic miracle of 1950 to 1960, when Japan rose from the ashes of war <strong>on</strong> the road to becoming the sec<strong>on</strong>d-largest ec<strong>on</strong>omy in the world through<br />

processes partially influenced by the ideas Deming taught:[4]<br />

Better design of products to improve service<br />

Higher level of uniform product quality<br />

Improvement of product testing in the workplace and in research centers<br />

Greater sales through side [global] markets<br />

Deming is best known in the United States for his 14 Points (Out of the Crisis, by W. Edwards Deming, preface) and his system of thought he called the "System of Profound Knowledge". The system includes four comp<strong>on</strong>ents or<br />

"lenses" through which to view the world simultaneously:<br />

Appreciating a system<br />

Understanding variati<strong>on</strong><br />

Psychology<br />

Epistemology, the theory of knowledge[5]<br />

Deming made a significant c<strong>on</strong>tributi<strong>on</strong> to Japan's reputati<strong>on</strong> for innovative, high-quality products, and for its ec<strong>on</strong>omic power. He is regarded as having had more impact <strong>on</strong> Japanese manufacturing and business than any other<br />

individual not of Japanese heritage. Despite being h<strong>on</strong>ored in Japan in 1951 with the establishment of the Deming Prize, he was <strong>on</strong>ly just beginning to win widespread recogniti<strong>on</strong> in the U.S. at the time of his death in 1993.[6]<br />

President R<strong>on</strong>ald Reagan awarded him the Nati<strong>on</strong>al Medal of Technology in 1987. The following year, the Nati<strong>on</strong>al Academy of Sciences gave Deming the Distinguished Career in Science award.<br />

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/W._Edwards_Deming


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VD1<br />

Comm<strong>on</strong> Causes<br />

Variati<strong>on</strong> that is always present or inherent in a process is called comm<strong>on</strong> cause variati<strong>on</strong> It occurs when <strong>on</strong>e<br />

or more of the six previously menti<strong>on</strong>ed factors fluctuate within the normal or expected manner and can be<br />

improved <strong>on</strong>ly by changing a factor. Comm<strong>on</strong> causes of variati<strong>on</strong> occur c<strong>on</strong>tinually and result in c<strong>on</strong>trolled<br />

variati<strong>on</strong>. They ensue, for example, from the choice of supplier, quality of inputs, worker hiring and training<br />

practices, equipment selecti<strong>on</strong>, machinery maintenance, and working c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s. If the process variati<strong>on</strong> is<br />

excessive, then the process must be changed. Eradicating these stable and predictable causes of variati<strong>on</strong> is<br />

the resp<strong>on</strong>sibility of the managers of the process. Comm<strong>on</strong> causes are bey<strong>on</strong>d the c<strong>on</strong>trol of workers, as was<br />

dem<strong>on</strong>strated by Deming’s famous red bead experiment.1 In that experiment, volunteers were told to produce<br />

<strong>on</strong>ly white beads from a bowl c<strong>on</strong>taining a mixture of white and red beads. M<strong>on</strong>itoring or criticizing worker<br />

performance had no effect <strong>on</strong> the output. No matter what the workers did, they got red beads—sometimes<br />

more, sometimes less, but always some—because the red beads were in the system. Deming estimated that<br />

comm<strong>on</strong> causes account for 80 percent to 95 percent of workforce variati<strong>on</strong>. This is not the fault of the workers,<br />

who normally do their best even in less- than-ideal circumstances. Rather, this is the resp<strong>on</strong>sibility of the<br />

managers, who work <strong>on</strong>, not in, the process. Management decides how much m<strong>on</strong>ey and time is to be spent <strong>on</strong><br />

designing processes, which impacts the resources and methods that can be used. It is the design of the<br />

process that impacts the amount of comm<strong>on</strong> cause variati<strong>on</strong>.


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VD1<br />

Special Causes (also called assignable causes)<br />

When variati<strong>on</strong> from <strong>on</strong>e or more factors is abnormal or unexpected, the resultant variati<strong>on</strong> is known as special<br />

cause variati<strong>on</strong>. This unexpected level of variati<strong>on</strong> that is observed in an unstable process is due to special<br />

causes that are not inherent in the process. Special causes of variati<strong>on</strong> are usually local in time and space, for<br />

example, specific to a change in a particular machine or a difference in shift, operator, or weather c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>.<br />

They appear in a detectable pattern and cause unc<strong>on</strong>trolled variati<strong>on</strong>. Special causes of variati<strong>on</strong> often result in<br />

sudden and extreme departures from the normal, but can also occur in the form of gradual shifts (or drifts) in a<br />

characteristic of a process. When a c<strong>on</strong>trol chart shows a lack of c<strong>on</strong>trol, skilled investigati<strong>on</strong> should reveal<br />

what special causes affect the output. The workers in the process often have the detailed knowledge necessary<br />

to guide this investigati<strong>on</strong>.<br />

Structural Variati<strong>on</strong><br />

Structural variati<strong>on</strong> is inherent in the process;2 however, when plotted <strong>on</strong> a c<strong>on</strong>trol chart, structural variati<strong>on</strong><br />

appears like a special cause (blip), even though it is predictable. For example, a restaurant experiences a high<br />

number of errors in diners’ orders taken <strong>on</strong> Saturday nights. The number of diners increases by 50 percent or<br />

more <strong>on</strong> every Saturday night, served by the same number of waitpers<strong>on</strong>s and chefs as <strong>on</strong> other nights.


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VD1<br />

Achieving Breakthrough Improvement<br />

Building <strong>on</strong> Shewhart’s noti<strong>on</strong>s to develop a systematic method for improvement, Juran distinguished between<br />

sporadic and chr<strong>on</strong>ic problems for quality improvement projects (QIPs). Starting from a state of chaos, a QIP<br />

should first seek to c<strong>on</strong>trol variati<strong>on</strong> by eliminating sporadic problems. When a state of c<strong>on</strong>trolled variati<strong>on</strong> is<br />

reached, the QIP should then break through to higher levels of quality by eliminating chr<strong>on</strong>ic problems, thereby<br />

reducing the c<strong>on</strong>trolled variati<strong>on</strong>. The noti<strong>on</strong>s of c<strong>on</strong>trol and breakthrough are critical to Juran’s thinking. The<br />

following scenario dem<strong>on</strong>strates this c<strong>on</strong>cept: A dart player throws darts at two different targets. The darts <strong>on</strong><br />

the first target are all fairly close to the bull’s-eye, but the darts are scattered all over the target. It is difficult for<br />

the player to determine whether changing stance (or any other variable) will result in an improved score. The<br />

darts thrown at the sec<strong>on</strong>d target are well off target from the bull’s-eye, but the locati<strong>on</strong> of the darts is clustered<br />

and therefore predictable. When the player determines what variable is causing the darts to miss the bull’seye,<br />

immediate and obvious improvement should result. The impetus behind Juran’s work is to achieve repeatable<br />

and predictable results. Until that happens, it will be almost impossible to determine whether a quality<br />

improvement effort has had any effect. Once a process is in c<strong>on</strong>trol, breakthroughs are possible because they<br />

are detectable. The following points are essential to an understanding of variati<strong>on</strong>:<br />

• Everything is the result or outcome of some process.<br />

• Variati<strong>on</strong> always exists, although it is sometimes too small to notice.<br />

• Variati<strong>on</strong> can be c<strong>on</strong>trolled if its causes are known. The causes should be determined through the practical<br />

experience of workers in the process as well as by the expertise of managers.<br />

• Variati<strong>on</strong> can result from special causes, comm<strong>on</strong> causes, or structural variati<strong>on</strong>. Corrective acti<strong>on</strong> cannot be<br />

taken unless the variati<strong>on</strong> has been assigned to the proper type of cause.<br />

For example, in Deming’s bead experiment (white beads = good product, red beads = bad product) the workers<br />

who deliver the red beads should not be blamed; the problem is the fault of the system that c<strong>on</strong>tains the red<br />

beads. • Tampering by taking acti<strong>on</strong>s to compensate for variati<strong>on</strong> within the c<strong>on</strong>trol limits of a stable process<br />

increases rather than decreases variati<strong>on</strong>. • Practical tools exist to detect variati<strong>on</strong> and to distinguish c<strong>on</strong>trolled<br />

from unc<strong>on</strong>trolled variati<strong>on</strong>.


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VD1<br />

Variati<strong>on</strong> exists everywhere (even the earth wobbles a bit in its journey around the sun). So, too, variati<strong>on</strong><br />

exists at an organizati<strong>on</strong>al level—within management’s sphere of influence. The organizati<strong>on</strong> as a system is<br />

subject to comm<strong>on</strong> cause variati<strong>on</strong> and special cause variati<strong>on</strong>. Unfortunately, members of management in<br />

many organizati<strong>on</strong>s do not know about or understand the theory of variati<strong>on</strong>. As a result of this, management<br />

tends to treat all anomalies as special causes and therefore treats actual comm<strong>on</strong> causes with c<strong>on</strong>tinual<br />

tampering. Three examples follow:<br />

• A d<strong>on</strong>ut shop, am<strong>on</strong>g its variety of products, produces jelly d<strong>on</strong>uts. The fruit mix used to fill the jelly d<strong>on</strong>uts is<br />

purchased from a l<strong>on</strong>g- time, reliable supplier. From time to time, a c<strong>on</strong>sumer complains about the tartness of<br />

the d<strong>on</strong>ut filling (nature produces berries of varying degrees of sweetness). The shop owner complains to the<br />

jelly supplier who adds more sugar to the next batch (tampering). Several c<strong>on</strong>sumers complain about the overly<br />

sweet d<strong>on</strong>ut filling. The shop owner complains to the supplier who reduces the amount of sugar in the next<br />

batch (tampering). Some c<strong>on</strong>sumers complain about tartness, and so it goes.<br />

• Susan, a normally average salespers<strong>on</strong>, produces 10 percent fewer sales (number of sales, not dollar value)<br />

this m<strong>on</strong>th. The sales manager criticizes Susan for low sales producti<strong>on</strong> and threatens her with compensati<strong>on</strong><br />

loss. Susan resp<strong>on</strong>ds by an extra effort to sell to any<strong>on</strong>e who will buy the service, regardless of the dollar<br />

volume of the sale (tampering). The sales manager criticizes Susan again, pointing out that dollar volume is<br />

more important than number of sales made. Susan c<strong>on</strong>centrates <strong>on</strong> large- dollar buyers, which take several<br />

m<strong>on</strong>ths to bring to fruiti<strong>on</strong>. Susan’s m<strong>on</strong>thly figures show a drastic drop and she is severely criticized for lack of<br />

productivity. Susan leaves the company and takes the large- dollar prospects with her to a competitor. The<br />

system failed due to tampering, but the worker was blamed.<br />

• A VP of finance of a widely known charity c<strong>on</strong>tinually tinkers with the organizati<strong>on</strong>’s portfolio of investments,<br />

selling or buying whenever a slight deviati<strong>on</strong> is noted, resulting in suboptimal yield from the portfolio.<br />

An organizati<strong>on</strong> must focus its attempts at reducing variati<strong>on</strong>. Variati<strong>on</strong> does not need to be eliminated from<br />

everything; rather, the organizati<strong>on</strong> should focus <strong>on</strong> reducing variati<strong>on</strong> in those areas most critical to meeting<br />

customers’ requirements.


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VD2<br />

VD2. Process Performance Metrics<br />

Process capability is the range within which a process is normally able to operate given the inherent variati<strong>on</strong><br />

due to design and selecti<strong>on</strong> of materials, equipment, people, and process steps. Knowing the capability of a<br />

process means knowing whether a particular specificati<strong>on</strong> can be held if the process is in c<strong>on</strong>trol. If a process is<br />

in c<strong>on</strong>trol, <strong>on</strong>e can then calculate the process capability index. Several formulae are used to describe the<br />

capability of a process, comparing it to the specificati<strong>on</strong> limits; the two most popular indexes are Cp and Cpk.<br />

• C p indicates how the width of the process compares to the width of the specificati<strong>on</strong> range, while<br />

• C pk looks at whether the process is sufficiently centered in order to keep both tails from falling outside<br />

specificati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />

Following are the formulae:<br />

C p =<br />

Specificati<strong>on</strong> range<br />

Process range<br />

=<br />

Upper Spec ;Lower Spec<br />

6σ<br />

C pk =<br />

Upper Spec ;Lower Spec<br />

3σ<br />

Upper Spec ;Averafge<br />

3σ<br />

whichever smaller ?<br />

,<br />

or<br />

C pk =<br />

Upper Spec ;Lower Spec<br />

3σ<br />

or<br />

Upper Spec ;Averafge<br />

3σ<br />

, whichever smaller<br />

Process Capability<br />

Note that the σ used for this calculati<strong>on</strong> is not the standard deviati<strong>on</strong> of a sample.<br />

It is the process sigma based <strong>on</strong> time- ordered data, such as given by the formula R-bar/d 2 .<br />

Following are the rules often used to determine whether a process is c<strong>on</strong>sidered capable:<br />

• Cpk > 1.33 (capable)<br />

• Cpk = 1.00 – 1.33 (capable with tight c<strong>on</strong>trol)<br />

• Cpk < 1.00 (not capable)


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VD2<br />

C pk =<br />

Upper Spec ;Averafge<br />

3σ<br />

Upper Spec ;Lower Spec<br />

3σ<br />

or<br />

, whichever smaller ?<br />

C pk = Min [ USL;μ<br />

3σ<br />

, μ;lSL<br />

3σ ]


<strong>Part</strong> VD2<br />

Process capability index.<br />

In process improvement efforts, the process capability index or process capability ratio is a statistical measure<br />

of process capability: the ability of a process to produce output within specificati<strong>on</strong> limits. The c<strong>on</strong>cept of<br />

process capability <strong>on</strong>ly holds meaning for processes that are in a state of statistical c<strong>on</strong>trol. Process capability<br />

indices measure how much "natural variati<strong>on</strong>" a process experiences relative to its specificati<strong>on</strong> limits and<br />

allows different processes to be compared with respect to how well an organizati<strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>trols them.<br />

If the upper and lower specificati<strong>on</strong> limits of the process are USL and LSL, the target process mean is T, the<br />

estimated mean of the process is μ and the estimated variability of the process (expressed as a standard<br />

deviati<strong>on</strong>) is σ, then comm<strong>on</strong>ly accepted process capability indices include:<br />

C pk<br />

Adjusted Sigma<br />

level (σ)<br />

Area under the Ф<br />

(σ)<br />

Process yield<br />

0.33 1 0.3085375387 30.85% 691462<br />

0.67 2 0.6914624613 69.15% 308538<br />

1.00 3 0.9331927987 93.32% 66807<br />

1.33 4 0.9937903347 99.38% 6209<br />

1.67 5 0.9997673709 99.9767% 232.6<br />

2.00 6 0.9999966023 99.99966% 3.40<br />

DPMO : defects per milli<strong>on</strong> opportunities or (or n<strong>on</strong>c<strong>on</strong>formities per milli<strong>on</strong> opportunities (NPMO)<br />

Process fallout<br />

(in terms of DPMO/PPM)<br />

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Process_capability_index<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


<strong>Part</strong> VD2<br />

Index<br />

C p = USL;LSL<br />

6σ<br />

C p, lower = μ;LSL<br />

3σ<br />

C p, upper = USL;μ<br />

3σ<br />

C pk =<br />

min [ USL;μ<br />

3σ<br />

C pm =<br />

Descripti<strong>on</strong><br />

Estimates what the process is capable of producing if the process mean were to<br />

be centered between the specificati<strong>on</strong> limits. Assumes process output is<br />

approximately normally distributed.<br />

Estimates process capability for specificati<strong>on</strong>s that c<strong>on</strong>sist of a lower limit <strong>on</strong>ly<br />

(for example, strength). Assumes process output is approximately normally<br />

distributed.<br />

Estimates process capability for specificati<strong>on</strong>s that c<strong>on</strong>sist of an upper limit <strong>on</strong>ly<br />

(for example, c<strong>on</strong>centrati<strong>on</strong>). Assumes process output is approximately<br />

normally distributed.<br />

Estimates what the process is capable of producing, c<strong>on</strong>sidering that the<br />

process mean may not be centered between the specificati<strong>on</strong> limits. (If the<br />

, μ;lSL<br />

] process mean is not centered, Cp overestimates process capability.) Cpk


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VD2<br />

Example<br />

C<strong>on</strong>sider a quality characteristic with target of 100.00 μm and upper and lower specificati<strong>on</strong> limits of 106.00 μm<br />

and 94.00 μm respectively. If, after carefully m<strong>on</strong>itoring the process for a while, it appears that the process is in<br />

c<strong>on</strong>trol and producing output predictably (as depicted in the run chart below), we can meaningfully estimate its<br />

mean and standard deviati<strong>on</strong>. If μ and σ are estimated to be 98.94 μm and 1.03 μm, respectively, then<br />

Cp = USL;LSL<br />

6σ<br />

= 1.06;96<br />

6x1.03 = 1.94<br />

Cpk = min [ USL;μ<br />

3σ<br />

C pm =<br />

= min [ 106;98.94<br />

3x1.03<br />

= 1.60<br />

=<br />

C p<br />

1: μ−T<br />

σ<br />

1.94<br />

2<br />

1: 98.94−100<br />

1.03<br />

, μ;lSL<br />

3σ ]<br />

2<br />

, 98.94;94<br />

3x1.03 ]<br />

= 1.35<br />

3σ<br />

T<br />

μ<br />

C pKm =<br />

C p<br />

1: μ−T<br />

σ<br />

2<br />

=<br />

1.60<br />

1: 98.94−100<br />

1.03<br />

2<br />

= 1.11


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VD2<br />

Potential Process Capability<br />

Initial process capability studies are often performed as part of the process validati<strong>on</strong> stage of a new product<br />

launch. Since this is usually a run of <strong>on</strong>ly a few hundred parts, it does not include the normal variability that will<br />

be seen in full producti<strong>on</strong>, such as small differences from batch to batch of raw material. In this case the study<br />

is called potential process capability, with the symbol P pk used instead of C pk To compensate for the reduced<br />

variability the decisi<strong>on</strong> points are typically set at:<br />

• P pk > 1.67 (capable)<br />

• P pk = 1.33 – 1.67 (capable with tight c<strong>on</strong>trol)<br />

• P pk < 1.33 (not capable)<br />

Capability is then studied so<strong>on</strong> after producti<strong>on</strong> release and <strong>on</strong> an as- needed basis during normal producti<strong>on</strong>.<br />

Changes to the process due to engineering changes or as part of c<strong>on</strong>tinuous improvement should also be<br />

evaluated for their impact <strong>on</strong> process capability. If process capability is found to be unsatisfactory, the following<br />

may be c<strong>on</strong>sidered:<br />

• Ensure that the process is centered<br />

• Initiate process improvement projects to decrease variati<strong>on</strong><br />

• Determine if the specificati<strong>on</strong>s can be changed<br />

• Do nothing, but realize that a percentage of output will be outside acceptable variati<strong>on</strong><br />

When using statistical software programs to evaluate process capability, it is important that the user understand<br />

the specific terminology used by the programmers. Although the same c<strong>on</strong>cepts may be used, different symbols<br />

or formulae may be used.


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VD3<br />

VD3. Outliers<br />

The dicti<strong>on</strong>ary defines outlier as a statistical observati<strong>on</strong> not homogeneous in value with others of a sample. An<br />

outlier is a special case of a special cause.<br />

An outlier is a data point that deviates markedly from the other data points collected or in the sample. An outlier<br />

is a result of a special cause such as using the wr<strong>on</strong>g test equipment or pulling the sample from the wr<strong>on</strong>g bin.<br />

A data point identified as an outlier is abnormal and if not removed from the data base will result in skewed,<br />

misleading, or false c<strong>on</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong>s.<br />

Outliers are the most extreme observati<strong>on</strong>s and are either the sample maximum or sample minimum.<br />

However, sample maximums and minimums are not normally outliers. Outliers are data points so extreme,<br />

they do not appear to bel<strong>on</strong>g to the same data base.<br />

Deleti<strong>on</strong> of outlier data may be the correct thing to<br />

do but it is a subjective judgment. The practice of<br />

deleting outliers is frowned (displease) up<strong>on</strong> by<br />

many scientists due to the potential of researchers<br />

manipulating statistical data for their own selfinterest.<br />

If the cause of the outlier data point is<br />

known, it should be verified before removal from the<br />

data base. When data points are excluded from data<br />

analysis, the rati<strong>on</strong>ale should be clearly stated in<br />

any subsequent report.


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VD2<br />

Terminology.<br />

When using statistical software programs<br />

to evaluate process capability, it is<br />

important that the user understand the<br />

specific terminology used by the<br />

programmers. Although the same c<strong>on</strong>cepts<br />

may be used, different symbols or<br />

formulae may be used.


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

Chapter 22<br />

Sampling Methods/<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

_______________________


<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

Statistical Sampling Plans<br />

The auditor should follow the sampling plan required by audit program management.<br />

• Normally, statistical sampling plans are not required for process or system audits.<br />

However, knowledge of sampling methods and techniques may be needed to evaluate auditee sampling<br />

processes.<br />

Also, auditors need to know the limitati<strong>on</strong>s and biases created by taking samples.<br />

Sampling<br />

Sampling is the practice of taking selected items or units from a total populati<strong>on</strong> of items or units. The method<br />

and reas<strong>on</strong> for taking certain samples or a certain number of samples from a populati<strong>on</strong> should be based <strong>on</strong><br />

sampling theory and procedures. Samples may be taken from:<br />

• the total populati<strong>on</strong> or universe, or<br />

• the populati<strong>on</strong> may be separated into subgroups called strata.<br />

Inferences drawn from the sampling of a stratum, however, may not be valid for the total populati<strong>on</strong>. To infer<br />

statistical significance from any sample, two c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s must be met:<br />

• The populati<strong>on</strong> under c<strong>on</strong>siderati<strong>on</strong> must be homogeneous, and<br />

• the sample must be random.


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

Sampling<br />

Sampling is the practice of taking selected items or units from a total populati<strong>on</strong> of items or units. The method<br />

and reas<strong>on</strong> for taking certain samples or a certain number of samples from a populati<strong>on</strong> should be based <strong>on</strong><br />

sampling theory and procedures. Samples may be taken from:<br />

• the total populati<strong>on</strong> or universe, or<br />

• the populati<strong>on</strong> may be separated into subgroups called strata.


<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

Sampling- Strata<br />

Sampling is the practice of taking selected items or units from a total populati<strong>on</strong> of items or units. The method<br />

and reas<strong>on</strong> for taking certain samples or a certain number of samples from a populati<strong>on</strong> should be based <strong>on</strong><br />

sampling theory and procedures. Samples may be taken from:<br />

• the total populati<strong>on</strong> or universe, or<br />

• the populati<strong>on</strong> may be separated into subgroups called strata.<br />

https://www.slideshare.net/shanmooz/sampling-35931464<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

Stratified Sampling<br />

In statistical surveys, when subpopulati<strong>on</strong>s within an overall populati<strong>on</strong> vary, it could be advantageous to<br />

sample each subpopulati<strong>on</strong> (stratum) independently. Stratificati<strong>on</strong> is the process of dividing members of the<br />

populati<strong>on</strong> into homogeneous subgroups before sampling. The strata should be mutually exclusive: every<br />

element in the populati<strong>on</strong> must be assigned to <strong>on</strong>ly <strong>on</strong>e stratum.<br />

The strata should also be collectively<br />

exhaustive: no populati<strong>on</strong> element can<br />

be excluded. Then simple random<br />

sampling or systematic sampling is<br />

applied within each stratum. The<br />

objective is to improve the precisi<strong>on</strong> of<br />

the sample by reducing sampling error.<br />

It can produce a weighted mean that<br />

has less variability than the arithmetic<br />

mean of a simple random sample of the<br />

populati<strong>on</strong>.<br />

In computati<strong>on</strong>al statistics, stratified<br />

sampling is a method of variance<br />

reducti<strong>on</strong> when M<strong>on</strong>te Carlo methods<br />

are used to estimate populati<strong>on</strong><br />

statistics from a known populati<strong>on</strong>.<br />

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stratified_sampling<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

Homogeneous<br />

Homogeneous means that the populati<strong>on</strong> must be uniform throughout—the bad parts should not be hidden <strong>on</strong><br />

the bottom of <strong>on</strong>e load— or it could refer to the similarities that should exist when <strong>on</strong>e load is checked against<br />

others from a different producti<strong>on</strong> setup.<br />

Random<br />

Random means that every item in the populati<strong>on</strong> has an equal chance of being checked. To ensure this,<br />

samples can be pulled by a random number generator or other unbiased method. The preferred practice is for<br />

the auditor to go to the locati<strong>on</strong> of the sample and select the sample for the audit. However, there are<br />

situati<strong>on</strong>s (l<strong>on</strong>g distances, c<strong>on</strong>venience, files off- site, and so <strong>on</strong>) in which the auditee may be permitted to<br />

provide the sample populati<strong>on</strong>, such as in a file, folder, or logbook to the auditor, who may then select the<br />

sample. When sampling, auditors should record the identity of samples selected, the number in the populati<strong>on</strong><br />

from which the samples were taken (if possible), and the number of samples selected for examinati<strong>on</strong>. The<br />

goal is to provide management with supportable informati<strong>on</strong> about the company, with the expectati<strong>on</strong> that<br />

management will take acti<strong>on</strong> based <strong>on</strong> the results presented. An auditor must be able to qualify the sampling<br />

methods used to management as either statistical or n<strong>on</strong>-statistical, but factual based.<br />

Keywords:<br />

should record the identity of samples selected, the number in the populati<strong>on</strong> from which the samples were<br />

taken (if possible), and the number of samples selected for examinati<strong>on</strong>.<br />

• Populati<strong>on</strong><br />

• Number of samples


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

Types Of Sampling<br />

Populati<strong>on</strong> sampling is the process of taking a subset of subjects that is representative of the entire populati<strong>on</strong>. The sample must<br />

have sufficient size to warrant statistical analysis.<br />

https://explorable.com/populati<strong>on</strong>-sampling<br />

• Haphazard sampling/ C<strong>on</strong>venient/ Accidental.<br />

Haphazard sampling is used by auditors to try to gather informati<strong>on</strong> from a representative sample of a<br />

populati<strong>on</strong>. Items are selected without intenti<strong>on</strong>al bias and with the goal of representing the populati<strong>on</strong> as a<br />

whole. The auditor might ask to see the deficiency reports <strong>on</strong> the coordinator’s desk. These reports might be<br />

rati<strong>on</strong>alized as being random and as representing the populati<strong>on</strong> as a whole. The auditor might ask for 10<br />

deficiency reports, two from each line, and will ask to be the <strong>on</strong>e who picks them. This might be rati<strong>on</strong>alized as<br />

removing the bias from having the coordinator select the sample.<br />

The pro side of haphazard sampling is that it is easy to select the sample, so the audit can be completed more<br />

quickly. There is less preparati<strong>on</strong> time, making it possible to do more audits.<br />

The c<strong>on</strong> side of haphazard sampling may outweigh its advantages. If the coordinator is reviewing the<br />

deficiency reports for a specific department at the time the auditor walks in, the results of the audit will show<br />

that this department has a disproporti<strong>on</strong>ate number of deficiencies when compared with the other departments<br />

in the sample. The auditor might pick deficiency reports that catch his or her eye for some unknown reas<strong>on</strong>,<br />

thus introducing an unknown bias. Haphazard sampling is the easy approach to sampling, but the results may<br />

not reflect all departments, lines, items, people, problems, or a myriad of other c<strong>on</strong>siderati<strong>on</strong>s. The results are<br />

not statistically valid, and generalizati<strong>on</strong>s about the total populati<strong>on</strong> should be made with extreme cauti<strong>on</strong>. The<br />

results of haphazard sampling are difficult to defend objectively.<br />

Of all the n<strong>on</strong>-statistical audit sampling methods, haphazard is arguably the worst.


<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

Haphazard Sampling<br />

Haphazard sampling is a sampling method that does not follow any systematic way of selecting participants. An<br />

example of Haphazard Sampling would be standing <strong>on</strong> a busy corner during rush hour and interviewing people<br />

who pass by. Haphazard sampling gives little guarantee that your sample will be representative of the entire<br />

populati<strong>on</strong>. If you were to use this method to c<strong>on</strong>duct a survey to find out who people will vote for president, the<br />

results you get may not predict the actual outcome of the electi<strong>on</strong>. This is because you would probably <strong>on</strong>ly be<br />

able to interview people who were probably white-collar workers <strong>on</strong> their way to work, or those who were not in<br />

such a big hurry to get to where they're going, or those who lived or worked near the area where you c<strong>on</strong>ducted<br />

your survey.<br />

http://aerohaveno.blogspot.com/2014/12/asia-summer-series-shanghai-china-part-1.html<br />

http://www.ilishi.net/html/200909/18715.html<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

Block Sampling or Cluster Sampling – Statically Valid<br />

Block sampling or cluster sampling can be used by auditors to gain a pretty good picture of the populati<strong>on</strong>, if<br />

the blocks are chosen in a statistical manner. This requires that numerous blocks be chosen before an<br />

accurate representati<strong>on</strong> of the total populati<strong>on</strong> is obtained, and often more items are examined than if a<br />

statistical sample was selected in the beginning. Normally, auditors d<strong>on</strong>’t use block sampling during audits but<br />

do use it extensively after a problem has been identified. Auditors and others use block sampling when trying<br />

to determine when or how a previously identified problem began, ended, or both. For example, if a problem<br />

began in May, the auditor might examine all items made or processed in May to try to determine when the<br />

problem began and whether it is still occurring. If a problem with calibrati<strong>on</strong> of balances was identified, every<br />

balance could be examined to determine when the problem began and whether it affected <strong>on</strong>ly those in <strong>on</strong>e<br />

building or in <strong>on</strong>e department. Some may recognize these activities as investigative acti<strong>on</strong>s taken subsequent<br />

to identificati<strong>on</strong> of a problem. Block sampling is also used in investigative acti<strong>on</strong>s.<br />

The pro side of block sampling is that it allows statistically valid judgments about the block examined. With a<br />

sufficiently large number of blocks selected randomly using the same selecti<strong>on</strong> criteria, statistically valid<br />

judgments about the total populati<strong>on</strong> can be made. Single blocks allow the auditor to narrow down the root<br />

cause of a previously identified problem by focusing the investigati<strong>on</strong> in the area of c<strong>on</strong>cern. Single blocks also<br />

allow the auditor to recognize a possible problem with a single machine or a specific process.<br />

The c<strong>on</strong> side of block sampling is that it requires sampling a large number of items—even more than<br />

statistically selected samples—before judgments about the total populati<strong>on</strong> can be made. Auditors often want<br />

more than just informati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> a particular block of time, products, or locati<strong>on</strong>s. Auditors want to be able to<br />

provide management with supportable statements about the entire populati<strong>on</strong>. For this reas<strong>on</strong>, block sampling<br />

is normally not used during the audit to identify problems.


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

Judgmental Sampling- Not Statistically Valid<br />

Judgmental sampling can be used by auditors to get a pretty good idea of what is happening, although the<br />

results are not statistically valid. In the first approach, the auditor selects samples based <strong>on</strong> his or her best<br />

judgment of what is believed to give a representative picture of the populati<strong>on</strong>. These samples are chosen<br />

based <strong>on</strong> the auditor’s past experience. Often these samples are taken from areas that expose the company to<br />

the greatest risk, such as high-dollar orders, special orders, or critical applicati<strong>on</strong> orders.<br />

The auditor may already know from past history (past audits) that problems have existed in department A,<br />

activity C, and with this knowledge, the auditor examines that area in an audit. In judgmental sampling, the<br />

auditor may also decide to look at all orders over $2 milli<strong>on</strong> or all orders destined for installati<strong>on</strong> in the military<br />

aircraft. If a problem is found, the auditor examines additi<strong>on</strong>al samples to determine the extent of the<br />

immediate problem. In the sec<strong>on</strong>d approach (that is, looking at all orders over $2 milli<strong>on</strong>), the process or<br />

system has reached maturity, and very few problems are identified in a general audit using random sample<br />

techniques. The company may then decide to audit all areas in which problems were identified, with the<br />

intenti<strong>on</strong> of determining whether the activity can be improved bey<strong>on</strong>d its current level.<br />

The nuclear industry and several other industries have reached this point and have begun to rely <strong>on</strong><br />

judgmental sampling to identify areas for improvement.<br />

The pro side of judgmental sampling is extensive. The auditor focuses <strong>on</strong> areas where previous problems were<br />

found and corrected. High-risk areas and activities historically have received the most attenti<strong>on</strong> from<br />

management. By doing judgmental sampling, the auditor will be providing informati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> areas known to be of<br />

interest to management. Judgmental sampling allows companies to focus their efforts <strong>on</strong> specific<br />

improvements rather than general assessment. It allows the auditor to more effectively use his or her time<br />

during the audit. And finally, selecti<strong>on</strong> of the audit sample is relatively simple, which leaves more time to<br />

prepare for and perform the audit.


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

The c<strong>on</strong> side of judgmental sampling is that the results are not statistically valid or objectively defensible.<br />

Judgmental sampling is open to abuse through retaliati<strong>on</strong> (selecting a group for a detailed audit because of<br />

some previous acti<strong>on</strong>). Judgmental sampling causes auditors to c<strong>on</strong>tinue to focus <strong>on</strong> areas where problems<br />

were found previously. It is a fact that an auditor focusing <strong>on</strong> an area will probably find problems that get<br />

recorded and reported.<br />

An unwritten law of auditing is that ―if we look for it, we will find it.‖ If auditors c<strong>on</strong>tinue to focus <strong>on</strong>ly <strong>on</strong> areas<br />

where problems are found, logic would take them to the extreme where they always audit the same thing over<br />

and over. Thus, certain areas would be seen as pristine (in its original c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>; un-spoilt) , while others would<br />

be seen as c<strong>on</strong>sistently incompetent. Statistical sampling is needed to provide a baseline from which further<br />

auditing using judgmental sampling may proceed.<br />

Haphazard sampling should be avoided if at all possible. Block sampling is effective in pinpointing problems,<br />

and statistically valid c<strong>on</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong>s can be made about the block evaluated; but c<strong>on</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong>s about the total<br />

populati<strong>on</strong> require more work. Judgmental sampling is effective in focusing the auditor’s efforts and in<br />

identifying areas of improvement in a relatively mature program. The job of the auditor is to know which<br />

method is best for obtaining the informati<strong>on</strong> needed.


<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

Judgmental Sampling<br />

Judgmental sampling is a n<strong>on</strong>-probability sampling technique where the researcher selects units to be sampled based <strong>on</strong> their<br />

knowledge and professi<strong>on</strong>al judgment. This type of sampling technique is also known as purposive sampling and authoritative<br />

sampling. Purposive sampling is used in cases where the specialty of an authority can select a more representative sample that<br />

can bring more accurate results than by using other probability sampling techniques. The process involves nothing but purposely<br />

handpicking individuals from the populati<strong>on</strong> based <strong>on</strong> the authority's or the researcher's knowledge and judgment. Example of<br />

Judgmental Sampling In a study wherein a researcher wants to know what it takes to graduate summa cum laude in college, the<br />

<strong>on</strong>ly people who can give the researcher first hand advise are the individuals who graduated summa cum laude. With this very<br />

specific and very limited pool of individuals that can be c<strong>on</strong>sidered as a subject, the researcher must use judgmental sampling.<br />

When to Use Judgmental Sampling<br />

Judgmental sampling design is usually used when a limited number of individuals possess the trait of interest. It is the <strong>on</strong>ly viable<br />

sampling technique in obtaining informati<strong>on</strong> from a very specific group of people. It is also possible to use judgmental sampling if<br />

the researcher knows a reliable professi<strong>on</strong>al or authority that he thinks is capable of assembling a representative sample.<br />

Setbacks of Judgmental Sampling<br />

The two main weaknesses of authoritative sampling are with the authority and in the sampling process; both of which pertains to<br />

the reliability and the bias that accompanies the sampling technique. Unfortunately, there is usually no way to evaluate the<br />

reliability of the expert or the authority. The best way to avoid sampling error brought by the expert is to choose the best and most<br />

experienced authority in the field of interest. When it comes to the sampling process, it is usually biased since no randomizati<strong>on</strong><br />

was used in obtaining the sample. It is also worth noting that the members of the populati<strong>on</strong> did not have equal chances of being<br />

selected. The c<strong>on</strong>sequence of this is the misrepresentati<strong>on</strong> of the entire populati<strong>on</strong> which will then limit generalizati<strong>on</strong>s of the<br />

results of the study.<br />

https://explorable.com/judgmental-sampling<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

Block sampling<br />

https://es.slideshare.net/drbharatpaul/sampling-techniques-48927352<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

https://es.slideshare.net/drbharatpaul/sampling-techniques-48927352<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

https://es.slideshare.net/drbharatpaul/sampling-techniques-48927352<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

https://es.slideshare.net/drbharatpaul/sampling-techniques-48927352<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

or Haphazard sampling<br />

https://es.slideshare.net/drbharatpaul/sampling-techniques-48927352<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

https://es.slideshare.net/drbharatpaul/sampling-techniques-48927352<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

Judgmental Sampling<br />

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-kwdXEXC7yE<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

N<strong>on</strong>-Probability Sampling<br />

N<strong>on</strong>-Probability Sampling Other names Descripti<strong>on</strong><br />

Haphazard sampling<br />

Snow ball sampling<br />

C<strong>on</strong>venient sampling<br />

Accidental sampling<br />

Judgmental sampling<br />

Purposive sampling<br />

Voluntary sampling<br />

https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=Rahul+Patwari+sampling<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

N<strong>on</strong>-Probability Sampling<br />

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-kwdXEXC7yE<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

Dr. Rahul Patwari MD. Lectures <strong>on</strong> Sampling<br />

Subject<br />

Links<br />

Sampling 01: Introducti<strong>on</strong><br />

https://youtu.be/Cl2uZGGL-_U<br />

Sampling 02: Simple Random Sampling https://youtu.be/-BRoHNiRM-o<br />

Sampling 03: Stratified Random Sampling https://youtu.be/rsNCCQhkKN8<br />

Sampling 04: Cluster Sampling<br />

https://youtu.be/pV3FAVr086s<br />

Sampling 05: Systematic Sampling https://youtu.be/SBsgnpby-Hc<br />

Sampling 06: N<strong>on</strong>-Probability Sampling https://youtu.be/-kwdXEXC7yE<br />

https://www.rushu.rush.edu/faculty/rahul-g-patwari-md<br />

https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=Rahul+Patwari+sampling<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

Dr. Manishika lecture <strong>on</strong> Statistical Sampling<br />

https://youtu.be/bQ5_PPRPjG4<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

Statistical Sampling (Random And Systematic)<br />

For a sampling approach to be c<strong>on</strong>sidered statistical, the method must have random selecti<strong>on</strong> of items to be<br />

valuated and use probability theory to quantitatively evaluate the results. Statistically valid sampling is<br />

necessary to quantify problems resulting from an administrative process or producti<strong>on</strong> line.<br />

Statistically valid sampling allows the auditor to state in the audit report that ―we are 95 percent c<strong>on</strong>fident that<br />

the actual populati<strong>on</strong> deviati<strong>on</strong> rate lies between 1.2 percent and 5 percent. Since this is less than the tolerable<br />

deviati<strong>on</strong> rate of 6 percent, the c<strong>on</strong>trol procedure appears to be functi<strong>on</strong>ing as prescribed.‖ With a slightly<br />

different sampling technique, the auditor would be able to state, ―We are 95 percent c<strong>on</strong>fident that the true<br />

populati<strong>on</strong> deviati<strong>on</strong> rate is less than 4.8 percent, which is less than the tolerable deviati<strong>on</strong> rate of 6 percent.‖<br />

These numbers and c<strong>on</strong>fidence levels mean more to upper management than, say, ―We think there is a<br />

problem in document c<strong>on</strong>trol.‖ There are two widely used methods of statistical sampling:<br />

• Simple random sampling and<br />

• Systematic sampling.<br />

How about:<br />

• Stratified random<br />

• Cluster/block sampling


<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

Simple random<br />

Simple random sampling ensures that each item in the populati<strong>on</strong> has an equal chance of being selected.<br />

Random number tables and computer programs can help make the sample selecti<strong>on</strong>s.<br />

Systematic sampling<br />

Systematic sampling also ensures that each item in the populati<strong>on</strong> has an equal chance of being selected. The<br />

difference here is that after the sample size is determined, it is divided into the total populati<strong>on</strong> size to<br />

determine the sampling interval (for example, every third item). The starting point is determined using a<br />

random number table. Several computer programs are available to help determine the sample size, the<br />

sampling interval, the starting point, and the actual samples to be evaluated.<br />

Reporting<br />

It’s not difficult to plug numbers into a formula and calculate the results. Management likes to work with<br />

numbers that have meaning and that put boundaries around a questi<strong>on</strong> or an error rate. This is where<br />

statistical sampling comes in. With statistical sampling, auditors can state in the audit reports that ―we have 95<br />

percent c<strong>on</strong>fidence that the purchase orders are being correctly processed.‖ Sample size depends <strong>on</strong><br />

c<strong>on</strong>fidence level and what the auditor wants to determine. Naturally, the larger the sample size, the more<br />

accurate the estimate. For small populati<strong>on</strong>s, the sample size is corrected. Auditing by statistical sampling is<br />

best suited to single-attribute auditing. However, <strong>on</strong>ce the item to be audited has been selected, many<br />

attributes can be checked during the audit. A purchase order has many attributes that can be checked<br />

simultaneously. In this way, <strong>on</strong>e calculati<strong>on</strong> for sample size can be used to report <strong>on</strong> many attributes. Standards<br />

(discussed in the next secti<strong>on</strong>) or statistical formulas should be used to determine the appropriate sample size<br />

given a required c<strong>on</strong>fidence level, such as 95% or 99%.<br />

For more informati<strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>cerning statistical sampling, Dodge- Romig or Bayesian sampling plans, and<br />

binominal distributi<strong>on</strong>s, c<strong>on</strong>sult a comprehensive statistical textbook.<br />

https://www.calculator.net/sample-size-calculator.html?type=1&cl=95&ci=5&pp=10&ps=1000&x=59&y=34<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

Random number tables<br />

How to use a random number table.<br />

Let’s assume that we have a populati<strong>on</strong> of 185 students and each student<br />

has been assigned a number from 1 to 185. Suppose we wish to sample 5<br />

students (although we would normally sample more, we will use 5 for this<br />

example).<br />

Since we have a populati<strong>on</strong> of 185 and 185 is a three digit number, we need<br />

to use the first three digits of the numbers listed <strong>on</strong> the chart.<br />

We close our eyes and randomly point to a spot <strong>on</strong> the chart. For this<br />

example, we will assume that we selected 20631 in the first column.<br />

We interpret that number as 206 (first three digits). Since we d<strong>on</strong>’t have a<br />

member of our populati<strong>on</strong> with that number, we go down to the next number<br />

899 (89990). Once again we d<strong>on</strong>’t have some<strong>on</strong>e with that number, so we<br />

c<strong>on</strong>tinue at the top of the next column. As we work down the column, we find<br />

that the first number to match our populati<strong>on</strong> is 100 (actually 10005 <strong>on</strong> the<br />

chart). Student number 100 would be in our sample. C<strong>on</strong>tinuing down the<br />

chart, we see that the other four subjects in our sample would be students<br />

049, 082, 153, and 164.<br />

Researchers use different techniques with these tables. Some researchers<br />

read across the table using given sets (in our examples three digit sets). For<br />

our class, we will use the technique I have described.<br />

Microsoft Excel has a functi<strong>on</strong> to produce random numbers.<br />

The functi<strong>on</strong> is simply<br />

=RAND()<br />

Type that into a cell and it will produce a random number in that cell. Copy<br />

the formula throughout a selecti<strong>on</strong> of cells and it will produce random<br />

numbers between 0 and 1.<br />

If you would like to modify the formula, you can obtain whatever range you<br />

wish. For example.. if you wanted random numbers from 1 to 250, you could<br />

enter the following formula:<br />

=INT(250*RAND())+1<br />

The INT eliminates the digits after the decimal, the 250* creates the range to<br />

be covered, and the +1 sets the lowest number in the range.<br />

https://researchbasics.educati<strong>on</strong>.uc<strong>on</strong>n.edu/random-number-table/<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

Random number tables<br />

How to use a random number table.<br />

Let’s assume that we have a populati<strong>on</strong> of 185 students and each student has been assigned a number from 1 to 185. Suppose we wish to sample 5 students (although we would normally sample more, we will use 5 for this example).<br />

Since we have a populati<strong>on</strong> of 185 and 185 is a three digit number, we need to use the first three digits of the numbers listed <strong>on</strong> the chart.<br />

We close our eyes and randomly point to a spot <strong>on</strong> the chart. For this example, we will assume that we selected 20631 in the first column.<br />

We interpret that number as 206 (first three digits). Since we d<strong>on</strong>’t have a member of our populati<strong>on</strong> with that number, we go down to the next number 899 (89990). Once again we d<strong>on</strong>’t have some<strong>on</strong>e with that number, so we c<strong>on</strong>tinue at the<br />

top of the next column. As we work down the column, we find that the first number to match our populati<strong>on</strong> is 100 (actually 10005 <strong>on</strong> the chart). Student number 100 would be in our sample. C<strong>on</strong>tinuing down the chart, we see that the other four<br />

subjects in our sample would be students 049, 082, 153, and 164.<br />

Researchers use different techniques with these tables. Some researchers read across the table using given sets (in our examples three digit sets). For our class, we will use the technique I have described.<br />

Microsoft Excel has a functi<strong>on</strong> to produce random numbers.<br />

The functi<strong>on</strong> is simply<br />

=RAND()<br />

Type that into a cell and it will produce a random number in that cell. Copy the formula throughout a selecti<strong>on</strong> of cells and it will produce random numbers between 0 and 1.<br />

If you would like to modify the formula, you can obtain whatever range you wish. For example.. if you wanted random numbers from 1 to 250, you could enter the following formula:<br />

=INT(250*RAND())+1<br />

The INT eliminates the digits after the decimal, the 250* creates the range to be covered, and the +1 sets the lowest number in the range.<br />

https://stattrek.com/statistics/random-number-generator.aspx#error<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

https://www.randomizer.org/<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

Sample Size Calculator<br />

This Sample Size Calculator is presented as a public service of Creative Research Systems survey software.<br />

You can use it to determine how many people you need to interview in order to get results that reflect the target<br />

populati<strong>on</strong> as precisely as needed. You can also find the level of precisi<strong>on</strong> you have in an existing sample.<br />

Before using the sample size calculator, there are two terms that you need to know. These are: c<strong>on</strong>fidence<br />

interval and c<strong>on</strong>fidence level.<br />

• The c<strong>on</strong>fidence interval (also called margin of error) is the plus-or-minus figure usually reported in<br />

newspaper or televisi<strong>on</strong> opini<strong>on</strong> poll results. For example, if you use a c<strong>on</strong>fidence interval of 4 and<br />

populati<strong>on</strong> proporti<strong>on</strong> with 47% picked an answer, you can be "sure" that if you had asked the questi<strong>on</strong> of<br />

the entire relevant populati<strong>on</strong> between 47% ±4%, i.e. 43% (47-4) and 51% (47+4) would have picked that<br />

answer.<br />

• The c<strong>on</strong>fidence level tells you how sure you can be. It is expressed as a percentage and represents how<br />

often the true percentage of the populati<strong>on</strong> who would pick an answer lies within the c<strong>on</strong>fidence interval. The<br />

95% c<strong>on</strong>fidence level means you can be 95% certain; the 99% c<strong>on</strong>fidence level means you can be 99%<br />

certain. Most researchers use the 95% c<strong>on</strong>fidence level.<br />

When you put the c<strong>on</strong>fidence level and the c<strong>on</strong>fidence interval together, you can say that you are 95% sure that<br />

the true percentage of the populati<strong>on</strong> is between 43% and 51%. The wider the c<strong>on</strong>fidence interval you are willing<br />

to accept, the more certain you can be that the whole populati<strong>on</strong> answers would be within that range.<br />

https://surveysystem.com/sscalc.htm#<strong>on</strong>e<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

For example, if you asked a sample of 1000 people in a city which brand of cola<br />

they preferred, and 60% said Brand A, you can be very certain that between 40 and<br />

80% of all the people in the city actually do prefer that brand, but you cannot be so<br />

sure that between 59 and 61% of the people in the city prefer the brand.<br />

https://surveysystem.com/sscalc.htm#<strong>on</strong>e<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

https://www.dawn.com/news/1329368<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

Sampling Standards (Acceptance Sampling)<br />

In this secti<strong>on</strong>, three sampling procedures are discussed for applicati<strong>on</strong> to auditing:<br />

• ANSI/<strong>ASQ</strong> Z1.4-2008: Sampling Procedures and Tables for Inspecti<strong>on</strong> by Attributes<br />

• ANSI/<strong>ASQ</strong> Z1.9-2008: Sampling Procedures and Tables for Inspecti<strong>on</strong> by Variables for Percent<br />

N<strong>on</strong>c<strong>on</strong>forming<br />

• <strong>ASQ</strong>C Q3-1998: Sampling Procedures and Tables for Inspecti<strong>on</strong> of Isolated Lots by Attributes<br />

Note:<br />

ANSI/<strong>ASQ</strong> Z1.4-2003<br />

http://vcg1.com/files/ANSI_<strong>ASQ</strong>C-Z1.4.pdf


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

Applicati<strong>on</strong><br />

We are interested in determining c<strong>on</strong>formance with procedures, instructi<strong>on</strong>s, and other program documentati<strong>on</strong>.<br />

Audits for adequacy require a point- by-point comparis<strong>on</strong> of the lower- tier document, such as a procedure, with<br />

the upper- tier document, such as a standard. This is a 100% check. Thus, statistical sampling does not apply.<br />

Effectiveness and performance audits require the judgment skills of the auditor, as applied to the results of the<br />

program. Again, statistical sampling does not apply.<br />

C<strong>on</strong>formance is determining whether an activity or a document is satisfactory or unsatisfactory. This, then, is<br />

attribute sampling, rather than variable sampling. In additi<strong>on</strong>, we are dealing with whole numbers (1, 2, 3), so<br />

we need to deal with discrete probability distributi<strong>on</strong>s. The most comm<strong>on</strong> of these are hypergeometric,<br />

binomial, and Poiss<strong>on</strong>. For general discussi<strong>on</strong>, we need to assume a large populati<strong>on</strong>, N. This c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong> is met<br />

if N is greater than or equal to 10n, where n is the sample size. This c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong> is not required when the<br />

standards are used, as the sample size is corrected for small populati<strong>on</strong> (lot size). But what are the<br />

characteristics of the lot that we will examine during the audit?<br />

Meanings:<br />

Hypergeometric- In probability theory and statistics, the hypergeometric distributi<strong>on</strong> is a discrete probability<br />

distributi<strong>on</strong> that describes the probability of k successes (random draws for which the object drawn has a<br />

specified feature) in n draws, without replacement, from a finite populati<strong>on</strong> of size N that c<strong>on</strong>tains exactly K<br />

objects with that feature, wherein each draw is either a success or a failure. In c<strong>on</strong>trast, the binomial distributi<strong>on</strong><br />

describes the probability of k successes in n draws with replacement.


<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

Hypergeometric Distributi<strong>on</strong><br />

The probability distributi<strong>on</strong> of a hypergeometric random variable is called a hypergeometric distributi<strong>on</strong>. This<br />

less<strong>on</strong> describes how hypergeometric random variables, hypergeometric experiments, hypergeometric<br />

probability, and the hypergeometric distributi<strong>on</strong> are all related.<br />

Notati<strong>on</strong><br />

The following notati<strong>on</strong> is helpful, when we talk about hypergeometric distributi<strong>on</strong>s and hypergeometric<br />

probability:<br />

• N: The number of items in the populati<strong>on</strong>.<br />

• k: The number of items in the populati<strong>on</strong> that are classified as successes.<br />

• n: The number of items in the sample.<br />

• x: The number of items in the sample that are classified as successes.<br />

• kC x : The number of combinati<strong>on</strong>s of k things, taken x at a time.<br />

• h(x; N, n, k): hypergeometric probability - the probability that an n-trial hypergeometric experiment results<br />

in exactly x successes, when the populati<strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>sists of N items, k of which are classified as successes.<br />

• Hypergeometric Formula.. Suppose a populati<strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>sists of N items, k of which are successes. And a<br />

random sample drawn from that populati<strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>sists of n items, x of which are successes. Then the<br />

hypergeometric probability is: h(x; N, n, k) = [ k C x ] [ N-k C n-x ] / [ N C n ]<br />

The hypergeometric distributi<strong>on</strong> has the following properties:<br />

• The mean of the distributi<strong>on</strong> is equal to n * k / N .<br />

• The variance is n * k * ( N-k ) * ( N-n ) / [ N 2 * ( N-1 ) ] .<br />

https://www.stattrek.com/probability-distributi<strong>on</strong>s/hypergeometric.aspx<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

Example 1<br />

Suppose we randomly select 5 cards without<br />

replacement from an ordinary deck of playing<br />

cards. What is the probability of getting exactly<br />

2 red cards (i.e., hearts or diam<strong>on</strong>ds)?<br />

Soluti<strong>on</strong>:<br />

This is a hypergeometric experiment in which we<br />

know the following:<br />

• N = 52; since there are 52 cards in a deck.<br />

• k = 26; since there are 26 red cards in a deck.<br />

• n = 5; since we randomly select 5 cards from<br />

the deck.<br />

• x = 2; since 2 of the cards we select are red.<br />

We plug these values into the hypergeometric<br />

formula as follows:<br />

• h(x; N, n, k) = [ k C x ] [ N-k C n-x ] / [ N C n ]<br />

• h(2; 52, 5, 26) = [ 26 C 2 ] [ 26 C 3 ] / [ 52 C 5 ]<br />

• h(2; 52, 5, 26) = [ 325 ] [ 2600 ] / [ 2,598,960 ]<br />

• h(2; 52, 5, 26) = 0.32513<br />

Thus, the probability of randomly selecting 2 red<br />

cards is 0.32513.<br />

https://www.stattrek.com/probability-distributi<strong>on</strong>s/hypergeometric.aspx<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

Hypergeometric distributi<strong>on</strong>,<br />

N=250, k=100<br />

http://www.statsref.com/HTML/index.html?hypergeometric.html<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

The Moving Lot<br />

Most audits are a snapshot covering a specific time period. Our snapshot is of a lot from a c<strong>on</strong>tinuous<br />

producti<strong>on</strong> line. As part of the scope of the audit, we might have to examine the deficiency reports (DRs) for the<br />

last quarter. Obviously there were DRs written before our time period, and there will be DRs written after we are<br />

g<strong>on</strong>e. This might look like:<br />

Stream of DRs occurring<br />

----------------------------------------------------<br />

Time {Scope of Audit #1}<br />

The populati<strong>on</strong> (lot size) c<strong>on</strong>sists of the number of DRs written during the selected time period. During a<br />

subsequent audit, the lot might be completely separate from the lot selected during this audit, or it might<br />

overlap.<br />

Stream of DRs occurring<br />

----------------------------------------------------<br />

Time {Scope of Audit #1}<br />

{Scope of Audit #2}<br />

Thus, the lot moves for each audit performed, depending <strong>on</strong> the goals set for the audit. The process being<br />

examined can be said to have an acceptable quality level (AQL) set by the people doing the work. This is the<br />

work standard they are attempting to achieve. Now that we understand the nature of our lot, we are ready to<br />

use the standards.


<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

QC101 C<strong>on</strong>trol Charts<br />

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sV5PRDV7hyM<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

Variable C<strong>on</strong>trol Chart.<br />

Z1.9 Applicability<br />

Z1.9 has been eliminated from c<strong>on</strong>siderati<strong>on</strong> because it is variable sampling, and auditors need to c<strong>on</strong>cern<br />

themselves with attribute sampling. This leaves Z1.4 and <strong>ASQ</strong>C Q3-1998 for possible use by auditors. We will<br />

c<strong>on</strong>sider them in turn.


<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

QC101 Attribute C<strong>on</strong>trol Charts: P & NP Charts<br />

https://www.youtube.com/embed/sV5PRDV7hyM<br />

https://www.youtube.com/embed/8XEvaR2TPlU<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

Attribute C<strong>on</strong>trol Charts<br />

• ANSI/<strong>ASQ</strong> Z1.4-2008 Applicability And Use<br />

ANSI/<strong>ASQ</strong>C Z1.4-2008 is the revised and updated versi<strong>on</strong> of the old MIL- STD-105. This standard assumes<br />

that isolated lots are drawn from a process and sampled separately. The process AQL is a factor in determining<br />

the sample size in this case. In auditing, we want to know the maximum error rate, which translates into a<br />

limiting quality level (LQL) for the standards.<br />

Tables VI- A and VII- A of ANSI/<strong>ASQ</strong> Z1.4-2008 provide LQLs as a percent n<strong>on</strong>c<strong>on</strong>forming with a probability of<br />

acceptance Pa = 10% and 5%, respectively. Pa = 10% means that there is <strong>on</strong>ly a 10% chance that we will<br />

accept a lot with a percent n<strong>on</strong>c<strong>on</strong>forming greater than our specified LQL.<br />

As an example, let’s assume that we want a 10% LQL for our lot with Pa = 10% or less, and an AQL of 1.5% for<br />

a series of lots.<br />

Enter the ANSI/<strong>ASQ</strong> Z1.4-2008 sample size of 50, and we can accept the lot with two problems noted but must<br />

reject the lot if three problems are noted.<br />

The sample size of 50 implies that our populati<strong>on</strong> is approximately 500 (N is greater than or equal to 10n). If<br />

the populati<strong>on</strong> is much less than 500, we need to use the calculati<strong>on</strong>s presented in ―Proporti<strong>on</strong>al Stratified<br />

Sampling‖ in this chapter. C<strong>on</strong>tinuing with the example, we need to choose a random sample of 50 items.<br />

Computer random number generator programs or random number tables provide the selecti<strong>on</strong> method for our<br />

sample. When completed, assuming the results are acceptable, we will be able to say that there is a 90%<br />

probability that the audited attribute has a percent defective less than 10%. When working to very exact<br />

requirements, such as low AQL and low LQL, we need to use the operating characteristic curves to determine<br />

the discriminati<strong>on</strong> desired. The operating characteristic curves are imprecise when working in this area. This<br />

brings up the sec<strong>on</strong>d standard applicable to auditing, <strong>ASQ</strong>C Q3-1998.


<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

Table VI-A Limiting Quality (in percent n<strong>on</strong>c<strong>on</strong>forming) for Which Pa = 10 Percent (for Normal Inspecti<strong>on</strong>,<br />

Single Sampling)<br />

• https://www.youtube.com/embed/y5WbL_86OOo<br />

• http://www.ombuenterprises.com/LibraryPDFs/Attributes_Acceptance_Sampling_Understanding_How_it_Works.pdf<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

Table VI-A Limiting Quality (in percent n<strong>on</strong>c<strong>on</strong>forming) for Which Pa = 10 Percent (for Normal Inspecti<strong>on</strong>,<br />

Single Sampling)<br />

C=2, r=3; this<br />

corresp<strong>on</strong>d to<br />

AQL=4<br />

https://www.youtube.com/embed/y5WbL_86OOo<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

Table VI-A Limiting Quality (in percent n<strong>on</strong>c<strong>on</strong>forming) for Which Pa = 10 Percent (for Normal Inspecti<strong>on</strong>,<br />

Single Sampling)<br />

Single /<br />

Double/Multiple plan<br />

Standard offers 3 types of sampling plans<br />

Mil. Std. 105E offers three types<br />

of sampling plans: single, double and multiple plans. The choice is, in<br />

general, up to the inspectors.<br />

Because of the three possible selecti<strong>on</strong>s, the standard does not give a<br />

sample size, but rather a sample code letter. This, together with the<br />

decisi<strong>on</strong> of the type of plan yields the specific sampling plan to be used.<br />

https://qualityinspecti<strong>on</strong>.org/inspecti<strong>on</strong>-level/<br />

Example IIA/IIB/IIC<br />

Normal/ Tighten/<br />

Reduce<br />

https://www.youtube.com/embed/y5WbL_86OOo<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

Table I—Sample size code letters<br />

Why different inspecti<strong>on</strong> levels?<br />

There is a fairly obvious principle in statistical quality c<strong>on</strong>trol: the greater the order quantity, the higher the number of samples to check.But should the number of samples ONLY depend <strong>on</strong> the order quantity? What if this factory had many quality problems recently, and you suspect there are many defects? In this case, you might want more products to be checked.On the other hand, if an inspecti<strong>on</strong> requires tests that end up in product<br />

destructi<strong>on</strong>, shouldn’t the sample size be drastically reduced? And if the quality issues are always present <strong>on</strong> all the products of a given batch (for reas<strong>on</strong>s inherent to processes at work), why not check <strong>on</strong>ly a few samples?<br />

For these reas<strong>on</strong>s, different levels are proposed by MIL-STD 105 E (the widely recognized standard for statistical quality c<strong>on</strong>trol).It is usually the buyer’s resp<strong>on</strong>sibility to choose the inspecti<strong>on</strong> level–more samples to check means more chances to reject bad products when they are bad, but it also means more days (and dollars) spent in inspecti<strong>on</strong>.<br />

he 3 ―general‖ inspecti<strong>on</strong> levels<br />

Level I<br />

Has this supplier passed most previous inspecti<strong>on</strong>s? Do you feel c<strong>on</strong>fident in their products quality? Instead of doing no quality c<strong>on</strong>trol, buyers can check less samples by opting for a level-I inspecti<strong>on</strong>.However, settling <strong>on</strong> this level by default, in order to spend less time/m<strong>on</strong>ey <strong>on</strong> inspecti<strong>on</strong>s, is very risky. The likelihood of finding quality problems is lower than generally recommended.<br />

Level II<br />

It is the most widely used inspecti<strong>on</strong> level, to be used by default.<br />

Level III<br />

If a supplier recently had quality problems, this level is appropriate. More samples are inspected, and a batch of products will (most probably) be rejected if it is below the quality criteria defined by the buyer.<br />

Some buyers opt for level-III inspecti<strong>on</strong>s for high-value products. It can also be interesting for small quantities, where the inspecti<strong>on</strong> would take <strong>on</strong>ly <strong>on</strong>e day whatever the level chosen.<br />

Lot Size N=150<br />

https://www.intouch-quality.com/aql-calculator<br />

http://rsjqa.com/useful-corner/aql-manday-calculator/aql-calculator<br />

https://www.youtube.com/embed/y5WbL_86OOo<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

Table II-A—Single sampling plans for normal inspecti<strong>on</strong> (Master table)<br />

Acceptable quality levels (AQL)<br />

Sometimes called ―acceptable quality limits‖, AQLs range from 0 to 15 percent or more, with 0 representing the lowest tolerance for defects. Importers’ tolerance for ―minor‖ defects tends to be higher than that for ―major‖ and ―critical‖ defects. So they usually choose a different AQL for each of these classes of product defects. For c<strong>on</strong>sumer goods, QC professi<strong>on</strong>als typically recommend AQLs of 0, 2.5 and 4 percent for critical, major and minor defects,<br />

respectively Choosing an AQL isn’t always as simple as adopting the <strong>on</strong>e that similar importers are using. What works for <strong>on</strong>e importer might not work for another to verify that orders are meeting customer expectati<strong>on</strong>s. To ensure you can choose the best AQL for your circumstances, there are a number of factors to c<strong>on</strong>sider, including:<br />

What quality level your supplier c<strong>on</strong>siders reas<strong>on</strong>able and has agreed to meet<br />

Your inspecti<strong>on</strong> budget (lower AQLs typically require larger sample sizes and more time)<br />

Your exit-factory date<br />

The value of the goods in questi<strong>on</strong> (more expensive products tend to warrant lower AQLs)<br />

Although you might select what you perceive as a reas<strong>on</strong>able AQL to apply, that doesn’t mean a factory will feel the same way. Agreeing up<strong>on</strong> standards early is crucial when it comes to QC inspecti<strong>on</strong>. The factory may try to dispute the results of an inspecti<strong>on</strong> if there’s no prior agreement <strong>on</strong> an appropriate AQL


<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

Table II-A—Single sampling plans for normal inspecti<strong>on</strong> (Master table)<br />

https://www.smartchinasourcing.com/anatomy-ansi-asq-z1-4-industry-standard-aql-table/<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

Table II-B—Single sampling plans for tightened inspecti<strong>on</strong> (Master table)


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

Table VI-A Limiting Quality (in percent n<strong>on</strong>c<strong>on</strong>forming) for Which Pa = 10 Percent (for Normal Inspecti<strong>on</strong>,<br />

Single Sampling)<br />

Limiting Quality (LQ) and a<br />

c<strong>on</strong>sumer’s risk to be associated with it. Limiting Quality is<br />

the percentage of n<strong>on</strong>c<strong>on</strong>forming units (or n<strong>on</strong>c<strong>on</strong>formities)<br />

in a batch or lot for which for purposes of acceptance sampling,<br />

the c<strong>on</strong>sumer wishes the probability of acceptance to<br />

be restricted to a specified low value.<br />

Tables VI and VII give process levels for which the probabilities<br />

of lot acceptance under various sampling plans are<br />

10 percent and 5 percent respectively. If a different value of<br />

c<strong>on</strong>sumer’s risk is required, the O.C. curves and their tabulated<br />

values may be used. For individual lots with percent<br />

n<strong>on</strong>c<strong>on</strong>forming or n<strong>on</strong>c<strong>on</strong>formities per 100 units equal to the<br />

specified Limiting Quality (LQ) values, the probabilities of<br />

lot acceptance are less than 10 percent in the case of plans<br />

listed in Table VI and less than 5 percent in the case of<br />

plans listed in Table VII.<br />

When there is reas<strong>on</strong> for avoiding<br />

more than a limiting percentage of n<strong>on</strong>c<strong>on</strong>forming units (or<br />

n<strong>on</strong>c<strong>on</strong>formities) in a lot or batch, Tables VI and VII may be<br />

useful for fixing minimum sample sizes to be associated<br />

with the AQL and Inspecti<strong>on</strong> Level specified for the inspecti<strong>on</strong><br />

of a series of lots or batches.<br />

For example, if an LQ of<br />

5 percent is desired for individual lots with an associated Pa<br />

of 10 percent or less, then if an AQL of 1.5 percent is designated<br />

for inspecti<strong>on</strong> of a series of lots or batches. Table VI<br />

indicates that the minimum sample size must be that given<br />

by Code Letter M.


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

<strong>ASQ</strong>C Q3-1998 Applicability And Use<br />

<strong>ASQ</strong>C Q3-1998 is designed for isolated lots and uses the hypergeometric probability functi<strong>on</strong>. This applies<br />

even more directly to audits than ANSI/<strong>ASQ</strong>C Z1.4-1993. <strong>ASQ</strong>C Q3-1998 also uses the customer’s specified<br />

limiting quality (LQ) as the basis for sample sizes. The goal is to have a very low probability of accepting (Pa) a<br />

lot that has a percent n<strong>on</strong>c<strong>on</strong>forming equal to or worse than the LQ. <strong>ASQ</strong>C Q3-1998 ties back to ANSI/<strong>ASQ</strong><br />

Z1.4-2008 for AQLs to provide a comm<strong>on</strong>ality or cross- reference. Because we will be pulling isolated lots from<br />

a c<strong>on</strong>tinuous process, we will be working with Table B of the <strong>ASQ</strong>C Q3-1998 standard. There are cases when<br />

we will work with truly isolated lots, in which case Table A would be used, but this is the excepti<strong>on</strong>.<br />

<strong>ASQ</strong>C Q3-1998 is fairly simple to understand. Let’s assume that from the DR log, we counted 239 DRs written<br />

during the period being audited. Our client isn’t overly c<strong>on</strong>cerned with detailed compliance with the procedures,<br />

but does want each deficiency corrected. For compliance, we select an LQ of 12.5%, which is fairly loose. Table<br />

B8 shows our sample size to be 32. For deficiency correcti<strong>on</strong>, we select an LQ of 2%, which is fairly tight. Table<br />

B4 shows our sample size to be 200. Please note that this is almost a 100% sample because our populati<strong>on</strong> is<br />

low. From Table C3, we find that in both cases we accept the lot if we find <strong>on</strong>e or zero problems in our sample.<br />

We approach this by selecting a random sample of 200 for auditing deficiency correcti<strong>on</strong>. Next, we divide 200<br />

by the 32 samples needed for the compliance porti<strong>on</strong> of the audit, to get a frequency of 6. Thus for the<br />

compliance porti<strong>on</strong>, we will use every sixth item from our deficiency correcti<strong>on</strong> sample as <strong>on</strong>e of our<br />

compliance samples, beginning with item 4 (chosen because it is less than 6). The sequence looks like this:<br />

Deficiency correcti<strong>on</strong> 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 . . . 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200<br />

Compliance 1 2 32 33<br />

Note that because the divisi<strong>on</strong> does not yield an even number, we end up with 33 total samples for compliance,<br />

rather than the 32 from the table. Use the extra sample as part of the audit. We then perform the audit, and if<br />

<strong>on</strong>e or zero problems is noted for each sample (200 and 32), we can be 90% c<strong>on</strong>fident that the DRs meet the<br />

LQ specified for the attribute being checked (12.5% for compliance and 2% for deficiency correcti<strong>on</strong>).<br />

Read more: http://www.uotechnology.edu.iq/dep-producti<strong>on</strong>/branch3_files/Dr.%20Mahmoud%20Chapter%2010%20Acceptance%20Sampling%20Systems.pdf


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

Summary<br />

Two of the most familiar sampling plans, ANSI/<strong>ASQ</strong> Z1.4-2008 and <strong>ASQ</strong>C Q3-1998, are readily applied to and<br />

used during audits. These allow the auditor to speak with authority to management about the results of the<br />

audit. There is a lot to learn about applying the standards to audits, but many people who have previously<br />

applied the standards to product acceptance will be able to apply the standards to their auditing. C<strong>on</strong>sider<br />

using some of these sampling methods the next time you audit a large populati<strong>on</strong> to improve the audit<br />

credibility.


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

Proporti<strong>on</strong>al Stratified Sampling<br />

Proporti<strong>on</strong>al stratified sampling can be used to gain an understanding of each stratum within a populati<strong>on</strong>, but it<br />

cannot be used to make statistical inferences for each stratum. The sample size is determined by any <strong>on</strong>e of<br />

the statistical methods/standards. Then the sample size is divided and applied in proporti<strong>on</strong> to the populati<strong>on</strong> of<br />

each stratum in the total populati<strong>on</strong>. If the sample is not statistically determined, the statistical validity is<br />

compromised, and no statistically valid c<strong>on</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong>s can be drawn.<br />

For example, the populati<strong>on</strong> is 1000 purchase orders over the past year. Eight hundred of these are for<br />

amounts of $500 or less; 150 are for amounts of $501– $1000, and 50 are for amounts over $1000. We chose<br />

an LQ of 5% and used <strong>ASQ</strong>C Q3-1998, Table B6, to learn that the sample size is 80.<br />

To apporti<strong>on</strong> the sample to the stratum, simply set up a proporti<strong>on</strong> for each:<br />

• Then we solve for X500 ($500 or less):<br />

X 500 = 64<br />

• Similar proporti<strong>on</strong>s give us ($501–$1000):<br />

X 1000 = 12<br />

• and ($1000 or greater):<br />

X 1000+ = 4<br />

The samples are chosen from each stratum using the random sampling technique. If the samples are not<br />

chosen using a random sampling technique, the results will not be statistically valid.


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

With this knowledge, we can accept the total populati<strong>on</strong> with <strong>on</strong>e or zero deficiencies and reject the total<br />

populati<strong>on</strong> with two or more deficiencies. Although we cannot make statistical inferences <strong>on</strong> each stratum, we<br />

gain some informati<strong>on</strong> that we can use to further investigate the stratum. If all the deficiencies are found in a<br />

particular stratum, the auditor can revise the focus of the audit to further investigate that particular stratum, and<br />

the auditee could justifiably focus corrective acti<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> that stratum. This method places emphasis <strong>on</strong> the<br />

populati<strong>on</strong> of the strata within a populati<strong>on</strong>. This may not be desirable to management. For example,<br />

management may want the auditor to focus <strong>on</strong> the high- cost items, which is where the greatest risk lies.<br />

Proporti<strong>on</strong>al stratified sampling is deceptive in that the auditor and the auditee could be misled into drawing<br />

c<strong>on</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong>s about each stratum instead of the total populati<strong>on</strong>. The method, sample size, and results allow the<br />

auditor to draw c<strong>on</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong>s about the total populati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong>ly. The auditor can use the results to determine where<br />

to focus further investigati<strong>on</strong>, and the auditee can use the results as a guide to determine where to focus<br />

corrective acti<strong>on</strong>s.


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

Risks in Sampling<br />

Hypothesis Testing is creating two hypotheses to arrive at a decisi<strong>on</strong> based <strong>on</strong> sampling. Sampling is used to<br />

make business decisi<strong>on</strong>s regarding the marketability of a product or quality c<strong>on</strong>trol decisi<strong>on</strong>s regarding the<br />

acceptance of a batch, lot, or process.<br />

A hypothesis may be: if the lot achieves a certain acceptable quality level (AQL), it will be approved. Or a<br />

decisi<strong>on</strong> rule may be: if X number of parts is found to be defective, the lot will be rejected. C<strong>on</strong>sumer and<br />

producer risk are the chances of making decisi<strong>on</strong> errors based <strong>on</strong> the sample taken.<br />

Producer Risk, or Type I Error, is the probability that good quality product is rejected or the probability that a<br />

product survey would indicate that a product is not marketable, when it actually is. The producer suffers when<br />

this occurs because good product (or marketable product or service) is rejected. The math symbol used to<br />

represent producer risk is alpha (α risk). See Figure 22.1.<br />

C<strong>on</strong>sumer Risk, or Type II Error, is the probability that bad quality product is accepted or the probability that a<br />

product survey would indicate that a product is marketable, when it actually is not. The c<strong>on</strong>sumer suffers when<br />

this occurs because bad product is accepted (released). The math symbol used to represent c<strong>on</strong>sumer risk is<br />

beta (β risk). For example: A product recall may be the result of a Type II error. See Figure 22.2.<br />

Sufficient samples of the populati<strong>on</strong> must be taken to achieve a certain c<strong>on</strong>fidence that Type I and Type II<br />

errors will be avoided. Statistically, we can define a sampling plan as <strong>on</strong>e that will give us c<strong>on</strong>fidence in the<br />

results. Typical c<strong>on</strong>fidence levels are 95% or 99%. There is a trade- off between the c<strong>on</strong>fidence level you want<br />

to achieve versus the cost of sampling.


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

Figure 22.1 Producer risk or Type I error (note: sample taken from shaded area).


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

Figure 22.2 C<strong>on</strong>sumer risk or Type II error (note: sample taken from shaded area).


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

Sampling Summary<br />

This chapter has discussed methods of sampling that are comm<strong>on</strong>ly encountered in the performance of<br />

product, process, and system audits. Table 22.1 summarizes the methods, their advantages and<br />

disadvantages, and their applicability. Statistically, random sampling must ensure that each item in the<br />

populati<strong>on</strong> has an equal chance of being selected. A sampling scheme is developed for selecti<strong>on</strong> of the<br />

samples. This scheme can use a strictly random selecti<strong>on</strong> based <strong>on</strong> random number tables or computerized<br />

random number generators, or a systematic sampling scheme based <strong>on</strong> the number of samples selected and<br />

the total populati<strong>on</strong>.<br />

N<strong>on</strong>-statistical sampling, although very easy and quick to perform, has many disadvantages, which include<br />

potential bias in the sample, inability to make generalizati<strong>on</strong>s about the total populati<strong>on</strong>, and indefensibility as<br />

objective sampling. Statistically valid auditing must have random selecti<strong>on</strong> of items to be evaluated and use<br />

probability theory to quantitatively evaluate the results.<br />

Two methods can be applied to auditing to provide the ability to make statistically valid c<strong>on</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong>s for use by<br />

management: statistical sampling for attributes and sampling with standards. These methods allow c<strong>on</strong>fidence<br />

levels and error estimati<strong>on</strong> based <strong>on</strong> the results of the evaluati<strong>on</strong> of the samples. Auditors are encouraged to<br />

begin using statistically valid sampling when it adds value and improves the effectiveness of the audit report.<br />

When using statistical sampling techniques for the first time, the auditor may use <strong>on</strong>e method during an audit<br />

and try a different <strong>on</strong>e for the next to learn the various methods. This has the additi<strong>on</strong>al advantage of allowing<br />

the auditor to educate management <strong>on</strong> statistical methods and the accurate results that can be obtained. Often<br />

managers have not had extensive training in statistical methods (other than as applied to business applicati<strong>on</strong>s<br />

and budget), so it may be the auditor’s job to help familiarize management with the value of statistical<br />

methods. After the auditor and management become familiar with the methods, a complete audit using<br />

statistical methods should be performed and the results reported to management.


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

Table 22.1 Sampling methods summary.


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VE<br />

Table 22.1 Sampling methods summary. (c<strong>on</strong>tinued)


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VF<br />

Chapter 23<br />

Change C<strong>on</strong>trol and C<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong><br />

Management/<strong>Part</strong> VF<br />

___________________<br />

C<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong> Management.<br />

Since the advent of the industrial age, organizati<strong>on</strong>s have recognized the need to c<strong>on</strong>trol products and the<br />

documents that describe those products to ensure that the latest models and their descripti<strong>on</strong>s match.<br />

Historically, this involved blueprints and specificati<strong>on</strong> sheets that were updated and noted by date of revisi<strong>on</strong> or<br />

a revisi<strong>on</strong> of model code or letter. Over time, there has been a c<strong>on</strong>tinual evoluti<strong>on</strong> in the means and techniques<br />

involved in managing change. However, change must be c<strong>on</strong>trolled so that unnecessary risks are avoided.<br />

Before an organizati<strong>on</strong> offers a product or service for sale, it must figure out how to provide it. The established<br />

way for providing a product or service is to dem<strong>on</strong>strate how it is c<strong>on</strong>figured. A collecti<strong>on</strong> of documents such as<br />

procedures, specificati<strong>on</strong>s, or drawings defines the product or service c<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong>. C<strong>on</strong>trolling the<br />

c<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong> is called c<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong> management. C<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong> management can include:<br />

• Planning,<br />

• Identificati<strong>on</strong> and<br />

• Tracking,<br />

• Change c<strong>on</strong>trol,<br />

• History,<br />

• Archiving, and<br />

• Auditing.<br />

Some companies call this management change c<strong>on</strong>trol. If there is a change in the management system, it<br />

should be c<strong>on</strong>trolled relative to the risks to the organizati<strong>on</strong>. One aspect of change c<strong>on</strong>trol is the c<strong>on</strong>trol of<br />

documents. Document c<strong>on</strong>trol is not new and is a well-established management system c<strong>on</strong>trol.


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VF<br />

Document C<strong>on</strong>trol<br />

All organizati<strong>on</strong>s have documents either internally or externally generated that need to be identified and<br />

c<strong>on</strong>trolled so that correct, complete, current, and c<strong>on</strong>sistent informati<strong>on</strong> is distributed am<strong>on</strong>g those who need it<br />

in order to do their jobs effectively and to meet customer and stakeholder requirements. These documents<br />

could be federal or other governmental registers or regulati<strong>on</strong>s, employment regulati<strong>on</strong>s, industry-specific<br />

material and product specificati<strong>on</strong>s, maintenance manuals, customer-supplied designs and specificati<strong>on</strong>s,<br />

standards, organizati<strong>on</strong> policies and procedures, price lists, c<strong>on</strong>tracts, other purchasing-related documents,<br />

business and project plans, and so <strong>on</strong>. Which documents need to be c<strong>on</strong>trolled? Much depends <strong>on</strong> the nature<br />

of the organizati<strong>on</strong>’s business and the types of products and services produced, the regulatory climate, federal<br />

and state law, industry practices, and organizati<strong>on</strong> experience. There are references available that provide<br />

guidance. Some of the standards have wording to the effect that documents required by the management<br />

systems for envir<strong>on</strong>mental c<strong>on</strong>cerns, quality, or whatever must be c<strong>on</strong>trolled.


https://1drv.ms/f/s!AgjXpjEHTe0ej1ZlZxoQmNEbj3eG<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VF<br />

Technology<br />

Technology is a c<strong>on</strong>siderati<strong>on</strong> in document management and change c<strong>on</strong>trol. Many aspects of change c<strong>on</strong>trol,<br />

such as revisi<strong>on</strong> levels, revisi<strong>on</strong> dates, signatures, distributi<strong>on</strong> copies, distributi<strong>on</strong> lists, distributi<strong>on</strong> verificati<strong>on</strong>s,<br />

master lists, and so forth, are holdovers in the development of systems to c<strong>on</strong>trol what could be termed hardcopy<br />

documents. In the past, there were master and derivative blue (or sepia) prints, carb<strong>on</strong> or mimeographed<br />

copies of procedures, and other documents, and the management, distributi<strong>on</strong>, and updating of c<strong>on</strong>trolled<br />

documents often required a full-time positi<strong>on</strong> for <strong>on</strong>e or more pers<strong>on</strong>s, depending <strong>on</strong> the size of the<br />

organizati<strong>on</strong>. With the advent of word processing, distributed computing, shared drives, and designated or<br />

limited file access, the task of keeping documents current and ensuring appropriate distributi<strong>on</strong> became<br />

somewhat easier. Many organizati<strong>on</strong>s evolved to the state where all of their c<strong>on</strong>trolled documents had <strong>on</strong>ly <strong>on</strong>e<br />

c<strong>on</strong>trolled copy, and that copy was <strong>on</strong> a shared drive or in a certain computer or server.<br />

Hard copies were time and date stamped and c<strong>on</strong>sidered to be unc<strong>on</strong>trolled; some were c<strong>on</strong>sidered to be<br />

obsolete the day after they were printed, or as indicated by the time/date stamp. Even then, hard copies of<br />

references, industry specificati<strong>on</strong>s, customer documents, and the like still existed, requiring mixed systems of<br />

hard-copy and electr<strong>on</strong>ic documents. With the advent of web-based technology, the internet, and company<br />

intranets, the evoluti<strong>on</strong> of document c<strong>on</strong>trol has c<strong>on</strong>tinued. Access and distributi<strong>on</strong> are through web-pageaccess<br />

technology. One copy is maintained <strong>on</strong>line by a designated individual/owner, who has electr<strong>on</strong>ic review<br />

and approval. However, when <strong>on</strong>e abstracts the c<strong>on</strong>tent from the technology, the elements of effective<br />

document c<strong>on</strong>trol are still evident.<br />

https://1drv.ms/f/s!AgjXpjEHTe0ej1ZlZxoQmNEbj3eG


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VF<br />

C<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong> Management C<strong>on</strong>trol<br />

C<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong> management is a management oversight activity for m<strong>on</strong>itoring and c<strong>on</strong>trolling changes to<br />

c<strong>on</strong>figured products, services, and systems. C<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong> management ensures that existing product, service,<br />

or system c<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong> is documented, traceable, and current (accurate) during its life cycle (series of stages<br />

or phases from beginning to end). C<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong> management includes planning, identificati<strong>on</strong> and tracking,<br />

change c<strong>on</strong>trol, history, archiving, and auditing. C<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong> management audits include auditing the<br />

c<strong>on</strong>figured documents to ensure they meet requirements and auditing the c<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong> management<br />

process/system to ensure it c<strong>on</strong>forms and is effective.


<strong>Part</strong> VF<br />

http://slideplayer.com/slide/5823154/<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


<strong>Part</strong> VF<br />

http://slideplayer.com/slide/5823154/<br />

https://www.youtube.com/embed/-xVXAIrZcZU<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


<strong>Part</strong> VF<br />

http://slideplayer.com/slide/5823154/<br />

https://www.youtube.com/embed/i2E1VDjmrXo<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VF<br />

A c<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong> management program includes a plan, procedures, identificati<strong>on</strong>, change c<strong>on</strong>trol, records, and<br />

audit processes, as described in the following list:<br />

1. Plan: A c<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong> plan should include activities to be implemented and goals to be achieved—such as<br />

XYZ product line will be put under c<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong> management c<strong>on</strong>trol, c<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong> management c<strong>on</strong>trol<br />

process will be expanded, suppliers will be provided training, or there will be change c<strong>on</strong>trol training for all<br />

administrative assistants, and so <strong>on</strong>.<br />

2. Procedures and guidelines: An organizati<strong>on</strong> may need guidelines for the selecti<strong>on</strong> of items to be<br />

c<strong>on</strong>figured, review frequency, distributi<strong>on</strong>, and c<strong>on</strong>tents and c<strong>on</strong>trol of c<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong> reports. Guidelines<br />

may be needed for establishing the baseline c<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong> to be c<strong>on</strong>trolled (what is needed to define the<br />

product, service, or system).<br />

3. Identificati<strong>on</strong> process: Items to be under c<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong> management c<strong>on</strong>trol should be identified, such as<br />

drawings, specificati<strong>on</strong>s, c<strong>on</strong>trol plans, and procedures. C<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>s for marking and numbering should<br />

be established.<br />

4. Change-c<strong>on</strong>trol process: There should be a change- c<strong>on</strong>trol procedure before and after the c<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong><br />

baseline is established.<br />

5. Records status process: There should be an established method for collecting, recording, processing,<br />

maintaining, archiving, and destroying c<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong> data.<br />

6. Audit process: Process or product audits may be used to audit the c<strong>on</strong>figured items and the c<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong><br />

management process.


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VF<br />

Audits can be used to verify that the c<strong>on</strong>figured product/service c<strong>on</strong>forms to specified characteristics<br />

product/service audit) and that the product/service can perform its intended functi<strong>on</strong>. Additi<strong>on</strong>ally, a process<br />

audit may be c<strong>on</strong>ducted <strong>on</strong> the c<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong> process itself.<br />

A c<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong> process audit should verify that the process is adequate, implemented, and maintained. Within<br />

c<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong> management c<strong>on</strong>trol, organizati<strong>on</strong>s should c<strong>on</strong>duct audits of the document c<strong>on</strong>trol system as<br />

they have d<strong>on</strong>e in the past. An auditor should verify the effectiveness of the document and record c<strong>on</strong>trol<br />

system by verifying all aspects of the procedures, policies, and practices.


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VF<br />

C<strong>on</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong><br />

Change c<strong>on</strong>trol includes product design (including hardware, software, and service), process design, project<br />

(including schedule), and the management system. The key principles of change c<strong>on</strong>trol are what was d<strong>on</strong>e,<br />

why, when, where, by whom, and how, and the result, including the impact of changes to other processes.<br />

C<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong> management is a key factor of change c<strong>on</strong>trol because any change could affect various<br />

processes and sub-processes and because it is necessary to have a good grasp of which process or part<br />

relates to which other process or part. C<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong> management is the basis for good process management.


C<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong> management (CM).<br />

Introducti<strong>on</strong>.<br />

CM applied over the life cycle of a system provides visibility and c<strong>on</strong>trol of its performance, functi<strong>on</strong>al, and physical attributes. CM verifies that a system performs as intended, and is identified and documented in sufficient detail to support its projected life cycle. The CM<br />

process facilitates orderly management of system informati<strong>on</strong> and system changes for such beneficial purposes as to revise capability; improve performance, reliability, or maintainability; extend life; reduce cost; reduce risk and liability; or correct defects. The relatively<br />

minimal cost of implementing CM is returned many fold in cost avoidance. The lack of CM, or its ineffectual implementati<strong>on</strong>, can be very expensive and sometimes can have such catastrophic c<strong>on</strong>sequences such as failure of equipment or loss of life.<br />

CM emphasizes the functi<strong>on</strong>al relati<strong>on</strong> between parts, subsystems, and systems for effectively c<strong>on</strong>trolling system change. It helps to verify that proposed changes are systematically c<strong>on</strong>sidered to minimize adverse effects. Changes to the system are proposed, evaluated,<br />

and implemented using a standardized, systematic approach that ensures c<strong>on</strong>sistency, and proposed changes are evaluated in terms of their anticipated impact <strong>on</strong> the entire system. CM verifies that changes are carried out as prescribed and that documentati<strong>on</strong> of items<br />

and systems reflects their true c<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong>. A complete CM program includes provisi<strong>on</strong>s for the storing, tracking, and updating of all system informati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> a comp<strong>on</strong>ent, subsystem, and system basis.[6]<br />

A structured CM program ensures that documentati<strong>on</strong> (e.g., requirements, design, test, and acceptance documentati<strong>on</strong>) for items is accurate and c<strong>on</strong>sistent with the actual physical design of the item. In many cases, without CM, the documentati<strong>on</strong> exists but is not<br />

c<strong>on</strong>sistent with the item itself. For this reas<strong>on</strong>, engineers, c<strong>on</strong>tractors, and management are frequently forced to develop documentati<strong>on</strong> reflecting the actual status of the item before they can proceed with a change. This reverse engineering process is wasteful in terms of<br />

human and other resources and can be minimized or eliminated using CM.<br />

History.<br />

C<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong> Management originated in the United States Department of Defense in the 1950s as a technical management discipline for hardware material items—and it is now a standard practice in virtually every industry. The CM process became its own technical<br />

discipline sometime in the late 1960s when the DoD developed a series of military standards called the "480 series" (i.e., MIL-STD-480, MIL-STD-481 and MIL-STD-483) that were subsequently issued in the 1970s. In 1991, the "480 series" was c<strong>on</strong>solidated into a single<br />

standard known as the MIL–STD–973 that was then replaced by MIL–HDBK–61 pursuant to a general DoD goal that reduced the number of military standards in favor of industry technical standards supported by standards developing organizati<strong>on</strong>s (SDO).[7] This marked<br />

the beginning of what has now evolved into the most widely distributed and accepted standard <strong>on</strong> CM, ANSI–EIA–649–1998.[8] Now widely adopted by numerous organizati<strong>on</strong>s and agencies, the CM discipline's c<strong>on</strong>cepts include systems engineering (SE), Integrated<br />

Logistics Support (ILS), Capability Maturity Model Integrati<strong>on</strong> (CMMI), ISO 9000, Prince2 project management method, COBIT, Informati<strong>on</strong> Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL), product lifecycle management, and Applicati<strong>on</strong> Lifecycle Management. Many of these<br />

functi<strong>on</strong>s and models have redefined CM from its traditi<strong>on</strong>al holistic approach to technical management. Some treat CM as being similar to a librarian activity, and break out change c<strong>on</strong>trol or change management as a separate or stand al<strong>on</strong>e discipline.<br />

Overview.<br />

CM is the practice of handling changes systematicall y so that a system maintains its integrity over time. CM implements the policies, procedures, techniques, and tools that manage, evaluate proposed changes, track the status of changes, and maintain an inventory of<br />

system and support documents as the system changes. CM programs and plans provide technical and administrative directi<strong>on</strong> to the development and implementati<strong>on</strong> of the procedures, functi<strong>on</strong>s, services, tools, processes, and resources required to successfully develop<br />

and support a complex system. During system development, CM allows program management to track requirements throughout the life-cycle through acceptance and operati<strong>on</strong>s and maintenance. As changes inevitably occur in the requirements and design, they must be<br />

approved and documented, creating an accurate record of the system status. Ideally the CM process is applied throughout the system lifecycle. Most professi<strong>on</strong>als mix up or get c<strong>on</strong>fused with Asset management (AM), where it inventories the assets <strong>on</strong> hand. The key<br />

difference between CM and AM is that the former does not manage the financial accounting aspect but <strong>on</strong> service that the system supports.<br />

The CM process for both hardware- and software-c<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong> items comprises five distinct disciplines as established in the MIL–HDBK–61A[9] and in ANSI/EIA-649. These disciplines are carried out[by whom?] as policies and procedures for establishing baselines and<br />

for performing a standard change-management process. The IEEE 12207 process IEEE 12207.2 also has these activities and adds "Release management and delivery".<br />

The five disciplines are:<br />

CM Planning and Management: a formal document and plan to guide the CM program that includes items such as:<br />

pers<strong>on</strong>nel<br />

resp<strong>on</strong>sibilities and resources<br />

training requirements<br />

administrative meeting guidelines, including a definiti<strong>on</strong> of procedures and tools<br />

baselining processes<br />

c<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>trol and c<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong>-status accounting<br />

naming c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>s<br />

audits and reviews<br />

subc<strong>on</strong>tractor/vendor CM requirements<br />

C<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong> Identificati<strong>on</strong> (CI): c<strong>on</strong>sists of setting and maintaining baselines, which define the system or subsystem architecture, comp<strong>on</strong>ents, and any developments at any point in time. It is the basis by which changes to any part of a system are identified, documented,<br />

and later tracked through design, development, testing, and final delivery. CI incrementally establishes and maintains the definitive current basis for C<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong> Status Accounting (CSA) of a system and its c<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong> items (CIs) throughout their lifecycle (development,<br />

producti<strong>on</strong>, deployment, and operati<strong>on</strong>al support) until disposal.<br />

C<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong> C<strong>on</strong>trol: includes the evaluati<strong>on</strong> of all change-requests and change-proposals, and their subsequent approval or disapproval. It covers the process of c<strong>on</strong>trolling modificati<strong>on</strong>s to the system's design, hardware, firmware, software, and documentati<strong>on</strong>.<br />

C<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong> Status Accounting: includes the process of recording and reporting c<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong> item descripti<strong>on</strong>s (e.g., hardware, software, firmware, etc.) and all departures from the baseline during design and producti<strong>on</strong>. In the event of suspected problems, the verificati<strong>on</strong><br />

of baseline c<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong> and approved modificati<strong>on</strong>s can be quickly determined.<br />

C<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong> Verificati<strong>on</strong> and Audit: an independent review of hardware and software for the purpose of assessing compliance with established performance requirements, commercial and appropriate military standards, and functi<strong>on</strong>al, allocated, and product baselines.<br />

C<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong> audits verify that the system and subsystem c<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong> documentati<strong>on</strong> complies with the functi<strong>on</strong>al and physical performance characteristics before acceptance into an architectural baseline.<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VF<br />

C<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong> management (CM)<br />

C<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong> management (CM) is a systems engineering process for establishing and maintaining c<strong>on</strong>sistency of a product's<br />

performance, functi<strong>on</strong>al, and physical attributes with its requirements, design, and operati<strong>on</strong>al informati<strong>on</strong> throughout its life. The<br />

CM process is widely used by military engineering organizati<strong>on</strong>s to manage changes throughout the system lifecycle of complex<br />

systems, such as weap<strong>on</strong> systems, military vehicles, and informati<strong>on</strong> systems. Outside the military, the CM process is also used<br />

with IT service management as defined by ITIL, and with other domain models in the civil engineering and other industrial<br />

engineering segments such as roads, bridges, canals, dams, and buildings.<br />

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/C<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong>_management<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


<strong>Part</strong> VF<br />

C<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong> Management (CM).<br />

originated in the United States Department of Defense in the 1950s as a technical management discipline for hardware material<br />

items—and it is now a standard practice in virtually every industry. The CM process became its own technical discipline sometime<br />

in the late 1960s when the DoD developed a series of military standards called the "480 series" (i.e., MIL-STD-480, MIL-STD-481<br />

and MIL-STD-483) that were subsequently issued in the 1970sa. In 1991, the "480 series" was c<strong>on</strong>solidated into a single standard<br />

known as the MIL–STD–973 that was then replaced by MIL–HDBK–61 pursuant to a general DoD goal that reduced the number<br />

of military standards in favor of industry technical standards supported by standards developing organizati<strong>on</strong>s (SDO).<br />

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/C<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong>_management<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


<strong>Part</strong> VF<br />

C<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong> Management (CM).<br />

originated in the United States Department of Defense in the 1950s as a technical management discipline for hardware material<br />

items—and it is now a standard practice in virtually every industry. The CM process became its own technical discipline sometime<br />

in the late 1960s when the DoD developed a series of military standards called the "480 series" (i.e., MIL-STD-480, MIL-STD-481<br />

and MIL-STD-483) that were subsequently issued in the 1970sa. In 1991, the "480 series" was c<strong>on</strong>solidated into a single standard<br />

known as the MIL–STD–973 that was then replaced by MIL–HDBK–61 pursuant to a general DoD goal that reduced the number<br />

of military standards in favor of industry technical standards supported by standards developing organizati<strong>on</strong>s (SDO).<br />

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/C<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong>_management<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


<strong>Part</strong> VF<br />

C<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong> Management (CM).<br />

originated in the United States Department of Defense in the 1950s as a technical management discipline for hardware material<br />

items—and it is now a standard practice in virtually every industry. The CM process became its own technical discipline sometime<br />

in the late 1960s when the DoD developed a series of military standards called the "480 series" (i.e., MIL-STD-480, MIL-STD-481<br />

and MIL-STD-483) that were subsequently issued in the 1970sa. In 1991, the "480 series" was c<strong>on</strong>solidated into a single standard<br />

known as the MIL–STD–973 that was then replaced by MIL–HDBK–61 pursuant to a general DoD goal that reduced the number<br />

of military standards in favor of industry technical standards supported by standards developing organizati<strong>on</strong>s (SDO).<br />

http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/nati<strong>on</strong>al-security/us-test-icbm-tensi<strong>on</strong>s-rise-north-korea-n788481<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VG<br />

Chapter 24<br />

Verificati<strong>on</strong> and Validati<strong>on</strong>/<strong>Part</strong> VG<br />

_____________________


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VG<br />

An audit is a systematic, independent, and documented process for obtaining audit evidence and evaluating it<br />

objectively to determine the extent to which audit criteria are fulfilled (ISO 19011:2011).<br />

Auditors collect evidence to ensure that requirements are being met. Auditors may verify and/or validate that<br />

requirements (audit criteria) are being met. In general, verificati<strong>on</strong> is checking or testing, and validati<strong>on</strong> is the<br />

actual performance of its intended use. The dicti<strong>on</strong>ary does not support the distincti<strong>on</strong> normally associated<br />

between verificati<strong>on</strong> and validati<strong>on</strong> in the management systems and system-process audit fields. However,<br />

definiti<strong>on</strong>s of these terms were used by the FDA in its GMP starting in the 1980s and were later incorporated<br />

into ISO 9000 series standards. Now we can reference the definiti<strong>on</strong>s of verificati<strong>on</strong> and validati<strong>on</strong> provided in<br />

ISO 9000:2005 and the design and development model outlined in ISO 9001:2008, clause 7.3.<br />

Verificati<strong>on</strong> should be performed to ensure that the system-process outputs have met the system-process<br />

requirements (audit criteria). Verificati<strong>on</strong> is the authenticati<strong>on</strong> of truth or accuracy by such means as facts,<br />

statements, citati<strong>on</strong>s, measurements, and c<strong>on</strong>firmati<strong>on</strong> by evidence.<br />

An element of verificati<strong>on</strong> is that it is independent or separate from the normal operati<strong>on</strong> of a process. The act<br />

of an auditor checking that the process or product c<strong>on</strong>forms to requirement is verificati<strong>on</strong> (as opposed to<br />

inspecti<strong>on</strong> checks). For example, ISO 9000:2005, clause 3.8.4 notes that verificati<strong>on</strong> activities include<br />

performing alternative calculati<strong>on</strong>s, comparing a new design specificati<strong>on</strong> to a similar proven design<br />

specificati<strong>on</strong>, undertaking tests and dem<strong>on</strong>strati<strong>on</strong>s, and reviewing documents prior to issue. The most<br />

comm<strong>on</strong> method of verificati<strong>on</strong> is the examinati<strong>on</strong> of documents and records. Records verify that a process or<br />

activity is being performed and the results recorded. Interviewing is another method of verifying that processes<br />

meet requirements through affirmati<strong>on</strong> by the interviewee.


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VG<br />

Techniques<br />

• Verify by examinati<strong>on</strong> of records, documents, or interviewing<br />

• Validate by observing or using the product or process Validati<strong>on</strong> should be performed to ensure that the<br />

system-process outputs are meeting the requirements for the specified applicati<strong>on</strong> or intended use.<br />

Validati<strong>on</strong> is the dem<strong>on</strong>strati<strong>on</strong> of the ability of the system-processes under investigati<strong>on</strong> to achieve planned<br />

results.<br />

According to ISO 9000:2005, clause 3.8.5, validati<strong>on</strong> is c<strong>on</strong>firmati<strong>on</strong>, through the provisi<strong>on</strong> of objective<br />

evidence, that the requirements for a specific intended use or applicati<strong>on</strong> have been fulfilled. Sometimes an<br />

activity cannot be verified by records or interviews, and the actual process must be observed as intended to be<br />

operated. The observati<strong>on</strong> can be the real process or a simulated <strong>on</strong>e. Some activities can <strong>on</strong>ly be verified; for<br />

example, it would be too costly or impractical to validate a process such as a plant shutdown or start-up or the<br />

use of emergency procedures. Sometimes products or activities are <strong>on</strong>ly verified because the product would be<br />

destroyed or the process ruined by validating it (such as checking the seal <strong>on</strong> a c<strong>on</strong>tainer). For example, an<br />

auditor may assume there is a requirement to post revisi<strong>on</strong> dates <strong>on</strong> revised documents. At the audit, he or she<br />

asks about this and is told the computer does it automatically. The auditor may want to validate this process by<br />

asking the document coordinator to make a change to a document and then see if the software program<br />

automatically posts today’s date.


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VG<br />

Process Auditing And Techniques<br />

One of the advantages of process-based management systems and using process auditing techniques is that<br />

the auditor follows al<strong>on</strong>g the process steps. In many cases an auditor is able to validate the audit criteria as<br />

opposed to just verifying them.


<strong>Part</strong> VG<br />

Process Auditing Techniques<br />

One of the advantages of process-based management systems and using process auditing techniques is that<br />

the auditor follows al<strong>on</strong>g the process steps. In many cases an auditor is able to validate the audit criteria as<br />

opposed to just verifying them.<br />

https://pt.slideshare.net/ignitetribes/process-related-mechanical-and-piping-workshop-by-technip<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VG<br />

Process Auditing Techniques<br />

One of the advantages of process-based management systems and using process auditing techniques is that<br />

the auditor follows al<strong>on</strong>g the process steps. In many cases an auditor is able to validate the audit criteria as<br />

opposed to just verifying them.


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

Chapter 25<br />

Risk Management Tools/<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

_____________________<br />

Risk has four main comp<strong>on</strong>ents:<br />

1. probability,<br />

2. hazard,<br />

3. exposure, and<br />

4. c<strong>on</strong>sequences.<br />

1. probability,<br />

2. exposure, and<br />

3. hazard,<br />

4. c<strong>on</strong>sequences.<br />

Probability<br />

C<strong>on</strong>sequences<br />

Ropeik and Gray define risk using these comp<strong>on</strong>ents as ―the probability that exposure to a hazard will lead to a<br />

negative c<strong>on</strong>sequence.‖ Other definiti<strong>on</strong>s look at risk as the combinati<strong>on</strong> of these comp<strong>on</strong>ents in some fashi<strong>on</strong><br />

or another, such as the mathematical, statistical expected value or a mathematical expressi<strong>on</strong> attempting to<br />

capture the essence of some, if not all, of the comp<strong>on</strong>ents. An example of the latter is the calculati<strong>on</strong> of risk<br />

numbers or risk priority numbers in Design/Process Failure Mode (and Criticality) Analyses (DFMEAs,<br />

PFMEAs, DFMECAs). These analysis methods also expand <strong>on</strong> the hazard comp<strong>on</strong>ent by introducing an<br />

evaluati<strong>on</strong> of how easily the failure mode can be detected or prevented—the idea being that something that<br />

cannot be easily prevented or detected will pose a higher level of risk than something that is more readily<br />

apparent.


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

Quantificati<strong>on</strong> Of Risk<br />

Assessment scales that assign numbers or weights in order to rank or prioritize comp<strong>on</strong>ents of risk are<br />

subjective and may cause c<strong>on</strong>fusi<strong>on</strong> and false c<strong>on</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong>s. A simple quantificati<strong>on</strong> approach is classificati<strong>on</strong> of<br />

the elements of risk by category, such as ―high,‖ ―medium,‖ or ―low,‖ and ―red,‖ ―yellow,‖ or ―green.‖ This may<br />

apply to risk assessments for disaster and recovery planning, financial plans, product development strategies,<br />

product and process design evaluati<strong>on</strong>s, product liability exposure, internal c<strong>on</strong>trols, envir<strong>on</strong>mental<br />

assessments, and producti<strong>on</strong> and quality systems. Evidence of such assessments can be used to dem<strong>on</strong>strate<br />

prudence and due care by establishing what risks were evaluated, how they were classified, and what was<br />

d<strong>on</strong>e to address or mitigate the effects. In general, elements of risk can be (1) designed out of a product or a<br />

process, (2) detected or the effects minimized, or if neither of these is feasible, then (3) warned against.2


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

The following are methods to identify, assess, and treat risks. Though the techniques were originally designed<br />

for specific purposes, they can all be used as a tool to manage risks. FMEA was designed to assess product<br />

risk, HACCP (hazard analysis and critical c<strong>on</strong>trol point) was developed to manage food safety hazards, and so<br />

<strong>on</strong>.


<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

Other reading:<br />

APPLICATION OF FIS<strong>HB</strong>ONE DIAGRAM TO DETERMINE THE RISK OF AN EVENT WITH MULTIPLE<br />

CAUSES<br />

Gheorghe ILIE 1, Carmen Nadia CIOCOIU 2 1 UTI Grup SRL, Soseaua Oltenitei no.107A, Bucharest,<br />

Romania, gheorghe.ilie@uti.ro 2 Academy of Ec<strong>on</strong>omic Studies, Piata Romana, 6, Bucharest, Romania,<br />

nadia.ciocoiu@man.ase.ro<br />

http://mrp.ase.ro/no21/f1.pdf<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

http://slideplayer.com/slide/6118604/18/images/18/Risk+Assessment+Matrix.jpg<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

IE2-Gossip<br />

Diligent And Using Due Care.<br />

A small company hired an outside firm to assist in a comprehensive<br />

assessment of regulatory, envir<strong>on</strong>mental, business, operati<strong>on</strong>al, and<br />

financial risks. The tools and techniques employed were way over<br />

the heads of the people involved, and the results were not acti<strong>on</strong>able.<br />

In frustrati<strong>on</strong>, they turned to a local c<strong>on</strong>sultant, who sat the<br />

principals and outside counsel around a table and quickly had them<br />

list c<strong>on</strong>cerns, issues, and the like <strong>on</strong> a whiteboard. He then distilled<br />

these down and put them into general classificati<strong>on</strong>s. Next, he had<br />

the group rate them in terms of ―high,‖ ―medium,‖ or ―low.‖ After<br />

that, they developed short, doable acti<strong>on</strong> plans, taking each group in<br />

order. Within a couple of sessi<strong>on</strong>s they had a real plan with assignments,<br />

dates, and review points. This was then shared with investors,<br />

insurance providers, local officials, and other parties. When later<br />

issues arose, the existence of the plan was used as evidence that the<br />

company was diligent and using due care.


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

Failure Mode And Effects Analysis<br />

Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) has been in use for many years and is used extensively in the<br />

automotive industry. FMEA is used for analyzing designs or processes for potential failure. Its aim is to reduce<br />

risk of failure. Therefore, there are two types in general use:<br />

• the DFMEA for analyzing potential design failures and<br />

• the PFMEA for analyzing potential process failures.<br />

For example, a small organizati<strong>on</strong> engaged in bidding for military c<strong>on</strong>tracts for high- tech devices successfully<br />

used an FMEA to identify and assess risks for a product never made before. The FMEA aided in evaluating<br />

design inputs, assured that potential failure modes were identified and addressed, provided for the<br />

identificati<strong>on</strong> of the failure modes’ root cause(s), determined the acti<strong>on</strong>s necessary to eliminate or reduce the<br />

potential failure mode, and added a high degree of objectivity to the design review process. The FMEA also<br />

directed attenti<strong>on</strong> to design features that required additi<strong>on</strong>al testing or development, documented risk reducti<strong>on</strong><br />

efforts, provided less<strong>on</strong>s-learned documentati<strong>on</strong> to aid future FMEAs, and assured that the design was<br />

performed with a customer focus.


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

The FMEA methodology is:<br />

1. Define the device design inputs or process functi<strong>on</strong>s and requirements<br />

2. Identify a failure mode (what could go wr<strong>on</strong>g) and the potential effects of the failure<br />

3. Rank the severity of the effects (using a 1–10 scale, where 1 is minor and 10 is major and without warning)<br />

4. Establish what the root cause(s) could be<br />

5. Rate the likelihood of occurrence for the failure using a 1–10 scale<br />

6. Document the present design or present process c<strong>on</strong>trols regarding preventi<strong>on</strong> and detecti<strong>on</strong><br />

7. Rate the likelihood of these c<strong>on</strong>trols—detecting the failure using a 1–10 scale<br />

8. Compute the risk priority number (RPN = severity × occurrence × detecti<strong>on</strong>)<br />

9. Recommend preventive/corrective acti<strong>on</strong> (what acti<strong>on</strong>, who will do it, when)<br />

—note that preventive acti<strong>on</strong> is listed first when dealing with the design stage and corrective acti<strong>on</strong> first if<br />

analyzing potential process failures<br />

10. Return to number 2 if other potential failures exist<br />

11. Build and test a prototype<br />

12. Redo the FMEA after test results are obtained and any necessary or desired changes are made<br />

13. Retest and, if acceptable, place in producti<strong>on</strong><br />

14. Document the FMEA process for the knowledge base


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

The collaborati<strong>on</strong> with employees who have been involved in design, development, producti<strong>on</strong>, and customer<br />

service activities is critical because their knowledge, ideas, and questi<strong>on</strong>s about a new product design will be<br />

based <strong>on</strong> their experience at different stages of product realizati<strong>on</strong>. Furthermore, if your employees are also<br />

some of your customers (end users), obtaining and documenting the employees’ experience is most useful.<br />

This experiential input, al<strong>on</strong>g with examinati<strong>on</strong>s of similar designs (and their FMEAs, n<strong>on</strong>c<strong>on</strong>forming product<br />

and corrective acti<strong>on</strong> records, and customer feedback reports), is often the best source for analysis input.<br />

Figure 25.1 shows a sample PFMEA.


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

Figure 25.1 C<strong>on</strong>sumer risk or Type II error.<br />

RPN = severity ×<br />

occurrence ×<br />

detecti<strong>on</strong>


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Failure_mode_and_effects_analysis<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA)<br />

<strong>on</strong>e of the first highly structured, systematic techniques for failure analysis. It was developed by reliability<br />

engineers in the late 1950s to study problems that might arise from malfuncti<strong>on</strong>s of military systems. A FMEA is<br />

often the first step of a system reliability study. It involves reviewing as many comp<strong>on</strong>ents, assemblies, and<br />

subsystems as possible to identify failure modes, and their causes and effects. For each comp<strong>on</strong>ent, the failure<br />

modes and their resulting effects <strong>on</strong> the rest of the system are recorded in a specific FMEA worksheet. There<br />

are numerous variati<strong>on</strong>s of such worksheets. A FMEA can be a qualitative analysis, but may be put <strong>on</strong> a<br />

quantitative basis when mathematical failure rate models are combined with a statistical failure mode ratio<br />

database. A few different types of FMEA analyses exist, such as:<br />

• Functi<strong>on</strong>al<br />

• Design<br />

• Process<br />

Sometimes FMEA is extended to FMECA (failure mode, effects, and criticality analysis) to indicate that criticality<br />

analysis is performed too.<br />

FMEA is an inductive reas<strong>on</strong>ing (forward logic) single point of failure analysis and is a core task in reliability<br />

engineering, safety engineering and quality engineering.<br />

A successful FMEA activity helps identify potential failure modes based <strong>on</strong> experience with similar products and<br />

processes—or based <strong>on</strong> comm<strong>on</strong> physics of failure logic. It is widely used in development and manufacturing<br />

industries in various phases of the product life cycle. Effects analysis refers to studying the c<strong>on</strong>sequences of<br />

those failures <strong>on</strong> different system levels.<br />

Functi<strong>on</strong>al analyses are needed as an input to determine correct failure modes, at all system levels, both for<br />

functi<strong>on</strong>al FMEA or Piece-<strong>Part</strong> (hardware) FMEA.


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Failure_mode_and_effects_analysis<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

An FMEA is used to structure Mitigati<strong>on</strong> for Risk reducti<strong>on</strong> based <strong>on</strong> either:<br />

• Failure (mode) effect severity reducti<strong>on</strong> or<br />

• Based <strong>on</strong> lowering the probability of failure or both.<br />

The FMEA is in principle a full inductive (forward logic) analysis, however the failure probability can <strong>on</strong>ly be<br />

estimated or reduced by understanding the failure mechanism. Hence, FMEA may include informati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong><br />

causes of failure (deductive analysis) to reduce the possibility of occurrence by eliminating identified (root)<br />

causes.


http://www.leanhospitals.pl/en/2017/12/21/analiza-fmea-w-szpitalu/<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

An FMEA Methodology<br />

http://www.leanhospitals.pl/en/2017/12/21/analiza-fmea-w-szpitalu/


https://www.slideshare.net/Anleitner/lts-2009-dfmea<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

An FMEA Methodology


<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

FMEA-Introducti<strong>on</strong>.<br />

The FME(C)A is a design tool used to systematically analyze postulated comp<strong>on</strong>ent failures and identify the<br />

resultant effects <strong>on</strong> system operati<strong>on</strong>s. The analysis is sometimes characterized as c<strong>on</strong>sisting of two subanalyses,<br />

the first being the failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), and the sec<strong>on</strong>d, the criticality analysis<br />

(CA). Successful development of an FMEA requires that the analyst include all significant failure modes for<br />

each c<strong>on</strong>tributing element or part in the system. FMEAs can be performed at the system, subsystem, assembly,<br />

subassembly or part level. The FMECA should be a living document during development of a hardware design.<br />

It should be scheduled and completed c<strong>on</strong>currently with the design. If completed in a timely manner, the<br />

FMECA can help guide design decisi<strong>on</strong>s. The usefulness of the FMECA as a design tool and in the decisi<strong>on</strong>making<br />

process is dependent <strong>on</strong> the effectiveness and timeliness with which design problems are identified.<br />

Timeliness is probably the most important c<strong>on</strong>siderati<strong>on</strong>. In the extreme case, the FMECA would be of little<br />

value to the design decisi<strong>on</strong> process if the analysis is performed after the hardware is built. While the FMECA<br />

identifies all part failure modes, its primary benefit is the early identificati<strong>on</strong> of all critical and catastrophic<br />

subsystem or system failure modes so they can be eliminated or minimized through design modificati<strong>on</strong> at the<br />

earliest point in the development effort; therefore, the FMECA should be performed at the system level as so<strong>on</strong><br />

as preliminary design informati<strong>on</strong> is available and extended to the lower levels as the detail design progresses.<br />

Remark: For more complete scenario modeling another type of Reliability analysis may be c<strong>on</strong>sidered, for<br />

example fault tree analysis (FTA); a deductive(backward logic) failure analysis that may handle multiple failures<br />

within the item and/or external to the item including maintenance and logistics. It starts at higher functi<strong>on</strong>al /<br />

system level. A FTA may use the basic failure mode FMEA records or an effect summary as <strong>on</strong>e of its inputs<br />

(the basic events). Interface hazard analysis, Human error analysis and others may be added for completi<strong>on</strong> in<br />

scenario modeling.<br />

Meanings:<br />

FTA-<br />

Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a top-down, deductive failure analysis in which an undesired state of a system is analyzed using Boolean logic to combine a series of lower-level events. This analysis method is mainly used<br />

in the fields of safety engineering and reliability engineering to understand how systems can fail, to identify the best ways to reduce risk or to determine (or get a feeling for) event rates of a safety accident or a particular<br />

system level (functi<strong>on</strong>al) failure. FTA is used in the aerospace,[1] nuclear power, chemical and process, pharmaceutical,[5] petrochemical and other high-hazard industries; but is also used in fields as diverse as risk<br />

factor identificati<strong>on</strong> relating to social service system failure. FTA is also used in software engineering for debugging purposes and is closely related to cause-eliminati<strong>on</strong> technique used to detect bugs.<br />

In aerospace, the more general term "system failure c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>" is used for the "undesired state" / top event of the fault tree. These c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s are classified by the severity of their effects. The most severe c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s<br />

require the most extensive fault tree analysis. These system failure c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s and their classificati<strong>on</strong> are often previously determined in the functi<strong>on</strong>al hazard analysis.<br />

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Failure_mode_and_effects_analysis<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

Functi<strong>on</strong>al analysis.<br />

The analysis may be performed at the functi<strong>on</strong>al level until the design has matured sufficiently to identify<br />

specific hardware that will perform the functi<strong>on</strong>s; then the analysis should be extended to the hardware level.<br />

When performing the hardware level FMECA, interfacing hardware is c<strong>on</strong>sidered to be operating within<br />

specificati<strong>on</strong>. In additi<strong>on</strong>, each part failure postulated is c<strong>on</strong>sidered to be the <strong>on</strong>ly failure in the system (i.e., it is<br />

a single failure analysis). In additi<strong>on</strong> to the FMEAs d<strong>on</strong>e <strong>on</strong> systems to evaluate the impact lower level failures<br />

have <strong>on</strong> system operati<strong>on</strong>, several other FMEAs are d<strong>on</strong>e. Special attenti<strong>on</strong> is paid to interfaces between<br />

systems and in fact at all functi<strong>on</strong>al interfaces. The purpose of these FMEAs is to assure that irreversible<br />

physical and/or functi<strong>on</strong>al damage is not propagated across the interface as a result of failures in <strong>on</strong>e of the<br />

interfacing units. These analyses are d<strong>on</strong>e to the piece part level for the circuits that directly interface with the<br />

other units. The FMEA can be accomplished without a CA, but a CA requires that the FMEA has previously<br />

identified system level’s critical failures. When both steps are d<strong>on</strong>e, the total process is called a FMECA.<br />

Ground rules<br />

The ground rules of each FMEA include a set of project selected procedures; the assumpti<strong>on</strong>s <strong>on</strong> which the<br />

analysis is based; the hardware that has been included and excluded from the analysis and the rati<strong>on</strong>ale for the<br />

exclusi<strong>on</strong>s. The ground rules also describe the indenture level of the analysis, the basic hardware status, and<br />

the criteria for system and missi<strong>on</strong> success. Every effort should be made to define all ground rules before the<br />

FMEA begins; however, the ground rules may be expanded and clarified as the analysis proceeds. A typical set<br />

of ground rules (assumpti<strong>on</strong>s) follows:<br />

• Only <strong>on</strong>e failure mode exists at a time.<br />

• All inputs (including software commands) to the item being analyzed are present and at nominal values.<br />

• All c<strong>on</strong>sumables are present in sufficient quantities.<br />

• Nominal power is available<br />

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Failure_mode_and_effects_analysis<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

Benefits<br />

Major benefits derived from a properly implemented FMECA effort are as follows:<br />

1. It provides a documented method for selecting a design with a high probability of successful operati<strong>on</strong> and<br />

safety.<br />

2. A documented uniform method of assessing potential failure mechanisms, failure modes and their impact<br />

<strong>on</strong> system operati<strong>on</strong>, resulting in a list of failure modes ranked according to the seriousness of their system<br />

impact and likelihood of occurrence.<br />

3. Early identificati<strong>on</strong> of single failure points (SFPS) and system interface problems, which may be critical to<br />

missi<strong>on</strong> success and/or safety. They also provide a method of verifying that switching between redundant<br />

elements is not jeopardized by postulated single failures.<br />

4. An effective method for evaluating the effect of proposed changes to the design and/or operati<strong>on</strong>al<br />

procedures <strong>on</strong> missi<strong>on</strong> success and safety.<br />

5. A basis for in-flight troubleshooting procedures and for locating performance m<strong>on</strong>itoring and fault-detecti<strong>on</strong><br />

devices.<br />

6. Criteria for early planning of tests.<br />

From the above list, early identificati<strong>on</strong>s of SFPS, input to the troubleshooting procedure and locating of<br />

performance m<strong>on</strong>itoring / fault detecti<strong>on</strong> devices are probably the most important benefits of the FMECA. In<br />

additi<strong>on</strong>, the FMECA procedures are straightforward and allow orderly evaluati<strong>on</strong> of the design.<br />

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Failure_mode_and_effects_analysis<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Failure_mode_and_effects_analysis<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

History<br />

Procedures for c<strong>on</strong>ducting FMECA were described in US Armed Forces Military Procedures document MIL-P-<br />

1629 (1949); revised in 1980 as MIL-STD-1629A. By the early 1960s, c<strong>on</strong>tractors for the U.S. Nati<strong>on</strong>al<br />

Aer<strong>on</strong>autics and Space Administrati<strong>on</strong> (NASA) were using variati<strong>on</strong>s of FMECA or FMEA under a variety of<br />

names. NASA programs using FMEA variants included Apollo, Viking, Voyager, Magellan, Galileo, and Skylab.<br />

The civil aviati<strong>on</strong> industry was an early adopter of FMEA, with the Society for Automotive Engineers (SAE)<br />

publishing ARP926 in 1967. After two revisi<strong>on</strong>s, ARP926 has been replaced by ARP4761, which is now broadly<br />

used in civil aviati<strong>on</strong>.<br />

During the 1970s, use of FMEA and related techniques spread to other industries. In 1971 NASA prepared a<br />

report for the U.S. Geological Survey recommending the use of FMEA in assessment of offshore petroleum<br />

explorati<strong>on</strong>. A 1973 U.S. Envir<strong>on</strong>mental Protecti<strong>on</strong> Agency report described the applicati<strong>on</strong> of FMEA to<br />

wastewater treatment plants. FMEA as applicati<strong>on</strong> for HACCP <strong>on</strong> the Apollo Space Program moved into<br />

the food industry in general.<br />

The automotive industry began to use FMEA by the mid 1970s. The Ford Motor Company introduced FMEA to<br />

the automotive industry for safety and regulatory c<strong>on</strong>siderati<strong>on</strong> after the Pinto affair. Ford applied the same<br />

approach to processes (PFMEA) to c<strong>on</strong>sider potential process induced failures prior to launching producti<strong>on</strong>. In<br />

1993 the Automotive Industry Acti<strong>on</strong> Group (AIAG) first published an FMEA standard for the automotive<br />

industry. It is now in its fourth editi<strong>on</strong>. The SAE first published related standard J1739 in 1994. This standard is<br />

also now in its fourth editi<strong>on</strong>.


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Failure_mode_and_effects_analysis<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

Although initially developed by the military, FMEA methodology is now extensively used in a variety of<br />

industries including semic<strong>on</strong>ductor processing, food service, plastics, software, and healthcare. Toyota has<br />

taken this <strong>on</strong>e step further with its Design Review Based <strong>on</strong> Failure Mode (DRBFM) approach. The method is<br />

now supported by the American Society for Quality which provides detailed guides <strong>on</strong> applying the method. The<br />

standard Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis<br />

(FMECA) procedures identify the product failure mechanisms, but may not model them without specialized<br />

software. This limits their applicability to provide a meaningful input to critical procedures such as virtual<br />

qualificati<strong>on</strong>, root cause analysis, accelerated test programs, and to remaining life assessment. To overcome<br />

the shortcomings of FMEA and FMECA, a Failure Modes, Mechanisms and Effect Analysis (FMMEA) has often<br />

been used.


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Failure_mode_and_effects_analysis<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

Basic terms<br />

The following covers some basic FMEA terminology.<br />

• Failure<br />

The loss of a functi<strong>on</strong> under stated c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s.<br />

• Failure mode<br />

The specific manner or way by which a failure occurs in terms of failure of the item (being a part or (sub)<br />

system) functi<strong>on</strong> under investigati<strong>on</strong>; it may generally describe the way the failure occurs. It shall at least<br />

clearly describe a (end) failure state of the item (or functi<strong>on</strong> in case of a Functi<strong>on</strong>al FMEA) under<br />

c<strong>on</strong>siderati<strong>on</strong>. It is the result of the failure mechanism (cause of the failure mode). For example; a fully<br />

fractured axle, a deformed axle or a fully open or fully closed electrical c<strong>on</strong>tact are each a separate failure<br />

mode of a DFMEA, they would not be failure modes of a PFMEA. Here you examine your process, so<br />

process step x - insert drill bit, the failure mode would be insert wr<strong>on</strong>g drill bit, the effect of this is too big a<br />

hole or too small a hole.<br />

• Failure cause and/or mechanism<br />

Defects in requirements, design, process, quality c<strong>on</strong>trol, handling or part applicati<strong>on</strong>, which are the<br />

underlying cause or sequence of causes that initiate a process (mechanism) that leads to a failure mode<br />

over a certain time. A failure mode may have more causes. For example; "fatigue or corrosi<strong>on</strong> of a structural<br />

beam" or "fretting corrosi<strong>on</strong> in an electrical c<strong>on</strong>tact" is a failure mechanism and in itself (likely) not a failure<br />

mode. The related failure mode (end state) is a "full fracture of structural beam" or "an open electrical<br />

c<strong>on</strong>tact". The initial cause might have been "Improper applicati<strong>on</strong> of corrosi<strong>on</strong> protecti<strong>on</strong> layer (paint)" and<br />

/or "(abnormal) vibrati<strong>on</strong> input from another (possibly failed) system".<br />

• Failure effect<br />

Immediate c<strong>on</strong>sequences of a failure <strong>on</strong> operati<strong>on</strong>, functi<strong>on</strong> or functi<strong>on</strong>ality, or status of some item.<br />

• Indenture levels (bill of material or functi<strong>on</strong>al breakdown)<br />

An identifier for system level and thereby item complexity. Complexity increases as levels are closer to <strong>on</strong>e.


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Failure_mode_and_effects_analysis<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

• Local effect<br />

The failure effect as it applies to the item under analysis.<br />

• Next higher level effect<br />

The failure effect as it applies at the next higher indenture level.<br />

• End effect<br />

The failure effect at the highest indenture level or total system.<br />

• Detecti<strong>on</strong><br />

The means of detecti<strong>on</strong> of the failure mode by maintainer, operator or built in detecti<strong>on</strong> system, including<br />

estimated dormancy period (if applicable)<br />

• Probability<br />

The likelihood of the failure occurring.<br />

• Risk Priority Number (RPN)<br />

Severity (of the event) x Probability (of the event occurring) x Detecti<strong>on</strong> (Probability that the event would not<br />

be detected before the user was aware of it)<br />

• Severity<br />

The c<strong>on</strong>sequences of a failure mode. Severity c<strong>on</strong>siders the worst potential c<strong>on</strong>sequence of a failure,<br />

determined by the degree of injury, property damage, system damage and/or time lost to repair the failure.<br />

• Remarks / mitigati<strong>on</strong> / acti<strong>on</strong>s<br />

Additi<strong>on</strong>al info, including the proposed mitigati<strong>on</strong> or acti<strong>on</strong>s used to lower a risk or justify a risk level or<br />

scenario.


<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

Example of FMEA worksheet<br />

Ref. Item Potential<br />

failure<br />

mode<br />

1.1.1.1 Brake<br />

Manifold<br />

Ref.<br />

Designat<br />

or 2b,<br />

channel<br />

A, O-ring<br />

Internal<br />

Leakage<br />

from<br />

Channel<br />

A to B<br />

Potential<br />

cause(s)<br />

/<br />

mechani<br />

sm<br />

a) O-ring<br />

Compres<br />

si<strong>on</strong> Set<br />

(Creep)<br />

failure b)<br />

surface<br />

damage<br />

during<br />

assembl<br />

y<br />

Missi<strong>on</strong><br />

Phase<br />

Local<br />

effects of<br />

failure<br />

Landing Decreas<br />

ed<br />

pressure<br />

to main<br />

brake<br />

hose<br />

Next<br />

higher<br />

level<br />

effect<br />

No Left<br />

Wheel<br />

Braking<br />

System<br />

Level<br />

End<br />

Effect<br />

Severely<br />

Reduced<br />

Aircraft<br />

decelerat<br />

i<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong><br />

ground<br />

and side<br />

drift.<br />

<strong>Part</strong>ial<br />

loss of<br />

runway<br />

positi<strong>on</strong><br />

c<strong>on</strong>trol.<br />

Risk of<br />

collisi<strong>on</strong><br />

(P)<br />

Probabili<br />

ty<br />

(estimate<br />

)<br />

(C)<br />

Occasio<br />

nal<br />

(S)<br />

Severity<br />

(V)<br />

Catastro<br />

phic (this<br />

is the<br />

worst<br />

case)<br />

(D)<br />

Detectio<br />

n<br />

(Indicatio<br />

ns to<br />

Operator<br />

,<br />

Maintain<br />

er)<br />

(1) Flight<br />

Compute<br />

r and<br />

Maintena<br />

nce<br />

Compute<br />

r will<br />

indicate<br />

"Left<br />

Main<br />

Brake,<br />

Pressure<br />

Low"<br />

Detectio<br />

n<br />

Dormanc<br />

y Period<br />

Built-In<br />

Test<br />

interval<br />

is 1<br />

minute<br />

Risk<br />

Level<br />

P*S (+D)<br />

Unaccep<br />

table<br />

Acti<strong>on</strong>s<br />

for<br />

further<br />

Investiga<br />

ti<strong>on</strong> /<br />

evidence<br />

Check<br />

Dormanc<br />

y Period<br />

and<br />

probabilit<br />

y of<br />

failure<br />

Mitigatio<br />

n /<br />

Require<br />

ments<br />

Require<br />

redunda<br />

nt<br />

independ<br />

ent<br />

brake<br />

hydraulic<br />

channels<br />

and/or<br />

Require<br />

redunda<br />

nt<br />

sealing<br />

and<br />

Classify<br />

O-ring as<br />

Critical<br />

<strong>Part</strong><br />

Class 1<br />

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Failure_mode_and_effects_analysis<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

Probability (P)<br />

It is necessary to look at the cause of a failure mode and the likelihood of occurrence. This can be d<strong>on</strong>e by<br />

analysis, calculati<strong>on</strong>s / FEM, looking at similar items or processes and the failure modes that have been<br />

documented for them in the past. A failure cause is looked up<strong>on</strong> as a design weakness. All the potential causes<br />

for a failure mode should be identified and documented. This should be in technical terms. Examples of causes<br />

are: Human errors in handling, Manufacturing induced faults, Fatigue, Creep, Abrasive wear, err<strong>on</strong>eous<br />

algorithms, excessive voltage or improper operating c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s or use (depending <strong>on</strong> the used ground rules). A<br />

failure mode is given a Probability Ranking.<br />

A<br />

B<br />

C<br />

D<br />

E<br />

Rating<br />

Meaning<br />

Extremely Unlikely (Virtually impossible or<br />

No known occurrences <strong>on</strong> similar products or<br />

processes, with many running hours)<br />

Remote (relatively few failures)<br />

Occasi<strong>on</strong>al (occasi<strong>on</strong>al failures)<br />

Reas<strong>on</strong>ably Possible (repeated failures)<br />

Frequent (failure is almost inevitable)<br />

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Failure_mode_and_effects_analysis<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

Severity (S)<br />

Determine the Severity for the worst-case scenario adverse end effect (state). It is c<strong>on</strong>venient to write these<br />

effects down in terms of what the user might see or experience in terms of functi<strong>on</strong>al failures. Examples of<br />

these end effects are: full loss of functi<strong>on</strong> x, degraded performance, functi<strong>on</strong>s in reversed mode, too late<br />

functi<strong>on</strong>ing, erratic functi<strong>on</strong>ing, etc. Each end effect is given a Severity number (S) from, say, I (no effect) to V<br />

(catastrophic), based <strong>on</strong> cost and/or loss of life or quality of life. These numbers prioritize the failure modes<br />

(together with probability and detectability). Below a typical classificati<strong>on</strong> is given. Other classificati<strong>on</strong>s are<br />

possible. See also hazard analysis.<br />

Rating<br />

Meaning<br />

I<br />

II<br />

III<br />

IV<br />

V<br />

No relevant effect <strong>on</strong> reliability or safety<br />

Very minor, no damage, no injuries, <strong>on</strong>ly results in a maintenance acti<strong>on</strong> (<strong>on</strong>ly noticed by discriminating<br />

customers)<br />

Minor, low damage, light injuries (affects very little of the system, noticed by average customer)<br />

Critical (causes a loss of primary functi<strong>on</strong>; Loss of all safety Margins, 1 failure away from a catastrophe, severe<br />

damage, severe injuries, max 1 possible death )<br />

Catastrophic (product becomes inoperative; the failure may result in complete unsafe operati<strong>on</strong> and possible<br />

multiple deaths)<br />

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Failure_mode_and_effects_analysis<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

Detecti<strong>on</strong> (D)<br />

The means or method by which a failure is detected, isolated by operator and/or maintainer and the time it may<br />

take. This is important for maintainability c<strong>on</strong>trol (availability of the system) and it is especially important for<br />

multiple failure scenarios. This may involve dormant failure modes (e.g. No direct system effect, while a<br />

redundant system / item automatically takes over or when the failure <strong>on</strong>ly is problematic during specific missi<strong>on</strong><br />

or system states) or latent failures (e.g. deteriorati<strong>on</strong> failure mechanisms, like a metal growing crack, but not a<br />

critical length). It should be made clear how the failure mode or cause can be discovered by an operator under<br />

normal system operati<strong>on</strong> or if it can be discovered by the maintenance crew by some diagnostic acti<strong>on</strong> or<br />

automatic built in system test. A dormancy and/or latency period may be entered.<br />

Rating<br />

Meaning<br />

1 Certain – fault will be caught <strong>on</strong> test - e.g. Poke-Yoke<br />

2 Almost certain<br />

3 High<br />

4 Moderate<br />

5 Low<br />

6 Fault is undetected by Operators or Maintainers<br />

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Failure_mode_and_effects_analysis<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

Dormancy or Latency Period<br />

The average time that a failure mode may be undetected may be entered if known. For example:<br />

• Sec<strong>on</strong>ds, auto detected by maintenance computer<br />

• 8 hours, detected by turn-around inspecti<strong>on</strong><br />

• 2 m<strong>on</strong>ths, detected by scheduled maintenance block X<br />

• 2 years, detected by overhaul task x<br />

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Failure_mode_and_effects_analysis<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

Indicati<strong>on</strong><br />

If the undetected failure allows the system to remain in a safe / working state, a sec<strong>on</strong>d failure situati<strong>on</strong> should<br />

be explored to determine whether or not an indicati<strong>on</strong> will be evident to all operators and what corrective acti<strong>on</strong><br />

they may or should take.<br />

Indicati<strong>on</strong>s to the operator should be described as follows:<br />

• Normal. An indicati<strong>on</strong> that is evident to an operator when the system or equipment is operating normally.<br />

• Abnormal. An indicati<strong>on</strong> that is evident to an operator when the system has malfuncti<strong>on</strong>ed or failed.<br />

• Incorrect. An err<strong>on</strong>eous indicati<strong>on</strong> to an operator due to the malfuncti<strong>on</strong> or failure of an indicator (i.e.,<br />

instruments, sensing devices, visual or audible warning devices, etc.).<br />

PERFORM DETECTION COVERAGE ANALYSIS FOR TEST PROCESSES AND MONITORING (From<br />

ARP4761 Standard):<br />

This type of analysis is useful to determine how effective various test processes are at the detecti<strong>on</strong> of latent<br />

and dormant faults. The method used to accomplish this involves an examinati<strong>on</strong> of the applicable failure<br />

modes to determine whether or not their effects are detected, and to determine the percentage of failure rate<br />

applicable to the failure modes which are detected. The possibility that the detecti<strong>on</strong> means may itself fail<br />

latently should be accounted for in the coverage analysis as a limiting factor (i.e., coverage cannot be more<br />

reliable than the detecti<strong>on</strong> means availability). Inclusi<strong>on</strong> of the detecti<strong>on</strong> coverage in the FMEA can lead to each<br />

individual failure that would have been <strong>on</strong>e effect category now being a separate effect category due to the<br />

detecti<strong>on</strong> coverage possibilities. Another way to include detecti<strong>on</strong> coverage is for the FTA to c<strong>on</strong>servatively<br />

assume that no holes in coverage due to latent failure in the detecti<strong>on</strong> method affect detecti<strong>on</strong> of all failures<br />

assigned to the failure effect category of c<strong>on</strong>cern. The FMEA can be revised if necessary for those cases where<br />

this c<strong>on</strong>servative assumpti<strong>on</strong> does not allow the top event probability requirements to be met.<br />

After these three basic steps the Risk level may be provided.<br />

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Failure_mode_and_effects_analysis<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

Risk level (P*S) and (D)<br />

Risk is the combinati<strong>on</strong> of End Effect Probability And Severity where probability and severity includes the<br />

effect <strong>on</strong> n<strong>on</strong>-detectability (dormancy time). This may influence the end effect probability of failure or the worst<br />

case effect Severity. The exact calculati<strong>on</strong> may not be easy in all cases, such as those where multiple<br />

scenarios (with multiple events) are possible and detectability / dormancy plays a crucial role (as for redundant<br />

systems). In that case Fault Tree Analysis and/or Event Trees may be needed to determine exact probability<br />

and risk levels.<br />

Preliminary Risk levels can be selected based <strong>on</strong> a Risk Matrix like shown below, based <strong>on</strong> Mil. Std.<br />

882. [24] The higher the Risk level, the more justificati<strong>on</strong> and mitigati<strong>on</strong> is needed to provide evidence and lower<br />

the risk to an acceptable level. High risk should be indicated to higher level management, who are resp<strong>on</strong>sible<br />

for final decisi<strong>on</strong>-making.<br />

Probability<br />

Severity<br />

I II III IV V VI<br />

A Low Low Low Low Moderate High<br />

B Low Low Low Moderate High Unacceptable<br />

C Low Low Moderate Moderate High Unacceptable<br />

D Low Moderate Moderate High Unacceptable Unacceptable<br />

E Moderate Moderate High Unacceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable<br />

After this step the FMEA has become like a FMECA<br />

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Failure_mode_and_effects_analysis<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

Timing<br />

The FMEA should be updated whenever:<br />

• A new cycle begins (new product/process)<br />

• Changes are made to the operating c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s<br />

• A change is made in the design<br />

• New regulati<strong>on</strong>s are instituted<br />

• Customer feedback indicates a problem<br />

Uses<br />

• Development of system requirements that minimize the likelihood of failures.<br />

• Development of designs and test systems to ensure that the failures have been eliminated or the risk is<br />

reduced to acceptable level.<br />

• Development and evaluati<strong>on</strong> of diagnostic systems<br />

• To help with design choices (trade-off analysis).<br />

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Failure_mode_and_effects_analysis<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

Advantages<br />

• Catalyst for teamwork and idea exchange between functi<strong>on</strong>s<br />

• Collect informati<strong>on</strong> to reduce future failures, capture engineering knowledge<br />

• Early identificati<strong>on</strong> and eliminati<strong>on</strong> of potential failure modes<br />

• Emphasize problem preventi<strong>on</strong><br />

• Improve company image and competitiveness<br />

• Improve producti<strong>on</strong> yield<br />

• Improve the quality, reliability, and safety of a product/process<br />

• Increase user satisfacti<strong>on</strong><br />

• Maximize profit<br />

• Minimize late changes and associated cost<br />

• Reduce impact <strong>on</strong> company profit margin<br />

• Reduce system development time and cost<br />

• Reduce the possibility of same kind of failure in future<br />

• Reduce the potential for warranty c<strong>on</strong>cerns<br />

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Failure_mode_and_effects_analysis<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

Limitati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />

While FMEA identifies important hazards in a system, its results may not be comprehensive and the approach<br />

has limitati<strong>on</strong>s. In the healthcare c<strong>on</strong>text, FMEA and other risk assessment methods, including SWIFT<br />

(Structured What If Technique) and retrospective approaches, have been found to have limited validity when<br />

used in isolati<strong>on</strong>. Challenges around scoping and organisati<strong>on</strong>al boundaries appear to be a major factor in this<br />

lack of validity.<br />

If used as a top-down tool, FMEA may <strong>on</strong>ly identify major failure modes in a system. Fault tree analysis (FTA) is<br />

better suited for "top-down" analysis. When used as a "bottom-up" tool FMEA can augment or complement FTA<br />

and identify many more causes and failure modes resulting in top-level symptoms. It is not able to discover<br />

complex failure modes involving multiple failures within a subsystem, or to report expected failure intervals of<br />

particular failure modes up to the upper level subsystem or system.<br />

Additi<strong>on</strong>ally, the multiplicati<strong>on</strong> of the severity, occurrence and detecti<strong>on</strong> rankings may result in rank reversals,<br />

where a less serious failure mode receives a higher RPN than a more serious failure mode. The reas<strong>on</strong> for this<br />

is that the rankings are ordinal scale numbers, and multiplicati<strong>on</strong> is not defined for ordinal numbers. The ordinal<br />

rankings <strong>on</strong>ly say that <strong>on</strong>e ranking is better or worse than another, but not by how much. For instance, a<br />

ranking of "2" may not be twice as severe as a ranking of "1," or an "8" may not be twice as severe as a "4," but<br />

multiplicati<strong>on</strong> treats them as though they are. See Level of measurement for further discussi<strong>on</strong>. Various<br />

soluti<strong>on</strong>s to this problems have been proposed, e.g., the use of fuzzy logic as an alternative to classic RPN<br />

model<br />

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Failure_mode_and_effects_analysis<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

Process FMEA can be challenging for participants who have not completed many PFMEAS, often c<strong>on</strong>fusing<br />

FAILURE MODES with EFFECTS and CAUSES. To clarify, a Process FMEA shows how the process can go<br />

wr<strong>on</strong>g. Using a detailed Process Map will aid the pers<strong>on</strong> filling in the worksheet to correctly list the steps of the<br />

process being reviewed. The FAILURE MODE is then simply how that step can go wr<strong>on</strong>g.<br />

Example, Process Step 1. Pick Up right handed part. Can they pick up the wr<strong>on</strong>g part? (some manufacturing<br />

centers have left and right handed parts etc.) FAILURE MODE put left hand part in, EFFECT could be wrecked<br />

CNC machine and scrapped part, or hole drilled in wr<strong>on</strong>g locati<strong>on</strong>. The cause, keeping inventory of similar parts<br />

at the job. Why is it important to do a PFMEA with regard to the process? When a process is examined or if we<br />

ask what can go wr<strong>on</strong>g with the process unknown issues are uncovered, solving problems before they occur<br />

and tackling root cause issues or at least 2 Y's deep <strong>on</strong> a 5 Y. Here the manufacturing engineer could possibly<br />

poke yoke the tooling to prevent a left handed part in the fixture when running the right handed parts or<br />

program a touch off probe in the CNC programming - all before ever making the mistake the first time. If a<br />

PFMEA is set up where the FAILURE MODE relates to the feature <strong>on</strong> the print, example FAILURE MODE<br />

drilled hole too big - no further understanding of what caused the problem is gained.<br />

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Failure_mode_and_effects_analysis<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

Numerous PFMEA's have been examined and show that little to no value is gained when reviewing features off<br />

of a print as FAILURE MODES - little understanding of the cause is gained. New PFMEA practiti<strong>on</strong>ers often try<br />

to relate the PFMEA FAILURE MODE to the FEATURE, numerous authors list this as trying to inspect in quality<br />

rather than listing the process step determining how it can go wr<strong>on</strong>g and building in quality through root cause<br />

evaluati<strong>on</strong>.<br />

Besides, two shortcomings are:<br />

1. complexity of the FMEA worksheet;<br />

2. intricacy of its use. Entries in an FMEA worksheet are voluminous.<br />

The FMEA worksheet is hard to produce, hard to understand and read, as well as hard to maintain. The use of<br />

neural network techniques to cluster and visualize failure modes were suggested, recently.<br />

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Failure_mode_and_effects_analysis<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

Types<br />

• Functi<strong>on</strong>al: before design soluti<strong>on</strong>s are provided (or <strong>on</strong>ly <strong>on</strong> high level) functi<strong>on</strong>s can be evaluated <strong>on</strong><br />

potential functi<strong>on</strong>al failure effects. General Mitigati<strong>on</strong>s ("design to" requirements) can be proposed to limit<br />

c<strong>on</strong>sequence of functi<strong>on</strong>al failures or limit the probability of occurrence in this early development. It is based<br />

<strong>on</strong> a functi<strong>on</strong>al breakdown of a system. This type may also be used for Software evaluati<strong>on</strong>.<br />

• C<strong>on</strong>cept Design / Hardware: analysis of systems or subsystems in the early design c<strong>on</strong>cept stages to<br />

analyse the failure mechanisms and lower level functi<strong>on</strong>al failures, specially to different c<strong>on</strong>cept soluti<strong>on</strong>s in<br />

more detail. It may be used in trade-off studies.<br />

• Detailed Design / Hardware: analysis of products prior to producti<strong>on</strong>. These are the most detailed (in mil<br />

1629 called Piece-<strong>Part</strong> or Hardware FMEA) FMEAs and used to identify any possible hardware (or other)<br />

failure mode up to the lowest part level. It should be based <strong>on</strong> hardware breakdown (e.g. the BoM = Bill of<br />

Material). Any Failure effect Severity, failure Preventi<strong>on</strong> (Mitigati<strong>on</strong>), Failure Detecti<strong>on</strong> and Diagnostics may<br />

be fully analyzed in this FMEA.<br />

• Process: analysis of manufacturing and assembly processes. Both quality and reliability may be affected<br />

from process faults. The input for this FMEA is am<strong>on</strong>gst others a work process / task Breakdown.<br />

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Failure_mode_and_effects_analysis<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

Missi<strong>on</strong> Success


<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

Missi<strong>on</strong> Failure.<br />

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deepwater_Horiz<strong>on</strong>_oil_spill<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

FMEA<br />

https://www.youtube.com/embed/QBFRuXo88ic<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

Critical to Quality, CTQ<br />

In the realm of Six Sigma methodology, there is a tool for displaying the causal relati<strong>on</strong>ship am<strong>on</strong>g the key<br />

business indicators (labeled as Y), the critical- to-quality (CTQ) process outputs (labeled y) that directly affect<br />

the Ys, and the causal factors that affect the process outputs (labeled as x). For example: One key business<br />

indicator (an outcome, a dependent variable) is customer retenti<strong>on</strong> (Y). CTQ outputs are services delivered <strong>on</strong><br />

time (y), services delivered correctly (y), and customer satisfied (y). Factors affecting outputs (independent<br />

variables) are scheduling/ dispatch system (x); training of service pers<strong>on</strong>nel (x); supplies, vehicles, tools, and<br />

equipment (x); and time to complete service properly (x). See the relati<strong>on</strong>ship of x to y and y to Y in Figure 25.2.<br />

The selecting of the key metrics to be included in the balanced scorecard is illustrative of how key indicators<br />

are established. The top- level metrics of the scorecard (typically four) are the <strong>on</strong>es executives use to make<br />

their decisi<strong>on</strong>s. Each of these top- level metrics (dependent variables) is backed up by metrics <strong>on</strong> independent<br />

variables, usually available through computer access. Thus if the marketing vice president wants to know the<br />

cause for a negative trend in the customer metric of the scorecard, the vice president can drill down to the<br />

variable affecting the negative trend.


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

Figure 25.2 Causal relati<strong>on</strong>ship in developing key process measurements.


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

HACCP<br />

Hazard analysis and critical c<strong>on</strong>trol point (HACCP) is an effective tool to prevent food from being c<strong>on</strong>taminated.<br />

HACCP is not a new c<strong>on</strong>cept. The Pillsbury Co. developed it for NASA in the late 1950s to prevent food safety<br />

incidents <strong>on</strong> manned space flights. The technique identifies hazards, assesses their significance, and develops<br />

c<strong>on</strong>trol measures (treats the risk).<br />

Seven Principles<br />

1. C<strong>on</strong>duct a hazard analysis<br />

2. Determine the critical c<strong>on</strong>trol points (CCPs)<br />

3. Establish critical limits (CLs)<br />

4. Establish m<strong>on</strong>itoring procedures<br />

5. Establish corrective acti<strong>on</strong><br />

6. Establish verificati<strong>on</strong> plan<br />

7. Establish records and documented procedures


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

12 HACCP Applicati<strong>on</strong> Steps<br />

1. Assemble the HACCP team<br />

2. Describe the product<br />

3. Identify the intended use<br />

4. C<strong>on</strong>struct flow diagram<br />

5. On-site c<strong>on</strong>firmati<strong>on</strong> of flow diagram<br />

6. List all potential hazards<br />

- C<strong>on</strong>duct hazard analysis<br />

- C<strong>on</strong>sider c<strong>on</strong>trol measures<br />

7. Determine the CCPs<br />

8. Establish critical limits for each CCP<br />

9. Establish a m<strong>on</strong>itoring system for each CCP<br />

10. Establish corrective acti<strong>on</strong>s<br />

11. Establish verificati<strong>on</strong> procedures<br />

12. Establish documentati<strong>on</strong> and recordkeeping


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

HHA<br />

The purpose of Health Hazard Assessment (HHA) is to identify health hazards, evaluate proposed hazardous<br />

materials, and propose protective measures to reduce the associated risk to an acceptable level.<br />

• The first step of the HHA is to identify and determine quantities of potentially hazardous materials or<br />

physical agents (noise, radiati<strong>on</strong>, heat stress, cold stress) involved with the system and its logistical<br />

support.<br />

• The next step is to analyze how these materials or physical agents are used in the system and for its<br />

logistical support. Based <strong>on</strong> the use, quantity, and type of substance/agent, estimate where and how<br />

pers<strong>on</strong>nel exposures may occur and if possible the degree or frequency of exposure.<br />

• The final step includes incorporati<strong>on</strong> into the design of the system and its logistical support<br />

equipment/facilities, cost- effective c<strong>on</strong>trols to reduce exposures to acceptable levels.<br />

The life- cycle costs of required c<strong>on</strong>trols could be high, and c<strong>on</strong>siderati<strong>on</strong> of alternative systems may be<br />

appropriate. An HHA evaluates the hazards and costs due to system comp<strong>on</strong>ent materials, evaluates<br />

alternative materials, and recommends materials that reduce the associated risks and life- cycle costs.<br />

Materials are evaluated if (because of their physical, chemical, or biological characteristics; quantity; or<br />

c<strong>on</strong>centrati<strong>on</strong>s) they cause or c<strong>on</strong>tribute to adverse effects in organisms or offspring, pose a substantial<br />

present or future danger to the envir<strong>on</strong>ment, or result in damage to or loss of equipment or property during the<br />

system’s life cycle.


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

An HHA should include the evaluati<strong>on</strong> of the following:<br />

• Chemical hazards—Hazardous materials that are flammable, corrosive, toxic, carcinogens or suspected<br />

carcinogens, systemic pois<strong>on</strong>s, asphyxiants, or respiratory irritants<br />

• Physical hazards (e.g., noise, heat, cold, i<strong>on</strong>izing and n<strong>on</strong>- i<strong>on</strong>izing radiati<strong>on</strong>)<br />

• Biological hazards (e.g., bacteria, fungi)<br />

• Erg<strong>on</strong>omic hazards (e.g., lifting, task saturati<strong>on</strong>)<br />

• Other hazardous materials that may be introduced by the system during manufacture, operati<strong>on</strong>, or<br />

maintenance


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

The evaluati<strong>on</strong> is performed in the c<strong>on</strong>text of the following:<br />

• System, facility, and pers<strong>on</strong>al protective equipment requirements (e.g., ventilati<strong>on</strong>, noise attenuati<strong>on</strong>,<br />

radiati<strong>on</strong> barriers) to allow safe operati<strong>on</strong> and maintenance. When feasible engineering designs are not<br />

available to reduce hazards to acceptable levels, alternative protective measures must be specified (e.g.,<br />

protective clothing, operati<strong>on</strong> or maintenance procedures to reduce risk to an acceptable level).<br />

• Potential material substituti<strong>on</strong>s and projected disposal issues. The HHA discusses l<strong>on</strong>g- term effects such<br />

as the cost of using alternative materials over the life cycle or the capability and cost of disposing of a<br />

substance.<br />

• Hazardous material data. The HHA describes the means for identifying and tracking informati<strong>on</strong> for each<br />

hazardous material. Specific categories of health hazards and impacts that may be c<strong>on</strong>sidered are acute<br />

health, chr<strong>on</strong>ic health, cancer, c<strong>on</strong>tact, flammability, reactivity, and envir<strong>on</strong>ment.


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

The HHA’s hazardous materials evaluati<strong>on</strong> must include the following:<br />

• Identificati<strong>on</strong> of the hazardous materials by name(s) and stock numbers (or CAS numbers); the affected<br />

system comp<strong>on</strong>ents and processes; the quantities, characteristics, and c<strong>on</strong>centrati<strong>on</strong>s of the materials in<br />

the system; and source documents relating to the materials.<br />

• Determinati<strong>on</strong> of the c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s under which the hazardous materials can release or emit comp<strong>on</strong>ents in a<br />

form that may be inhaled, ingested, absorbed by living beings, or leached into the envir<strong>on</strong>ment.<br />

• Characterizati<strong>on</strong> of material hazards and determinati<strong>on</strong> of reference quantities and hazard ratings for<br />

system materials in questi<strong>on</strong>.<br />

• Estimati<strong>on</strong> of the expected usage rate of each hazardous material for each process or comp<strong>on</strong>ent for the<br />

system and program-wide impact.<br />

• Recommendati<strong>on</strong>s for the dispositi<strong>on</strong> of each hazardous material identified. If a reference quantity is<br />

exceeded by the estimated usage rate, material substituti<strong>on</strong> or altered processes may be c<strong>on</strong>sidered to<br />

reduce risks associated with the material hazards while evaluating the impact <strong>on</strong> program costs.


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

For each proposed and alternative material, the assessment must provide the following data for management<br />

review:<br />

• Material identificati<strong>on</strong>. Includes material identity, comm<strong>on</strong> or trade names, chemical name, chemical<br />

abstract service (CAS) number, nati<strong>on</strong>al stock number (NSN), local stock number, physical state, and<br />

manufacturers and suppliers.<br />

• Material use and quantity. Includes comp<strong>on</strong>ent name, descripti<strong>on</strong>, operati<strong>on</strong>s details, total system and life<br />

cycle quantities to be used, and c<strong>on</strong>centrati<strong>on</strong>s of any mixtures.<br />

• Hazard identificati<strong>on</strong>. Identifies the adverse effects of the material <strong>on</strong> pers<strong>on</strong>nel, the system, envir<strong>on</strong>ment,<br />

or facilities.<br />

• Toxicity assessment. Describes expected frequency, durati<strong>on</strong>, and amount of exposure. References for the<br />

assessment must be provided.<br />

• Risk calculati<strong>on</strong>s. Includes classificati<strong>on</strong> of severity and probability of occurrence, acceptable levels of risk,<br />

any missing informati<strong>on</strong>, and discussi<strong>on</strong>s of uncertainties in the data or calculati<strong>on</strong>s.


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

<strong>Part</strong> VH<br />

For work performed under c<strong>on</strong>tract, details to be specified in the SOW (statement of work) include:<br />

• Minimum risk severity and probability reporting thresholds<br />

• Any selected hazards, hazardous areas, hazardous materials or other specific items to be examined or<br />

excluded<br />

• Specificati<strong>on</strong> of desired analysis techniques and/or report formats


Appendixes<br />

________________________________________________<br />

Appendix A <strong>ASQ</strong> Code of Ethics<br />

Appendix B Notes <strong>on</strong> Compliance, C<strong>on</strong>formance, and C<strong>on</strong>formity<br />

Appendix C Example Guide for Technical Specialists<br />

Appendix D The Institute of Internal Auditors Code of Ethics<br />

Appendix E History of Quality Assurance and Auditing<br />

Appendix F Certified Quality Auditor Body of Knowledge<br />

Appendix G Example Audit Program Schedule<br />

Appendix H Example Third- <strong>Part</strong>y Audit Organizati<strong>on</strong> Forms<br />

Appendix I Example Audit Reports<br />

Appendix J Product Line Audit Flowchart<br />

Appendix K First, Sec<strong>on</strong>d, and Third Editi<strong>on</strong> C<strong>on</strong>tributors and Reviewers<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang


Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang<br />

Charlie Ch<strong>on</strong>g/ Fi<strong>on</strong> Zhang

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